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Abstract 
 
This dissertation develops a theory of film noir as sovereign-image, a meta-generic and 
meta-cinematic discourse that confronts the viewer with the biopolitical ambivalence of the 
cinematic apparatus but enjoins her to nonetheless affirm its normative use. I argue that classical 
American noir deploys a proto-neoliberal ideology to turn the indeterminacy at its core into a 
spectacle of victimized white men, offering emphatically gendered and racialized images of a 
pathological “entrepreneur of the self” who is not ashamed to exhibit his wounded private life as 
the source of his singular market value. I claim, however, that even in his fully developed 
contemporary form in which his classical predecessor’s trauma induced shamelessness turns into 
a cynically calculated affective display, noir’s neoliberal hero is not the self-made man he 
appears to be but remains delegated by a homosocial group to be the sovereign arbiter of their 
life’s value for them, instead of them. As an individual who—not unlike the film viewer—is 
temporarily isolated from his peers he is in the exceptional position to freely decide what kind of 
life to consider productive for the process of capital accumulation, turning his body into the 
arbitrary link between what Agamben calls bare life and a qualified form of life—a link I call the 
sovereign-image. I track the evolution of film noir’s sovereign function alongside the expansion 
and transformation of the United States from a territorialized nation state to a deterritorialized 
global financial network (what Hardt and Negri call Empire) to shed light on how Hollywood’s 
anomalous noir crisis, its war trauma induced state of exception, became the expression of the 
governing paradigm of unbridled global biocapitalism in the age of North Atlantic unilateralism. 
In contemporary neo-noirs like The Usual Suspects (1995), Trainspotting (1996), Inception 
(2010), Fight Club (1999), or Drive (2011) becoming a self-made neoliberal subject coincides 
with gaining membership in a hybrid and flexible white male bios, the old-new flesh of Empire 
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now cynically framed as the condition of possibility for autonomous selfhood as such. In 
critiquing neo-noir’s cynical paradigm I demonstrate that its reactionary force can be mobilized 
only if the films first construct a biopolitical zone of indistinction where the inevitability of the 
western capitalo-patriarchal status quo is questioned and the equality of all forms of life is 
posited.
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Towards a Film Noir Theory of Neoliberal Cynicism 
We're talking about an ideology marked by the selling off of public goods to private 
interests; the attack on social provisions; the rise of the corporate state organized around 
privatization, free trade, and deregulation; the celebration of self-interests over social 
needs; the celebration of profit-making as the essence of democracy coupled with the 
utterly reductionist notion that consumption is the only applicable form of citizenship. 
But even more than that, it upholds the notion that the market serves as a model for 
structuring all social relations: not just the economy, but the governing of all of social 
life. – Henry Giroux on neoliberalism1 
 
In neo-liberalism [...] homo oeconomicus is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself. 
– Michel Foucault2 
 
[As a cynic] one catches a glimpse of oneself in individual “games” which are destitute 
of all seriousness and obviousness, having become nothing more than a place for 
immediate self-affirmation—a self-affirmation which is all the more brutal and arrogant, 
in short, cynical, the more it draws upon, without illusions but with perfect momentary 
                                                 
1 Henry Giroux, “Henry Giroux on the Rise of Neoliberalism,” interview by Michael Nevradakis Truthout, October 
19, 2014, accessed December 10, 2016, http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/26885-henry-giroux-on-the-rise-of-
neoliberalism.  
2 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France (1978-79), trans. M. Senellart (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 226. 
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allegiance, those same rules which characterize conventionality and mutability. – Paolo 
Virno3 
 
In film noir privacy establishes itself as the rule, not as a clandestine exception. – Joan 
Copjec4 
 
At the end of Bryan Singer’s neo-noir mind game film The Usual Suspects (1995) 
Verbal, the limping, stuttering small time crook narrating the story from police custody is 
revealed to be the legendary criminal mastermind Keyser Söze, the man, allegedly, behind a 
series of high stakes robberies and drug deals whom the FBI had been unable to even identify. 
After the authorities cluelessly release him, his disabilities turn out to be faked, and the name 
Söze nothing but an empty signifier he had made up to manipulate his colleagues and enemies 
much the same way the viewer had been deceived by such a post-classical narrative device. As J. 
P. Telotte observes, Verbal therefore remains “unknowable, at least in the manner of classical 
narrative: as a figure who is marked by easily observable traits, whose motivations are readily 
understood, and who sets the plot in motion along a straight line.”5 By consciously going against 
expectations about character and narrative form (deploying, for instance, an unreliable flashback 
sequence), the film makes the viewer reflect on classical Hollywood conventions as nothing but 
contingent linguistic constructs.6 The nonlinear narration becomes the carefully calculated 
                                                 
3 Paolo Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life, trans. I. Bertoletti et 
al. (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004), 87. 
4 Joan Copjec, “The Phenomenal Nonphenomenal: Private Space in Film Noir,“ in Shades of Noir: A Reader, ed. 
Joan Copjec (New York: Verso, 1993), 183. 
5 On The Usual Suspects’ post-classical narration see J. P. Telotte, “Rounding up ‘The Usual Suspects’: The 
Comforts of Character and Neo-Noir,” Film Quarterly 51, no. 4 (1998): 17. 
6 Ibid., 19. 
3 
 
unfolding of the hero’s and indeed the film’s fabricated persona, a code mobilized to eliminate 
characters with a traditional (realistic) psychology in the diegesis to preserve the myth of Söze, 
and compete with conventional Hollywood products on the extra-diegetic marketplace.  
On the one hand, through his narrative self-mobilization, Verbal becomes a neoliberal 
homo oeconomicus in the Foucauldian sense, an “entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his 
own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings.”7 
At the same time he also represents the obscene underside of such neoliberal selfhood: the noir 
subject thrown into a Hobbesian world where capitalist competition, rather than being a liberal 
platform of meritocratic self-affirmation, becomes a struggle for life and death. Yet, he 
emphatically lacks the existential malaise of the classical noir characters who, as Foster Hirsch 
notes, “have no place of refuge in [noir’s] cruel naturalistic world, this life-as-a-jungle setting. 
Alone and unprotected, they are truly strangers, to themselves as well as to others. The world is 
littered with pitfalls against which the individual has, at the most, meager defenses.”8 Verbal, by 
contrast, is a successful self-made man whose refusal to depend on others makes him stronger 
rather than more vulnerable: he triumphs by cutting his homosocial ties with his fellow gangsters 
working with him, and a flashback even shows him (as Keyser Söze) killing his own wife and 
children to avoid being cornered when they are taken hostage. He stands for the neoliberal 
fantasy of a fully autonomous subject always in control, self-programmed into a winning 
algorithm. 
With its fetishization of the self-sufficient entrepreneur, The Usual Suspects is 
symptomatic of what Laurent Berlant calls the contemporary “waning of genre,” the increasing 
                                                 
7 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 226. 
8 Foster Hirsch. The Dark Side of the Screen: Film Noir (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2008), 4. 
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difficulty to imagine shared fictions of “good life” under neoliberalism.9 It is the homosocial 
script of the gangster genre (men cooperating to break the law) that reaches a crisis in the film, 
collapsing into a noir story of an isolated individual whose very voice-over is a genre destroying 
weapon (weaving the fable about Söze killing off one by one the team of hard-boiled criminals 
he hired). Contrary to classical noir, where, as I will argue, the male protagonist’s increasing 
isolation from his patriarchal peers is death driven, The Usual Suspects presents it as a strategy 
that yields profit. In Giorgio Agamben’s biopolitical terminology, the film glorifies the 
separation of the noir subject’s bare life (zoe) from the (generic) life of his masculine community 
(bios).10 Or, insofar as we understand, with Althusser, ideology as the “imaginary relationship of 
individuals to their real conditions of existence,”11 the film is a product of today’s so called post-
ideological age where subjects, supposedly, can directly connect to the world market, without the 
mediation of now outdated imagined communities like nation, family, or brotherhood. This is the 
epoch announced by theorists like Frances Fukuyama who saw in the fall of the Soviet Union 
and the triumph of global capitalism the end of history as we know it and the beginning of a 
universal free market utopia.12 As Michel Foucault suggests, neoliberal governmentality 
accumulates human capital by activating an “abilities-machine” made up of qualities like 
mobility, flexibility, innovation, and the capacity to choose that are attributed to individuals 
rather than particular social groups.13 Along these lines one could argue that The Usual Suspects 
is a post-patriarchal film: by revealing the nonexistence of the hyperphallic gangster boss Söze, 
                                                 
9 Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 6. 
10 See Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. D. Heller-Roazen. (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998) 
11 Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. B. Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1971), 162. 
12 See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); for a theory of 
postmodern condition as the end of ideological meta-narratives, see Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern 
Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. G. Bennington and B. Massumi (Minneapolis: Minnesota University 
Press, 1984) 
13 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 226-33. 
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masculinity itself is exposed as a hollow shell—or as Judith Butler would say: a performance 
with no essential core at its center—and the protagonist’s market value is attributed not to his 
manliness but to his entrepreneurial abilities as an individual.14 For Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri, this is how Empire, the global, deterritorialized regime of post-Fordist capitalism 
functions: instead of prescribing a particular group identity for the productive subject through 
disciplinary measures like Fordism did, Empire exploits the creative potential of human life as 
such, even in its forms that were previously considered useless and unproductive like Verbal’s 
disabilities. Now, they contend, “the construction of value takes place beyond measure,” 
“determined only by humanity’s own continuous innovation and creation.”15  
Upon closer look at the film’s biopolitics, however, its post-ideological facade quickly 
dissipates. After his release from police custody, Verbal drops his faked limp and stutter he 
performed to remain invisible among hardened criminals and lawmen flaunting their machismo, 
and he is driven away in his Jaguar by his (white male) chauffeur/lawyer as an able bodied white 
man of the American bourgeoisie. He strategically wears the mask of a social abject not to 
subvert the norm of white heterosexual masculinity but to make it more flexible, hybrid, and all 
encompassing; deploying it against its former, more rigid and limited manifestations in the kind 
of postmodern ruse of patriarchal power critiqued by gender theorists such as Demetrakis Z. 
Demetriou,16 David Savran,17 Fintan Walsh,18 or Claire Sisco King.19 This synthesis between 
hegemonic and abject is perfectly captured in the protagonist’s (fake) German-Turkish 
                                                 
14 See Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990) 
15 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univesity Press, 2001), 356. 
16 Demetrakis Z. Demetriou, “Connell's Concept of Hegemonic Masculinity: A Critique,” Theory and Society 30, 
no. 3 (2001): 337-61. 
17 David Savran, Taking it Like a Man: White Masculinity, Masochism, and Contemporary American Culture 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) 
18 Fintan Walsh, Male Trouble: Masculinity and the Performance of Crisis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) 
19 Claire Sisco King, “It Cuts Both Ways: Fight Club, Masculinity, and Abject Hegemony,” Communication and 
Critical/Cultural Studies 6, no. 4 (2009): 366-85. 
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hyphenated identity: while in flashbacks he is depicted as a dark skinned, long haired gypsy from 
the Balkans (a romanticized nomadic subject in the south-eastern border zone of Europe), he has 
a western name, Kaiser being German for emperor. He is an “abject hegemonic”20 subject of a 
neoliberal Empire that, despite its openness to the productive potential of multiple forms of life, 
hasn’t given up its allegiance with white male biopower as their hidden anchoring point. At the 
core of The Usual Suspects’ clever puzzle narrative is therefore a biopolitically motivated pathos 
of what Mark Fisher called capitalist realism, the resigned conviction that the current global 
capitalist status quo has no outside and no alternatives, that all counter-hegemonic and minority 
positions are coopted by it in advance.21  
After Peter Sloterdijk I will use the term cynicism to describe this contemporary post-
ideological state of mind exemplified by Verbal in Singer’s film; an “enlightened false 
consciousness” that puts on counter-hegemonic ideological masks without believing in them 
while driven by the inertia of the (bio)political status quo (the bios of western white patriarchy), 
forming a productive body that is completely flexibile yet utterly rigid. Cynics, Sloterdijk argues, 
“know what they are doing, but they do it because, in the short run, the force of circumstances 
and the instinct for self-preservation are speaking the same language, and they are telling them 
that it has to be so. Others would do it anyway, perhaps worse.”22 For Paolo Virno the cynic 
emerges after the decline of the modern social contract based on the principle of equality, and as 
such, he is the neoliberal subject par excellence who “renounces from the beginning the search 
for an intersubjective foundation for his practice and for a shared criterion of moral value” and 
                                                 
20 See King, Abject Hegemony 
21 Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? (Hants: Zero Books, 2009) 
22 Peter Sloterdijk, The Critique of Cynical Reason, trans. M. Eldred (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1987), 5. 
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considers social codes to be games of self-affirmation.23 He is both an opportunist and, as 
Sloterdijk notes, a “borderline melancholic” “who can keep [his] symptoms of depression under 
control and can remain more or less able to work.” “Indeed,” he continues, “this is the essential 
point in modern cynicism: the ability of its bearers to work—in spite of anything that might 
happen, and especially, after anything that might happen.”24 Slavoj Žižek similarly emphasizes 
the practical dimension of cynicism, which he considers an ideology of the so called post-
ideological age. 
The fundamental level of ideology [...] is not that of an illusion masking the real state of 
things but that of an (unconscious) fantasy structuring our social reality itself. And at this 
level, we are of course far from being a post-ideological society. Cynical distance is just 
one way - one of many ways - to blind ourselves to the structuring power of ideological 
fantasy: even if we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an ironical distance, we 
are still doing them.25 
In fact, he maintains, such blindness is a necessary condition of our libidinal cathexis to, our 
enjoyment of ideology.26 In other words, not only is the seemingly self-enclosed cynic a socially 
mediated identity position, but hiding one’s ideological enjoyment under cynical roleplaying 
may actually be a more efficient way of preserving the biopolitical status quo than classical 
ideological indoctrination and discipline. In The Usual Suspects, the fundamental fantasy offered 
to the viewer for enjoyment underneath the multitude of Verbal’s cynically changing masks is 
                                                 
23 Paolo Virno, “The Ambivalence of Disenchantment,” in Radical Thought in Italy, ed. P. Virno and M. Hardt 
(Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1996), 23. 
24 Sloterdijk, Cynical Reason, 5. 
25 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (Verso: New York, 2008), 30., emphasis in the original 
26 “[E]njoyment, in its stupidity, is possible only on the basis of certain non-knowledge, ignorance.” Ibid., 73. 
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the persistence of white masculinity as a kind of zero-institution, a condition of possibility for 
neoliberal entrepreneurship.27  
It is no coincidence that The Usual Suspects uses film noir tropes (voice-over confession, 
non-linear narration, homme fatale, deception and betrayal, murder as an existentialist act, etc.) 
to reflect on the transformation of Hollywood cinema in the age of neoliberal cynicism. Film noir 
is the Hollywood discourse of the self-enclosed, isolated modern subject par excellence, a meta-
genre emerging out of the crisis of traditional generic communities—except that in its classical 
form such crisis was framed as a failure rather than an opportunity. I will argue that film noir has 
already been proto-neoliberal in its classical stage, but only in the era of unchallenged global 
capitalism could it realize its full cynical potential, freeing itself from the censorship of the 
Production Code and the early postmodern a nostalgia for it that anchored the viewer’s desire in 
an imagined national community of the past. The central claim of this dissertation is therefore 
that cynicism, neoliberalism, and film noir are interconnected; indeed it aims to develop what 
could be called a film noir theory of neoliberal cynicism, mapping the emergence and history of 
noir’s “self-made” sovereign subject in Hollywood cinema and its seamless knot with the 
patriarchal ideological fantasies supporting it. In critiquing its cynicism, I will consider film noir 
not only as a meta-generic but also as a meta-cinematic phenomenon that reflects not just on the 
crisis of generic communities but points also to a radical indeterminacy at the core of the 
cinematic apparatus itself that needs to be disavowed to suture the viewer into the culture 
industry’s biopolitical hegemony.  
                                                 
27 The term zero-institution comes from Claude Levi-Strauss, for whom, as Žižek explains, it is an “empty signifier 
with no determinate meaning, since it signifies only the presence of meaning as such in opposition to its absence: a 
specific institution that has no positive, determinate content.” Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Žižek, 
Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Discourses on the Left (New York: Verso, 2000), 113. By 
contrast, I argue that zero-institutions are never neutral biopolitically.  
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1.2 Reconsidering Apparatus Theory 
In reading film noir as the suture of the cinematic apparatus I will rely on Lacanian film 
theory while also expanding on it, taking into account the challenge of neoliberal cynicism. To 
understand the shortcomings of contemporary psychoanalytic approaches to the cinema, it’s 
important to track the trajectory of Lacan’s integration into the field. When two of his influential 
concepts, the suture and the imaginary first appear in French film theory in the late 1960s 
through the mediation of Jacques-Alain Miller and Louis Althusser,28 they are read through the 
lens of structuralism understanding languages as self-contained systems structured by binary 
oppositions. On the one hand, suture theorists such as Jean-Pierre Oudart or Stephen Heath are 
interested in explaining how films can construct a meaningful signifying chain by including the 
point of view of the spectator in a continuous sequence of shots and reverse shots, where her 
perspective, that of the “Absent One,” can temporarily totalize the diegetic space at a certain 
point of the narrative from the outside, only to be revealed later in an objective shot as 
someone’s intra-diegetic point of view.29 Suture names this retroactive moment of signification 
whereby the place of the spectator-subject as the absent cause of the film’s symbolic structure 
gains a positive representation (enters the picture), leading to the deferral of the lack she stood 
for to a different spatiotemporal location, thus serving the development of the narrative. If the 
theory of the suture gives an account of the film viewer’s look as a device of subjectification 
(subject formation), the theory of the apparatus goes a step further and maps her subjection to the 
ruling ideologies entrapping her gaze through the machinery of the cinema: she is lured into 
                                                 
28 Jean-Pierre Oudart, “Cinema and Suture,” trans. Kari Hanet, Screen 18 (1977/78): 35-47.; Jean-Louis Baudry, 
“The Apparatus,” Camera Obscura 1, no. 1 (1976): 104-26.; Jacques-Alain Miller, “Suture: Elements of the Logic 
of the Signifier,” Screen 18, no. 4 (Winter 1977-78): 24-34.; Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses,” in Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. B. Brewster (New York, Monthly 
Review Press, 1971), 127-89. 
29 See Oudart, “Cinema and Suture”; and Stephen Heath, “Narrative Space,” Screen 17, no. 3 (1976): 68-112.; 
Stephen Heath, “Notes on Suture,” Screen 23, no. 4 (1977-78): 48-76. 
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taking the images on the screen for reality, regressing into an infantile state of narcissism like the 
slaves in Plato’s allegorical cave of illusions.30 This Althusserian concept of the imaginary as a 
site of self-alienation and ideological misrecognition is heavily influenced by Lacan’s 1949 essay 
on the mirror stage where he discusses how the infant’s ego is constituted through her imaginary 
identification with an idealized mirror image. Unlike Althusser, however, Baudry ignores 
Lacan’s seminars from the early 60s (especially Seminar IX from 1961-62) where he develops 
how this imaginary ideal ego is offered by the child as an answer to the enigma of the (m)Other’s 
desire which she misrecognizes as a demand for a complete image that lacks nothing—that lacks 
lack itself, negating the void in the symbolic order where Lacan locates the subject.31 In 
Baudry’s version of the apparatus, instead of this tripartite structure we find the (rather 
inconsistent)32 duality of a powerful transcendental subject distanced (erased) from the cinematic 
spectacle on the one hand,33 and an ego that is imprisoned in an ideological dream on the other.34 
What is missing from this framework is the Lacanian gaze of the (m)Other (or its equivalent in 
the Althusserian policeman’s interpellation)35 as the external cause of the subject’s split, the gaze 
that in the later Lacan’s post-structuralist theory becomes objet a, the real-impossbile object-
cause of desire which cannot be assumed by the subject. This is the gaze that Lacan in his 
Seminar XI identifies as the “source of light” “photo-graphing” the subject from behind what he 
calls the screen, the mediator between the gaze as the Other’s desire and the eye that belongs to 
                                                 
30 Jean-Louis Baudry, “Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus,” Film Quarterly 28, no. 2 
(1974): 39-47. 
31 Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience,” in 
Jacques Lacan, Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2006), 75-82; Jacques Lacan, 
Identification. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book IX (1961-1962), trans. C. Gallagher (unpublished), accessed 
December 19, 2016, http://www.lacaninireland.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Seminar-IX-Amended-Iby-
MCL-7.NOV_.20111.pdf.  
32 See Kaja Silverman’s critique of Baudry in Kaja Silverman, The Threshold of the Visible World (New York: 
Routledge, 1996), 127. 
33 Baudry, “Ideological Effects,” 39-47. 
34 Baudry, “The Apparatus,” 104-26. 
35 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” 174. 
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the ego (“the subject of representation,” see Figure 1.).36 This aspect of the gaze is ignored by 
early suture theory as well, insofar as the Absent One only accounts for one of cinema’s two 
extradiegetic gazes. 
 
Figure 1. 
 
Although both equally avoid the dimension of the real, the two early attempts to integrate 
Lacan into film theory avoid it in opposite directions. While suture theory focuses on how a 
film’s intradiegetic gazes are synthetized with the spectator’s/the camera’s extradiegetic 
perspective into a master signifier that, as its constitutive exception, helps the meaningful totality 
of a symbolic order to emerge, Baudry’s early apparatus theory takes cinema to be a machine of 
the imaginary where the binary conflict between the gaze of the transcendental ego and that of 
his imaginary other is never sublated into a higher unity. It is Christian Metz who reads suture 
theory’s focus on the symbolic and Baudry’s somewhat paranoid vision of the imaginary37 
together when he insists that while the cinematic situation resembles the child’s entrapment in 
the mirror stage, unlike the perfect image of the ideal ego in the mirror, the “imaginary” of film 
                                                 
36Jacques Lacan, “Of the Gaze as Objet Petit a,” in Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 
1981), 106. 
37 See Joan Copjec, “The Anxiety of the Influencing Machine,” October 23 (Winter, 1982): 43-59.; Constance 
Penley, “Feminism, Film Theory and the Bachelor Machines,” in Constance Penley, The Future of an Illusion: Film, 
Feminism, and Psychoanalysis (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1989), 57-83.  
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does in fact rely on its viewer’s ability to realize its inherently lacking nature, which means that 
the “second mirror of the screen” is always already a “symbolic apparatus.”38 Metz demonstrates 
this through his theory of fetishism that introduces, borrowing the concept from Octave 
Mannoni,39 a third term mediating between the viewer’s gaze and the her perfect mirror image 
looking back at her from the screen: that of the naïve observer. It is the symbolic fiction of the 
Other as an idiot who, supposedly, takes the images on the screen for reality that alleviates the 
anxiety of the subject’s imaginary struggle for completeness and allows her the fetishistic play 
with the medium through a dialectic of identification and disidentification, belief and knowledge, 
avowal and disavowal.40 Or, to put it differently, this is what allows the viewer to identify with 
the camera without being swallowed up by its machinery. A similar (symbolic) reading of 
Baudry’s theory is offered by Jean-Louis Comolli, for whom the naïve, ideal observer becomes 
the camera itself with which the viewer willingly identifies despite her awareness of the discord 
between actual and ideal. She wants to be fooled and oscillate between the position of distance 
and immersion because her playful complicity with the ideological spectacle is the very source of 
her pleasure.41 
If Metz’s intervention attested to the symbolic nature of what seemed to be imaginary in 
the cinematic apparatus, Laura Mulvey’s influential 1975 article argues the opposite, developing 
what could be called an imaginary theory of suture, ignoring the structural role that the naïve 
observer plays in the apparatus of the cinema. For her, since a patriarchal ideology of sexual 
difference dominates Hollywood films, the main motor of their narrative is not simply the 
                                                 
38 Christian Metz, Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The Imaginary Signifier, trans. Celia Britton et al. (London: 
MacMillan Press, 1982), 57. 
39 Octave Mannoni. “I Know Very Well, but All the Same…,” in Perversion and the Social Relation, ed. M. A. 
Rothenberg et al. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 68-93. 
40 Metz, Psychoanalysis and Cinema, 72-76. 
41 Jean-Louis Comolli, “Machines of the Visible,” in The Cinematic Apparatus, ed. T. De Lauretis and S. Heath 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980), 139. 
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integration of diegetic absence into the continuous signifying chain but a more fundamental 
operation that projects lack onto the female other who poses a threat of castration to the male 
spectator. This way Mulvey, drawing heavily on Baudry, turns around the Lacanian formula of 
the mirror by placing lack on the screen (locating it in representations of “passive” women) 
while identifying the masculine viewer’s transcendental “active look” with the place of power 
that voyeuristically investigates the feminine deviations from the phallic norm from a 
comfortable distance. For her, cinema’s ideal viewer is not the Lacanian subject as pure void but 
the socially constructed masculine ego looking for his own powerful double on the screen to 
identify with in representations where the active male look dominates women passively 
exhibiting themselves “to be looked at.”42 As Joan Copjec notes more than a decade later, such 
concept of the gaze has more to do with the Foucauldian notion of the panopticon as a 
disciplinary mechanism, which ignores the fundamental Lacanian insight about the gaze being 
ultimately impotent, blind.43 Mulvey only hints at this possibility in her discussion of cases like 
Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1958) where the threat of femininity comes too close to the diegetic 
voyeur, to which he reacts with the fetishistic disavowal of feminine sexual difference by 
elevating a frozen image of the powerful woman as a shield against the threat of castration.44 It is 
Gaylyn Studlar who explores Mulveys imaginary theory fetishism to its logical conclusion by 
claiming that fetishistic scopophilia is not a defense mechanism against castration anxiety but a 
properly non-phallic form of pleasure that the subject experiences masochistically, as the 
                                                 
42 Laura Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” in Media and Cultural Studies Key Works, ed. M. G. 
Durham and D. M. Kellner (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 342-53. 
43 Joan Copjec, “The Orthopsychic Subject: Film Theory and the Reception of Lacan,” October 49 (Summer, 1989): 
53-71.; Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1995), 195-231. 
44 Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure, 348 
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immobile cinema viewer exposed to the forces of the spectacle looking back at her.45 In Studlar’s 
Deleuzian reading the subject of the cinema is not the sadistic male voyeur but a pre-Oedipal 
masochist who enjoys being powerless in front of the gaze of the (m)Other. In the end, the 
problem with Studlar is the same as with Mulvey; they both oversimplify an already reductionist 
model of the apparatus by trying to uncover the founding gaze of the cinema, ultimately siding 
with one of Baudry’s apparatus essays against the other, thus eliminating the productive tension 
between them that could reveal how they are always already mediated by a third (symbolic) 
term.46 
By contrast, a more Metzian route in feminist psychoanalytic film theory is taken by 
Mary-Ann Doane who argues that patriarchal ideology positions the feminine spectator as the 
naïve observer who, unlike the masculine voyeur, is unable to create a distance between herself 
and the screen which leads to her “over-identification with the image.”47 In the Mulveyian 
(imaginary) framework, Doane suggests, women’s only alternative to passive femininity is to 
assume the position of the masculine voyeur through “transvestitism.”48 There is, however, a 
third (symbolic) option, that of masquerade, which allows the feminine spectator to play with her 
phallic distance from the image.49 What Doane’s move effectively amounts to is a 
democratization of the Metzian fetishist’s position, which, in an unfortunate turn, creates the now 
“neutral” figure of the naïve observer as its ultimate disavowed ideological support. It is 
tempting to read this as a shift away from the sharp political antagonisms of Mulvey’s second 
wave feminism towards the less confrontative multiculturalism of postfeminist identity politics, 
                                                 
45 Gaylyn Studlar, “Masochism and the Perverse Pleasures of the Cinema,” Quarterly Review of Film Studies, 9, no. 
4 (1984): 267-82. 
46 Mulvey clearly prefers the Ideological Effects essay while Studlar draws from The Apparatus. 
47 Mary-Ann Doane, “Film and Masquerade: Theorizing the Female Spectator,” Screen 23, no.3-4 (1982): 80. 
48 Laura Mulvey, “Afterthoughts on 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema' inspired by Duel in the Sun,” in 
Psychoanalysis and Cinema, ed. E. A. Kaplan (New York: Routledge, 1990), 24-35. 
49 Doane, “Film and Masquerade,” 82. 
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theorizing different viewers’ active negotiation of and participation in cinematic fantasies.50 
Within this framework, one of the most rigorous analyses of the Lacanian gaze as a symbolic 
apparatus is offered by Kaja Silverman who tackles the often ignored paradoxes of Lacan’s 
Seminar XI, the gaze as objet petit a, positioned on the opposite extradiegetic side of screen as 
the viewer’s transcendental look. In a simplification of the Lacanian model, however, Silverman 
reduces the Other’s gaze to that of the camera as an apparatus providing socially constructed 
fictions for the spectator by “photo-graphing” her through a screen of cultural mediations.51  
What Silverman ignores, according to Copjec, is Lacan’s insistence on the purely 
fantasmatic status of the Other’s gaze, the fact that its place cannot be occupied by any 
determinate look, for which reason the subject’s encounter with it always remains a failed one.52 
To put it differently, the Lacanian big Other doesn’t exist: the object of its desire (of the subject’s 
desire mediated by the symbolic order) is not some culturally specific representation on the 
screen but the subject herself as void, as a real-impossible kernel the concealment of which is the 
condition of possibility for any field of representation to emerge. Lacan’s point, however, is not 
that the real gaze can never be represented; he claims, on the contrary, that this gaze as objet a, 
as the fantasmatic objectal stand-in for the subject, has to be inscribed into the “picture” as its 
stain, as its structurally necessary point of symptomal torsion. This picture, which for Lacan 
refers to the fantasmatic mise-en-scene organizing the Other’s desire for the subject, disintegrates 
the moment its stain becomes fully distinguishable.53 In film theory the first to take into account 
                                                 
50 For an illustration of the identity political turn in spectatorship theory see Judith Mayne, “Paradoxes of 
Spectatorship,” in Viewing Positions: Ways of Seeing Film, ed. L. Williams (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers 
University Press, 1995), 155-183., and Elizabeth Cowie, Representing the Woman: Cinema and Psychoanalysis 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 123-66. 
51 Silverman, The Threshold of the Visible World, 195-229. 
52 Joan Copjec, Imagine There’s No Woman: Ethics and Sublimation (Cambridge, MA: MIT University Press, 
2002), 209. 
53 Lacan, “Of the Gaze as Objet Petit a,” 85-89. 
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this real dimension of the Lacanian gaze was Jacqueline Rose who used it to dismantle the doxa 
about the voyeur’s control over his object.54 But it took the intervention of two Slovenian 
philosophers, Joan Copjec and Slavoj Žižek, to change psychoanalytic film theory’s 
preoccupation with the imaginary and the symbolic towards the direction of the real. Although 
their theories are not incompatible, they nonetheless emphasize different consequences of 
Lacan’s Seminar XI. Copjec elaborates on Lacan’s claim that the gaze of the big Other is blind in 
order to explore the affect of shame, defining it as the paradoxical experience of one’s visibility 
accompanied by the awareness that “there is no external Other who sees.”55 A similar theoretical 
direction is taken by Hugh Manon in his discussion of the subject’s anxiety ridden exposure to a 
nonexistent gaze in Michael Haneke’s Caché.56 On the other hand, Žižek is interested in how the 
real gaze enters the frame of the screen in the form of a stain that distorts it, as in the famous 
scene from Hitchcock’s The Birds (1963) where the animals all of a sudden materialize from 
behind of a God’s view shot of Bodega Bay.57  
The most systematic exploration to date of the sublime disruptions of the object gaze in 
cinema is offered in Todd McGowan’s The Real Gaze: Film Theory after Lacan, which, 
however, risks the fetishization of cinema’s non-signifying real as a source of post-ideological 
cinephilia, not unlike some contemporary approaches to film phenomenology and/or Deleuzian 
film philosophy.58 Critiquing classical apparatus theory he claims that “[t]he gaze triggers the 
subject’s desire because it appears to hold the key not to the subject’s achievement of self-
                                                 
54 Jacqueline Rose, Sexuality in the Field of Vision (New York: Verso, 1986), 194. 
55 Copjec, Imagine There’s No Woman, 127. 
56 Hugh S. Manon,  “Comment ça, rien?: Screening the Gaze in Caché,” in On Michael Haneke, ed. B. Price and J. 
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completion or wholeness but to the disappearance of self in the experience of enjoyment.”59 
Accordingly, he proposes that “psychoanalytic film theory should pave the way to a more intense 
submission to the dictates of this experience in order to facilitate an encounter with the gaze.”60 
By contrast, Fabio Vighi warns against the temptation of theorizing the Lacanian real as the 
alternative to symbolic closure and ideological meaning: “the crucial psychoanalytic insight 
resides in the [...] operation of bringing the Real at the level of suture, showing that the Real is 
operative precisely in the field from which it is supposedly excluded.”61 In his attempt to move 
away from psychoanalytic film theory’s preoccupation with the Althusserian imaginary, what 
McGowan, contrary to Vighi, ignores is Žižek’s insight about the ideological function of (“post-
ideological”) enjoyment, how the real as objet petit a can serve as “the sublime object of 
ideology.”62 The Usual Suspects is a case in point insofar as its finale delivers the viewer an 
encounter with the real gaze in the precise Lacanian sense. We learn that Verbal randomly used 
signifiers from his interrogator’s office—e.g. newspaper clippings attached to the wall in front of 
him or the brand name displayed at the bottom of his coffee mug—to embellish his fake Keyser 
Söze narrative. Throughout the film, these elements worked as stains on his web of deception; 
they had to remain invisible in order for the detective and the viewer to buy the story about Söze. 
The point, however, is that even though we, along with the policeman, discover their real 
function after Verbal’s release, not only does this not hurt the protagonist’s (and the film’s) 
scheme, it is in fact a necessary condition for his fetishization as a white male criminal 
                                                 
59 Todd McGowan, The Real Gaze: Film Theory After Lacan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 
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60 Ibid., 14. 
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mastermind. To put it differently, what cynical neo-noirs like The Usual Suspects confront us 
with is that classical psychoanalytic film theory’s structuralist notion that the cinematic apparatus 
is a “bachelor machine”63 rigged to reproduce patriarchal ideology may have been abandoned a 
little too hastily in the 90s, and the novel approach that bypasses old forms of ideology critique 
through the post-structuralist register of the real eventually has to face “die ganze alte Scheiße,” 
the same old ideological problems as its predecessors.64 
The question is then how to develop an apparatus theory that doesn’t assume that the 
viewer’s encounter with the real gaze, disruptive though it may be of a film’s symbolic order, is 
somehow inherently progressive politically (or even worse: entirely apolitical), while it also 
doesn’t regress into what Copjec called the paranoid theory of the cinema as an “influencing 
machine,”65 an ideological apparatus hermetically sealed by the unsuspecting viewer 
manipulated into submission. I suggest doing this by turning to the late Lacan’s concept of 
sexual difference, which until now has been remarkably ignored by psychoanalytic theories of 
the cinematic apparatus.66 The novelty of his approach in Seminar XX is that,67 contrary to his 
own earlier work,68 he considers femininity not as the unrepresentable, real excess of the social 
symbolic order, the stand-in for objet a as the object-cause of masculine desire, but as an 
alternative form of totalizing the symbolic without isolating and separating the sublime object of 
                                                 
63 See Penley, Bachelor Machines 
64 The expression comes from Marx, and its literal translation would be “all the old crap,” by which Marx refers to 
the pre-French revolutionary ancien regime. In Marxist theory the term is used to discredit liberal ideologies of post-
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the real. While the masculine order of language, he argues, reaches illusory completeness insofar 
as one exceptional element (objet a) is excluded (primordially repressed) from it, in its feminine 
use the symbolic has no such exception and as a result is “not whole.”69 Crucially, Lacan 
stresses, whether one comes to be “sexuated” as a man or as a woman is ultimately a matter of 
choice.70 In other words, we’re not talking here about socially constructed gender, nor biological 
sex, but a third category that overdetermines their binarisms through an existential decision. 
Accordingly, taking into account Lacan’s formulas of sexuation doesn’t mean that the theory of 
the cinematic apparatus should ignore representations of sexual difference on screen, only that 
they have to be supplemented with an analysis of sexual difference of the screen itself, of the 
viewer’s relationship to its potential for antagonistic totalizations, that is, his or her participation 
in contradictory regimes of symbolic power.  
 I will argue that the film noir meta-genre, by suspending the movement-image of the 
classical Hollywood narrative and its patriarchal ideological support, offers a unique meta-
cinematic insight into the indeterminacy at the core of the cinematic apparatus, the existential 
choice of sexual difference faced by the viewer in a zone of indistinction between the feminine 
and the masculine logic of film language. Furthermore, noir also shows that the political stakes 
of this indeterminacy go beyond matters of gender and sexuality, that the decision of sexuation is 
the knot that holds together capitalism’s biopolitically grounded apparatuses of production. This 
is why my analysis of the cinematic apparatus will incorporate the Foucault inspired theories of 
biopower put forward by Roberto Esposito and Giorgio Agamben, as well as Marx’s labour 
theory of value and its recent updates by the Wertkritik school of German Marxism and post-
autonomist Italian philosophers like Antonio Negri, Paolo Virno, Maurizio Lazzarato, Franco 
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Berardi, or Christian Marazzi. The common feature of these theories is that they point at the 
convergence in today’s late capitalist society between the apparatuses administering life and the 
ones that manage labour power—a shift towards a new, totalitarian logic of biopolitical 
production that has various names: “post-Fordism,”71 “neoliberalism,”72 “the new spirit of 
capitalism,”73 “the society of control,”74 “biocapitalism,”75 “flexible accumulation,”76 “cognitive 
capitalism,”77 “24/7 capitalism”78 or “Empire.”79  In film studies, the influence of these theories 
led some (mostly Deleuzian) scholars to conceptualize the new modalities of cinema in the 
digital age of global, networked capital as the expression of human life’s breaking with its 
former boundaries and becoming post-human in a “life-image,”80 “neuro-image,”81 “rhythm-
image,”82 or “desiring-image.”83 While drawing on these Deleuzian trends in contemporary film-
philosophy, this dissertation remains skeptical of their vitalist tendencies that celebrate these new 
aesthetic forms for their fluidity, openness, multiplicity, and difference without considering that 
such qualities are the norms of neoliberal ideology today. The deadlock of the vitalist position is 
visible in Steven Shaviro’s proposal of an “absolute identification” with capital for the reason 
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that “the only thing that remains ‘transgressive’ today is capital itself”—84a position termed 
accelerationist by Benjamin Noys.85 By adding the Lacanian framework of sexual difference to 
the biocapitalist theories of the apparatus, I aim to avoid the vitalist trap implying that totalitarian 
capitalism has no alternative.  
 Besides Lacanian psychoanalysis, my second, similarly dualistic master theory will be 
the philosophy of Giorgio Agamben. In his Foucauldian understanding an apparatus is “anything 
that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or 
secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions or discourses of living beings”—and thereby produce 
subjects.86 The purpose of apparatuses, he argues, is to isolate humanity’s common social-
linguistic substance into a separate, “sacred” sphere where its free use is prohibited. After Walter 
Benjamin, he considers capitalism to be a religious machine that introduces a totalitarian logic of 
the sacred separation through commodification:  
[T]here is now a Single, multiform, ceaseless process of separation that assails every 
thing, every place, every human activity in order to divide it from itself. [...] In the 
commodity, separation inheres in the very form of the object, which splits into use-value 
and exchange value and is transformed into an ungraspable fetish. The same is true for 
everything that is done, produced, or experienced even the human body, even sexuality, 
even language. They are now divided from themselves and placed in a separate sphere 
that no longer defines any substantial division and where all use becomes and remains 
impossible. This sphere is consumption. If, as has been suggested, we use the term 
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‘spectacle’ for the extreme phase of capitalism in which we are now living, in which 
everything is exhibited in its separation from itself, then spectacle and consumption are 
the two sides of a single impossibility of using. What cannot be used is, as such, given 
over to consumption or to spectacular exhibition.87 
While consecration once installed bodies and objects into states of exception for limited, 
religious use, the apparatuses of global capitalism make the logic of sacred exception into a rule.  
Not only does Agamben’s regime of the capitalist sacred where things become 
“ungraspable fetishes” resemble what Lacan calls the phallic-masculine logic of language 
isolating objet a in a separate sphere of the real, in a Lacanian manner he sees the alternative in a 
counter-apparatus he calls profanation that would restore to common use what has been captured 
in the sacred.88 Counter-apparatuses, he maintains, are possible not because they are external to 
the capitalist machine, but because all apparatuses are fundamentally indeterminate, which is 
why “it is impossible for the subject of an apparatus to use it ‘in the right way.’”89 For this 
reason the cinematic apparatus for Agamben is not simply, as Deleuzian theorist Jonathan Beller 
claims, the “hyper development of the commodity logic,”90 “a technology for increasing the 
eloquence (efficiency) of capital through the optical and the visual,”91 but both the means of 
capital’s becoming image in the society of the spectacle, and a potential site of the common. He 
sums up this ambiguity when he suggests that “[i]n the cinema, a society that has lost its 
[common] gestures tries at once to reclaim what it has lost and to record its loss.”92 I will argue 
                                                 
87 Giorgio Agamben, Profanations, trans. J. Fort (New York: Zone Books, 2007), 81-82. 
88 Agamben, What is an Apparatus, 19. 
89 Ibid., 21. 
90 Jonathan Beller, The Cinematic Mode of Production: Attention Economy and the Society of the Spectacle 
(Lebanon: University Press of New England, 2006), 9. 
91 Ibid., 155. 
92 See Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End: Notes on Politics, trans. V. Binetti and C. Casarino (Minneapolis: 
Minnesota University Press, 2000), 53. 
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that this is the ambiguity that film noir presents to the viewer as a choice between a sacred and a 
profane use of cinema’s apparatus, a decision between what I will call sovereign-image and 
utopian gesture.  
1.3 A Dialectical Method 
By taking cinema to be a contradictory apparatus, this dissertation performs a dialectical 
critique of its noir suture in the Hegelian-Marxist tradition, following Fredric Jameson’s 
methodological principles of historicization and totalization. In his Political Unconscious 
Jameson considers the Lacanian registers of the symbolic, imaginary, and real as three layers of 
ideologies that should be totalized, studied together to understand how texts participate in 
historically specific discourses of power in relation to the capitalist mode of production.93 I will 
expand on this tripartite notion of the ideological apparatus by insisting that the real anchoring it 
is the constitutive exception Lacan associated with the masculine use of language and what 
Agamben saw as the absent (sacred) center of sovereign biopower.94 Asserting the isomorphy 
between their theories, I will offer a Lacanian reading of Agamben, pairing his category of bare 
or sacred life (zoe) with the real of the Lacanian enjoyment, communal life (bios) with the 
imaginary, and what Agamben calls glory with Lacan’s symbolic. Furthermore, I will apply a 
similar conceptual map to the Marxian theory of labour, to Esposito’s theory of immunization, 
and Rick Altman’s notion of film genre. I also agree with Jameson that in the postmodern, post-
                                                 
93 See Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (New York: Routledge, 
1983) 
94 In Jameson’s Althusser inspired model, the real that determines ideology in the last instance is history as an open 
process resisting rational appropriation. History, he suggests, is “what hurts, it is what refuses desire and sets 
inexorable limits to individual as well as collective praxis, which its ‘ruses’ turn into grisly and ironic reversals of 
their overt intention.” Ibid., 88. History in the Jamesonian sense is therefore not an element in what I called the 
sovereign-masculine ideological apparatus but rather a synonym for the Lacanian sexual difference or the 
Agambenian antagonism between the sacred and profane uses of apparatuses that point beyond ideology. The 
difference between my approach and Jameson’s is that he is not ready to accept a possible exit from ideological 
thinking in the way that my use of the feminine logic of the symbolic or the profane use of sovereign apparatuses 
implies.   
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historical context totalization becomes an interpretative technique that reads texts as cognitive 
maps of the global capitalist situation, as attempts at its aesthetic representation and 
historicization so that the present can appear as contingent, liable to change.95 Totalizing here 
doesn’t mean yearning for the imaginary completeness often critiqued by poststructuralists but, 
as Jameson and Žižek both insist, the inclusion into a conceptually total field a series of 
antagonisms, inconsistencies, symptoms, and unrealized possibilities. As Žižek argues, “the 
Hegelian totality is not merely the totality of the actual content; it includes the immanent 
possibilities of the existing constellation. To ‘grasp a totality’ one should include its possibilities; 
to grasp the truth of what there is, one should include its failure, what might have happened but 
was missed.”96 It is possible, he maintains, to “’[make] a system’ out of the very series of failed 
totalizations, to enchain them in a rational way, to discern the strange ‘logic’ that regulates the 
process by means of which the breakdown of a totalization itself begets another totalization.”97 
This dissertation maps film noir’s failed totalizations of the cinematic apparatus in two 
parts. The first two chapters deal with the pre-history of noir’s neoliberal cynicism, tracking how 
the contradictions of the classical noir form blow up into a series of dialectical reversals and 
failed attempts at aesthetic reconciliation. The master narrative organizing this history will be the 
crisis of the American Empire discussed by Giovanni Arrighi in The Long Twentieth Century.98 
Arrighi claims that the US had risen to imperial power after eliminating its rivals in the Second 
World War, enjoying the benefits of the post-war economic boom until in the early 70s it faced a 
“signal crisis” of its dominant (Fordist) regime of capital accumulation. This meant that in order 
                                                 
95 See Fredric Jameson, “Cognitive Mapping,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of the Culture, ed. C. Nelson and 
L. Grossberg (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 347-60. 
96 Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (New York: Verso, 2012), 
285. 
97 Slavoj Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor (New York: Verso, 2008), 99. 
98 Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times (New York: Verso, 
2010) 
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to expand further, it had to increasingly rely on finance capital and as a consequence its imperial 
infrastructure became more and more deterritorialized. The gold standard was abandoned, the 
welfare state gradually dismantled, the banking system deregulated, and global neoliberal 
institutions like the World Bank or the IMF were introduced to re-colonize the world through the 
instrument of debt. For Arrighi, such financial overexpansion cannot but lead to a “terminal 
crisis” of an empire—a prediction that may have come true with the 2008 collapse of the US 
economy from which it hasn’t recovered ever since. I will argue that there are four stages in 
American film noir’s development corresponding to specific moments in the rise and fall of the 
US Empire. If classical noir set the biopolitical grounds of the post-war nation state, what is 
commonly referred to as revisionist noir in the 60s and 70s is a reflection on the empire’s signal 
crisis. This crisis is temporarily resolved in Reagan-era neo-noirs that return to the memory of 
the classical period with postmodern nostalgia. Finally, the genre’s full-blown nihilism erupts in 
the mid-90s with the contemporary cynical cycle corresponding to the terminal decline of the US 
superseded by a deterritorialized Empire of global capital.  
 The second, main part of the dissertation focuses on this final period, offering a 
synchronic map of cynical neo-noir by close reading the films of four noir auteurs who are 
positioned as internal outsiders (or external insiders) to Hollywood, embodying different faces of 
the same hybrid hegemony of the North Atlantic white heterosexual male bios that, as Donald 
Trump’s recent victory indicates, holds on firmly to its power in the era of imperial decline. I 
will draw on the author structuralist method developed by Peter Wollen in focusing on how the 
directors’ work deals with the bios – zoe binary, more specifically its cynical collapse that 
constructs the neoliberal monad as a one member productive community who nonetheless 
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remains aligned to the dominant body politic of the west.99 As Agamben stresses, “the author [...] 
is not something that can be directly attained as a substantial reality present in some place; on the 
contrary, it is what results from the encounter and from the hand-to-hand confrontation with the 
apparatuses in which it has been put - and has put itself - into play.”100 Since my overarching 
argument is that the notion of the neoliberal apparatus producing an identity between bios and 
zoe is nothing but the ideology for our “post-ideological” era, the directors’ authorship in my 
analysis will ultimately correspond to their idiosyncratic failure to get caught up in cynicism’s 
post-ideological apparatus “in the right way,” leading to their unique form of regression into the 
phallic-sovereign logic of sacred separation. Expanding on Wollen’s method, I will consider the 
structural interconnectedness of the four filmmakers’ author-functions to one another, how their 
seemingly individual oeuvres are part of a series of failed totalizations that can be pushed to the 
point of logical exhaustion. This is what I hope to achieve by using the totalizing scheme of the 
semiotic square developed by A. J. Greimas and Francois Rastier in its simplest version that 
maps the logical outcomes of combining (“+”) two opposed terms (A and B) and their negations 
(NOT-A and NOT-B) into four analytical classes in the following manner (Figure 2):101 
    5. (=1+2) 
COMPLEX TERM 
    
  1. TERM A   2. TERM B 
   
 
  
3. TERM NOT-B   4. TERM NOT-A 
 
  
7. (=1+3) 
POSITIVE DEIXIS 
8. (=2+4) 
NEGATIVE DEIXIS 
    
    6. (=3+4)  
NEUTRAL TERM 
   
                                                 
99 Peter Wollen, Signs and Meaning in the Cinema (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 74-115. 
100 Agamben, Profanations, 72. 
101 The sample semiotic square is taken from Louis Hébert, “The Semiotic Square,” Signo: Theoretical Semiotics on 
the Web, accessed January 19, 2017, http://www.signosemio.com/greimas/semiotic-square.asp.  
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Figure 2. 
In our case, a simple semiotic square mapping four logical combinations of bios and zoe through 
the films of four filmmakers will look like this (Figure 3): 
    BIOS + ZOE 
Danny Boyle 
    
  BIOS   ZOE 
   
 
  
NOT-ZOE          NOT-BIOS 
 
  
BIOS + NOT-ZOE 
Christopher Nolan 
ZOE + NOT-BIOS 
Nicolas Winding Refn 
    
    NOT-ZOE + NOT-BIOS  
David Fincher 
   
  
Figure 3. 
To simplify, in each case the affirmed term or terms betray a hidden bias of the synthesis, the 
fetishization of one or more particular ideological content(s). We pass through the semiotic 
square when we get to the place of double negation (occupied here by David Fincher), where the 
attempted synthesis reveals its inherent contradiction and thereby exhausts its unconscious 
ideological appeal.  
1.4 Chapter Breakdown 
 The first chapter serves as an introduction to the concept of film noir: it surveys the 
literature on and key examples of classical noir, tackles the dilemma whether noir is a genre or 
not, and maps its relationship to modern apparatuses of cinema, biopower, abstract labour, and 
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sexual difference. My main claim is that film noir is a sovereign exception to Hollywood cinema, 
a meta-genre that sutures together the classical Hollywood narrative in a moment of crisis when 
traditional generic discourses fail to do so. Reading Rick Altman’s theory of film genre through a 
biopolitical lens, I suggest that genres are imagined communities that immunize themselves 
through partial exemption from the abstract universal demands of cultural norms (like those of 
the Hollywood Production Code), offering pleasurable scripts of shared transgression available 
to anyone willing to play the given genre game. Film noir, by contrast, emerges out of an 
autoimmune crisis of generic communities in which the immunizing tendency to suspend one’s 
obligation to the symbolic law in the name of enjoyment starts to undermine generic codes of 
belonging as well, leaving the subject alone with his idiosyncratic form of life he is unable to 
share with anyone. This, I argue, is what leads to noir’s all pervasive death drive responsible for 
bringing the films’ Oedipalized movement-image to a halt. I further claim that noir’s death drive 
is not in and of itself a subversive category but a device placing the protagonists as well as the 
viewer in a zone of indistinction between two, masculine-sovereign and feminine-utopian uses of 
the symbolic order. Classical noir both brings this existential choice to the surface and disavows 
it through its fatalistic sovereign-image that conjures up white heterosexual masculinity as a rigid 
biopolitical body, belonging to which is revealed to be the real source of life’s value in the 
multitude of Hollywood genres inflicted by noir. Through a detailed discussion of Lacan’s theory 
of feminine jouissance, Agamben’s notion of gesture, and Jameson’s concept of utopia, I also 
draw the contours of a non-sovereign use of film noir in the second half of the chapter 
introducing snow noir as the counter-apparatus to noir’s sovereign-image. 
 Chapter 2 subsequently deals with the American film noir of the post-classical era, 
arguing for its historicization in three periods. The first, roughly coinciding with what noir 
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canons call the era of modernist genre revisionism (1962-1975), is examined for its counter-
sovereign apparatus, what I call the subtraction-image deconstructing classical noir’s fatalism. I 
suggest that such progressive rethinking of the noir form becomes possible through the crisis of 
America’s territorial integrity due to its global capitalist deterritorialization that reframes the 
post-war masculine sovereign anchored to the nation state as a failure. The second stage of neo-
noir, the chapter claims, starts with films like Chinatown (1974), Taxi Driver (1976), and Body 
Heat (1981) at the beginning of the postmodern era, and can be seen as a nostalgic return to 
classical noir’s sovereign apparatus while also recognizing its irrevocable loss. My main point is 
that these films represent a compromise formation between two contradictory components of 
what solidifies in the 80s as the Reagan consensus, suturing together “feminine” neoliberal 
deterritorialization and “masculine” neoconservative reterritorialization in an aestheticized 
antinomy. Once the global status quo shifts, however, with the fall of the USSR after 1991, 
nostalgic neo-noir also disappears, giving way to a cynical paradigm in film noir reflecting the 
unchallenged unilateralism of the American Empire now imagining itself to be identical with the 
global apparatuses of neoliberal deterritorialization. The rise of cynicism in film noir 
corresponds to an anti-feminist backlash and a new fetishization of the white heterosexual male 
bios standing for the biopolitical inertia of Empire. I also examine the new cycle of snow noir 
films that starts in the mid-90s, arguing that despite their new traditionalist and post-feminist 
frame, they continue to have a potential for critical cognitive mapping. 
 Chapters 3 - 6 then move on to the discussion of individual filmmakers who represent 
different manifestations of noir’s cynical paradigm today. Chapter 3 introduces the problem of 
neoliberal cynicism through the films of Danny Boyle, taking them as allegories for what Gilles 
Deleuze identified as the shift from disciplinary societies to societies of control, or what Hardt 
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and Negri saw as the transition from a territorially anchored imperialism to a deterritorialized 
Empire of global capital. Boyle’s use of the noir form is examined in relation to the postmodern 
crisis of generic communities, highlighted in his autoimmune use of the smart film discourse 
framing shared irony as a dead end. I underline how his cynicism-images that stabilize this crisis 
are tied to digital cinema and new media aesthetics, commenting on a necessary evolution 
towards a global network society made up of self-reliant neoliberal monads.  
 Chapter 4 takes up the films of Christopher Nolan to show how cynical noirs continue to 
rely on a privileged white masculine bios as a condition of possibility for their neoliberal 
monadism. I discuss Nolan’s use of the mind game film genre as a tool in his neoconservative 
interpretation of the postmodern cinematic apparatus in which a small group of viewers, who 
heroically embrace the truth-effect of the screen as the product of a lie, are opposed to the naive 
observers misreading the cinema as a machine of intersubjective truth. Through a close reading 
of his Inception (2010) I demonstrate how the construction of the cynic’s interpassive “subject 
supposed to believe” through a fetishistic disavowal reproduces the masculine fantasy about 
Woman as objet a, while ignoring the utopian, counter-sovereign potential of the feminine 
subject. Furthermore, I suggest that Nolan’s initial neoconservative position becomes even more 
pervasive in his later blockbusters that condone a corporate fascist patriarchy over the new 
democratic threats brought about by networked global capitalism and digital media, offering, at 
least on paper, to value everyone’s bare life equally. 
 Chapter 5 focuses on the work of Nicolas Winding Refn, who proposes to solve the 
autoimmune crisis of film genres not by resurrecting classical Hollywood masculinity as their 
old-new anchoring point like Nolan does, but by aestheticizing its very disappearance. Instead of 
pathologizing the precarity and madness of the neoliberal individual pursuing the truth of his 
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isolated bare life, Refn deploys the language of slow cinema to underline how the cynic’s self-
erasure from his generic community is a neverending process. His films perform a Deleuzian 
schizo-analysis, fetishizing the masochistic self-sacrifice of their protagonists’ fixed identity in 
front of neoliberal apparatuses of power ordering them to purify their bodies to the point of self-
annihilation. Far from being the opposite of Nolan’s glorification of the white masculine bios, I 
maintain that this procedure leads to the same result by different means, by valuing classical 
hegemonic masculinity through its inverted form as bios.   
 Finally, Chapter 6 considers the possibility of cynical neo-noir’s exhaustion in the films 
of David Fincher that in a double negation push the bios – zoe binary at their center to a 
contradiction without offering any resolution. Through the aesthetic of contradiction, I claim, 
these films are able to bring the utopian potential of the cinema to the surface, decreating the 
sovereign-image of neoliberal cynicism to give way to the existential choice of sexuation. I 
discuss these utopian aspects by introducing Agamben’s notion of messianic time, Sloterdijk’s 
idea of co-immunism, and Bracha Ettinger’s concept of the matrixial borderspace—all of which 
aim at an alternative, “feminine” totalization of the symbolic order.  
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2 Between Sovereign-Image and Utopian Gesture: The Use and 
Abuse of Cinema’s Inoperativity in Film Noir 
 
2.1 Hollywood’s Sovereign Exception: Film Noir as a Masculine Biopolitical 
Apparatus 
 
2.1.1 The Indeterminacy of Film Noir as Sexual Difference 
It is now commonplace to associate film noir’s emergence in the 1940s with Hollywood’s 
perverse preoccupation with the dark underside of American modernity hitherto repressed from 
the consciousness of mainstream audiences. By revelling in the anxieties and contradictions 
behind the façade of the official ideologies of capitalist progress and puritan conformism, these 
films turned the collective dream about a thriving American nation into a nightmare of detached 
and disaffected anti-heroes driven by self-destructive sexual and criminal obsessions.1 At the 
same time, reading the noir phenomenon as a vaguely defined sickness unto death of modernity 
made its status within critical and academic discourse a prime example of what Hungarians call a 
veterinarian’s horse, the figure illustrating all the possible illnesses the animal can have. Framing 
an object this way makes proper diagnosis impossible because its ontological status becomes 
overdetermined by the multitude of contradictory symptoms simultaneously projected on it. 
Perhaps this is why seven decades after the term film noir was first used by Nino Frank in 1946,2 
there is still no consensus within the discipline of film studies whether it designates a cinematic 
                                                 
1 The first systematic study of film noir that set up this interpretative frame was Raymond Borde and Etienne 
Chaumeton’s A Panorama of American Film Noir 1941-1953, trans. P. Hammond (San Francisco: City Lights 
Books, 2002). 
2 Nino Frank, “The Crime Adventure Story: A New Kind of Detective Film,” trans. R. Barton Palmer, in 
Perspectives on Film Noir, ed. R. Barton Palmer (New York: G. K. Hall, 1996), 21-24.; As Charles O’Brien 
demonstrated, there are actually earlier uses of the term for French films before Frank’s article. See Charles 
O’Brien, “Film Noir in France: Before the Liberation.” Iris 21 (1996): 7–20. 
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genre on its own or it’s just a category invented by French critics to retroactively make sense of 
Hollywood’s change of tone towards darker, more nihilistic and violent films during and after 
the Second World War.3 The non-generic approach originated with Paul Schrader, who 
suggested that noir had been a set of stylistic traits such as high contrast lighting, unbalanced 
compositions, flashbacks, and the dominance of night scenes that, to a different degree, appeared 
in most American films regardless of genre in the 40s and 50s, expressing a sense of alienation, 
loss, and hopelessness—what Raymond Borde and Etienne Chaumeton called the “malaise” of 
the war and postwar era.4 Yet, as many have pointed out, the implications of this zeitgeist-theory 
of noir are too strong and certainly can be challenged by empirical evidence: noir style films 
were almost completely missing from popular box office hits of the 40s and 50s that continued to 
radiate patriotic optimism.5 Other theorists like Thomas Schatz,6 Frank Krutnik,7 Elizabeth 
Cowie,8 or Steve Neale9 argued against noir’s generic status without turning it into a period 
style. For them the corpus of films canonized later by critics as noir10 simply lacked a coherent 
set of discursive expectations and narrative conventions that characterize a genre proper. Some 
of them suggested instead the splitting up of the canon into more clearly identifiable clusters 
                                                 
3 As Marc Vernet puts it, “[a]s an object or corpus of films, film noir does not belong to the history of cinema; it 
belongs as a notion to the history of film criticism, or, if one prefers, to the history of those who wanted to love the 
American cinema even in its middling production and to form an image of it.” Marc Vernet, “Film Noir on the Edge 
of Doom,” in Shades of Noir: A Reader, ed. J. Copjec (New York: Verso, 1993), 26. 
4 Paul Schrader, “Notes on Film Noir,” in Perspectives on Film Noir, ed. R. Barton Palmer (New York: G. K. Hall, 
1996), 99-108., and Borde and Chaumeton, A Panorama of American Film Noir 
5 See Richard Maltby, “’Film Noir’: The Politics of the Maladjusted Text,” Journal of American Studies 18, no. 1 
(1984): 49-71., and Mike Chopra-Gant, Hollywood Genres and Postwar America: Masculinity, Family and Nation 
in Popular Movies and Film Noir (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 1-26. 
6 Thomas Schatz, Hollywood Genres: Formulas, Filmmaking, and the Studio System (New York: Random House, 
1981), 111-50. 
7 Frank Krutnik, In a Lonely Street: Film Noir, Genre, Masculinity (New York, Routledge, 1991) 
8 Elizabeth Cowie, “Film Noir and Women,” in Shades of Noir: A Reader, ed. Joan Copjec (New York: Verso, 
1993), 121-67. 
9 Steve Neale, Genre and Hollywood (New York: Routledge, 2000), 142-68. 
10 See Alan Silver and Elizabeth Ward, Film Noir: The Encyclopedia (New York: Overlook Books, 2010) 
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such as the “hardboiled detective film,”11 the “tough suspense thriller,”12 or the “middle class 
murder narrative”13 while others proposed to reserve the generic designation of noir only for its 
post-classical, more self-conscious recurrences, usually referred to as neo-noir.14  
In face of these criticisms, those who wanted to defend the concept of noir as a genre had 
to account for its diffuse nature—a challenge first taken up by James Damico who isolated, to his 
mind, the lowest common denominator of noir plots which, despite its diverse setting and 
capacity to attach itself to other genres, he saw as the recurring essence of the genre: a femme 
fatale luring a fallible male protagonist into violent crime and eventual self-ruin.15 It was clear, 
however, that even such minimal description fit only a small percentage of a much larger set of 
films marked by the noir style.16 To avoid this problem, scholars like J. P. Telotte drew a more 
abstract map of noir’s characteristic narrative structure, seeing the genre as the negative of 
classical Hollywood cinema, one that exposes the fragility of its normative constructions and 
thereby forms a meta-discourse within Hollywood, an immanent critique of the genre system as a 
whole. The unconventional narrative devices of noir that support this argument include 
flashbacks that break the linear progression of the often already convoluted plot, unclear 
character motives, voice-overs that draw attention to the cinematic artifice, a dreamlike 
                                                 
11 Schatz, Hollywood Genres, 111-50. 
12 Krutnik, In a Lonely Street, 126-38. 
13 Raymond Durgnat, “Paint it Black: The Family Tree of Film Noir,” in Film Noir Reader, ed. A. Silver and J. 
Ursini (New York: Limelight Editions, 1996), 46. 
14 Neale, Genre and Hollywood, 165. 
15 “Either because he is fated to do so by chance, or because he has been hired for a job specifically associated with 
her, a man whose experience of life has left him sanguine and often bitter meets a non-innocent woman of similar 
outlook to whom he is sexually and fatally attracted. Through this attraction, either because the woman induces him 
to it or because it is the natural result of their relationship, the man comes to cheat, attempt to murder, or actually 
murder a second a man to whom the woman is unhappily or unwillingly attached (generally he is her husband or 
lover), an act which often leads to the woman’s betrayal of the protagonist, but which in any event brings about the 
sometimes metaphoric, but usually literal destruction of the woman, the man to whom she is attached, and 
frequently the protagonist himself.”James Damico, “Film Noir: A Modest Proposal,” in Perspectives on Film Noir, 
ed. R. Barton Palmer (New York: G. K. Hall, 1996), 137. 
16 See Julie Grossman, Rethinking the Femme Fatale in Film Noir: Ready for Her Close-Up (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2009), and Helen Hanson, Women in Film Noir and the Female Gothic Film (New York: I. B. Tauris, 
2007) 
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subjectivism that challenges the false objectivity of the camera, the use of documentary 
techniques mixing reality and fiction, sexual innuendos and an overall sense of moral ambiguity 
reflecting the crisis of the heterosexual couple and the bourgeois family that is never fully 
resolved by the occasional tacked on happy ending.17 It is for these features that some theorists 
like James Naremore or Andras Balint Kovacs placed film noir within the historical trajectory of 
modernism, either by claiming that the genre “can be explained in terms of a tense, contradictory 
assimilation of high modernism into the American culture industry,”18 or by identifying film 
noir’s contradictory form—its synthesis between high and mass culture, its unorthodox 
“modernist” tendencies that are nonetheless bound by the Hays Code—as a transitory 
phenomenon between classical (Hollywood) cinema and modern art cinema proper that emerged 
later in the 50s.19  
Once film noir thereby becomes the synonym for a Hollywood version of modernism, 
however, it can be referred to as a genre, much like modernism itself, only in a very loose sense 
of a Wittgensteinian language game of which, Naremore stressed, “we can never establish clear 
boundaries and uniform traits.”20 Indeed, as Steffen Hantke observers, contemporary scholarship 
“has begun to coalesce around the idea that, in a sense, there never was such a thing as film 
noir.”21 As Ben Tyrer puts it, “film noir doesn’t exist;” as a master signifier it fails to 
meaningfully totalize a group of films, designating rather an incomplete set which can never be 
closed with the addition of a definitive element. As such, he argues, the noir discourse 
                                                 
17 J. P. Telotte, Voices in the Dark: The Narrative Patterns of Film Noir (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989) 
18 James Naremore, More Than a Night: Film Noir and Its Contexts (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2008), 7. 
19 Andras Balint Kovacs, Screening Modernism: European Art Cinema, 1950-1980 (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 2007), 246-47. 
20 Naremore, More Than a Night, 6. 
21 Steffen Hantke, “Boundary Crossing and the Construction of Cinematic Genre: Film Noir as 'Deferred Action,"' 
Kinema (Fall 2004), accessed Feb 20, 2016, http://www.kinema.uwaterloo.ca/article.php?id=76&feature.  
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exemplifies the radical openness of what Lacan called the feminine use of language that is 
antagonistic to the phallic-masculine one seeking closure and the setting of clear boundaries.22 
Similarly, Jonathan Auerbach sees “film noir less as a bounded genre than a ‘meta-genre’--a 
threshold concept, or better yet, a concept or mode that tests the very permeability and limits of 
borders.”23 
Should we then understand noir as a “feminine” tendency that inflects other genres—or 
indeed the genre system as such—negatively, undermining their “masculine” discursive identity 
while also creating, as Kelly Oliver and Benigno Trigo suggest, anxiety about the “arbitrary and 
blurred borders of race, sex, and nationality”?24 And, to go further, does this make film noir 
politically progressive, subversive of Hollywood’s capitalo-patriarchal ideology that critics like 
Robin Wood saw as the promotion of bourgeois values of entrepreneurship, property ownership, 
heterosexual family and the dominance of men?25 As the next section will show, scholars have 
been divided on this issue from the very beginning, and the consensus seems to be that noir’s 
subversive tendencies are themselves inconsistent, opening up contradictory, what I will call 
feminine-utopian and masculine-fatalistic directions, lines of flight from the ideological status 
quo as well as feedback loops that perpetuate it. My endeavour here is to offer a totalizing 
framework explaining these antagonistic trajectories in relation to cinema’s role in modern 
apparatuses of biopower.  
 
                                                 
22 Ben Tyrer, “Film Noir Doesn’t Exist: A Lacanian Topology,” in Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society, ed. D. 
Henderson (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012), 127-41. 
23 Jonathan Auerbach, “Noir Citizenship: Anthony Mann's ‘Border Incident’,” Cinema Journal 47, no. 4 (2008): 
116. 
24 Kelly Oliver and Benigno Trigo, Noir Anxiety (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2003), xv.; On noir as 
an inflection of genres see Elizabeth Cowie, “Film Noir and Women,” in Shades of Noir: A Reader, ed. Joan Copjec 
(New York: Verso, 1993), 129. 
25 Robin Wood, “Ideology, Genre, Auteur,” Film Comment 13, no. 1 (1977): 46-51. 
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2.1.2 Subversion or Perversion? Film Noir and the Death Drive 
There are many modern precursors to film noir’s death driven gender dynamics, such as 
German Expressionist and French Poetic Realist films or hard-boiled detective novels from the 
20s and 30s,26 not to mention the rich history of femme fatale representations in 19th century 
gothic novels, operas, Romantic paintings, etc. The unique historical conditions, however, that 
led to Hollywood’s own “noir anxiety”27 about the boundaries of traditional gender roles were 
made possible by the Second World War, during which a large part of the female population in 
the US had to enter the workforce to fill in for the men fighting overseas. As a result, after the 
war the returning GIs were faced with a double loss; not only did they have to abandon the space 
of wartime male bonding, but their formerly homosocial workplace back home also lost its 
phallic status, i.e. its clear separation from the feminine household. As life returned to “normal,” 
a large number of women were eventually fired from their jobs, and the femme fatale, the 
sexualized threat of autonomous feminine labour power also gradually disappeared from film 
noir.28 
What is less often noted is that at the core of noir is therefore a conflict inherent in the 
capitalist mode of production that today’s Wertkritik (value-critical) school of Marxism refers to 
as value dissociation. In Marx’s theory the source of a commodity’s value is the amount of 
labour time socially necessary to produce it, and capitalism is nothing but an apparatus that 
organizes the social totality by turning all human endeavours into units of abstract labour to be 
measured, collected, sold, and consumed—feeding ever expanding cycles of production and 
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capital accumulation. Yet, as Marx famously demonstrated, the capitalist market also obfuscates 
the real source of the commodity’s value while relying on it in practice:  
Men do not therefore bring the products of their labour into relation with each other as 
values because they see these objects merely as the material integuments of homogeneous 
human labour. The reverse is true: by equating their different products to each other in 
exchange as values, they equate their different kinds of labour as human labour. They do 
not know it, nevertheless they do it. Value, therefore, does not have its description 
branded on its forehead; it rather transforms every product into a social hieroglyphic. 
Later on, men try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of their own social 
product: for the characteristic which objects of utility have of being values is as much 
men's social product as is their language.29 
The becoming hieroglyphic of value is what Marx referred to as commodity fetishism, attributing 
a magical-transcendental power to commodities outside the real process of value producing 
labour. The value-critical reading of Marx supplements this basic model by arguing that 
capitalism at the same time devalues other activities, turning them into the gendered ideological 
opposite against which the idea of “commodity-producing patriarchy” is constructed.30 As 
Roswitha Scholz puts it, “value dissociation means that capitalism contains a core of female 
determined reproductive activities and the affects, characteristics, and attitudes (emotionality, 
sensuality, and female or motherly caring) that are dissociated from value and abstract labor.”31 
Devalued in this strict Marxian sense, of course, doesn’t mean not being invested in libidinally. 
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In fact it is precisely because of its dissociation from productive labour that femininity in 
capitalism develops its magical-fetishistic character.32 For our historical context the logic of 
value-dissociation is important because it shows that capitalism’s rationale of transforming all 
human life into wage labour to be exploited actually threatens to undermine the very basis of that 
exploitation: an effective organizing principle of abstract labour that is always already distorted 
by biopolitics. This is the contradiction the American society had to face during the Second 
World War when the use of a feminine labour force both strengthened and weakened the nation: 
it increased production but destabilized the masculine identity of the workers, which could be 
resolved through a re-fetishization of femininity, its exclusion from value producing activity. 
As Krutnik perspicaciously observes, because these socioeconomic circumstances led to 
the crisis of America’s Oedipal order (of commodity-producing patriarchy), for a brief period in 
this select group of Hollywood films heterosexual coupling itself was presented as a threat to the 
male hero’s agency or even mental health, who preferred the company of other men or 
desexualized and/or masculinized women.33 This makes the typical noir protagonist’s desire for 
the femme fatale a perverse one in the psychoanalytic sense, often fixated, as Hugh Manon notes, 
on fetish objects the real function of which is to shield the man from the abyss of feminine sexual 
difference, blocking his access to the woman they merely pretend to pursue. Walter Neff, the 
murderous insurance salesman of Double Indemnity (1944), for instance, falls in love with the 
ankle bracelet of his female partner in crime, Phyllis Dietrichson, only for his already distorted 
desire for the woman to get further diverted toward his male colleague, Keyes, who is 
investigating them. Keyes is the obstacle to the heterosexual couple’s official romantic quest and 
                                                 
32 See Roswitha Scholz, Das Geschlecht des Kapitalismus: Feministische Theorie und die postmoderne 
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therefore Walter’s true homoerotic love object to whom he addresses the final intimate 
confession of his sins, using him as a fetish-filter against femininity. While in classical 
narratives, Manon argues, obstacles to heterosexual romance are what effectively make the male 
protagonist desire his partner (they are what Lacan called objet a, the object-cause of desire), 
noir’s perverse hero gets fixated on the obstacle to prevent himself from getting what he seems to 
want.34  
This perverse libidinal economy, “the systematic halting of the forward progress of 
desire”35 for a traditional (heteronormative) outcome leads to a spatiotemporal suspension 
unique to film noir, what Vivian Sobchack calls the chronotope of “lounge time” where the 
protagonists idle their life away in the non-spaces of hotel rooms, dining lounges, night clubs, 
gambling joints and cars, cut off from productive work and the safety of home alike, forever 
fixed in a transitory moment without arriving anywhere.36 For Sianne Ngai, noir’s characteristic 
“stretching” of narrative time produces moments of affective disorientation in the viewer, “a 
meta-feeling in which one feels confused about what one is feeling.”37 Noir thereby touches on 
what Giorgio Agamben terms the fundamental inoperativity of the human subject, the fact that 
her life, instead of unfolding (actualizing itself) according to a predetermined essence, is 
radically contingent, exists as pure potentiality.38 Despite its attractiveness, scholars are 
nonetheless split about the critical merits of film noir’s perverse universe, alternating between 
Sobchack’s and Ngai’s quasi utopian enthusiasm about its capacity to suspend normative affects 
and gender roles, and a more pessimistic claim that such space-time is more like an inherent 
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41 
 
transgression of classical Hollywood ideologies, a very much controlled and limited release of 
their excesses.39  
Regarding noir’s weak masculinities, some like Richard Dyer suggest that film noir is 
characterized by a general anxiety over defining normative manhood, demonstrating the 
difficulty of presenting a positive masculine image, which in turn allows for embracing a series 
of non-normative and queer representations.40 On the other hand, as Marc Vernet argues, there is 
a reactionary dimension to noir’s excessive depiction of impotent men as victims, typically as 
petty bourgeois white Americans who are stuck in the doubly besieged position between the 
ominous, abstract forces of corporate capitalism beyond their control and a mass of lower social 
strata including women and racial minorities threatening to engulf them (the structuring absence 
for the creeping shadows of noir’s empty streets has often been identified as the post-Jim Crow 
black population migrating to urban areas whose presence was foreclosed by Hollywood’s white 
supremacist imaginary).41 Vernet sees the hardboiled detective film in particular as the 
manifestation of the conservative-populist ethos of the (white) masculine entrepreneurial spirit 
under the threat of extinction.42 Along these lines one can read Andrew Spicer’s catalogue of 
male roles in classical noir—the male victim, the damaged man (maladjusted veteran or rouge 
cop), the private eye and the psychopathic criminal—as variations on the same petty bourgeois 
archetype (with the exception of the homme fatale who is rather a fetishistic stand-in for 
corporate capitalism).43 Noir’s ambiguous mixing of progressive and reactionary elements also 
divides critics when it comes to focusing on the masochistic, self-shattering dimension of the 
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male protagonist’s gender performance on the one hand,44 or on its downright sadistic aspects on 
the other.45 Karen Hollinger sums up this contradiction in her commentary on the film noir 
voiceover by maintaining that it may be true that “what central male characters seek to confess 
about their past is their femininity,” but they do this from the position of phallic authority in 
order to disavow their feminine excess/lack which in turn is projected on the femme fatale.46 The 
femininity of men in film noir, then, even if it indeed signals the temporary suspension of 
capitalist value-dissociation and thereby the paradigm of wage labour itself, still tends to be 
framed as an illness to be cured. 
The glass is also half full and half empty when it comes to the subversive potential of the 
femme fatale herself. For some, like the contributors to the volume Women in Film Noir, she is a 
protofeminist subject playing an active part in the narrative instead of serving as a background 
for the male quest, which is precisely why she has to be destroyed or punished at the end.47 As 
Janey Place insists, noir femmes fatale are “intelligent and powerful, and derive power not 
weakness from their sexuality.”48 She contrasts this deadly figure of the “spider woman” to 
another, more traditional (that is, devalued but fetishized) female role in film noir, what she calls 
the “nurturing woman,” whose function is precisely to redeem the male protagonist from his dark 
obsessions with crime and the femme fatale, and pull him back into a productive bourgeois life, 
usually through marriage or a conventional romantic relationship. By operating under Screen 
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theory’s assumption that the ultimate ideological process in these films, the same way as for 
classical Hollywood cinema in general, is the development of the narrative towards an 
equilibrium and closure, these readings ignore the potentially no less ideological dimensions of 
film noir’s perverse economy which was, to be sure, partially masked by Production Code 
regulations. It is Mary Ann Doane who formulates a Lacanian-feminist response to the authors of 
Women in Film Noir that takes into account the challenge of masculine perversion. According to 
her, one should resist reading the femme fatale as an autonomous figure since she is nothing but 
the embodiment of male castration anxiety, fear of sexual difference and feminism that finds its 
historical roots in the late 19th century’s male loss of control over the self amidst the rapidly 
exploding, destabilizing forces of urban modernization (new mechanical technologies of 
production, bureaucratization, cinema, psychoanalysis, etc.).49 The femme fatale, then, is not an 
independent agent but a symptom of modern masculinity in crisis, the amalgamation of various 
hostile apparatuses of capitalism that, from the traditional masculine perspective, can’t but seem 
to be running amok, melting the solid ground of men’s former lives into air (or abstract labour to 
be more precise). What one should add to Doane’s analysis is that being transformed and 
exploited by the capitalist machine is only part of the reason for modern masculine anxiety; its 
other source, paradoxically, is the simultaneous fear of not being captured by the apparatuses of 
production and being devalued, i.e. feminized as a result.  
A move towards unraveling this dialectic is Joan Copjec’s and Slavoj Žižek’s Lacanian 
account that complicates Doane’s thesis about modernity as the crisis of the traditional with an 
inquiry into the crisis of modernity itself. They argue that the gender dynamics of film noir 
attests to a general decline of the modern (rather than a premodern) public sphere, a tendential 
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retreat of what Lacanian psychoanalysis calls the Oedipal father-function of the phallic signifier 
that used to publically mediate, keep at bay irreconcilable forms of life, different practices of 
enjoyment.50 For Lacanians, the father-function is activated in the process of symbolic 
castration, the introduction of empty signifiers like father, nation, or democracy into public 
discourse that, precisely by not having a rigid referent, allow for different parties to fill them out 
with their own, potentially incompatible fantasies.51 When considering symbolic castration in the 
field of vision, Lacan’s starting point is that human subjectivity is always already a condition of 
being looked at by the gaze of the Other. This gaze is the real, primordially separated objectal 
correlate (objet a) to the subject, the reminder of his founding trauma, loss. Writes Lacan, “From 
the moment that this gaze appears, the subject tries to adapt himself to it, he becomes that 
punctiform object, that point of vanishing being with which the subject confuses his own 
failure.”52 In turn, symbolic castration is an operation that puts a mediatory bar between objet a 
and the subject in the form of a symbolic (as opposed to the real) gaze of the Other (the visual 
equivalent of the empty phallic signifier) that is not identical with the missing (real) piece of the 
subject, one that cannot see the supposedly complete, fully enjoying self he had lost. Symbolic 
castration thereby allows the subject to playfully appropriate his loss, to fill in its place with 
phantasmatic mise-en-scenes of desire where objet a is positioned as their structurally 
unattainable transcendental object-cause instead of being a paralyzing reminder of the subject’s 
existential failure. As Henry Krips observes, Lacan is therefore in agreement with Foucault that 
the panoptic institutions of the modern world, what Foucault referred to as apparatuses of 
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disciplinary power, work well only insofar as they remain virtual, without a fully actualized 
determinate content at their center.53 Modern (capitalist) subjects are never completely alienated; 
they gain their autonomy against an imagined panoptic gaze of Oedipal authority (of the father, 
state, police, factory, prison, etc.), by resisting its instrumentalizing force through constructing 
spaces, inventing practices beyond its phantasmatic field of vision. In other words, the panoptic-
Oedipal gaze of power works (holds together a social order) insofar as it’s blind, insofar as its 
locus is empty, symbolically castrated. For Lacan, enjoyment (jouissance) is the real that resists 
symbolization (explicit linguistic articulation); Oedipalization “tames” the paralyzing force of 
jouissance by turning it into the amalgam of social practices born out of imaginary resistance to 
abstract, symbolic authority; one enjoys only where the imagined demanding gaze of such “big 
Other” cannot see.54 In biopolitical theory the equivalent of this regime is what Roberto Esposito 
calls the immunization paradigm in which cohesion within a community is built through the 
partial exemption (immunity) of its members from their obligations (munus) to an abstract-
symbolic law imposed on them to regulate their life.55 
However, in film noir’s atomized social landscape lacking the mediation of modern 
symbolic institutions such as the bourgeois family, the workplace, the army, or the church, the 
isolated male hero becomes terrorized by the hallucinated return of an all-seeing (real) gaze of a 
primordial father beyond castration who, unlike his symbolic (Oedipal) counterpart, not only 
knows about enjoyment but even commands it, turns it into a perverse ethical duty the force of 
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which there is nowhere to hide from.56 Previously, the blind gaze of the modern symbolic 
indirectly helped to create common ways of being in the world through a shared resistance to it, 
serving as a condition of possibility for immunized communities. By contrast, the perverse, all-
seeing gaze of power is something like an autoimmune excess of the Oedipal-disciplinary regime 
of commodity-producing patriarchy. Autoimmunity, in Esposito’s words, is a “condition in 
which the protective apparatus becomes so aggressive that it turns against its own body (which is 
what it should protect), leading to its death.”57 What is crucial here is that death for Esposito is 
not the opposite of life, on the contrary, it is the name for too much life: 
[E]ntrusted to itself, freed from its restraints, life tends to destroy and to destroy itself. It 
tends to dig a crevasse on every side as well as within, one into which life continually 
threatens to slip. Such a self-dissolving tendency isn't to be understood as a defect of 
nature or as a breach that is bound to damage an initial perfection. Nor is it an accident or 
the beginning that suddenly rises up or penetrates into life's domain. Rather, it is the 
constitutive character of life. Life doesn't fall in an abyss; rather, it is the abyss in which 
life itself risks falling.58  
When life’s resistance turns against the life of the community it was supposed to protect, we 
arrive to the fragmentation of the social characteristic of the noir universe. I’d like to suggest that 
Copjec describes the same shift from immunity to auto-immunity with psychoanalytic 
terminology as the move from “the old modern order of desire, ruled over by an oedipal father” 
to “the new order of drive” in which “ever smaller factions of people [are] proclaiming their 
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duty-bound devotion to their own special brand of enjoyment.”59 In this reading the noir 
universe, far from offering an inoperative respite from the capitalist demand to be productive in 
fact preserves what Agamben calls the “ontology of operativity” (the ontology of “having-to-
be”) at its core by reducing it to a pure ethical duty without a determinate content.60 This new 
noir subject of drive is the one caught in a libidinal economy that Manon called perverse, 
suspending the forward movement of the classical Hollywood narrative after its desired, socially 
acceptable goal. Instead, he gains partial satisfaction from what Lacan associates with the 
topology of drive: the repetitive circular movement around objet a.61 Contrary to Manon’s 
suggestion that the noir hero tends to fetishize external objects and other characters (obstacles to 
narrative progress), Copjec goes further and maintains that the ultimate noir fetish is the 
masturbatory jouissance of one’s own being, the subject’s own gaze and voice as objet a, insofar 
as it’s separated from the community of language users. The noir protagonist is driven to make 
his inner excess seen and heard, paradoxically, beyond the possibility of reciprocal 
communication, to the point when it clearly undermines his belonging to any community and 
risks sliding into madness.62 As Antonio Quinet explains, “the drive indicates that the subject is 
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seen, that there is a gaze which aims at the subject, a gaze we cannot see because it is excluded 
from our field of vision.”63 
We have to make two clarifying remarks here. First, for Lacan “the drive, [which is 
always] partial drive, is profoundly a death drive and represents in itself the portion of death in 
the sexed living being.”64 Second, this portion of death refers to the signifier and not some kind 
of enjoyment-substance separate from it. As Alenka Zupancic puts it, “it is by means of the 
repetition of a certain signifier that we have access to jouissance and not by means of going 
beyond the signifier.”65 She argues that Lacan described this unconventional (we might say anti-
Oedipal) deployment of the signifier with his category of the “unary trait,” a contingent semiotic 
marker like a nervous tick or a unique tone of voice that becomes libidinally invested by the 
subject, standing for her singular being in the world. “The uniqueness of the trait springs from 
the fact that it marks the relation of the subject to satisfaction or enjoyment, that is to say, it 
marks the point (or the trace) of their conjunction.”66 As a contingent stand-in for objet a that 
carries no meaning, the unary trait is part of a non-signifying semiotic; as the gravitational center 
of the subject’s libidinal economy it perpetuates the repetitive jouissance of the death drive, the 
surplus enjoyment that is the useless (inoperative) but necessary byproduct of the social-
symbolic order.67 It is this nonsensical death drive that comes to the fore in film noir’s 
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fetishization of the unary trait through formal devices such as the voice-over, extreme facial 
close-ups, skewed camera angles reflecting the fantasy of being looked at from a unique 
perspective, and flashbacks to traumatic or emotionally charged events in the past like the male 
hero’s first encounter with the femme fatale whose intense presence is often condensed into a 
piece of clothing or jewellery.68 Similarly to Esposito’s model, then, death for Lacan is also the 
name for the unproductive excess of life, for life threatening to throw itself off balance. The 
difference is that for psychoanalysis the autoimmunity of the death drive doesn’t so much kill the 
organism as it infinitely prolongs its agony by conferring on it, as Žižek suggests, “the obscene 
immortality of the 'living dead' which, after every annihilation, reconstitute themselves and 
shamble on.”69 Copjec brings up the same trope about the noir hero stuck in a lonely place 
between social life and biological death with the self-enclosed enjoyment of his voice that 
“bear[s] the burden of a living death, a kind of inexhaustible suffering.”70  
Walter Neff is a case in point insofar as he narrates his perverted crime story while 
already fatally wounded, the deadly bullet in his body fired by Phyllis Dietrichson marking his 
singular encounter with jouissance. Driven by death he then records his confession of murdering 
both Phyllis and her husband on a dictaphone, addressing Keyes as if he were some all-knowing, 
obscene, machinic deity demanding proof that Walter had been enjoying properly—a pervert’s 
projection that undermines his friendship with his colleague. As Žižek insists, this paralyzing 
relationship to a hallucinated all-seeing gaze of power should not be confused with illicit 
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homosexual desire, nor should it be reduced to the fascinating lure of femininity: whoever comes 
to occupy the place of the primordial father in film noir is there as a fetish to mask the 
fundamental breakdown of the social-symbolic order.71 It is this taming of the real that Copjec 
identifies in the male hero’s desperate attempt to impose rational limits on his enjoyment by 
establishing it as matter of exchange with an all-powerful specter of the femme fatale: 
Having chosen jouissance, the noir hero risks its shattering, annihilating effects, which 
threaten his very status as subject. In order to indemnify himself against these dangers, he 
creates in the femme fatale a double to which he surrenders the jouissance he cannot 
himself sustain. That is, he tries to take some distance from himself, to initiate some 
alterity in his relation to himself: to split himself, we could say, not as the desiring subject 
between sense and being, but between knowledge and jouissance. Giving up his right to 
enjoyment, the hero contracts with the femme fatale that she will henceforth command it 
from him, as levy.72  
In other words, the very method the noir hero uses to separate himself from his female double 
(an actual insurance contract in the case of Double Indemnity) simultaneously ties him to her—
an operation that, for Copjec, cannot but end in mutual self-destruction.  
What is striking in both Žižek’s and Copjec’s reading of noir’s gender dynamics is their 
downplaying of its biopolitical dimensions highlighted by feminist critics. Instead of talking 
about a struggle for power between unequal subject positions they suggest that at the heart of 
noir is the radical equalizing force of the death drive. We could say that for them the defining 
characteristic of the noir protagonist is his failure to scapegoat the femme fatale by isolating in 
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her, like a proper Oedipal regime would, the useless surplus enjoyment dissociated from the 
commodity producing patriarchy.73 Yet, it’s also worth considering that even in noirs like 
Double Indemnity where the male protagonist is indeed never allowed back into the company of 
men, his misogynistic violence nonetheless has a stabilizing function for the patriarchal order. 
After the wounded Walter kills Phyllis and Keyes overhears him recording his confession, 
although his co-worker cannot reciprocate with an equivalent story of noir jouissance, de facto 
excommunicating Walter from the homosocial community of their workplace by reporting him 
to the police, he nonetheless adds that the man has always been close to his heart. This, I claim, 
is the area where the Lacanian theories of perverse noir masculinities above have to be 
supplemented: what exactly is the nature of this half successful homosocial and often homoerotic 
bond the noir protagonist pursues instead of siding with the femme fatale? How should we 
understand the stabilizing role of the male hero’s crime, the fact that in the end it seems to be 
indirectly accepted by representatives of the normative masculine community? What is the 
relationship between the apparently gender neutral perversion of drive, the male community of 
homosocial desire, and the symbolic law restored at the end of these films due to Production 
Code regulations? Without clarifying these questions, the Lacanian critique of noir perversion 
and its pseudo subversiveness cannot be fully effective. It is this line of questioning that will be 
developed later in this chapter to reveal noir’s fatalistic ideology the sovereign function of which 
is to perpetuate the masculinist status quo.  
The other weak point of the Lacanians’ perspectives above, which several contemporary 
feminist criticisms are directed against, is the reduction of film noir heroines to props in the 
masculine imaginary. As a solution, Cowie proposes that these strong and autonomous women 
                                                 
73 Such scapegoating, as Silvia Federici has famously shown, has been the byproduct of capital accumulation since 
the early modern era witch-hunts. See Federici, Caliban and the Witch 
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should be considered just as much a feminine fantasy as a masculine one.74 Alternatively, Julie 
Grossman and Helen Hanson argue that the significance of the duplicitous spider woman for the 
noir canon has been largely overstated, ignoring a number of different female characters, such as 
the working girl investigator75 or the trapped housewife,76 who represent actual struggles of 
women at that time to be acknowledged as value producing labourers. While these suggestions 
are valid, they don’t address the fundamental contradiction of capitalism that gave birth to film 
noir, namely the system’s structural inability to allow everyone who wants to work to even seek 
employment, to value every human being’s potential labour equally. A different direction is 
taken by Elizabeth Bronfen who discovers feminine agency within the Lacanian reading of the 
femme fatale, identifying her tragic acceptance of death over life as the moment of freedom and 
responsibility in the otherwise fatalistic noir universe.77 Her rereading of Out of the Past and 
Double Indemnity through the lens of the Wagnerien Liebestod narrative of Tristan and Isolde 
also points towards a different 19th century genealogy of noir, emphasizing the heroine’s 
feminine death drive to abandon the patriarchal regime rather than her masculine desire to enter 
it, serving as a useful counterpoint to the male protagonist’s different mobilization of drive.78 
Bronfen’s intervention is a step away from Doane’s, Copjec’s, and Žižek’s reductionist approach 
to the femme fatale that was based on Lacan’s early notion of femininity as masquerade, nothing 
but a lure for the male gaze. While Lacan’s theory is an important critical tool against the 
essentializing tendencies of the phallic imaginary, it leaves the question “what is femininity 
when it doesn’t play its designated role in a masculine fantasy?” unanswered. Lacan himself 
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76 Grossman, Rethinking the Femme Fatale, 57 
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explored this problem later in his Seminar XX where he rethought femininity as an alternative 
mode to organize the symbolic order as such, adding not only an autonomous but also a utopian 
dimension to the feminine use of language.79 This theory will be the basis of my investigation of 
film noir’s utopian impulse later on.  
Let’s sum up for now the various categories used to illustrate the tripartite division of 
reality in film noir: 
Wertkritik Foucault Esposito Lacan 
abstract labour disciplinary 
power 
obligation symbolic demand 
living labour resistance immunity imaginary desire 
non-productive 
activity 
madness autoimmunity real drive 
   
Figure 3. 
  
2.1.3 Between Generic Immunity and Meta-Generic Autoimmunity: The Sovereign-
Function of Noir’s Fatalistic Necropolitics 
 Copjec’s and Žižek’s Lacanian reading of noir’s unique brand of masculine perversion as 
drive nonetheless helps to clarify its relation to the symbolic norms of classical Hollywood 
cinema and the genre system as such. It is not enough to say, as Naremore or Kovacs do, that 
noir goes against these norms within the limits of the Production Code. If we accept that 
Hollywood functions as an Oedipal-disciplinary apparatus, this means that such discourses of 
resistance are constitutive of its ideological regime from the very beginning; they are formative 
of its immune system. This is exactly what Rick Altman proposes, claiming that genres as such 
are nothing but communal suspensions of cultural norms, creating pleasure through a distance to 
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an imagined authority: “[Generic] pleasure derives from a perception that the activities 
producing it are free from the control exercised by the culture and felt by the spectator in the real 
world. For most of the film, then, the genre spectator's pleasure grows as norms of increasing 
complexity and cultural importance are eluded or violated.”80 To put it bluntly, viewers root for 
the monsters, villains, murderers or sex offenders of various genre plots and take pleasure in 
seeing the bourgeois order of a family, a city, or a nation disrupted or destroyed. There are three 
important consequences of this model. First, normative aspects of Hollywood (including the 
enforcement of a morally acceptable narrative closure) are not part of an actually existing set of 
cultural practices but are assumed as such for the purposes of “genre games” played by the 
community of viewers, critics, studios, directors, etc.; presupposed “in order to permit the 
construction of generic pleasure as in some way contradicting that norm.”81 It is completely false 
to conclude, for instance, that Hollywood audiences in the Production Code era really believed in 
the sanctity of bourgeois marriage and that this belief was expressed in the endings of most 
films. To paraphrase Žižek, they believed instead that ‘the big Other’ of Hollywood—this purely 
virtual entity (the “subject supposed to believe”) they relied on to assert their autonomy against 
it—believed in it.82 Or, to use Christian Metz’s term, it is only a fictive “credulous observer” 
who was assumed to have taken these norms seriously.83 This leads to the second consequence, 
namely that “to accept the premises of a genre is to agree to play within a special set of rules, and 
thus to participate in a community precisely not coterminous with society at large.” In other 
words, generic communities are immunized, they are posited through the suspension of one’s 
                                                 
80 Rick Altman, Film/Genre (London: BFI, 1999), 156. 
81 Ibid., 157. 
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obligation to a larger symbolic collective the norms of which are, supposedly, to be enforced at 
all times. Generic immunization therefore protects particular forms of enjoyment (or forms of 
life in Esposito’s biopolitical terminology) against an imagined rigidity and abstract universality 
of the symbolic law ignorant of their existence. Crucially, the result of this move is the 
narrowing down of the possible forms of life available for subjects that now become limited by 
generic conventions. As Esposito puts it: 
[I]mmunization is a negative [form] of the protection of life. It saves, insures, and 
preserves the organism, either individual or collective, to which it pertains, but it does not 
do so directly, immediately, or frontally; on the contrary, it subjects the organism to a 
condition that simultaneously negates or reduces its power to expand. Just as in the 
medical practice of vaccinating the individual body, so the immunization of the political 
body functions similarly, introducing within it a fragment of the same pathogen from 
which it wants to protect itself, by blocking and contradicting natural development.84  
Simply put, what secures the life of the generic community also cuts its participants off from 
relating to others outside the genre’s limits. No wonder that Altman considers the imagined 
communities of modern nations to be generic in nature.85 This also leads to the third important 
consequence Altman draws from his theory: “Isolated from each other, reduced to imaging the 
larger group on the basis of a few faint sightings, generic communities constitute what I call 
constellated communities, for like a group of stars their members cohere only through repeated 
acts of imagination.”86 At the heart of the generic function is the detached individual trying to 
connect with those select few who he imagines to be like him.  
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The question that Altman, contrary to Esposito, doesn’t explore is what happens if the 
process of generic immunization gets out of hand and becomes an autoimmune disorder of the 
symbolic that threatens to undermine its stabilizing function all together? What happens if the 
distrust of resisting individuals towards social norms extends to smaller scale communal 
practices of life, effectively sabotaging even the subjects’ limited, generic links with one another, 
making them more exposed and vulnerable instead of more safe as a result? This is the situation 
that can be mapped through the Lacanian theory of the death drive and the returning primordial 
father and is, as Žižek and Copjec suggest, the breeding ground of film noir. The autoimmune 
tendencies of noir therefore have to be distinguished from standard games of generic 
transgression. I propose that noir is precisely the name for a failure to transgress against the 
cultural norms of Hollywood in any way that could create a generic community of shared 
resistance. The noir hero, like Walter Neff, is stuck with the inoperative excess of his 
idiosyncratic enjoyment87 that he nevertheless imagines to be the direct command of the all-
seeing gaze of a perverse law—this is why he addresses his confession to such a superego 
authority, (mis)interpellating the viewer also as such authority instead of addressing her as a 
fellow player in a genre game with whom he could share his form of being in the world. The 
source of the drama at the end of Double Indemnity is precisely that while Keyes considers 
Walter his friend all along, trying to involve him in masculine homosocial rituals of 
immunization (shared misogyny and mockery of clients), these mundane pleasures don’t satisfy 
the protagonist who goes on to commit murder and then pushes Keyes to know and see all of it 
just so that the man could condemn him. This transformation is symptomatic of an autoimmune 
turn of the generic in film noir, of a moment when modern communities start to destroy 
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themselves. At the beginning of the film, Keyes and Walter are situated on the same level of 
their homosocial workplace as friends and colleagues. When Phyllis seduces Walter, Keyes plays 
the role of the benevolent symbolic authority whose blindness makes the romance possible (this 
is underlined, for instance, by the scene where he visits Walter in his apartment but remains 
unsuspecting of his involvement with the woman who is right there hiding behind the half open 
door—the viewer, by contrast is positioned to see and know all). By killing Phyllis and 
confessing to Keyes, however, Walter blows up both immunological bubbles he had with the 
other characters, exchanging them for the perverse solitude of a dying man (for the “lonely 
room”88 of the gas chamber in the original ending). At the same time, as his voiceover narrated 
precisely from such a place of abandonment clearly shows, he is not fully cut off from the 
community of language users in the way the silenced femme fatale eventually comes to be. This 
is why his confession can be overheard by Keyes, even though the addressee of the message is 
the real-impossible (all seeing and all knowing) gaze of the Other. And this is how, although his 
colleague officially condemns him (to a certain death sentence) by calling the police, their brief 
exchange also suggests the restoration of an illicit homosocial link: Walter: “You know why you 
couldn’t figure this one, Keyes? I’ll tell you. Because the guy you were looking for was too 
close. He was right across the desk from you.” Keyes: “Closer than that, Walter.” Walter: “I love 
you too.” The film then ends with Keyes lighting Walter’s cigarette as a homosocial or perhaps 
homoerotic gesture. To explore further this strange link between the isolated noir hero and the 
immunized community that expelled him, let’s look at a series of classical noirs with a similar 
narrative pattern.  
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Like Double Indemnity (1944), The Killers (1946) also starts with its male hero, the 
Swede, withdrawn to an isolated room, resigned to his fate of certain death at the hands of two 
contract killers hired by his former partners in crime he, supposedly, had betrayed years ago after 
a successful heist. The rest of the film is in part a series of flashbacks to the Swede’s past leading 
up to the robbery, complicated by his love affair with the boss’s treacherous girlfriend. While 
this narrative technique of opening with the protagonist’s death emphasizes the determinist 
trajectory of his life in a typical noir fashion that denies his agency, it’s important to add that, 
paradoxically, he plays a much more active role after his death by leaving clues behind in his 
will that incriminate those who killed him, most importantly the femme fatale. Therefore, 
although it’s true that in the last moments of his life the Swede chooses the solitude of his death 
drive over the protection of the small town community he came to hide and work in after a life of 
crime—unable to share the burden of his past with his young apprentice who comes to warn him 
about the arrival of the gangsters—he nonetheless builds a strange homosocial bond from 
beyond the grave with the investigator of his life insurance policy, making him follow up on his 
unusual will and thereby untangle his story of victimhood as a byproduct. Significantly, he is not 
the only posthumous fan of the foolish lover’s tale of melancholic self-abandonment; a detective, 
now happily married to the Swede’s former, more nurturing, less wicked girlfriend joins the 
posse of men hunting down the femme fatale—a group that in a bizarre final twist comes to 
include the crime boss himself who once ordered the Swede’s execution, and who is now 
husband and final victim of the spider woman.  
Out of the Past (1947) offers an interesting variation of The Killers storyline. The male 
protagonist is a former private eye, Jeff, who, while working for a gangster, got involved with 
the man’s mistress, Kathie, but after she eventually betrayed his trust he retired to a small town 
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where he now lives running a gas station, about to marry a local girl. His past (revealed also in a 
flashback) comes to haunt him when his former employer bursts the bubble of his rural idyll, 
demanding one more favour of him. The job, of course, once again involves Kathie who, much 
like Jeff himself, keeps getting drawn back to the powerful criminal who marks their original 
encounter with jouissance. This magnetism of the obscene father figure is responsible for a 
certain fatalistic disposition in both protagonists; yet, as Robert Pippin stresses, this should not 
be simply identified with that lack of reflective deliberation in their actions that separates them 
from classical Hollywood heroes. It is wrong to conclude from their stoic appearance that they 
are entirely passive tools in the hands of their superego master, determined by their past or 
indeed fate itself. Instead, “noir participants are […] perhaps best thought of creatively 
improvising on the fly, thrusting themselves into the future without benefit of much reliance on 
reflection and the past in general, much as a painter or a poet will improvise a figure or a line and 
try to determine afterward if the improvisation was appropriate.”89 Pippin points out that it is not 
true that either Jeff or Kathie would always fatalistically betray the other when they are forced to 
improvise this way, that is, when they cannot rely on pre-established cultural/communal codes to 
identify their motives through reflection (when their ontology of operativity breaks down as 
Agamben would put it). There is a radical indeterminacy of their acts which makes them both 
fundamentally free from the confines of normative society, yet also highly vulnerable to its 
judgment. As Kathy finally suggests to Jeff, Pippin notes, “neither of them is any good; they 
belong together. That is, she is encouraging Jeff to realize something about his fate, that neither 
of them belongs in the square or straight world, content with the limited room for maneuver as 
agents that fate allows them. That world has its appropriate rules or morality, and neither of them 
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shares that world, and in that sense will always be ‘bad.’”90 In other words, towards the end, in a 
retrospective deliberation about the couple’s improvisatory acts throughout the narrative Kathie 
proposes that their fate is precisely to break with their fate—a formula that appropriately 
summarizes the paradox of the death drive, the compulsion to repeat a past encounter with 
jouissance that eventually destroys linear temporality itself and with it any meaningful notion of 
the past.91   
While Pippin strangely (and against his own theory developed later in his book) 
dismisses here the woman’s project as vulgar fatalism that disavows the couple’s agency, I 
suggest reading it as a productive contradiction of the femme fatale figure that points precisely 
toward her (or indeed anyone’s) inability to autonomously assume a fatalistic stance.92 This is 
the dilemma the couple is stuck with after the elimination of the primordial father figure, the 
anchoring point between their jouissance and the symbolic economy of debt, the authority 
enforcing the linear notion of time through the pressure of future repayment, who thereby also 
stood as a convenient external source of superego pressure towards private enjoyment, i.e. an 
excuse for betrayal. Now with the gangster gone, when Kathie chooses to flee with Jeff, her 
fatalistic statement that she is no good is all of a sudden turned inoperative: she doesn’t betray 
the man despite her official warning suggesting that it is in her (and his) nature. Jeff, by contrast, 
makes an anonymous phone call to the police to give himself and Kathie up. There is an almost 
comic theatricality to the denouement he thereby orchestrates insofar as it provides the perfect 
appearance of a divine intervention while he (and the viewer addressed by the charade) knows 
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very well that there is no such invisible hand at work. It is only for the naïve observer (like an 
imagined censor of the Production Code) that the scene looks as if an outlaw couple were getting 
what they deserved just when they thought they could get away from fate’s punishment. It’s 
quite logical to assume, as Pippin does,93 that Jeff expects Kathie to shoot him when she sees the 
police cordon blocking the road, which means that he set up his own death, constructing a 
fantasy scene of castration by the femme fatale (literally as she shoots him in the crotch) for 
which the woman is immediately gunned down by the police. This means that at a decisive 
moment Jeff makes a decision to rather die a painful death but uphold the patriarchal hierarchy 
of sexes than live to accept that they are equally inoperative. Significantly, like the Swede in The 
Killers, he also builds a postmortem homosocial link with a mute boy working at his gas station 
who is asked by Jeff’s small town bride whether her now dead fiancée was planning to run away 
with the femme fatale or not. The boy, as if his muteness gave him a sixth sense to read his 
boss’s melodramatic intentions, lies to the woman and says yes, suggesting that Jeff wasn’t in 
love with her anymore, thereby handing her, as an object of patriarchal symbolic exchange, to 
the next man in line to marry. By pretending to condemn Jeff and excommunicate him from the 
town community, the young man’s gesture in fact immunizes the masculine bond against the 
fiancée’s ignorant gaze (when she is gone he salutes the sign on the top of the gas station spelling 
Jeff’s name). On the one hand, this scene retroactively feminizes the Metzian credulous observer 
in the presupposed audience who falls for the male protagonist’s theatrical dénouement and 
genders those who know about Jeff’s orchestrating his own downfall masculine. At the same 
time, however, the ending also reveals the Production Code’s gender norms as artificially 
constructed by male conspirators.  
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Contrary to Out of the Past, the fugitive couple of Gun Crazy (a.k.a. Deadly is the 
Female, 1950) do explore possibilities of living together outside the law and capitalist labour. 
Interestingly, they manage to avoid the traps of extreme individualism despite their awareness 
that after a series of bank robberies committed together their chance of survival would be 
significantly higher alone. Uncommon among noir protagonists they are actually married, tied 
through a symbolic bond which, however, lacks its usual immunological supplement of a home 
(they exchange it for the transitory non-places of the road). At the end, cornered by a state wide 
manhunt they are chased into a foggy swampland by the police. The netherworldly mise-en-
scene carries a sense of hopeless isolation; we see the couple’s frightened faces, framed together 
in a series of close-ups. The woman’s whisper then breaks the ominous silence: “Bart, we’re in 
real trouble this time,” to which her husband responds: “Laurie, no matter what happens, I 
wouldn’t have it any other way!” They embrace but their final kiss is disturbed by the sound of 
loud speakers; it’s the voice of Bart’s childhood (male) friends the police brought along to help 
convincing him to surrender: “We know you won’t kill us, you’re not a killer, Bart.” The 
implication is clear: he is not responsible for killing the couple’s victims; Laurie is. The woman, 
now indirectly interpellated as the femme fatale, steps away from her husband who stays frozen. 
The framing changes, we now see them in separate close-ups.94 As the group of men approaches, 
Laurie stands up and starts shouting at them with a death driven attachment to the signifier: “One 
more step and I’ll kill you! I’ll kill you! I’ll kill you!”, but before she could do anything Bart, 
still squatting, yells: “Laurie, don’t!”, and shoots dead, as if he were taken over by an 
uncontrollable impuls. Then, realizing what he had done, he stands up to look at her body, 
providing a clear target for the police who kill him immediately.  
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The film, in a modernist gesture, exposes the so called Hollywood ideology of producing 
a heterosexual couple for what it always already has been: an element of genre games with a 
purely formal role that can be fulfilled even by a final shot of dead lovers. However, it also 
reveals that such form cannot be properly ideological without its no less normative immunizing 
supplement transgressing and limiting it, appearing here as the law of the male homosocial 
brotherhood standing for a Repressive State Apparatus that literally puts an end to the excesses 
of heterosexual marriage itself, to the emancipatory potential opened up by its formal equality 
that threatened to subvert capitalism’s patriarchal hierarchy of gender roles. As in the previous 
examples, the community of men cannot seem to be able to do this on their own; they need the 
help of someone who is, paradoxically, both inside and outside of their immunized bubble. This 
is the responsibility often delegated to the lone male hero in film noir who is alienated, confused, 
and disoriented—forced to improvise until the moment he hears or hallucinates the call of his 
fellow men from beyond the walls of his lonely room, giving him hidden direction, inciting him 
to push the femme fatale away as an illicit act of banishment necessary to secure the boundaries 
of the male tribe. This is when he realizes that, contrary to his female double, his fate is not to 
break with his fate but to uphold the operativity of the status quo where no one else can.  
We find this structure already in one of the first canonical film noirs, The Maltese Falcon 
(1941). Sam Spade, the private detective protagonist, after uncovering his femme fatale lover’s 
involvement in a series of crimes and acts of betrayal (including the murder of Sam’s 
investigator partner), phones the police with the promise of clearing the case for them once they 
arrive at the scene. In the ensuing suspense before the officers’ arrival the always rather 
unscrupulous Spade puts up a highly theatrical and inconsistent (overdetermined) performance 
condemning the woman and rejecting her love in the name of masculine honour (his debt to his 
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partner), cynical rationality (the assumption that she would betray him again), and cold petty-
bourgeois professionalism (solving the case needs someone to take the fall). None of these 
rationalizations seem to stick, however. Hesitating what to do, he only makes the decision to 
actually act like he says and really denounce her lover, to reject her final kiss and push her away, 
a moment before the doorbell announces the police’s arrival. It is this small spatiotemporal 
interval that separates the noir hero’s death drive from the desire of a male homosocial 
community that retroactively sutures him into its midst—an unbridgeable gap of radical 
indeterminacy and freedom he overcomes/disavows through fatalistic telepathy and the 
ultimately arbitrary violent expulsion of the femme fatale.95  
According to Agamben, the performance of such violence that from our liberal 
democracies appears fascistic has been the designated role of the sovereign in various state 
apparatuses throughout history; his function has always been to decide on the undecidable 
ground of any living (for Esposito: immunized) political community by setting up a state of 
exception where the communal rules are suspended so that the sovereign can arbitrarily separate 
lives that should belong to the community from those that are should not.96 Agamben doesn’t 
have a theory of immunization as inherent transgression against the universal force of law and as 
a result he also has no concept of a symbolic apparatus in which life (enjoyment) is captured 
insofar as it resists being captured. He doesn’t believe in a neutral virtual space with regulative 
ideals such as universal equality and emphasizes how such concepts are always already imbued 
with particular forms of life.97 This is why he is pessimistic about the long term effects of 
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modern universalism for he sees it pursuing an impossible project: by merging two formerly 
distinct notions of the people, one referring to members of the political community, the other to 
the poor who are excluded from it, modern democracy seeks to collapse the boundary between 
fundamentally antagonistic forms of life.98 While in the classical Greek polis bios, the (generally 
masculine) life lived inside political institutions was clearly separated from zoe, the (feminine) 
life of mere self-preservation lived within the household, modern democracies consider bare life 
(zoe) the source of political sovereignty, aiming to liberate the element that was the sign of 
subjection in the classical political model.99 This project for Agamben (much like for the value-
critical Marxists) is a self-defeating one because every politics of sovereignty necessarily 
involves a founding decision on what is going to be political and what is not. Therefore, in 
modern (capitalist) democracies the need to find the bios of zoe, to emancipate bare life as such 
brings with it the contradictory need to delineate what kind of bare life will be considered 
political (or in Marxist terms: productive), which now in the universalist context increasingly 
means worth living, and what kind of bare life will the sovereign have to let die (a slippage from 
being marked as unproductive). This is why the modern universalist biopolitics of life soon turns 
into thanatopolitics, constantly redrawing the unstable boundary between life worth living and 
life void of value.100 As a result, Agamben stresses, the political community’s founding site of 
the sovereign decision—the zone of indistinction between bios and zoe holding the vulnerable 
life of those who the Romans called homo sacer, the “sacred” person who can be killed without 
                                                                                                                                                             
ceremonial excess of the modern apparatus of biopower. Yet, even glory is always attached to a particular form of 
life for Agamben. This additional dimension of sovereignty will be explored later in this chapter. See Giorgio 
Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government, trans. L. Chiesa 
and M. Mandarini (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011) 
98 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 177. 
99 Ibid., 10. 
100 Ibid., 122.; There is a clear homology between Agamben’s biopolitical theory of modern life and the value-
critical approach to capitalist labour: universal citizenship and universal employment are both impossible projects as 
long as we remain within sovereign power/capitalism.  
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repercussions—stops being a state of exception and becomes the rule.101 This means that the 
popular sovereignty of “modern democracy does not abolish sacred life but rather shatters it and 
disseminates it into every individual body; making it into what is at stake in political conflict.”102 
This is the biopolitical paradigm the modern democratic state develops towards and that 
Agamben, after its Nazi example, calls the camp, “the new, hidden regulator of the inscription of 
life in the order—or, rather, the sign of the systems inability to function without being 
transformed into a lethal machine.”103 
If Esposito’s theory explains the emergence of stable communities through a top down 
model of immunization, Agamben has a bottom up approach where the communal security is 
reached through the violence of sovereign exclusion. I will use a Lacanian synthesis of the two 
theories to explain the complex biopolitical role of film noir, why the multitude of Hollywood 
genres immunizing different forms of life have to be supplemented with the meta-generic noir 
state of exception arbitrarily deciding on what life would be valuable for the genre system as 
such and what life would be devalued and/or expelled from it. As Agamben stresses, “The camp 
is the space of [the] absolute impossibility of deciding between fact [zoe] and law [bios], rule and 
application, exception and rule, which nevertheless incessantly decides between them.”104 The 
camp is the (non)-place where characters of film noir are thrown with their idiosyncratic excess 
of unproductive enjoyment (death drive), their bare life hopelessly separated from the 
immunized life of any capitalist community that could give an operative meaning to their 
existence. This is where both men and women lose their traditional gender identity and white 
people slide towards blackness (their shadowy existence signalling their ontological 
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indisctinction from the nation’s ultimate non-citizens: African Americans). As homo sacer, 
subjects of a sacred life the value of which is suspended,105 they are equally vulnerable to the 
violence of others. Yet, others in this noir camp of modernity are just like them: lonely, exposed, 
and distrustful; improvising as they go along, betraying those they assume could betray them. 
And the price to leave this precarious but equalizing site of the camp behind is precisely the 
assumption of the role of the sovereign instead of the homo sacer; to forge an arbitrary link with 
an imagined (constellated) community, to pretend it exists and commit a violent act of exclusion 
on the basis of its norms: a sovereign decision that would retroactively make it exist.106 As 
Agamben writes, “what confronts the guard or the camp official [in Auschwitz] is not an 
extrajuridical fact (an individual biologically belonging to the Jewish race) to which he must 
apply the discrimination of the National Socialist rule. On the contrary, every gesture, every 
event in the camp, from the most ordinary to the most exceptional, enacts the decision on bare 
life by which the German biopolitical body is made actual.”107 As I have indicated, the 
biopolitical body actualized through the noir hero’s sovereign decision is a constellated 
community of petty-bourgeois heterosexual white men, a meta-generic zero-institution valorizing 
bare life that props up Hollywood’s ideological apparatus when the traditional dialectic of 
generic immunization fails. Contrary to genre games that are “democratic” insofar as they are 
open to anyone who plays along, noir’s meta-discourse posits an exceptional bios with rigid 
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boundaries.108 That is to say, what comes alive through the sovereign act in film noir is not the 
masculinity of this or that particular generic community constituted negatively through resisting 
disciplinary power but the flesh of an self-made brotherhood that perpetuates itself, or so it 
seems, by affirming its own bare life through an endless short circuit between its bios and zoe.  
 Crucially, once the masculinist status quo is thereby consolidated, its illicit origins are 
immediately repressed. As a rule, the sovereign act of the noir hero (his arbitrary punishment of 
his femme fatale double from the position of their equality) cannot be explicitly acknowledged as 
such by the brotherhood whose existence is depending on it; doing so would expose its missing 
foundations, its essential indistinction from the feminine sphere. As Žižek notes, even Nazi 
Germany developed the same attitude towards the Holocaust, treating it as an obscene secret 
never to be publicly recognized.109 And didn’t critical discourse have a similar relationship the 
phenomenon of film noir itself? Jennifer Fay and Justus Nieland point out that the decision to 
canonize the French interpretation and grouping of these films was a rather arbitrary and 
biopolitically motivated one.110  
First of all, the authors note, in the same year when Nino Frank “coined” the term film 
noir Sigfried Kracauer also published an article called “Hollywood's Terror Films: Do They 
Reflect an American State of Mind?” in which he traced the genealogy of what Frank called noir 
back to Hollywood’s anti-Nazi propaganda films, suggesting that their pedagogical display of 
totalitarian dread among the German population eventually overflew the limits and purposes of 
                                                 
108 The opposition between generic and meta-generic technologies of power also recalls Althusser’s distinction 
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the genre and gave way to films registering America’s own fascist tendencies. These terror films 
“evoke a world in which everybody is afraid of everybody else, and no one knows when or 
where the ultimate and inevitable horror will arrive. When it does arrive it arrives unexpectedly: 
erupting out of the dark from time to time in a piece of unspeakable brutality. That panic which 
in the anti-Nazi films was characterized as peculiar to the atmosphere of life under Hitler now 
saturates the whole world.”111 It’s symptomatic of the discourse on noir that the rather disturbing 
claims of this text were later repressed: the whole issue of American noir’s fascism was reduced 
to the matter of interwar German cinema as well as the war itself influencing noir’s 
development.112 That is, until Edward Dimendberg looking at the spatial politics in Weimar 
cinema and American film noir rehabilitated Kracauer’s original argument by insisting that 
instead of causality we should be talking about “parallel modernities”113 as both groups of films 
represent “urban spaces inextricably identified with violence.”114 Along these lines I suggest to 
consider film noir’s parallel thanatopolitics or, to use Achille Mbembe’s term,115 necropolitics to 
Nazism: it offers us a formula not of the totalitarian suspension of democracy but the fascism at 
the core of modern democracy itself.116  
Furthermore, following Julien Morphet, Fay and Nieland also draw attention to the 
racially charged nature of the term noir in the post-war French context of imminent 
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decolonization, and how the French critics’ look at these films through the prism of 
existentialism may have offered them a convenient device to both express and obfuscate their 
anxieties over the decline of imperial white supremacy.117 The libidinal investment in a discourse 
where blackness is detached from skin color and is turned into an abstract existential threat—
while remaining metonymically linked to African Americans with noir’s urban shadows or jazz 
music score signifying their absence—may be the reason why, as Eric Lott argues, “the 
specifically racial means of noir's obsession with the dark side of 1940s American life has been 
remarkably ignored.”118 This implies that the initial critical discourse on noir was complicit in 
the films’ depoliticizing move, the foreclosure of America’s white supremacist biopolitics 
through the displacement of its systemic violence onto the existentialist crimes of petty-
bourgeois white individuals who, according to Robert Porfirio, faced the choice between “'being 
and nothingness', between the 'authentic' and 'inauthentic' life.” In the noir universe, he suggests, 
“[t]he inauthentic life is the unquestioned one which derives its rationale from a facile 
acceptance of those values external to the self. To live authentically, one must reject these 
assurances and therein discover the ability to create one's own values; in so doing each individual 
assumes responsibility for his life through the act of choosing between two alternatives. And 
since man is his own arbiter, he literally creates good and evil.”119 What this fetishization of the 
noir choice of authenticity (the choice of one’s death driven surplus-enjoiyment) ignores is that 
such authenticity can only be actualized through a sovereign submission to the unquestioned 
values of a biopolitical apparatus. And while various aspects of the noir discourse have by now 
been re-politicized through feminist, queer and critical race theory readings of the canon, these 
criticisms haven’t been totalized into considering noir as a form of American fascism. For 
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instance, as if to continue with the existentialist biases of noir’s early critics like Porfirio, Fay 
and Nieland suggest that “[a]gainst the culture of moral absolutism promoted by the Nazis and 
fascists, film noir presented a world of moral ambiguity in which the protagonist must, 
nevertheless, decisively act.” Our Agambenian reading of film noir, by contrast, allows us to see 
existentialist freedom as a key component of a fascistic biopolitical apparatus rather than its 
alternative.  
Agamben’s later work in The Kingdom and the Glory makes this connection between 
totalitarianism and individualism even tighter by suggesting that in addition to necropolitical 
violence, sovereign power also relies on a purely symbolic function of glorification. In Nazi 
Germany, for instance, the arbitrary terror of the camps was supplemented by mass celebrations 
of the Aryan Volk. According to Agamben, under the guise of secularisation western modernity 
remains within the political theological paradigm of the Christian Trinitarian ontology of 
operativity, for which the predetermined task of the worldly economy is to become the mirror 
image of God’s perfect and eternal heavenly order (for example, Adam Smith’s notion of the 
invisible hand creating equilibrium on the capitalist market is an example of divine providence in 
secular guise).120 This ideology produces what he calls “the paradox of glory,” insofar as glory, 
“the uncertain zone in which acclamations, ceremonies, liturgies, and insignia operate,”121 “is the 
exclusive property of God for eternity, and it will remain eternally identical in him, such that 
nothing and no one can increase or diminish it; and yet, glory is glorification, which is to say, 
something that all creatures always incessantly owe to God and that he demands of them.”122 
Because God doesn’t lack anything, he cannot be glorified through productive activity: the 
instrumental rationality of the worldly economy can in itself never be a mirror reflection of his 
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being. It has to be supplemented by a fundamentally inoperative sphere of glory that—in a 
paradoxical performative gesture similar to the sovereign exclusion—presupposes his perfection 
and short circuits it with the economic realm by glorifying it, becoming the ultimate driving 
force towards totalized production and bureaucratic administration, in other words, western 
modernity.123 It is this glorified economy that Agamben calls oikonomia, “a pure activity of 
government that aims at nothing other than its own replication.”124  
With the theory of glory, Agamben develops a functional equivalent of the Lacanian 
symbolic as the order of castration, lack. If for Lacan the secret of the symbolic is that it’s held 
together by an empty signifier, Agamben similarly claims that the apparatus of glory is 
inoperative, and therefore “finds its perfect cipher in the majesty of the empty throne. [...] The 
void is the sovereign figure of glory.”125 Film noir makes this empty performativity of glory 
visible through the tacked on endings that execute the symbolic norms of the Hollywood 
Production Code against the logic of the noir universe that emerges precisely out of the 
autoimmune crisis of the symbolic order, that is, through the decline of the apparatus of glory. 
Crucially, it is the arbitrary sovereign violence of the noir protagonist that indirectly reestablishes 
the sphere of glory as the glory of a particular (white patriarchal) bios, even if in most of the 
examples above the male hero himself is not allowed to participate in the subsequent symbolic 
rituals of glorification as they occur at his expense (such as the demonstration of police force that 
produces a dead heterosexual couple in in Out of the Past or Gun Crazy). The central male 
characters of Double Indemnity, The Killers, and Out of the Past take this into account by 
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sending their messages from a place where they are already dead, so to speak, to a masculine 
community that receives them yet never fully acknowledges the men’s sovereign role, 
abandoning them to existential solitude, madness, or death. Two more examples can elucidate 
this division further.  
In Scarlet Street (1945), a middle aged bank teller, Chris, with a boring petty-bourgeois 
life and painterly ambitions falls in love with a prostitute, Kitty, after he saves her from what he 
misrecognizes as a mugging attempt but what is in fact a dispute with her pimp/boyfriend. The 
gullible man is then conned by the two criminals who exploit his obsession with the femme 
fatale, persuading him to gradually give her his life savings, his paintings, and even embezzle 
money from the bank. When Chris finally catches Kitty with her boyfriend and realizes he’s been 
duped, he stabs her to death with an icepick in a raging moment of temporary insanity. The next 
day, ridden by guilt, he is waiting for the police to arrest him but to his surprise the officers 
coming to see him in the bank only ask about the money he took from the cash desk. Since his 
boss, a gentlemen with a great deal of understanding in such matters (“Was it because of a 
woman, Chris?”) doesn’t want to press charges, he is free to go (although he is fired from his 
job, of course). He is also not convicted for Kitty’s murder as all the evidence incriminates the 
pimp who is sentenced to death and is executed soon after. Tortured by the hallucinated voices of 
his victim, desperate for not being able to tell the truth to anyone, he withdraws into the solitude 
of a dark hotel room where he tries to hang himself—in vain as the hotel staff saves him in the 
last minute, offering yet another example of noir’s homosocial telepathy. The final scenes show 
him years later, living homeless on the street as a local madman, the police kicking him out of a 
park for the night and gently mocking him behind his back for his obsession with a murder he, 
they think, didn’t commit. This rejection of Chris by the masculine community, his 
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transformation into a homo sacer, a living dead, can be productively read as his identification 
with femininity; not simply with the fetishized image of Kitty as Mark Osteen argues,126 but with 
the very place of the femme fatale’s bare life behind the fetishistic male fantasy, with her body as 
death drive he killed acting as sovereign. At the very end of the film, after the incident with the 
policemen, we see Chris staring at the portrait of Kitty he once painted and what the woman sold 
to a gallery as her self-portrait. The scandalous murder of the assumed artist, of course, raised the 
price of the painting which is now sold in front of Chris’s eyes for 10000 Dollars to a female 
collector. On the one hand, this transaction wouldn’t be possible without the disappearance of 
both Kitty’s and Chris’s bare life behind the commodity-fetish living its own life without them. 
Yet, like with most voice-over narrated noirs, the viewer gets to witness the man’s exposed bare 
life at least as potentially productive (he made the painting, after all) while that of the femme 
fatale simply falls outside the boundaries of the visible and the audible: it is not her living labour 
as model and agent but the man’s sovereign act of killing her that becomes the source of the 
painting’s market value.  
 Night and the City’s (1950) Harry Fabian is also a male sovereign who ends up as homo 
sacer, abandoned and eventually killed by the masculine community he helped to create. As a 
small time grifter he makes a living by abusing the trust of others, specializing in faking male 
camaraderie. London, the film’s noir city of choice is populated by crooks just like him to the 
point where the only honest people around seem to be naïve foreigners—Harry’s primary targets. 
He manages to convince one of them, the Greek wrestling legend Gregorius that he is interested 
in setting up a club glorifying traditional Greco-Roman wrestling where he would not tolerate the 
decadence of modern fighting spectacles like the ones run by Gregorius’s gangster son Kristo. 
His real intention, of course, is to manipulate the old man into challenging his son’s arrogant 
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celebrity wrestler into a “match of honour” with the Greek champion Gregorius brought along. 
While he knows that he is playing with fire by risking a confrontation with Kristo, he assumes, 
correctly, that all the son wants is for his father to remain ignorant about the corrupted realities of 
for profit wrestling going on under his nose. He agrees to the fight as long as Gregorius doesn’t 
get hurt, as long as the old man believes the fight is honourable. Yet, to set up such a bubble of 
glory in the biopolitical camp of the noir city takes more than just the presence of a naive 
symbolic father figure. To raise the money for the fight, Harry has to act as a sovereign by 
cheating one woman and stealing from another, neutralizing their labour and treating them as 
homo sacer in support of his masculine games. Ironically, his eventual downfall is caused by his 
schemes working all too well, leading to a premature fight between the future opponents started 
by Kristo’s bully who takes Harry’s suggestion to provoke the Greeks a little too far. Gregorius 
steps in and wins honourably but dies out of exhaustion afterwards. This shows all too clearly 
that in classical noir the three, inconsistent layers of capitalist patriarchy, the ignorant symbolic 
father (Gregorius) standing for glory, the homosocial techniques of inherent transgression (the 
gansgsters), and the sovereign (Harry) cannot be represented on the same plane, that they are 
traversed by a fundamental inconsistency mediated/neutralized thorough the topology of separate 
levels.127 This is what Kristo’s furious response to his father’s death aims to restore: his putting a 
price on Harry’s head starts a city-wide manhunt that makes all the hustler’s male friends betray 
him. The only remaining shelter is offered by the woman he once loved but whom he robbed and 
abandoned for his sovereign break. But even there he refuses to share her homo sacer status and 
disappear from the masculine order of capital, making instead one last attempt to have the 
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gangsters recognize his sacred life as part of the homosocial community: he wants to collect the 
money on his own head and then give it back to his girlfriend he stole it from, undoing through 
its open recognition the illicit sovereign act that brought together the brotherhood now hunting 
him. In other words, what he wants is to glorify his sovereign act, to reveal the entire economy 
built on it as fundamentally inoperative. In his tragicomic blindness to his own role he doesn’t 
realize that what he is asking for is structurally impossible: his sovereign decisions are both the 
conditions of possibility for the immunized consensus of the city to emerge and have to be 
foreclosed to cover up that community’s lack of solid foundation. This is why Harry’s fate is 
sealed the moment he even offers such symbolic reconciliation: without saying a word, Kristo 
orders his henchman to quickly strangle him and throw his body into the Thames. This way film 
ends without the restoration of Hollywood’s glory, which should come as no surprise since the 
director, Jules Dassin was blacklisted in America during the production of Night and the City in 
England.   
  
2.1.4 Cinema’s Feminine Gesture and the Sovereign-Image of Masculinity 
Noir’s male protagonist, therefore, often ends up in the place of the feminine homo sacer, 
abandoned by his peers to cover-up the dependency of the male community on his sovereign 
violence. What is not to be missed here is that the logic of this temporal sequence is circular. In 
The Killers, for instance, the Swede's fatalistic acceptance that he could be killed anytime at the 
beginning of the film is caused, in a paradoxical temporal loop, by an event in the future, after 
his death when he will have punished the femme fatale through his proxies. It is his fatalistic 
identification with the female homo sacer’s life not worth living that performatively leads to her 
sovereign exclusion that will have been the condition of possibility for her sacred life. In other 
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words, the Swede identifies with the femme fatale qua homo sacer in order to turn her into one, 
to facilitate her punishment, yet he publicly denies his agency in the matter, acting like he was 
paralyzed by primordial, irredeemable guilt: “There ain’t anything to do […] I did something 
wrong, once.” (the word once does not refer here simply to the past but to what will have been). 
The noir hero’s voice-over can also be read this way as a fatalistic message to a future past, the 
function of which is to perpetuate the sovereign oikonomia by hiding behind the mask of a man 
wounded by it. His wound is his non-reciprocal message to the brotherhood, the mark of his 
sovereign crime repressed by the homosocial community it helps to create. Fatalism is therefore 
the meta-ideology through which film noir grounds in the masculine regime of sovereign 
violence against women by endlessly presupposing it, covering up its necessary inconsistency 
and founding crisis by acting as if it were always already there in men’s dark past. Fatalism is 
film noir’s version of phallic jouissance through which the masculine body politic gets off on its 
sinful self while excluding the feminine subject from this ritual of guilt-ridden self-glorification. 
It is through fatalism that, as Fabio Vighi puts it, “film noir enjoys its symptoms.”128 In 
Deleuzian terminology, noir fatalism constructs crystal images of time, points of “indiscernibility 
of the real and the imaginary, or of the present and the past, of the actual and the virtual.”129 It 
produces the time of modernity itself (the time of abstract labour), time in a “pure state” as the 
missing transcendental link between the isolated masculine individual’s (real) jouissance and the 
constellated (imaginary) homosocial community of his fellow monads, between the atemporal 
order of drive and the order of desire based on linear, progessive temporality. The connection is 
made through men’s sovereign capacity to become homo sacer, to inflict deadly wounds upon 
themselves in the name of a perverse law in front of which they are always already guilty, 
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thereby offering the masochistic jouissance of the petty-bourgeois white male flesh as the 
embodiment of productive life as such, the bios of zoe that capitalist biopower needs to keep its 
oikonomia running.130 As Agamben puts it, “sovereignty is, after all, precisely this ‘law beyond 
the law to which we are abandoned,’ that is, the self-presuppositional power of nomos.”131 
For this reason, if there is a truly subversive form of femininity specific to the noir 
universe it cannot be simply identified with the homo sacer as patriarchy’s absolute victim. If 
noir’s sovereign masculinity is nothing but the masochistic articulation of his own sacred life, 
men absolutizing the power of their own law by falling victim to it, then to embrace some 
unrepresented, absolutely other feminine capacity to be hurt by the force of law that is refusing 
to be silenced would simply return us to the sacred life of noir’s sovereign man who is already 
precisely such “feminine” excess of the masculine regime, repressed by the community yet 
incessantly making itself seen and heard by them.132 Either way, we can say with Lacan that such 
a hidden essence of Woman, i.e. of the femme fatale (Woman as a Marxian fetish) doesn’t 
exist;133 in capitalism, all sacred life with a sovereign voice is masculine, the rest is simply 
marked for potential execution.134 Consequently, if there is any alternative to this masculine 
logic in film noir it has to undermine the male hero’s fatalistic presupposition and perpetuation 
of the very system of capitalist sovereignty. A move towards this direction is Pippin’s reading of 
Phyllis Dietrichson’s unexpected breakdown at the end of Double Indemnity: 
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In the first place, Phyllis, who has come to represent the ineradicability of a remorseless, 
self-serving, and so always fated presence of evil in human life, shoots her partner, but in 
the name of a sudden discovery of at least something like love, does not finish off Walter 
with a second shot, surprising herself and him. (MacMurray is surprised but not too 
much, though. He coolly takes the gun from her, which she meekly surrenders, then kills 
her as she embraces him.) We have come to expect from her what she clearly expects 
from herself—unremitting self-interest, her destiny—and her own genuine puzzlement at 
what she does not do, what in effect gets her killed, figures the puzzlement of the 
viewers.135  
Phyllis falls victim to the internal contradiction of her death drive: while it is a drive towards 
self-valorization, it simultaneously undermines the social condition of all capitalist value, that is, 
membership in a productive community. Contrary to Walter who performs here a sovereign act 
proper, Phyllis remains frozen into what Lacan calls a gesture, an arrested movement suspended 
in time. Lacan sees the origin of gestures in a paralyzing encounter with the enigmatic gaze of 
the Other (recounting the ancient myth about Medusa’s gaze). What immobilizes the body, he 
suggests, is the sense of visibility without the knowledge of what the subject is for the Other. In 
order to unfreeze herself, one has to imagine being part of a meaningful “picture,” an imaginary 
scene satisfying the Other’s desire that in turn offers coordinates for possible action. Such picture 
emerges in what Lacan calls “the moment of seeing” that “sutures” the gesture back to the realm 
of temporal progress by “warding off” the “evil eye” of the Other into the realm of the symbolic, 
thereby making it castrated, part blind, part seeing.136 The passage from gesture to the picture 
therefore corresponds to the Oedipalization (i. e. immunization) of the subject in the scopic 
                                                 
135 Pippin, Fatalism in Film Noir, 104. 
136 See Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts, 116-18. 
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dimension, taking partial control of the signifier qua gaze by offering it self-images that are 
incomplete, their lack activating a desire for one signifier more, one more picture. If, as Lacan 
famously claimed, “a signifier is what represents the subject for another signifier,” in the field of 
vision it is an image (qua mise-en-scene of desire in which the subject imagines herself to be 
“photo-graphed”137 by the gaze) that represents the subject for another (the next) image. And, of 
course, this is precisely why psychoanalytic film theorists like Christian Metz talked about the 
imaginary signifier of cinema instead of simply reducing the screen to the imaginary qua 
complete ego-image the child faces in the mirror stage: “while the mirror instituted the ego very 
largely in the imaginary, the second mirror of the screen, a symbolic apparatus, itself in turn 
depends on reflection and lack.”138 
 Where Lacan’s genealogy of images nonetheless digresses from the apparatus theories it 
later inspired is the slightly different role he attributes to the “suture.” As I have argued in the 
Introduction, in Lacanian film theory suture names the retroactive moment of signification 
whereby the place of the spectator-subject as the absent cause of the film’s structure gains a 
positive representation (enters the picture), leading to the deferral of the lack she stands for to a 
different spatiotemporal location, thus serving the development of the narrative. In short, suture 
is the name for the passage from imaginary to symbolic, from the spectator trapped in the mirror 
stage facing a scene of completeness she is absent from towards an Oedipalized subjectivity 
where she is sutured into the image as its constitutive lack. By contrast, Lacan seems to talk 
about suture qua passage from gesture to image in a more primordial sense, as a condition of 
possibility not only for the temporality of narrative (the symbolic sliding of the imaginary 
signifier) but also “the moment of seeing” a coherent image at all, that is, the imaginary of the 
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mirror stage where the subject is fixed into an image.139 In other words, gesture seems to fall into 
the domain of the real.   
Interestingly, it is not a Lacanian but Agamben who investigates the gestural origins of 
images in the cinema. He posits a similar opposition between gesture and image to Lacan’s, 
claiming that “on the one hand, images are the reification and obliteration of a gesture (it is the 
imago as death mask or as symbol); on the other hand, they preserve the dynamys intact (as in 
Muybridge's snapshots or in any sports photograph).”140 That is to say, just like Lacan he sees in 
the image the Hegelian Aufhebung (sublation) of the gesture that both maintains and eliminates 
its inner tension. Contrary to Lacan, however, he privileges gestures over images, going as far as 
claiming that “[t]he element of cinema is gesture and not image.”141 Gestures, he argues, exhibit 
mediality without meaning, they are “means without an end,” communicating nothing other than 
communicability.142 By becoming images, he asserts, gestures lose their pure potentiality and 
become commodified in the society of spectacle.143  
Agamben doesn’t offer a detailed analysis of how this transformation occurs, but I 
suggest that reading his film-philosophy together with the Lacan’s model of the suture can 
provide an answer. As I have already indicated, the conclusion of the Lacanian theory of the 
image is that once Oedipalized, our ordinary (desiring) life starts to function in a cinematic 
manner, as a movement from one mise-en-scene of the self photo-graphed by the gaze to another. 
While psychoanalytic film theory took note of this, perhaps most exhaustively Kaja Silverman in 
                                                 
139 If anything, the elaboration of suture in Seminar XI seems to link the emergence of the imaginary to the 
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her The Threshold of the Visible World,144 the conceptual filter for this school of thought has 
been Althusserian since Jean-Louis Baudry’s seminal essays introduced the cinema as an 
ideological apparatus.145 This means that the cinema has been understood as just one among 
many modern disciplinary apparatuses—a reading that ignored the unique anti-ideological 
potential in its very redoubling of life’s already existing moving image on film. Such redoubling 
through the screen has either been read as an imaginary mirror deceiving the viewer (in 
Baudry)146 or as a symbolic playground where various cultural masks (or as Silverman puts it: 
“poses”)147 of the self are put into play—a site of ideological fantasies in both cases. And despite 
a theoretical shift in the 90s towards the Lacanian register of the real by Joan Copjec,148 Slavoj 
Žižek,149 or Todd McGowan,150 these scholars have not theorized the screen itself as real, as the 
uncanny double of our ordinary mise-en-scenes of desire.  
I propose that such understanding of the screen as real in the Lacanian sense is offered by 
Stanley Cavell, who draws attention to the strange realism cinema derives from the fact that it’s a 
“succession of automatic world projections,”151 that its images are of a world that, contrary to 
ordinary reality, is not created through dialectical mediation by the viewer.152 “In screening 
reality, film screens its givenness from us; it holds reality from us, it holds reality before us, i.e., 
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withholds reality before us.”153 For this reason, Cavell argues, “[f]ilm is a moving image of 
skepticism: not only is there a reasonable possibility, it is a fact that here our normal senses are 
satisfied of reality while reality does not exist—even, alarmingly, because it does not exist, 
because viewing it is all it takes.”154 In Lacanian terms, the reality that does not exist on screen is 
the one mediated by Oedipalization, the mise-en-scene the subject places herself into for the gaze 
of the Other qua the alienated piece of herself she imagines watching her. Strictly speaking, the 
cinematic image is therefore not an image in the Lacanian sense. It is rather a gesture that 
momentarily stops the moving image of the viewer’s life by screening a world that is not for her, 
not for anyone in particular, but which is there for everyone to see. And it is this gestural 
potential of the cinematic medium that is neutralized by what I will call the meta-suture of the 
sovereign-image, the Oedipalization of cinema qua means without end, its integration into chains 
of signification grounded in a sovereign topology. The stake of this meta-suture is not the 
passage from imaginary to symbolic image as in the suture described by apparatus theorists, but 
the passage from the real of gesture to the domain of the image as such, from a non-signifying 
semiotic to (phallic) signification proper.  
It is against such suture that Agamben proposes that the task of cinema is the 
“decreation” of images through the means of repetition and stoppage.155 While his favoured 
examples are early cinema and the experimental films of Guy Debord, I suggest to consider the 
autoimmune metagenre of film noir as an example of decreation of the classical Hollywood 
narrative insofar as its mobilization of the logic of the death drive leads to the gestural stoppage 
of signification. On the part of the male protagonist, it’s perhaps more appropriate to talk about a 
gestural hesitation in the moment of absolute freedom preceding his sovereign suture back to the 
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territory of the image as it’s highlighted especially well in films like The Maltese Falcon or Gun 
Crazy. In the examples above it is the femme fatale who embodies gestural stoppage proper, 
most often against her will like Laurie in Gun Crazy whose action of shooting at the police is 
stopped by her husband killing her before she could pull the trigger. It is Bart’s sovereign deed 
that sublates her gesture of pointing a gun and repeatedly yelling “I’ll kill you!” into an image: 
through a sovereign moment of seeing he re-joins the patriarchal apparatus as its fatally guilty 
prodigal son, his fantasy image captured in the final glorious overhead shot of the police walking 
up to his dead body. This way he is able to capture, at the price of his death, “in a separate sphere 
the inoperativity that is central to human life,” make it work for the glory of what Agamben calls 
“the governmental machine” of oikonomia.156 If Laurie’s gesture nonetheless carries a utopian 
hope it’s because it reveals that not all of the existing population can be captured in the 
mechanism of capitalist sovereignty even though, at least in film noir, all of them might want to 
be. Or more precisely, not all of them can be sovereign because all of them want to be, because 
sovereignty is necessarily based on the exclusion of some life not worth living.157 
Double Indemnity is interesting insofar as it goes further and explores the feminine 
consciousness of the gestural and the possibility of choosing it against the masculine-sovereign 
act. I suggest reading Phyllis’ stoppage together with what I called the inoperative fatalism of 
Kathie in Out of the Past—inoperative being another Agambenian name for means without an 
end.158 While both femmes fatale see themselves as egotistic sociopaths pursuing only their self-
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interest, choosing jouissance over the Oedipalized society by orchestrating the murder of the 
father figures in ther lives, to commit their transgressions throughout the film they had always 
needed the help of a male patsy.159 This is why the final confrontation with their masculine 
doubles has a more primordial dimension and is ultimately a move towards ontological self-
sufficiency, that is, sovereignty. However, as Pippin suggested, the radical indeterminacy of the 
noir universe where individuals are separated from communal norms doesn’t lead to self-
transparency but to self-opacity. Or, in biopolitical terms, the gap between the unique life-
enjoyment one has and its articulation/valorization as political life is unbridgeable without a 
reference to a virtual entity (to some figure of the Lacanian big Other). Walter can only leap 
through this void with the help of the sovereign presupposition of the superego gaze of perverse 
masculine community (including the viewer) that always already has punished him for the illicit 
act he is just about to perform, and the punishment for which exposes his life-enjoyment as 
sacred, vulnerable, but, paradoxically, valued as such. The illicit crime in his presupposition, of 
course, has to do with the arbitrary (rather than substantiated) demonization and sovereign 
exclusion of the femme fatale from that constellated masculine community. Therein lies the 
fundamentally conservative function of noir’s sovereign-image: it sutures together and 
strengthens the boundaries of a social order that is already supposed to exist. By contrast, Phyllis 
cannot rely on such presupposition despite the fact that she initially clearly wants to. Her attempt 
at sovereign fatalism fails simply because the hegemonic biopolitical body of her time consists of 
petty-bourgeois white heterosexual men like Walter. Her sovereign threats fall back on her, they 
are turned inoperative much like Kathy’s, disconnecting rather than conjoining the actual and the 
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virtual dimensions of her life. Instead of covering up the missing foundation of modern biopower 
they unintentionally expose them, laying bare its contradictions. And before she dies, Phyllis 
reflects on her disconnect from what she thought were her own sovereign motives: “No, I never 
loved you or anybody else. I’m rotten to the heart. I used you just as you said until a minute ago, 
when I couldn’t fire that second shot. I never thought that could happen to me.” Her response is a 
gesture of embrace, communicating nothing but the desire to connect, which, however, is 
rejected by Walter (“Sorry baby, I don’t buy it.”) who shoots her dead.  
The proper Lacanian name for Walter’s dismissal is disavowal; it refers to an act of un-
seeing something that is in front of one’s eyes by substituting for it a fetish, in this case, that of 
the specter of the eternally evil Woman, the objet a the masculine subject separates himself from. 
It is by offering such fetishistic disavowal that film noir sutures the viewer into its sovereign-
image, making him ignore cinema’s gestures in front of him. For Lacan, disavowal is the form of 
denial specific to perversion, which he distinguishes from the less drastic repression, a symptom 
of neurosis, and the more radical foreclosure that accompanies psychosis. The three layers of 
denial are mobilized in film noir’s white heterosexual male dominated biopolitical regime 
against different forms of life. While disavowal is directed against femininity, blackness, as 
Morphet and Lott demonstrated, is rather foreclosed; it returns only in the real in the form of the 
hallucinatory noir mise-en-scene itself. And finally, what film noir represses is male 
homosexuality, which means, in a Foucauldian manner, that while explicit male to male 
intercourse is prohibited, illicit homoerotic and homosocial desire is constantly produced through 
this very prohibition as the self-enjoyment of the male bios.  
 To sum up, the sovereign-image of masculine perversion and the femininie gesture of its 
utopian subversion are two contradictory aspects of the death drive film noir puts into play. 
87 
 
Sovereignty offers a meta-generic biopolitical support to the multitude of Hollywood’s generic-
immune communities through the flesh of a perverse white male brotherhood whose desire for its 
feminine other is suspended in favour of an endless performance of self-positing. Noir femininity 
qua male fantasy, homo sacer as the bare life of the femme fatale is “exclusively included”160 in 
this regime: violently expelled but through that very same gesture also constituted as a 
transcendental, unrepresentable, purely virtual force that the male sovereign’s drive to make his 
sacred life seen and heard is pitted against. By contrast, the femme fatale’s subversive potential 
becomes visible when we shift to her actual perspective and note that she aims to follow the 
masculine example but hits the invisible walls of sovereign exclusion (value dissociation), 
generating a utopian hope for a different, non-sovereign and non-capitalist paradigm of life as a 
byproduct. This also means that while in its masculine use the death drive produces crystal 
images of time, showing us time as a transcendental a priori of commodity producing patriarchy, 
the feminine breakdown of the time image into a gesture points towards a subject of drive 
beyond capitalist temporality. This brings the question whether noir also offers an autonomous 
form of femininity beyond the experience of the femme fatale’s failed masculinity, one in which 
the time of bourgeois life is permanently suspended. To explore this question, we have to 
consider whether a different relationship to the abstract-disciplinary dimension of the modern 
symbolic order is possible, one that is not based on the logic of sovereign immunization. This is 
the possibility that the late Lacan explores in his Seminar XX. 
 
2.2 Noir Sovereignty’s Utopian Alternative: The Feminine Logic of Snow Noir 
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2.2.1 Feminine Jouissance as Film Noir’s Utopian Impulse 
 I’d like to propose that the utopian dimension associated with film noir femininities 
insofar as they don’t conform to the masculine notion of the femme fatale can be productively 
read through the late Lacan’s model of sexual difference already mentioned in relation to noir’s 
indeterminacy. This theory is often misunderstood as yet another ideological binary of 
psychoanalysis where instead of Freud’s outdated biologism it is now essentialized linguistic 
constructs that justify the unequal treatment of men and women.161 What Lacan calls sexuation, 
however, is not only not based on anatomical difference, but it also doesn’t simply designate the 
social (discursive) construction of gender. Instead of referring to particular symbolic categories it 
relates to the symbolic order as such, to the set of signifiers that constitute a language insofar as 
it is always necessarily incomplete, lacking, unable to signify itself (we always need one signifier 
more to do this ad infinitum). Based on this premise, Lacan, first of all, locates the human 
subject as such in the place of the big Other’s (the social symbolic order’s) fundamental lack, 
point of inconsistency. Second, he calls the exceptional signifier that fills the very same place the 
phallus; it is what signifies the very inability of the symbolic to close upon itself. Third, he 
proposes that there are only two, radically incompatible relations to the phallus (or master 
signifier) that subjects can have and these are responsible for one’s sexuated position. In 
patriarchal-Oedipal societies162 man is the name for someone who has control over phallic 
signifiers that suture subjects into the field of the symbolic by turning their own constitutive 
negativity (lack) into positivity through the performative magic of the phallus, exchanging their 
vulnerability for power over society’s dominant discourses. On the one hand, master signifiers 
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such as father, family, nation are empty; they are symbolic manifestations of nothing (they are in 
themselves inoperative as Agamben would say). Yet, this is precisely the reason why they also 
help those who control them to evoke the semblance of something substantial (real). Lacan 
suggests that the alternative to this masculine having the phallus qua signifier is the feminine 
being the phallus qua remainder-lack, the real that cannot be symbolized—two mutually 
exclusive positions which leads him to conclude that men desire precisely what they are not, that 
is, woman as the phantasmatic embodiment of lack (objet a) whereas women want the phallus 
they cannot have. Crucially, in this early framework both male and female subjects acquire 
jouissance through the mediation of the phallus. What Lacan calls feminine masquerade is 
precisely the phallic enjoyment available for women who can claim unsanctioned possession of 
master signifiers by imitating the masculine rituals associated with them.163 In the previous 
sections I have outlined the biopolitical edifice supporting phallic signification, emphasizing that 
its symbolic dimension (such as the Hollywood Production Code) capturing glory is always 
supplemented by the immunized life of an imaginary community (the level of fantasy in Lacan’s 
system), and how the whole apparatus has to be grounded in a sovereign decision made in the 
place of the system’s undecidability (what Lacan calls the void of the real). Jouissance is 
produced here always through some imaginary articulation of the real against the ignorant gaze 
of the symbolic.164  
 In his later work, however, Lacan complicates his previous formulations by introducing 
an additional, non-phallic jouissance on the feminine side that he calls “Other-jouissance” or the 
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“jouissance of being,”165 through which women relate to the big Other “insofar as it is barred,”166 
without this bar (lack) in the symbolic—the source of the subject’s enjoyment—being mediated 
(signified) by the phallus to give the illusion of completeness. This doesn’t mean that Lacan 
posits what he calls the feminine logic of “non-all” as independent from the phallic function 
(Φ),167 his name for the masculine apparatus of sovereignty.168 In his formulas of sexuation 
(Figure 4.) both the masculine (left) and the feminine (right) positions are still defined in relation 
to this phallic function. However, the first line of the formulas reverses his earlier claims by 
suggesting that it is the feminine position that follows the phallic logic without exception while 
the masculine side is not fully submitted to it. Still, Lacan’s paradoxical conclusion in the 
following line is that it is nonetheless woman, despite her complete alienation in the symbolic, 
who escapes full subordination to the phallic apparatus while man, despite his partial freedom 
from it, gets caught in it entirely.  
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Figure 5. 
Žižek proposes to resolve this apparent contradiction by turning to topology, emphasizing 
how Lacan places phallic jouissance and the symbolic order on two different levels of reality: 
“What Lacan designates as the 'phallic function' is this very splitting between the domain of 
phallic enjoyment and the desexualized 'public' field that eludes it - that is to say, 'Phallic' [the 
phallic function] is this self-limitation of the Phallus [the phallus as signifier], this positing of an 
Exception.”169 He thereby turns phallic into a synonym for what Esposito calls immunization. 
Consequently, he argues, all men are caught in the phallic function not despite but because they 
maintain an imaginary distance towards their own public-symbolic mask of power, i.e. the 
phallus as signifier. They enjoy this very ironic distance from it in an immunized (but, we might 
add, always potentially autoimmune) space of exception where they imagine having the real (as 
opposed to merely symbolic) phallus, the enjoyment-substance that would make up for the hole 
                                                 
169 Slavoj Žižek, The Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Woman and Causality (New York: Verso, 1994), 153. 
92 
 
in the symbolic order. Such a semblance of the impossible fullness and self-sufficiency of the 
social (expressed in the noir hero’s fatalism), of course, “merely ‘gives body’ to the 
impotence/inconsistency of the big Other.”170  
By contrast, Žižek interprets the feminine non-all as the position from which the subject 
“'sees through' the fascinating presence of the [real] Phallus, that she is able to discern in it the 
'filler' of the inconsistency of the big Other.”171 She is able to do this because all of woman is 
submitted to the phallic function without an immunizing exception; that is, woman cannot but 
know that there isn’t such a thing as the real phallus in men’s possession because her bare life is 
placed outside that supposedly complete universe that the jouissance of the male flesh closes 
upon itself. One might say that it is this knowledge that constitutes woman’s Other jouissance, 
however, Lacan is quick to add somewhat enigmatically, such knowledge cannot be articulated 
directly as it doesn’t exist in the symbolic; it rather “ex-sists” (or “insists” as Žižek puts it);172 it 
can only be experienced through the body.173 Once we try to make this excess sovereign, we end 
up reproducing the femme fatale as man’s double whom he kills so that he can take her place. As 
the bottom right corner of the formulas indicate, Lacan conceptualizes feminine jouissance (the 
subjectivity of the Woman who ex-sists) as a non-phallic relation to the social symbolic order, 
embracing a big Other that includes its lack instead of positing one that is blind to it; a symbolic 
that is inconsistent and therefore open to any form of bare life precisely because none of them 
could complete it. For this reason, Lacan’s claim that “there is no such thing as a sexual 
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relationship”174 means that the feminine and the masculine logic of sexuation represent two 
contradictory but, despite the masculine side’s best efforts, equally failed totalizations of the 
symbolic order as well as two irreconcilable ways to enjoy its lack. Sexual difference then is the 
Lacanian name of a fundamental deadlock of symbolization that accompanies every subject 
position,175 masculine (sovereign) and feminine (utopian) alike, destabilizing each through the 
exposure to the other’s incompatible way of making sense of the very same (inconsistent) 
universe, pushing them repeatedly to either support sovereign power’s oikonomia or, to use 
another Agambenian term, “destitute it,” “to rake away its legitimacy, compel it to recognize its 
arbitrariness, reveal its contingent dimension.”176  
Other jouissance is what femmes fatale like Phyllis Dietrichson or Kathie Moffat started 
to exhibit the moment when they fell out of the fetishistic role designated for them by the 
masculine imaginary, the role of the subject supposed to enjoy, the uncastrated Woman who 
supposedly has full access to phallic enjoyment.177 By not following this fatalistic script, they 
made their male counterpart’s act of sovereign violence appear arbitrary, even ridiculous. But 
doesn’t this mean they are tamed into the opposite noir stereotype, that of the nurturing woman 
who, as I have suggested, plays the role of the subject supposed to believe taking, presumably, 
the symbolic rituals of patriarchy at face value instead of the members of the masculine 
                                                 
174 Ibid., 144. 
175 As Žižek puts it, “sexual difference is not some mysterious inaccessible X which can never be symbolized but, 
rather, the very obstacle to this symbolization, the stain which forever keeps the Real apart from the modes of its 
symbolization.” Žižek, Plague of Fantasies, 278. 
176 The Invisible Committee, To Our Friends, trans. R. Hurley (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2015), 75. 
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community (including the viewer)?178 As Nicholas Christopher summarizes, such female 
character is usually depicted as 
unrelievedly pallid and passive—to the point of repulsing us, as well as the hero. She is 
most often the girl back home, or the faithful, long suffering wife, or the steady fellow 
worker at the office, or the platonic friend futilely in love with the hero. She is very much 
not a denizen of the night. In fact, she tends to be portrayed in the few daylit, pastoral 
scenes in film noir, usually with flat, high-key lighting, in the kind of wide open spaces to 
which the femme fatale would be a rare visitor, indeed.179  
In other words, she is a subject who is not supposed to enjoy, not even supposed to know about 
enjoyment (about the male hero’s dealings with the femme fatale), which makes her one of the 
names of the father, only instead of standing in for the primordial (real) father of the superego 
she plays the role of the castrated and blind symbolic one. While such woman is undoubtedly a 
reactionary fantasy, what’s crucial in films like Out of the Past or Double Indemnity is that she 
appears outside of her designated sphere as a layer of the femme fatale’s persona that contradicts 
her stereotypical mask of evil, exposing the ontological inconsistency of Woman qua male 
fantasy, turning it inoperative, that is to say, useless for the apparatus of patriarchal sovereignty. 
Insofar as Lacan maintains that “jouissance is what serves no purpose,”180 it is the feminine logic 
that embraces jouissance as such, and the masculine logic is nothing but a defense against this 
feminine enjoyment of inoperativity by turning jouissance into a building block of an operative 
                                                 
178 As Manon notes, “noir's central fantasy: the notion of an utterly oblivious "public eye," corresponding to that of 
the average citizen in the real world outside the theater, who does not know that s/he does not know.” Manon, 
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the figure of the nurturing woman. 
179 Nicholas Christopher, Somewhere in the Night: Film Noir and the American City (New York: The Free Press, 
1997), 198. 
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machine. For the phallic logic, (feminine) enjoyment is split up into two operative components, 
supposed enjoyment and supposed belief—two feminine roles that that appear on two different 
(real and symbolic) levels of reality. When Lacan talks about feminine jouissance as Other 
jouissance and jouissance of Being, this means that enjoyment that he in his early work 
positioned in the real as a state of exception from the big Other can now appear, in a feminine 
form, at the level of the symbolic itself precisely because it collapses the phallic topology of 
separate levels.  
 This indicates that there may also be more to noir’s nurturing woman than the above 
quote from Christopher suggests, that just like the femme fatale she might at times fall out of her 
designated operative role as a passive believer in the power of patriarchy. The atypical noir 
heroine of the “working-girl investigator” identified by Helen Hanson in films like Phantom 
Lady (1944) or The Dark Corner (1946) is a case in point insofar as she typically is an assistant 
platonically in love with her male employer, but after the man is falsely accused of a crime, she 
puts on the mask of the femme fatale and descends into the underworld to find the real culprit 
and clear the boss’s name. Phantom Lady is particularly interesting because it juxtaposes two 
contradictory deployments of the feminine gaze in the same protagonist, Carol “Kansas” 
Richman. One of them is her excessive and seemingly naive adoration of his boss, the refusal to 
believe that the man could commit a crime, which is framed in a series of close-ups of her 
troubled face reading the news about his arrest, looking worried while the man is being convicted 
in court, and watching his resignation to his fate in prison with pithy. Later, however, as she 
progresses with her investigation her gazing becomes both sexualized and threatening: she now 
uses it to stare at a false witness for hours to break him psychologically, seduce another to find 
out what he is hiding, and check out his boss’s body while he is not looking. And, although the 
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eventually cleared male protagonist’s decision to marry Kansas can be interpreted as an attempt 
to re-assign a rigid role to her (probably away from the masculine sphere of wage labour), the 
actual proposal that closes the film is more ambiguous. The boss records it at the end of his usual 
dictaphone message about the daily tasks for his secretary to which the woman listens in his 
absence: “You know you’re having dinner with me tonight, and tomorrow night, and the next 
night... and then... every night!” Here the record gets stuck repeating the words “every night” ad 
infinitum, while the camera closes in on Kansas’s face looking upwards in ecstasy, pulling the 
speaker close to her chest. I propose not to read her enjoyment (merely) as a phallic one, gained 
through the mediation of the master signifier controlled by the male hero. The uniqueness of this 
ending lies rather in its decreation of the phallic signifier of bourgeois marriage through its 
endless repetition that brings out what Lacan calls “the being of signifierness” which he 
identifies as the source of feminine jouissance. As he puts it, “that being has no other locus than 
the locus of the Other (Autre) that I designate with capital A,” that is to say, the jouissance of 
such being is not based on a phallic exception.181 This is also why Lacan maintains that feminine 
enjoyment belongs to a subject who is “non-all,” that it delineates an “indeterminate existence” 
belonging to an “infinite set” instead of the finite one totalized/closed off by an exceptional 
phallic signifier.182  
2.2.2 Sexual Difference as Utopian Program? 
 If Lacan’s theory of feminine jouissance opens up utopian possibilities for the non-
masculine reading of the femme fatale as well as the nurturing woman, the question nonetheless 
remains whether, to use Fredric Jameson’s Blochian distinction, film noir also offers something 
                                                 
181 Lacan, Encore, 77. 
182 “When I say that woman is not-whole and that that is why I cannot say Woman, it is precisely because I raise the 
question (je mets en question) of a jouissance that, with respect to everything that can be used in the function ɸx, is 
in the realm of the infinite.” Ibid., 103. 
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like a utopian program in addition to the utopian impulse or hope expressed from within the 
confines of the masculine world. What the former, according to Jameson, “all have in common, 
[...] besides the Utopian transformation of reality itself, is that closure or enclave structure which 
all Utopias must seemingly confront one way or another. These Utopian spaces are thus on 
whatever scale totalities; they are symbolic of a world transformed; as such they must posit 
limits, boundaries between the Utopian and the non-Utopian.”183 What we are looking for, 
therefore, is the space within which noir femininities stop functioning as the symptom of the 
masculine-sovereign universe and become instead the rule in an autonomous and self-sufficient 
totality opposed to the standard masculine logic of film noir, a totality that gains its closure effect 
from this very antagonism rather than from valuing any particular form of life. It should be 
emphasized, however, that Jameson does not suggest that utopian programs are actual blueprints 
for future societies to come: “Utopia is not what can be positively imagined and proposed, but 
rather what is not imaginable and not conceivable. Utopia, I argue, is not a representation but an 
operation calculated to disclose the limits of our own imagination of the future, the lines beyond 
which we do not seem able to go in imagining changes in our own society and world (except in 
the direction of dystopia and catastrophe).”184 Lacan’s theory of feminine jouissance, I claim, is 
just such a utopian program. If from the masculine perspective femininity is the symptom of the 
phallic order (its inclusive exclusion that supports it from the outside through its very exclusion), 
with the feminine logic of language Lacan formulates how the same society would look like 
from its symptom’s perspective, with the very mechanisms that turned it into a symptom still 
present but put out of order. Such an operation is properly unimaginable from a masculine 
position of the status quo. Yet, even the activation of this utopian (feminine) imagination beyond 
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the everyday (masculine) ideological imaginary only leads to contradictions. Utopias can be 
critical apparatuses not because they offer an actual alternative to the present but because they 
draw attention to how the same symbolic order can always be totalized in antagonistic ways.  
 
2.2.3 Freezing Capital's Masculine Dialectic: The Utopian Program of Snow Noir185 
 Snow is a rare substance in film noir primarily because it illuminates the gloomy mise-en-
scene too much, breaking with stylistic conventions of chiaroscuro lighting by exchanging the 
creeping shadows threatening to engulf the doomed protagonists for a more redemptive vision of 
universal brightness. As Ken Hills argues, the noir universe is based on the scarcity of light as a 
resource. After Augustine, he distinguishes between two forms of light: lumen, “the objective, 
inexhaustible, intelligible, and divinely created radiance passing through and illuminating 
space,” (which Hills identifies with Enlightenment universalism in the modern era) and lux, 
“lumen’s earthly reflection,” light in its culturally mediated form.186 The human in this 
framework “is a light also lit by light,” which—insofar as this circular economy of lumen and lux 
is a perfect example of the paradox of glory—can be rephrased as: humans perceive God’s 
(Enlightenment’s) glory but they are also supposed to glorify God (work on their own 
enlightenment).187 If we take light as a metaphor for the ineffable substance of glory, film noir’s 
autoimmune crisis of the symbolic order appears as the crisis of the universal light supply 
(lumen), which is resolved through light’s sovereign privatization (as lux) for a masculine body 
                                                 
185 My use of the term was inspired by the following article: Ian Buckwalter, “Snow is the New Noir: In Praise of 
Wintery Crime Films,” The Atlantic, December 10, 2012, accessed February 28, 2016, 
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films/266007/.  
186 Ken Hillis, “Film Noir and the American Dream: The Dark Side of Enlightenment,” The Velvet Light Trap no. 55 
(2005): 9. 
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politic. By contrast, snow noir imagines a world in which such limitation doesn’t occur and light 
belongs to everyone. 
Snow, of course, is also a pure manifestation of the eternal noir trope of death as 
everyone’s inevitable destiny, yet, as I will show, its power to freeze life curiously works against 
the noir heroes’ already death driven sovereign transgressions of immunized social norms. 
Within the unique constellation of what can be called the snow noir universe, the frozen 
landscape, much like death itself, is not a cruel fate’s punishment for the inherently flawed 
human condition as in traditional noir’s masculine fantasies but rather a sign of grace marking 
the exit from the Paulean vicious circle of sin, the perverse dialectic of the law and its sovereign 
exception that noir characters are caught within. As a decreation and “profane illumination” of 
the canonical noir image into a realm of gesture, the apparently dystopian spectacle of snow noir 
with its mythical space and time isolated from the rest of the world by eternal winter carries an 
unexpected message of hope. The desolate, icy locations of these films symbolize not simply the 
temporary suspension but the permanent deactivation of the law of the father, allowing for a 
utopian articulation of feminine jouissance not captured in noir’s masculine apparatus of 
compulsory transgression. The frozen landscape of these films is the result of a negation of 
negation. It’s a feminine utopia that undermines the official phallic symbolic order’s constitutive 
sovereign exception, that is, the temporal dialectic of the Oedipal law between pure time and 
productive time, in the name of an atemporal/eternal feminine non-all, universality without 
exception.  
 Snow noir is even less of a genre in Altman’s sense of the term than film noir itself and, 
as I will show in the next chapter, it cannot even be considered a cycle until the mid-90s. We are 
talking about a few isolated examples at the fringes of classical noir that represent a common 
100 
 
utopian agenda in negating noir’s masculinist ideological and stylistic traits. One of the 
paradigmatic snow noirs of the classical era is Nicholas Ray’s On Dangerous Ground (1952), a 
film that sets up the mise-en-scene for its second act by inverting the shadowy urban cityscape 
that dominates the first half of the film into a bright, snowy countryside. This is the destination 
where Wilson, the sadistic detective protagonist is sent on a temporary exile for enjoying beating 
up his suspects and his women little too much even for the cynical standards of the city’s rather 
unscrupulous police force. As he is driving away from the suffocating metropolitan core, 
however, instead of a sublime landscape of nature yet to be tainted by forces of progress he 
encounters what Edward Dimendberg calls the centrifugal forces of modernity: highway 
constructions, commuter trains and a steel bridge signifying the inevitable link of the small 
village community stirred up by the murder of a little girl with the already corrupted 
(modernized) centripetal space of the noir city. Upon the detective’s arrival, the dark fate of the 
countryside is foreshadowed by an overhead shot of the bridge that reveals a local lynch mob 
passing underneath, hunting for the killer.  
 Historically, as Dimendberg argues, this shift in noir’s favored territories can be linked to 
the increasing decentralization and suburbanization of American cities after 1949, which replaces 
the former noir sensation of being overwhelmed by and getting lost in the urban crowd with 
anxieties over perpetual motion and disorientation in a vast space without established 
landmarks.188 In Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, the new suburban sprawl involves capital’s 
dialectic of deterritorialization and reterritorialization; in order for it to move away from the 
city’s center, the remaining pre-modern territoriality of the countryside has to be destroyed, 
preparing the ground for its reterritorialization. The film maps this duality in capital’s movement 
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through its male protagonist who is both the representative of the city’s expanding symbolic law 
and the agent of its deterritorializing sovereign suspension. Lacking a conventional femme fatale 
opponent to undermine his endeavour, he is notably different from the typical noir hero who 
usually fails to maintain the appearance of phallic authority. In a larger historical context, Wilson 
is an example of what Michael Kimmel calls marketplace manhood, a modern American gender 
performance that has its roots in the mid-19th century when men had to adapt to the endless 
pressures of market competition. In this environment they developed a split consciousness, 
showing calmness, strength and independence on the outside while remaining restless and 
agitated on the inside, suspicious of any achievement, preparing for newer and newer tests of 
their manhood. Such dynamics produced its own ideology of sexual difference, the “flight from 
the feminine,” starting with the son’s repudiation of his dependency on the mother which then 
extended to the devaluation of femininity in the self and in the other, marking it as “sissyness.” 
The individual’s quest for real manhood, of course, is a goal that can never be reached as traces 
of unmanliness always remain that are continuously scrutinized and challenged by the gaze of a 
masculine community.189 In Kimmel’s model, therefore, it is the market that is responsible for 
the autoimmune turn of the homosocial and the individual’s sovereign quest for the real phallus.  
 The different functions of the feminine and the masculine gaze in Ray’s film are linked to 
the two moments of marketplace manhood’s dialectic and to its dual role in reterritorialization 
and deterritorialization. When Wilson interviews the mother and sister of the victim in their 
family home, he performs the reassuring patriarchal role expected from a male representative of 
the law (his authority is further emphasized by his towering figure making the much shorter 
women somewhat uneasy). Their “talk” about the case is then quickly interrupted by the barging 
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in of the murdered girl’s father who doesn’t want to waste time with formalities and quickly 
sends the women and children away, revealing his intention to lynch the perpetrator instead of 
bringing him to justice. Wilson doesn’t reply but when the two men step outside and look at each 
other again, a smirk appears on his face establishing a homosocial pact to transgress the limits of 
the official symbolic law he pretended to stick to only in front of the subjects supposed to 
believe. Accordingly, what follows is the detective’s frantic car chase after the killer into the 
wilderness, intensified by the impatient shouting of the bloodthirsty father on the passenger seat, 
leading the two men beyond territoriality. Their homosocial lynching ritual, however, is undercut 
when the car swerves off the road, which is now fully covered in snow, hiding the traces of the 
fugitive. After a short walk through the woods they happen upon an isolated house amidst the 
vast frozen landscape where they find a blind woman, Mary, the killer’s older sister who 
dedicates her life to taking care of her mentally retarded brother. Her Biblical name is 
appropriate for her saintly persona of love and forgiveness that offers sanctuary to her fallen 
sibling from the murderous rage of the village posse. Like the heavy snow before, the presence 
of the woman’s blind yet perceptive gaze derails Wilson’s quest further, confusing his gender 
performance as his sturdy façade doesn’t seem to have any effect on Mary who sees him as an 
embittered, broken, but ultimately kind hearted man, decreating his masculine self-image into 
inoperative gestures. Hers is the same all seeing and emasculating gaze the femme fatale has in 
the usual noir scenario, except it is now framed by a different symbolic regime, de-fetishized 
from its role in the masculine imaginary as the perverse superego underside of the symbolic law 
that pushed men over the edge towards a real-impossible manhood.190   
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It is the pressure and the enjoyment of this constant sovereign flight from the feminine 
that snow noir’s redemptive woman dislocates men from. Wilson, of course, doesn’t fully 
abandon his sadistic urge to kill, never openly conceding Mary’s request to take her brother 
alive, nor does Danny let go of his own sovereign-murderous impulse entirely. Their encounter 
nonetheless leads to a temporary feminine bond between the existentially disillusioned detective 
and the social outcast mentally ill boy. In their former noir scenarios now left behind for the 
snowbound sanctuary both of them played the sovereign murderer/abuser of femmes fatale for 
which both of them were abandoned by their local masculine communities. When they finally 
meet, the two men stare at each other as if they were looking into the mirror in a suspended 
showdown, both of them ready to use their weapon but never getting around doing so. Yet again, 
it is the father’s arrival that interrupts the potentially non-antagonistic scene of exchanging 
gestures, reactivating the economy of the superego that drives the boy off a cliff into his 
designated place in death. He is pushed outside the rapidly expanding territory of capital with the 
assistance of the masculine law that needs its illicit sovereign support such as Danny’s crime to 
remain irredeemable. Significantly, this arbitrary biopolitical separation of Wilson and Danny 
has to do with their relation to women. While in the first half of the film we see Wilson 
physically abusing femme fatale characters and thereby successfully exercising phallic control 
over them, Danny’s confession that his murderous outburst was motivated by his sense of 
inadequacy in front of a girl gets marked by the patriarchal regime as sissyness, and becomes the 
ultimate reason why he has to die (a “real man” like Wilson would have just raped or beaten the 
girl). 
 Wilson himself also flees from the feminine back to the city, which is how the original 
script ended the film, in an appropriately downbeat manner for its noir aspirations. Nicholas 
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Ray’s final version, however, adds what appears to be (at least in noir terms) a tacked on 
sentimental twist by having the male protagonist return to the countryside and live with the 
woman offering him redemption from his dark past happily ever after.191 Such a closure is 
certainly suspicious, fitting into the ideologically loaded centrifugal shift in the second half of 
the classical noir cycle when the femme fatale gradually losses her central role192 and the focus 
of crime films shifts to the suburbs where the ideological restoration of the bourgeois family is 
taking place towards a new postwar society of affluence and conformism.193 Yet, On Dangerous 
Ground doesn’t quite fit this paradigm as Mary’s lonely house on a snowbound hill where the 
couple withdraws into remains outside capital’s new centrifugal territoriality: the final panning 
shot of the icy landscape surrounding it lacks any sign of human civilization. At the same time, 
this strange non-place also resists deterritorialization; unlike all that is solid in Marx’s famous 
metaphor, this frozen country refuge emphatically does not melt into air. For this reason, it’s 
more appropriate to describe the film’s snow noir universe as what Jameson calls a utopian 
enclave, an imaginary by-product of modernization “dependent on the momentary formation of a 
kind of eddy or self-contained backwater within the general differentiation process and its 
seemingly irreversible forward momentum.”194 In this case it’s a rural utopia (but not an idyll as 
it barely has any living plants or animals) where time stands still (or, rather, time is dislocated 
from the temporality of abstract labour), appearing against the background of the increasing 
disappearance of the American countryside due to the expanding forces of capitalism that 
previously concentrated in urban centers.  
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The film’s mobilization of a Lacanian feminine symbolic to map this utopian space is 
thus an attempt to negate the masculine dialectic of capital’s expansion in a historical moment 
when its wheels are changing directions. It is by seeking newer and newer sovereign exceptions 
from its shifting territorializations that the machine of the Oedipal law’s masculine dialectic 
(ultimately, as Deleuze and Guattari suggested, the machine of capital itself)195 moves forward, 
running in circles after its own tail. By contrast, the feminine logic of non-all eliminates the 
space of exception by collapsing the two functions of the gaze, the universality of the symbolic 
and the real as its sovereign exception into one body of feminine jouissance based on a 
paradoxical singular universal.196 This is how in the film, Mary is able to see despite being 
physically blind; she sees the gestures beyond the arbitrary differentiations (images) set up by the 
ruling social order that take the police brutality of Wilson as the tolerated extension of the force 
of law while positioning Danny’s retarded body, his impotent outburst of sovereign violence on 
the side of feminized lawlessness. For her, the two men are equally worthy of forgiveness 
regardless whether the particular life-enjoyment they are caught up in is sanctioned by an 
immunized community or marked as its abnormal excess to be destroyed. This is why one should 
not all too hastily dismiss the film’s final turn to Christian ideology as sentimental Hollywood 
kitsch. Mary’s prayer for her dead brother has a utopian connotation directed against the perverse 
death drive of noir’s sovereign masculinities, identified here as sin: “Father, hear my prayer. 
Forgive him. As you have forgiven all your children who have sinned. Don’t turn your face from 
him. He didn’t know what he was doing. Bring him at last to rest in your peace . . . which he 
could never have found . . . here.” This plea to the symbolic father function of the masculine 
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regime not to look away from the jouissance exclusively included in it performatively turns the 
entire apparatus of sovereign power inoperative, making possible, as Agamben would put it, 
another use of the law197 through the deactivation of its (auto)immunizing topology, thereby also 
suspending capital’s masculine dialectic of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. 
It’s worth comparing the close-up of Mary’s face during her prayer to the shot of 
Kansas’s ecstasy at the end of Phantom Lady. On the one hand, to paraphrase Lacan’s assertion 
about Bernini’s Ecstasy of St. Teresa, “[the viewer] immediately understand[s] that [Kansas] is 
coming,”198 that is, she is getting off on the inoperative “signifierness” of language. By contrast, 
Mary’s face has the small twitches and contortions that betray her resentment of the phallic 
regime that made her powerless, that treats her like a subject supposed to believe (the policemen 
don’t tell her the details of Danny’s death, making her believe his fall into the abyss was an act 
of God). We could say that resentment is how feminine jouissance appears to the masculine 
regime that misidentifies it as the affect of what Nietzsche called slave morality, a trick the weak 
play on their masters by claiming that their impotence expressed through humility and 
compassion makes them morally superior.199 On the final images, however, resentment 
disappears from Mary’s face as she embraces the returning Wilson, a man she cannot see and 
therefore cannot glorify as a figure of patriarchal authority like noir’s nurturing woman but 
whom she can love as the non-phallic (inoperative, castrated) Other. 
 If On Dangerous Ground’s snowy utopia intervened into the noir canon by hijacking its 
centrifugal movement and suspending the efficacy of its phallic dialectic, an earlier, no less 
paradigmatic snow noir from the classical era, It’s a Wonderful Life (1946), follows the opposite 
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logic. Here it’s the explosion of the noir formula that temporarily erases the anti-capitalist 
enclave of the small town of Bedford Falls, a menacing force standing in for capital’s centripetal 
momentum that threatens the countryside with its gravitational pull towards the urban center, a 
direction that, according to Dimendberg, dominated American architectural planning as well as 
noir films between 1939 and 1949.200 This should be added to Kaja Silverman’s critique of the 
film that emphasizes how it conforms to the era’s “dominant fiction” by rejecting the male hero’s 
youthful dreams about international travel and big city life in favour of the established reality of 
a small town bourgeois family.201 These official layers of the symbolic law at the time, including 
the sanctity of heterosexual marriage and the petit-bourgeois family business should be 
understood rather as presupposed elements of genre games against which the superego pressure 
to abandon these very norms could be posited. Therefore, the fact that George Bailey expresses 
his desire to flee to the city and live as a bachelor several times yet never manages to realize his 
plan in fact goes against the dominant ideology. His inability to leave, of course, frustrates him; 
he considers himself the victim of a rather outdated patriarchal social order where his given word 
to his father to take over his loan business, much like the company’s commitment to finance the 
local community’s housing needs regardless of solvency, offers little to no profit, undermining 
his chance of a real manly adventure. The patriarchy dominant in the film is therefore strangely 
asexual, detaching itself from its libidinal support, forming a homosocial community markedly 
different from the hyperphallic lynch mob in On Dangerous Ground. As Silverman notes, it is 
filled with “castrated men” and “weak fathers” such as the George himself or his forgetful Uncle 
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Billy who loses a company cheque of 8000 dollars while walking around with a crow on his 
shoulder (even Potter, the town’s capitalist tycoon is a cripple).202  
 The specter of real (marketplace) manhood appears only as an external force intruding 
from the city, for instance in the phone call that Mary, George’s soon to be wife receives from 
Sam, their common childhood acquaintance, now finance capitalist and the girl’s official suitor. 
Mary is rather indifferent to the man’s advances and utilizes the event instead to divert the 
attention of her own inept love interest (George) from his travel plans using her feminine charms. 
On the one hand, the shot of Sam on the phone in his office in New York is styled after typical 
noir imagery: the dark city with neon lights in the background half covered by venetian blinds, a 
woman wearing a fur coat holding a drink and a cigarette leaning over her man’s shoulders to 
bite his ear while he tries to keep her away from the telephone. He jokingly expresses his 
jealousy about George’s presence in Mary’s house while at the same time offering him an 
investment opportunity in the city. Meanwhile, the spatial arrangement of the couple at the other 
end of the line is quite different; George is too disoriented, unable/unwilling to hold the phone 
alone so Mary steps in, the two of them having now an equal opportunity to listen and talk, both 
of them repeating the phrases of Sam’s investment pitch with a hollow tone, taking upon 
themselves its form (it’s signifierness) emptied of masculine jouissance, playfully diverting the 
funds towards the weird universe of Bedford Falls and their inoperative bourgeois marriage to 
come (Sam agrees to fund the Bailey company). They drop the receiver and start kissing, while 
George cries out the last vestiges of his sovereign masculine desire: “I don't want any plastics, I 
don't want any ground floor, and I don't want to get married-ever-to anyone ... I want to do what 
I want to do!” Then we immediately cut to their marriage ceremony as a possible example of 
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what Deleuze calls masochistic humor, “the downward movement from the law to its 
consequences” where “the very law which forbids the satisfaction of desire under threat of 
subsequent punishment is converted into one which demands the punishment first and then 
orders that the satisfaction of the desire should necessarily follow upon the punishment.”203 
Marriage is George’s “punishment”, not for his failure to succeed in the city as the masculine 
paradigm would frame it but instead of it—a different use of the law made possible by the 
suspension of the superego’s vicious circle of transgression and guilt (deterrotorialization and 
reterritorialization). As a result, his former opposition between the territoriality of the feminine 
countryside and the masculine deterritorializing force of the city collapses into a new space 
where the two become indistinct, exemplified by the couple’s new house the interior of which 
Mary transforms, with the help of some props and travel posters, “into a comic condensation of 
all the locations George has dreamed of visiting.”204  
 Such utopia, which develops into an alternative to the capitalist mode of production 
through Bailey Park’s community financed non-profit housing project, nonetheless continues to 
be vulnerable to the return of the film’s primordial father figure, Potter, who steals the cheque of 
8000 dollars that Uncle Billy drops on his lap, hoping to put an end to the Bailey’s anomalous 
enterprise and get his hand on some cheap real estate. When George hears the bad news on 
Christmas Eve, he collapses under the suddenly returning weight of guilt to the point that he is 
ready to end his life by jumping off a bridge into an ice cold river. He is saved, however, by the 
divine intervention of his guardian angel Clarence, who, in order to convince him that his life is 
worth living, shows George what Bedford Falls would have become had he not been born. Not 
surprisingly, without the hero’s feminine gestures, the town, now called Pottersville, turns into a 
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full blown noir nightmare with lives broken by urban isolation, prostitution, and alcoholism. It is 
this temporary irruption of the noir impulse, the bleak vision that pushes George’s masculine 
deterritorializing (death) drive to its logical conclusion that retroactively establishes the film’s 
snowy Christmas noir universe as its utopian obverse. In this nightmare sequence, similarly to 
film noirs like Scarlet Street, his failure to become a real man is expressed through his comic 
inability to die, being forced to wander around as a living dead in the noir realm of his youthful 
sovereign fantasies where, since he has finally left behind the symbolic entirely, he doesn’t exist, 
his acts can have no effect on the world. Unlike canonical noir films, however, It’s a Wonderful 
Life presents this lonely place of the abandoned sovereign hero as the result of his choice 
between two alternative visions of the symbolic based on different uses of George’s bare life. 
Clarence’s divine intervention, what Silverman sees as the “celestial suture”205 saving the hero 
from complete self-erasure,206 is therefore less a taming ideological move towards the dominant 
fiction as it is a narrative device that reveals the disavowed feminine Other of noir’s masculine 
fatalism. In fact George returns home when he decides to pass through, after his symbolic 
suicide, what Žižek calls a second death in the real,207 negating also the sovereign-masculine 
attachment to his idiosyncratic enjoyment. By doing this he abandons the superego’s pressure to 
seek out a fantasmatic other space where he could discover his true manhood. As a result, he 
embraces not only his own nonconformity with the normative masculine ideal hitherto 
determining his life but, as Silverman notes, affirms lack on a more fundamental level, as 
constitutive of the symbolic order as such: when he enters his house, he kisses the broken 
bannister knob, is excited to see the fallen petals of his daughter’s flower, etc.208 True, the last 
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scene effectively reunites the heterosexual couple in front of the Christmas tree evoking the 
iconography of the Holy Family (with the “weak” patriarch George nonetheless in the center).209 
But the finale perhaps more significantly also evokes another Biblical story with a more radical 
message, the tale of loaves and fishes, insofar as the poor local community unexpectedly comes 
up with more than enough donations to save George from jail and keep his non-profit 
organization going. As in the case of On Dangerous Ground, what is utopian here is not the 
capitalist sublation of lack into surplus (a maneuver that Silverman, after Lacan, rightly identifies 
as the phallic procedure par excellence),210 but the attempt to think to two together without 
separating them into two distinct realms.  
 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 Not all of film noir’s redeeming women have utopian connotations, however. Without the 
reorganization of noir’s signifiers towards an alternate symbolic universe, these women tend to 
remain trapped in their patriarchal role as domestic opposites of the femme fatale like the 
nurturing women in The Killers or Out of the Past. The utopian potential of film noir can be 
realized only if the distinction between femme fatale and redeeming woman collapses, when the 
contradictory role of these two characters becomes juxtaposed—a potential always present in 
film noir. It can happen when the femme fatale’s failure to perform a sovereign decision due to 
her exclusion from the hegemonic biopolitical body underpinning the patriarchal law stops being 
marked as failure to become a man and appears instead as an autonomous relationship to the big 
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Other that bypasses the masculine logic of sovereign immunization. The two snow noir films 
above are formal experiments in this direction. Like traditional film noirs they offer a non-
generic use of the Production Code but instead of submerging into a space of meta-generic 
sovereignty, they take the opposite approach and shifting to Christian discourse they overidentify 
with the inoperativity at the heart of Hollywood’s glory, offering the universal efficacy of its 
gestures as the truly subversive alternative to a masculine world of mandatory transgression, 
driven by the sovereign valorization of one’s unary trait. This is how the very egalitarian 
symbolic excess of bourgeois marriage, untamed by homosocial immunization, can be a slippery 
slope to communism in It’s a Wonderful Life, just like the prayer of On Dangerous Ground’s 
blind heroine, not limited by any patriarchal church institution can blow up the biopolitical 
apparatus it formally evokes. By drawing up a utopian double to Hollywood’s already uncanny 
dark mirror image, these films expose the radical contingency of film noir’s fatalistic libidinal 
economy, challenging its masculine-sovereign totality with an antagonistic formulation of the 
symbolic from a feminine perspective.  
 The utopian program of classical snow noir does not offer a radical alternative to the 
dominant fictions of white supremacist bourgeois society; it merely turns their commodity 
producing patriarchal bias inoperative by rejecting the masculinist flight from the fetishized 
feminine, that is, capitalist value-dissociation. It sets up an atemporal universe outside of the 
forces of modernity, refusing the temporality of wage labour. By affirming all human life as 
valuable, this perspective comes very close to that of the Marxian proletariat, of those who have 
nothing but their potential labour power (their bare life) as opposed to those who have actualized 
this potential through sovereign immunization and whom in this dissertation I will refer to as the 
petty-bourgeoisie. In a way noir shows how the biopolitical construction of this hegemonic bios 
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occurs prior to class struggle proper qua antagonism between working class and bourgeoisie: the 
enigmatic third class of the petty-bourgeoisie (usually referred to as the “middle class” in 
America) groups precisely those whose life the sovereign apparatus sanctioned as productive 
(their potential labour power is actualized) yet they don’t own the means of production. 
Although they don’t belong to the ruling class in an economic sense, they subscribe to the 
bourgeois ideology of value: instead of the living labour all human beings are capable of, they 
attribute its source to various metaphysical and moral (ultimately: sovereign) phantasmagorias 
(the market, manifest destiny, masculinity, white supremacy, etc.). It is this bourgeois 
perspective that noir fatalism stands for, managing, as Paul Arthur notes, “to subsume any 
contradictions it raises concerning class society under issues of individual deviance and guilt.”211 
In other words, film noir presents value-dissociation as the moralizing discourse that constructs 
the masculine petty-bourgeoisie as the hegemonic biopolitical group of value production. Noir’s 
petty-bourgeois white male hero emerges as the sovereign-immunizing limitation of the 
multitude of potential labourers, and this limitation also obfuscates the real source of capitalist 
value, ultimately identifying it with a self-enjoyment of white heterosexual masculinity. By 
contrast, snow noir offers a perspective that is indifferent to the spectacle of sovereign manhood, 
the phallic commodity “walking itself to the market,”212 viewing it only as one of many, equally 
valuable forms of life. 
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3 Neo-Noir and the Deterritorialization of the American Empire 
 
3.1 The Aftermath of Fatalism: Subtractive Gestures in the Film Noirs of the 
60s and 70s 
 
3.1.1 What is Neo-Noir?   
 Before moving on to film noir’s post-classical period, it’s worth looking at a film called 
Odds Against Tomorrow (1959) for its unique racial politics that is perhaps the best symbolic 
marker of the end of the initial noir cycle. What strikes the eye immediately is that high contrast 
expressionist lighting doesn’t dominate the film; its sporadic presence is counterbalanced by sun 
lit images of a not so noir city (an elderly criminal is peacefully feeding pigeons in the park and 
there is even a scene at the zoo with children) and a not so idyllic countryside (the small town 
location of the climactic heist is surrounded by heavy industry). The trees don’t have leaves but 
it’s hard to tell whether it’s fall or spring: we’re somewhere in-between. While, as Andrew 
Spicer observes, the tendency to move away from high contrast aesthetics is common in late 50s 
noirs,1 Odds Against Tomorrow is nonetheless unique for other reasons: next to its traditional 
misanthropic white loner protagonist played by Robert Ryan it adds a black central character 
(Harry Belafonte) with an equal amount of screen time and subjective narration. As a reflection 
of the ongoing civil rights struggles of the era, their story is not of friendship but extreme 
mistrust fuelled by white racist bigotry. Interestingly, the film ends with the mutual destruction 
of the black and white male sovereign: they turn on each other while running from the law; their 
bullets blow up the chemical plant they were hiding in a spectacular blast that lights up the noir 
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night. Drawing on Julien Morphet’s and Eric Lott’s theory, the film can be productively read as 
the return of noir’s primordially repressed (foreclosed) racial antagonism, where the emergence 
of black bodies as equal citizens desublimates their former abstraction into urban shadows, 
unravelling the whole libidinal economy at the core of the classical cycle. With Odds Against 
Tomorrow noir’s expressionist aesthetic loses its innocence, so to speak, and the deadly bright 
light putting an end to it signals the return of lumen, as if the wrath of God were punishing the 
warring sovereigns for appropriating lux for their own glory. 
This is a diversion from the classical noir universe where bright lights, although posing 
similar danger to criminal protagonists, tend to be associated with the authorities forcing the noir 
heroes to step out of the shadows and give themselves up. As such, they stand for the lux of the 
normative social order. At the end of the cycle, however, films like Odds Against Tomorrow 
introduce the threat of light at a different level, arguably that of lumen. The late noir Kiss Me 
Deadly (1955), for instance, summarizes this threat in an iconic image of a nuclear blast that 
ends the film, the deadly beams of light threatening not just the protagonists but the entire noir 
universe.2  
While America’s age of anxiety, the breeding ground of noir, arguably continues after the 
50s due to intensifying cold war paranoia and internal political turmoil, most critics agree that 
the initial noir cycle runs itself out by the end of the decade: as middle class women are forced 
back into the household, the cinematic femme fatale gradually loses her central role,3 and crime 
narratives move to the suburbs (as well as to the preferred medium of their inhabitants: TV)4 
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where the ideological restoration of the white patriarchal family is taking place, building a new 
society of petty-bourgeois conformism. After the late classical noirs like Odds Against 
Tomorrow or Kiss Me Deadly openly indict America’s nihilistic (autoimmune) biopolitics, the 
question of sovereignty, the founding violence of the post-war consensus, becomes buried under 
a new generic displacement of the noir formula. A good example of this shift is former noir 
director Otto Preminger’s Anatomy of a Murder (1959), a film that depicts the consequences of 
atypical noir violence (rape) against its femme fatale-esque heroine in a small town holiday 
resort—a countryside already transformed by capital’s centrifugal expansion. Contrary to 
classical noir, the film recounts the events from the perspective of the local community rather 
than sticking with the point of view of the male perpetrator—a failed sovereign in noir terms (he 
didn’t finish the job), who is nonetheless shot dead by the victim’s jealous and revengeful 
husband at the beginning of the film. The plot is then not about the rapist’s but the murderer’s 
trial and eventual acquittal by the town jury (an outcome unthinkable for the classical noir 
criminal): they rule “temporary insanity” because evidence shows him regularly beating his wife 
in raging fits of jealousy as the woman is known for her loose behaviour with tourists in the local 
bar. What is reconstructed in court is a “noir” world underneath the quotidian small town life 
where housewives turn into sex crazed “femmes fatale” while their husbands are desperately 
trying to reassign them to their proper place through misogynist violence.  
Unlike in classical noir, however, this violence is not arbitrary (driven by the subject’s 
inoperative jouissance) but ritualized; it is explicitly supported by members of the male 
homosocial community either by actively participating in it (rape) or looking the other way: the 
rapist’s bartender employee covers for his boss while the man takes his victim for a ride, the 
defense attorney helps his client to hide the traces of domestic violence, etc. The trial itself is no 
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exception from this paradigm. Instead of exposing the injustices underpinning the town’s 
masculine biopolitical body (a goal pursued only by the outsider district attorney’s unbending 
application of the penal code), the community, in an act of patriarchal self-immunization, decides 
to cover them up by designating the murdered rapist, essentially no different from any one of 
them, as a scapegoat to divert attention from systemic abuse. Their act recalls Freud’s tale about 
the sons’ collective murder of the primordial father that grounds “civilized” patriarchy,5 except 
that here women play along as well: the rape victim protagonist agrees to domesticate 
(desexualize) her appearance during the trial, readily accepting the social persona the community 
assigns to her like no noir femme fatale ever would. As a result, her brute husband goes free, 
likely to continue beating her up from time to time when she slips out to get drunk with tourists 
in the local bar to escape the prison of her bourgeois home (when we see her after the trial she is 
back in her tight seductress outfit flirting with the defense attorney). In other words, we move 
from the death driven equality of bodies in the noir zone of indistinction to their playfully 
performed inequality in a generic community.  
 Elements of the former noir universe similarly come to signify the repressed libidinal 
excess of suburban bourgeois life in a series of early 60s films of various genres that also exhibit 
some of noir’s stylistic traits (black and white photography, deep focus, chiaroscuro lighting, 
hallucination and dream sequences, etc.), without venturing into the territory of noir sovereignty 
proper. In Cape Fear (1962), an ex-con sex offender, Cady (played by noir icon Robert 
Mitchum) is terrorizing the family of the small town prosecutor who once put him in jail, 
threatening to rape both his wife and teenage daughter as revenge. Significantly, this resurfacing 
of the noir threat in the figure of the intruder (following thriller conventions) merely gives body 
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to that diffuse sense of anxiety the female members of the lawyer’s family have already been 
feeling in their domestic confinement. One emblematic scene shows the young daughter, Nancy, 
exiting her school with a group of girls, about to be driven home by her mother whose car is 
parked right outside. As the children walk towards the gate, the camera moves down from high 
angle and settles behind the bars of the school fence, giving the momentary impression that the 
girls are locked in a cage. Once they leave the premises, all of them quickly enter the cars of 
their parents and leave, except for Nancy whose mother is late running errands while leaving her 
car by the school. When the girl realizes she is alone on the street without protection, she 
anxiously looks around for a potential threat. However, it’s only after she takes refuge in the car 
that a reverse shot finally shows Cady approaching in the distance, emphasizing how the intruder 
is a fantasmatic correlate to feminine spaces of confinement.  
At the end of the film, it is the family and the town officials’ collective effort that traps 
and murders the ex-convict, projecting on him, much like in Anatomy, the role of the sovereign 
he was careful to avoid playing all along (always sticking to the letter of the law in public). They 
lure him into the swamplands outside the town limits, pushing him to reveal his true nature while 
he thinks he is not being watched by representatives of the symbolic order. And when he does 
they kill him, repressing their own community’s founding sovereign violence he came to stand 
for, allowing it to continue in a sublimated, “civilized” form through the everyday devaluation 
(and fetishization) of feminine life. Significantly, the lawyer protagonist asks his wife to give 
him the final go-ahead for Cady’s extermination, offering her what Lacan called a forced choice 
between “the Father—or worse,”6 between the voluntary confinement in the patriarchal 
bourgeois family led by her husband or the exposure to sovereign violence that underpins it. The 
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third, utopian alternative, the permanent dislocation of her and Cady’s bare life from the sphere 
of bourgeois society—a potential once present in film noir—is missing here entirely.  
Moreover, Cape Fear’s turn to high contrast aesthetic and its choice of a white homme 
fatale to serve as the amalgamation of contemporary threats to the suburban bourgeois family 
while setting the plot in the Deep South is also a conscious repetition of the classical cycle’s 
erasure of African-American presence. The desire to repress the sovereign crime of the classical 
noir hero (a role associated with Robert Mitchum) is realized through his lynching as a stand in 
for southern blacks the civil rights movement is now threatening to desegregate. This means that 
contrary to classical noir where arbitrary terror against the formally equal femme fatale could be 
seen as a substitute for a foreclosed systemic racism,7 here there is a double repression in place 
which reframes sovereign violence as the community’s immunological reaction to an outsider. 
We move back from the order of the drive to the order of desire, or in Deleuzian terms, from the 
time-image to the movement-image: voice-overs and flashbacks are not used anymore, the linear 
progress of the Classical Hollywood Narrative is restored, subordinating cinematic time to its 
forward momentum.  
This shift is also visible in spatial relations. The classical noir narrative’s fatalistic 
trajectory worked as a one way street for its criminal male protagonist, leading him into the 
lonely room of sovereign abandonment where he was left to die or condemned to solitude by the 
homosocial community he helped to create by taking the unspeakable and unforgivable sins of its 
founding violence on himself.8 By contrast, what I propose to call “post-noir films” offer a 
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version of the Agambenian zone of indistinction that has an exit back to bourgeois normalcy. 
Spatially, these films position the noir camp at the margins of their narrative universe as a place 
of exception, supplementing ordinary suburban reality from outside of its boundaries. The seedy 
swampland of Cape Fear and the “lovers’ lane” beyond town limits in Anatomy where sexual 
violence or even murder is permitted for otherwise upstanding white male citizens find their 
equivalent in Shock Corridor’s (1963) lunatic asylum, and The Naked Kiss’s (1964) brothel or 
the children’s hospital run by the town’s pedophile millionaire. All these spaces fall into the 
category of what Foucault calls heterotopias, counter-sites to the normative social order, 
embodying its ideal or, in this case, inverted mirror image, its excess separated by a border that 
can be crossed only under exceptional circumstances, following special regulations. The function 
of heterotopias, Foucault argues, should be understood “in relation to all the space that 
remains,”9 which here means that after a short dwelling in them subjects can return to their 
normal habitat rejuvenated, with the balance of their life restored. In other words, to refer to 
Altman’s theory, post-noir’s heterotopias are generic in nature; they help to immunize 
communities by offering sites for ritualistic temporary violations of social norms, whereas the 
classical noir universe emerged out of an autoimmune destruction of the generic as such. 
As a rule, the acceptable generic transgressions in these films are pitted against the 
sovereign excess of the very same heterotopic spaces embodied by a masculine scapegoat figure 
who on the outside resembles “normal” members of the community but who carries the system’s 
incurable, autoimmune pathology that drives him too far in the exercise of homosocial violence. 
What gets lost in these post-noir renderings of sovereignty as only quantitatively different from 
sanctioned ways of blowing off steam is the fundamentally arbitrary, radically free nature of the 
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noir hero’s decision whereby he abuses and devalues feminine life. Qualifying the sovereign as a 
sexual deviant as in Anatomy, Cape Fear, The Naked Kiss, and Shock Corridor suppresses the 
noir scandal about an ordinary, “innocent” man committing heinous crimes—what Hannah 
Arendt referred to as the banality of evil.10 Post-noir films, instead of addressing the nihilism and 
fascism of modern biopower (the crimes of sovereignty), tend to limit their critique to the 
hypocrisy of post-war America’s repressed conformism within the white community,11 the norms 
of which men regularly violate through the vices of immunization. As a result, they themselves 
often end with a moralistic condemnation of feminine sexuality as a cause of male transgression 
(sanctioned and unsanctioned alike), contributing to the repression they set out to expose. For 
instance, in Anatomy there is a clear blame-the-victim narrative constructed around the rape that 
triggers the murder on trial, similarly to The Naked Kiss where the former prostitute heroine is 
cast out of the small town community in the end despite her changing her ways (becoming a 
nurse) and exposing the local pedophile. Even Shock Corridor’s exotic dancer is indirectly 
blamed for causing her boyfriend’s mental collapse as the man ends up identifying with the 
cover story he fabricated to get inside an asylum as an embedded journalist: he really starts to 
feel pathological incestuous jealousy for his “sister” impersonated by his girlfriend. While these 
moralistic conclusions should be understood as obligatory closing panels of genre games, it is 
telling that the transgressive pleasures offered to women in these films still have to do with 
patriarchal confinement: in Anatomy it’s flirting with strangers while married, in The Naked Kiss 
it’s having a sexually promiscuous past while working as a nurse in a hospital owned by a rich 
man, in Cape Fear it’s enjoying the voyeuristic gaze of a male sex offender while being 
protected by one’s husband/father, and in Shock Corridor it’s appearing in an incestuous 
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hallucination of one’s boyfriend. In other words, although sexually promiscuous women don’t 
have to die in post-noir films like in classical noir as long as they accept Oedipal repression, their 
autonomy is even more undermined insofar as they are trapped in a closed totality made up of 
the patriarchal norm and its no less male controlled inherent transgression, without a utopian line 
of flight.  
Many film noir canons either gloss over the cluster of films above or mention them 
dismissively as sporadic aftereffects of the classical noir cycle that don’t develop into a 
movement proper.12 The reason for this approach might be that they don’t signal their 
contemporariness through colour, and they also don’t fit into the paradigm of nostalgic self-
reflexivity and/or modernist genre revisionism that, most critics agree, mark the emergence of 
neo-noir proper in films like Harper (1966), Point Blank (1967) or the later Chinatown (1974).13 
According to Neale, neo-noir is the product of Hollywood’s retrospective glance at its own noir 
past, finally creating a genre proper out of the self-conscious deliberation on its loss. This genre 
producing noir nostalgia, he argues, much like the French critics’ original application of the term 
relies more on fantasy than historical facts and it very well could be a “nostalgia for something 
that never existed.”14 According to Leighton Grist, neo-noirs themselves perform a 
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“demystification” of the classical noir canon.15 By contrast, what I have called the post-noir 
films of the late 50s and early 60s should be understood as the repression of the very much 
existing sovereign violence and systematic racism that classical noir eventually laid out in the 
open. This means that Hollywood’s nostalgic deconstruction of its noir past is accompanied by 
the will not to see what was so traumatic about it, that the desire to remember is also the desire to 
forget.16  
For this reason, I suggest to divide post-classical noir into two subcategories and consider 
whether films from this period that appear to be noirs follow Odds Against Tomorrow in 
critiquing meta-generic sovereignty or repress it and withdraw to the level of generic 
immunization like Anatomy or Cape Fear.17 I have argued above that the category of post-noir 
should be used to describe the latter group, which also can be counted as a genre on its own: it 
creates a generic community by repressing the scandal of noir sovereignty, turning misogyny 
from an arbitrary biopolitical decision of an isolated individual into what philosopher Wilfrid 
Sellars called a “we-intention,” a self-evident matter of how those who are inside a community 
conduct their daily lives, separating themselves from outsiders.18 Conversely, I will use the term 
neo-noir only for films that, building on the tradition of classical noir, map out the subjectivity 
and space of sovereignty in their own historical situation that is markedly different from the 
Second World War and its immediate aftermath. In other words, in my usage neo-noir, just like 
                                                 
15 Grist, “Moving Targets,” 267. 
16 Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter but one should also consider here noir parodies already present in 
the 40s (Ride the Pink Horse, 1947; The Big Steal, 1949) and the whole problem of whether or not classical noir 
directors’ were conscious of the cinematic movement they were part of and what that reflexivity entailed. See 
William Park, What is Film Noir? (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2011), 31-37. 
17 It’s important to emphasize here that repression should not be understood according to what Foucault labeled “the 
repressive hypothesis,” that is to say, as if its aim was the elimination of libidinal excess all together. On the 
contrary, as I have argued in the previous chapter, for Foucault and Lacan it is only through Oedipal-disciplinary 
repression that spaces of modern sexuality start to proliferate by resisting and thereby stabilizing the repressive 
apparatus. 
18 See Wilfrid Sellars, Imperatives, Intentions, and the Logic of ‘Ought’ (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 
1963) 
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classical noir itself, does not designate a genre but a meta-genre. This duality evokes but doesn’t 
fully overlap with Alan Silver’s distinction between neo-noir and retro-noir, the latter of which 
standing for noirs made after the classical period that are set in the 40s and 50s and, the author 
maintains, tend to be more conservative in their gender as well as racial politics than the 
contemporary and more progressive neo-noirs.19 By and large this may be true, but this 
categorization is too rigid to distinguish between the generic (repressive) and meta-generic 
(traumatic) heritage of noir: there are films of the post-noir genre that are not retro-noirs (see 
above) as well as neo-noirs with a classical setting (Chinatown—more on this below). This 
chapter and the remaining part of the dissertation will focus on the problem of sovereignty in 
neo-noirs in the narrow, meta-generic sense. 
 
3.1.2 Decreating the Sovereign-Image in Early Neo-Noir 
 Where, then, does neo-noir proper begin? First of all, contrary to the US where the mass 
production of noir declines after the late 50s, other film industries of the world, most notably 
France and Japan, continued providing a steady supply of film noirs throughout the 60s 
incorporating the American noir heritage into their local visions of “pulp modernism.”20 
Furthermore, as Kovacs notes, the initial noir cycle also had a significant influence on the 
development of modern European art cinema, the representative auteurs of which often applied 
and deconstructed the noir form in their early films like Visconti in Ossessione (1943), 
Antonioni in The Story of a Love Affair (1950), Godard in Breathless (1960), or Truffaut in 
                                                 
19 Alan Silver and Elizabeth Ward, Film Noir: The Encyclopedia (New York: Overlook Books, 2010), 350. 
20 The term pulp modernism for noir comes from Paula Rabinowitz, Black & White & Noir: America’s Pulp 
Modernism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002) 
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Shoot the Piano Player (1960).21 While the limited scope of this chapter doesn’t allow for the 
exploration of neo-noir as an international phenomenon, this connection to European modernism 
is relevant here because it went both ways: it also helped to jump start the second cycle of 
American noir as part of the so called Hollywood Renaissance when studios, lacking any other 
profitable creative input, temporarily invested in auteur driven productions inspired by the 
modernist experiments overseas, leading to the critical revision of genre traditions. According to 
Spicer, this stage of neo-noir started in 1967 with Point Blank, John Boorman’s colour 
adaptation of Richard Stark’s hardboiled novel The Hunter in the style of Alan Resnais’s oneiric 
French new wave film Last Year in Marienbad (1961), and lasted until 1976’s Taxi Driver, in 
which Martin Scorsese exhausted noir’s modernist impulse in a definitive vision of urban 
apocalypse.22  
Theorists who subscribe to a similar periodization emphasize how revisionist noir’s 
critical self-reflexivity pushes the modernist tendencies of its classical predecessors to the next 
level by using Brechtian techniques of alienation to defamiliarize audiences with Hollywood 
conventions, making them think by undermining the position of a rational, masculine subject in 
epistemic control over the narrative, and by offering a dark mirror to American society in an 
open state of crisis after the Eisenhower-era’s suburban conformism, corporate capitalism, and 
sexual as well as political repression. The 60s and 70s bring the crisis of Keynesian welfare state 
capitalism (the abandonment of the gold standard in 1971, the 1973 oil crisis), escalation of 
racial and gendered tensions (of the civil rights movement and second wave feminism), a mass 
anti-war movement due to the failure in Vietnam, and the rise of counterculture and alternative 
life-styles as a result of a general disillusionment from the government, escalated by scandals of 
                                                 
21 Andras Balint Kovacs, Screening Modernism: European Art Cinema, 1950-1980 (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 2007), 247. 
22 Spicer, Film Noir, 130-48 
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political conspiracy (Kennedy assassinations, Watergate).23 Hollywood Renaissance noirs are 
therefore full of disaffected anti-heroes and outlaws withdrawn to the system’s margins—which 
at first sight is not that different from the role and place of the classical noir protagonist. The real 
question is, then, whether the revised spaces of exception continue to support noir’s conservative 
agenda of patriarchal sovereignty or they problematize their male subject’s fatalistic biopolitical 
support of the American Empire’s status quo and initiate instead a utopian departure from it. 
 The main problem with marking 1967 as the emergence of neo-noir is that it obfuscates 
how the strongest distinguishing feature of the new cycle, what after Alain Badiou I call “the 
ethics of subtraction,” evolves historically as a critical response to classical noir’s fatalism. 
Subtraction is Badiou’s name for the “affirmative part of negation” which he opposes to 
destruction, the “negative part of negation.”24 The aim of destruction, he argues, is to obliterate a 
given situation the subject finds herself in in order to seek out some authentic real kernel hidden 
beneath it. In reality, all this procedure can ever do is keep peeling off newer and newer layers of 
the false while chasing the phantom of truth: 
There exists a passion for the real that is obsessed with identity: to grasp real identity, to 
unmask its copies, to discredit fakes. It is a passion for the authentic, and authenticity is 
in fact a category that belongs to Heidegger as well as to Sartre. This passion can only be 
fulfilled as destruction. Herein lies its strength – after all, many things deserve to be 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 133-35.; See also Richard Martin, Mean Streets and Raging Bulls: The Legacy of Film Noir in 
Contemporary American Cinema (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 1997), 63-90., and Philippa Gates, Detecting Men: 
Masculinity and the Hollywood Detective Film (Albany: SUNY Press, 2006), 95-125. 
24 Alain Badiou, “Destruction, Negation, Subtraction: On Pier Paolo Pasolini,” lacan.com, accessed July 15, 2015, 
http://www.lacan.com/badpas.htm 
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destroyed. But this is also its limit, because purification is a process doomed to 
incompletion, a figure of the bad infinite.25 
By contrast, as Sergei Prozorov explains, “the subtractive procedure, presented by Badiou as the 
true source of novelty and thus the ‘affirmative’ element in every negation, consists in the 
production of something that is indiscernible within the negated situation, that cannot be 
rendered positive in its terms and thus avoids any engagement or incorporation in this situation 
instead of destroying it.”26 While destruction’s negative dialectic remains forever tied to the 
regime it tries to purify, subtraction, on the contrary, is able to break free by becoming 
indifferent to the question of its authenticity.27 Translating this binary into the terms used in 
Chapter 1, we could say that subtraction suspends the (auto)immune (purifying) dynamic of the 
patriarchal law that leads to a sovereign-image conjoining men’s bare life with an organic-fascist 
community. By negating this masculine negativity of immunization, subtraction opens up a 
utopian gateway to different, feminine symbolic order based on gestures rather than images, 
affirming the principle of universal equality without the limitations imposed on it by the law of 
the male homosocial bios. By contrast, destruction is the sovereign violence that is inextricably 
linked to the immunized life of a particular imagined community insofar as it can keep negating 
the inauthentic forms of life not worth living only by opposing them to a normative (masculine) 
biopolitical body it presupposes and perpetuates while operating in a state of exception from its 
laws. For example, in the finale of Double Indemnity Phyllis Dietrichson’s sudden loss of interest 
in her destructive plot turns her (briefly before she is killed) into an autonomous feminine subject 
of subtraction, while her transformation and its utopian potential goes unnoticed by Walter 
                                                 
25 Alain Badiou, The Century, trans A. Toscano (Malden: Polity, 2007), 56. 
26 Sergei Prozorov, “Giorgio Agamben and the End of History: Inoperative Praxis and the Interruption of the 
Dialectic,” European Journal of Social Theory 12, no. 4 (2009): 534. My italics.  
27 Alain Badiou, “Destruction, Negation, Subtraction: On Pier Paolo Pasolini,” lacan.com, accessed July 15, 2015, 
http://www.lacan.com/badpas.htm 
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Neff’s blind fatalism which ends up destroying her, only seeing her as duplicitous and 
inauthentic. What is not to be missed, as Elizabeth Bronfen stresses, is that Phyllis is not simply 
a victim of masculine violence but should be understood as an agent of her own fate,28 even if 
her choice is prepared by her objective exclusion from the hegemonic (masculine) biopolitical 
body of her time. Subtraction, therefore, is the opposite existential decision to sovereignty, 
avowing the freedom to break with the status quo instead of closing off any opening out of it. Put 
in the terms of Agamben’s film-philosophy, subtraction decreates the image, redeeming thereby 
its gestural dimension. As the next sections will show, the new element introduced by neo-noir 
into this equation is a male protagonist in the position of autonomous subtraction with all the 
“castrating” and potentially self-annihilating consequences the classical femme fatale had to face.   
To my knowledge the first post-classical film noir that questions the predetermined 
necessity of the male hero’s sovereign support for a fascistic biopolitical regime is The 
Manchurian Candidate (1962), a cold war paranoia thriller with a remarkable conspiracy 
narrative that exposes its fanatical right wing senator (a McCarthy caricature) as a Soviet agent 
working against genuine leftist transformation and in the US. He plans to kill his democrat rival 
in the presidential race using an American soldier, Ray, brainwashed in a North Korean prison 
camp by agents from the Soviet “Pavlov Institute.” In the climactic scene of the assassination we 
see the target through the conditioned killer’s sniper scope. The image is blurred, however, 
indicating that small inconsistency in the reigning symbolic order that has to be made up for 
arbitrarily through sovereign violence. Yet, Ray, after carefully locking in on his target, suddenly 
breaks with his preprogrammed behaviour; the crosshairs of his rifle shift to the conspirators in 
                                                 
28 Elizabeth Bronfen, “Femme Fatale—Negotiations of Tragic Desire,” New Literary History 35, no. 1 (2004): 105. 
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the room and with two quick, instinctive shots he kills both of them.29 As the camera moves into 
the maintenance shaft he is hiding in it briefly shows the word NO written on the door—with the 
rest of the sign (ENTRY) erased, making the signifier inoperative. When his friend, Ben finds 
him, Ray speaks to him with a fatalistic yet autonomous voice “You couldn’t have stopped them. 
The army couldn’t have stopped them. So I had to.”—close-up of the friend’s clueless 
expression, reverse shot back to the killer, his face betraying frustration over not being 
understood: “Oh, God, Ben!” —he utters as he turns the rifle against himself and pulls the 
trigger. The final scene shows the surviving friend desperately trying to make sense of the 
events, reading Ray’s diary about the horrendous acts he was forced to do in Korea. He then 
improvises a eulogy exonerating him that, however, includes a major contradiction: if he was 
made to commit all those heinous crimes before, how could he have acted freely in the end? 
When Ben realizes that the story doesn’t add up, his voice falters; he sighs and cries out “Hell!” 
while turning away from the camera, undercutting the viewer’s suture with the diegetic space.  
 The Manchurian Candidate already displays what would become the defining feature of 
the revisionist noir cycle, what I will call the subtraction-image: the severing of the fatalistic link 
between the sovereign male individual and his biopolitical community through the hero’s 
suicidal no to the homosocial pact undergirding the status quo, emphasizing instead a direct 
connection between the withdrawn subject and the universality of the symbolic (after the 
shooting, the assassin puts on his war medal in a gesture now emptied out of masculine glory 
before he kills himself). This allows for a step back from classical noir’s masculine conspiracy 
narrative as fated (inevitable), and maps the contours of a more abstract system of control in the 
background at which level the United States and the Soviet Union pursue the same goals. We 
                                                 
29 It’s interesting to consider this since then commonplace element of many action narratives as the conflict between 
the individual’s freedom (autonomy) and sovereignty.  
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could say that in neo-noir conspiracy becomes increasingly deterritorialized, detached from the 
American male identity. This tendency will culminate in the paranoia noirs of the 70s (The 
Conversation, 1974; Parallax View, 1974), in what Jameson called their attempt to allegorically 
represent the unrepresentable totality of global capitalism itself as a conspiracy.30 What a 60s 
genealogy of Jameson’s ambiguous (potentially both critical and fatalistic) concept helps to 
clarify is that this move towards an abstract, global “conspiracy” initially has an anti-obscurantist 
aim: it helps to demystify the hostile biopolitical apparatus of capital by suggesting that it needs 
the sovereign consent of its masculine subjects to function, something that can be freely revoked 
any time.  
An important step in this direction is perhaps the first full blown American neo-noir, 
Orson Welles’s adaptation of Kafka’s The Trial (1962). Welles represents the modern apparatus 
of the Law as an abstract and chaotic machine which no one is in charge of (just like in the 
novel, we never learn what the protagonist K. is accused of and why). At one level, in a series of 
long shots the director makes use of the exterior of the newly built, empty, modernist housing 
blocks and city squares of Zagreb31 to emphasize not only K.’s noir alienation but also his 
insignificance, the fact that no one is really watching him in these abandoned public spaces 
(these scenes are often shot from low angle, overhead shots are missing entirely). By contrast, 
inside the densely populated labyrinthine buildings of the law that conform to a baroque 
aesthetic, a complex interplay of gazes unfolds with voyeuristic connotations: here, everybody is 
watching everybody. The apparent chaos of the legal apparatus is caused by the fact that 
                                                 
30 See Fredric Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1992), 9-87. Jameson doesn’t make a distinction between noirs and generic paranoia films but 
most of his sample are not neo-noirs proper but conspiracy thrillers with post-noir elements (Three Days of the 
Condor, 1975; All the President’s Men, 1976). 
31 This use of communist space here, much like in The Manchurian Candidate, suggests that the system of 
biopolitical control the modern Law stands for is global.   
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representatives of the law and people on trial alike are sidetracked by the pursuit of private 
sexual pleasures. Prostitutes seem to be holding the system together in inexplicable ways, judges 
read dirty magazines during trials, and legal aids are spying on everyone through the cracks and 
interstices of courtrooms, hallways, and bedrooms—all somehow connected into an unmappable 
megastructure of the law’s obscene underside. This dialectic of public and private spaces is then 
supplemented with the noir place of sovereign exception, making use of Kafka’s famous parable 
about “the door of the Law” that frames the film. As Žižek notes, Welles makes here significant 
changes to the novel which, I propose, can also be read as a shift away from the classical noir 
narrative: 
In the film, we hear [the parable] twice: at the very beginning, it serves as a kind of 
prologue, read and accompanied by (faked) ancient engravings projected from lantern-
slides; then, shortly before the end, it is told to Josef K., not by the priest (as in the novel) 
but by K.’s lawyer (played by Welles himself), who unexpectedly joins the priest and K. 
in the Cathedral. The action now takes a strange turn and diverges from Kafka’s novel – 
even before the lawyer warms to his narrative, K. cuts him short: ‘I’ve heard it. We’ve 
heard it all. The door was meant only for him.’ What ensues is a painful dialogue 
between K. and the lawyer in which the lawyer advises K. to ‘plead insanity’ by claiming 
that he is persecuted by the idea of being the victim of the diabolical plot of a mysterious 
State agency. K., however, rejects the role of the victim offered to him by the lawyer: ‘I 
don’t pretend to be a martyr.’ ‘Not even a victim of society?’ ‘No, I’m not a victim, I’m a 
member of society . . .’ In his final outburst, K. then asserts that the true conspiracy (of 
Power) consists in the very attempt to persuade the subjects that they are victims of 
irrational impenetrable forces, that everything is crazy, that the world is absurd and 
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meaningless. When K. thereupon leaves the Cathedral, two plainclothes policemen are 
already waiting for him; they take him to an abandoned building site and dynamite him. 
In the Welles version, the reason K. is killed is therefore the exact opposite of the reason 
implied in the novel – he presents a threat to power the moment he unmasks, ‘sees 
through’, the fiction upon which the social link of the existing power structure is 
founded.32 
Contrary to the classical noir hero, K. refuses to perform the sovereign act that would make him 
a co-conspirator by actively presupposing the legal apparatus through identifying as a victim of 
it.33  
 A no less Kafkaesque neo-noir, clearly inspired by Welles’s film is John 
Frankenheimer’s (The Manchurian Candidate) other 60s classic Seconds (1966) about a 
depressed suburban bank manager and talentless painter who is initiated into a secret society for 
the bored and wealthy where after a hefty payment and a bizarre body transplant the chosen 
members of the bourgeoisie can live a fantasy life as someone else they always wanted to be. 
Contrary to contemporary post-noir narratives, however, suburban life is not presented here as a 
                                                 
32 Slavoj Žižek, Interrogating the Real (New York: Bloomsbury, 2005), 217-18. 
33 It is this subtractive critical gesture that is missing from Welles’s otherwise hyperreflexive classical noirs. For 
Lady From Shanghai (1941), for instance, not only did he dye Rita Hayworth’s hair blonde as a publicity stunt, 
pointing at her artificial transformation into a femme fatale, but he even made the male protagonist (played by 
himself) lay out the constructed nature of his fatalism by calling himself a “deliberate, intentional fool” in his voice-
over. Yet, as Robert Pippin points out in his brilliant analysis, this doesn’t break the efficacy of the film’s fatalistic 
ideology: “In an unintended and ironic way, Michael does emerge as a diminished agent (more fated than agent), but 
by his own self-deceived view of himself. The pose he presents, the example of the maxim that "everybody is 
somebody's fool," is not a hypocritical attempt to deceive the audience, viewers, readers. He believes it and by 
believing it accepts a kind of diminished status and so is diminished. He reveals that he is simply incapable of 
registering and acknowledging his own culpability, the quite negligible difference that separates him from the 
sharks, and that lack is a limitation, too. His viewing himself as such a diminished agent, in other words, constitutes 
him as one; he becomes the diminished "object of the clever manipulation of others," and so his own relation to his 
deeds becomes for him constituted by such a self-image. It would be naïve to insist that he nevertheless "could have 
faced" what he did more honestly. Michael is self-deceived, not hypocritical, and he is self-deceived because of 
what he is, and he is what he is because of what he can and cannot admit about himself.” 33 Robert B. Pippin, 
Fatalism in American Film Noir: Some Cinematic Philosophy (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2012), 
73. 
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site of repression which the hero could escape towards more pleasurable heterotopic locations 
offering libidinal release. Frankenheimer’s use of Bergmanian extreme close-ups of the always 
sweating protagonist’s disoriented face as he goes about his daily business with people reveals 
instead the man’s disgust over the suffocating proximity of others’ enjoyment. His flight is 
therefore that of an ascetic rather than of a pervert, responding to the failure of a properly 
Oedipal suburban repression (the failure of immunization). His new life as a famous painter in a 
California beach house, however, doesn’t offer much relief either. Through the director’s deadly 
irony, which also serves as the scathing critique of countercultural movements at the time, he is 
now free to do whatever he pleases as long as he enjoys it. He is trapped in a noir world where 
enjoyment turns into a duty: the organization is paying a butler and a hired neighbour/sex worker 
who keep monitoring his mandatory happiness. It’s not long until he finds the prescribed pagan 
orgies and drunken debaucheries just as exhausting and suffocating as his former life and he 
makes arrangements to start afresh once again. To his surprise, he discovers that the people 
sitting by the multitude of desks in the company’s maze-like office he thought were workers are 
in fact all clients just like him, dissatisfied with their allocated piece of paradise. But since they 
have already paid all their money to the organization, the only way they can get a new identity is 
by recommending a new customer to be duped by the pyramid scheme. It is this phone call made 
by the client-workers that provides the labour that keeps the company running, an allegory for 
the act of sovereignty perpetuating the capitalist machine. The protagonist, however, refuses to 
cooperate and as a result he is killed; his life is not deemed worth living anymore but his body is 
used to accommodate the next customer.  
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3.1.3 The Utopian Impulse of Light’s Negative Dialectic: Dismantling the Panoptic 
Apparatus 
 Although the hero of Seconds dies a gruesome death due to his insubordination, the 
formal elements of his final scene are worth examining for traces of utopian desire. Strapped 
down to an operating table, a group of surgeons start drilling his skull while he is still conscious, 
preparing him to serve as a body transplant for a new client. The last shot shows the strong 
surgical light above from his point of view, its contours slowly fading as the drilling continues, 
giving way to a blurred childhood memory, a man with his son and a dog walking on a sunny 
beach. The camera then tries to zoom in on the figures but the image gets distorted and quickly 
spins out of frame. If there is something utopian here, I suggest, it has to do not with the 
realization of the protagonist’s most intimate fantasies in an authentic self but, on the contrary, 
with the decreation of such image, what Lacan referred to as the “traversing of the fundamental 
fantasy.”34 To understand this in relation to the noir’s high contrast aesthetic of darkness and 
light, we have to expand here on the Lacanian theory of the gaze introduced in the previous 
chapter. 
First of all, as I suggested, Lacan insists that the zero level of our subjectivity is not 
simply constituted through the voyeuristic experience of looking at something while remaining 
invisible, but it always already presupposes the condition of being looked at. The eye that is 
attached to the seeing subject is therefore supplemented by the fantasmatic entity of the gaze that 
makes the subject seen, acting as the external point of reference that guarantees the consistency 
of one’s visual field. This is why Lacan also refers to the gaze as the source of light, “the 
                                                 
34 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, 
trans. A. Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1981), 273. 
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instrument through which light is embodied and through which […] I am photo-graphed.”35 The 
gaze is the real, unattainable objectal correlate of subjectivity, an incarnation of the primordially 
separated object-cause of desire (objet a), the origin of an irreducible lack, the founding trauma 
constitutive of the subject. “From the moment that this gaze appears, the subject tries to adapt 
himself to it, he becomes that punctiform object, that point of vanishing being with which the 
subject confuses his own failure.”36 Although the inapprehensible nature of the gaze is a 
consequence of the subject’s structural inability to reach completeness (the fullness of 
enjoyment), because of her attempt to do so, the gaze enters her visual field as an object that 
cannot be captured through the power of vision: it appears as a stain in the picture.37 There is no 
eye (and no I) without a stain, without a distortion of vision, a blind spot marking the 
inconsistency of the symbolic order. It is crucial to emphasize here the difference between the 
real gaze and the symbolic stain. As Žižek explains: “[the real-impossible] objet petit a […] is 
not the stain itself but rather the gaze in the precise sense of the point of view from which the 
stain can be perceived in its ‘true meaning,’ the point from which, instead of the anamorphic 
distortion, it would be possible to discern the true contours of what the subject perceives as a 
formless stain.”38 The fantasmatic, real gaze as objet a is all seeing; in the noir context it is 
embodied by the primordial father, the subject supposed to know who is falsely assumed by the 
hero to be able to see him completely, knowing the secrets of his unconscious without any stain 
to block his view and therefore command him to reveal his idiosyncratic jouissance. In Seconds, 
this is the role of the psychiatrist who is responsible for the protagonist’s satisfactory 
transformation into his ideal, fully enjoying self—ironically, the character is played by the same 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 106. 
36 Ibid., 83. 
37 Ibid., 74. 
38 Slavoj Žižek, Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel and the Critique of Ideology (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1993), 65-66. 
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actor who is the head of the Pavlov Institute in The Manchurian Candidate. The stain, by 
contrast, functions similarly to the noir category of the subject supposed to believe, a character 
whose defining characteristic is the inability to see something. In the film, the hero’s neigbour 
plays such role until the man finds out she knows more than she lets on. This real gaze of the 
subject supposed to know and the symbolic gaze of the subject supposed to believe, however, 
should not be confused with the paralyzing imaginary look of what Lacan calls “the evil eye” 
that freezes the subject’s life into a gesture. As we shall see, such stoppage occurs only when the 
distinction between gaze and stain collapses, undoing the masculine topology of the visual field. 
In a recent paper, Will Straw has suggested that the gradual disappearance of chiaroscuro 
lighting in neo-noir that leads to the illumination of spaces formerly covered in shadows has to 
do with the historical intensification of panoptic surveillance—39an argument that echoes the 
situationist cry about total and mandatory visibility in the society of the spectacle40 as well as 
Jameson’s claim about the saturation of space and the disappearance of the system’s outside in 
capitalism’s global stage.41 On the surface, this reading is supported by evidence in revisionist 
noir narratives (as well as some late films of the classical period mentioned above) that often 
feature the protagonist encountering, right before his death, sources of light that are attached to 
police, military, or other disciplinary apparatuses of modern biopower. The hero of Seconds is 
killed under a surgical light; K. in The Trial is blown up in a dazzling dynamite blast; the last 
shot of Point Blank shows the island of Alcatraz with a surveillance beam after the protagonist 
                                                 
39 Will Straw, “The Paranoid Thriller and the Limits of Expose Politics,” (paper presented at FSAC 17th Graduate 
Colloquium, University of Regina, Regina, Saskatchewan, February 27, 2015) 
40 “Darkness and obscurity are banished by artificial lighting, and the seasons by air conditioning. Night and summer 
are losing their charm and dawn is disappearing.” Ivan Chtcheglov, “Formulary for a New Urbanism,” in 
Architecture Culture, 1943-1968: A Documentary Anthology, ed. J. Ockman and E. Eigen (New York: Columbia 
University Graduate School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation, 1993), 169. 
41 See Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, Or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1991), 399-418. 
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presumably drowned in the sea; and the hero of Parallax View meets his death running out of a 
dark room towards the light when a gunman steps into the doorway and shoots him. Yet, this 
apparently deadly encounter with light may have utopian connotations if we consider it as the 
disintegration of the sovereign-image, as a return of lumen, a light that cannot be owned by 
anyone. 
 Lacan himself alludes to this when in his Seminar XI he tells the story of his youthful 
endeavor to find his true self by working as a fisherman in a poor seaside town of Brittany. One 
day, while engaged in hard labor on a boat, one of his fellow fishermen pointed at a sardine can 
floating in the water: “It floated there in the sun, a witness to the canning industry, which we, in 
fact, were supposed to supply. It glittered in the sun. And Petit-Jean said to me—You see that 
can? Do you see it? Well, it doesn't see you!” Lacan describes his feeling after the encounter as 
“rather out of place in the picture.”42 In what picture? In the fantasmatic one that positioned him 
as a manual laborer, the supposed supplier of enjoyment for the panoptic gaze of the Other that 
in exchange had knowledge about his real, authentic self. This fantasy scenario about 
(incidentally also homosocial) identification was, of course, properly unconscious until the 
encounter; until that point, he had been convinced that his attempt of self-discovery among 
common working men was a form of dis-identification from the routines of academic life, 
building an immunizing distance from the normative symbolic he tried to escape through 
exploring the sublime, raw forces of nature on that fishing boat. The light reflecting on the 
sardine can reveals to him the futility and ridiculousness of this enterprise insofar as the gaze of 
the Other appears now as the rather banal object of the fishing industry, coinciding with a stain 
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on his fantasy image.43 It is this blind gleam of light that distracts the subject at the precise 
moment when he becomes aware that his fundamental fantasy of full enjoyment that tied him to 
the status quo cannot be realized. Crucially, this is not what the young Lacan had in mind when 
he withdrew from his ordinary bourgeois life in search of authenticity. Nonetheless, his naïvely 
voluntarist “No!” to his organic social position (a destructive gesture in Badiou’s terminology) 
was the precondition for his negative enlightenment, so to speak, insofar as his quest for self-
purification had to fail first to open up a different, subtractive aspect of negativity. Much the 
same way as the classical noir hero’s sovereign act is the necessary historical precondition for its 
failure to trigger an ethical negation of sovereignty in neo-noir.  
 It’s worth noting that Lacan’s deployment of the figure of a blinding gleam of light in his 
1964 seminar on the gaze was an implicit critique of existentialism’s notion of authenticity, a 
reference to Heidegger’s concept of the unconcealment of the self (Lichtung, “lighting” in 
German), and perhaps to Albert Camus’s novel The Stranger whose hero was also blinded by the 
sun while shooting an Arab in the face in French occupied Algiers in an “unmotivated,” 
“authentic” act—of sovereignty.44 A cinematic equivalent of Lacan’s post-Algerian War (1954-
1962) intervention into a potentially racist intellectual tradition is the 1966 film The Battle of 
Algiers, which accomplishes the political, subtractive revision not only of classical noirs along 
the lines of Odds Against Tomorrow, The Trial, or Seconds but of the French critics’ initial, 
existentialist reading of the noir phenomenon itself. The Battle of Algiers can be seen as a 
politicization of the noir city, a revolutionary reinstatement of the disavowed non-white masses 
into an urban fabric considered decadent and criminal by the white colonial imaginary. This 
transformation is perhaps best captured in the scenes depicting the final days of the revolution. 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 95-96. 
44 Albert Camus, The Stranger, trans. S. Gilbert (New York: Vintage Books, 1946) 
139 
 
After a cinema verité documentary style images of violent street protests accompanied by a 
newscaster’s voiceover commentary, we cut to a panning shot of the city by night while the 
inarticulate noises of the day’s turmoil continue from the previous scene, without, however, the 
official commentary to make sense of them, showing how the political crisis goes through a 
repression through noir style aestheticization and abstraction in the colonizer’ mind. We then cut 
to an overhead shot of a police cordon the next morning, placing the viewer once again on the 
side of the French, while the street ahead with the Algerian masses is covered in white fog lit by 
the rising sun. A policeman anxiously yells, “What do you want?” into his loudspeaker—the 
eternal noir question to which the crowd responds: “Independence! Our Pride! Our Freedom!” 
and they continue chanting as in a subtraction-image they emerge from what used to be an 
ontological void. The final shot is the close-up of a woman dancing (spinning endlessly) while 
waving the Algerian flag menacingly at the French authorities—a gesture of feminine jouissance 
breaking the frame of the sovereign-image that sutured together the noir universe. Significantly, 
the film doesn’t end with a point of view shot from the revolutionaries’ perspective that could 
introduce a (counter-)sovereign-image of Algerian nationalism. We see the autonomous colonial 
subjects emerge rather as the Rancierian “people,” the “part of those who have no part,” the 
uncounted immanent excess of the universalist colonial discourse, the Lacanian stain as its 
necessary blind spot supporting the coherence of its ideological self-image.45  
                                                 
45 For Ranciere, “The people is a supplementary existence that inscribes the count of the uncounted, or part of those 
who have no part - that is, in the last instance, the equality of speaking beings without which inequality itself is 
inconceivable. These expressions are to be understood not in a populist but in a structural sense. It is not the 
labouring and suffering populace that emerges on the terrain of political action and that identifies its name with that 
of the community. The 'all' of the community named by democracy is an empty, supplementary part that separates 
the community out from the sum of the parts of the social body. This initial separation founds politics as the action 
of supplementary subjects, inscribed as a surplus in relation to every count of the parts of society.” Jacques 
Ranciere, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, trans. S. Corcoran (New York: Continuum, 2010), 33. 
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 While America’s modernist neo-noir doesn’t quite go this far politically, from Point 
Blank on its more modest version of subtractive negation is similarly about ending the hero’s 
reliance on the controlling and knowing position of disciplinary power’s panoptic gaze. Walker, 
the film’s hitman protagonist always maps out the territory of battle from a safe and distant spot 
before engaging in a confrontation—a strategy that allows him to eliminate one by one the 
members of a powerful criminal organization that owes him money. Yet, despite still holding the 
higher ground in the end, he doesn’t pick up the bag of cash finally offered to him as a 
settlement. Perhaps he suspects that it’s a trap and that’s why he withdraws from his place of 
surveillance into the shadows, but neither he nor the viewer will ever know for sure. As a result, 
the film ends on an ambiguous note: maybe all we saw was all just a hallucination of a dying 
man killed for his share of a robbery.46 Or, alternatively, one could say that this is what a 
feminine, openly inconsistent narrative universe looks like: at the beginning, we see Walker 
being gunned down, then a moment after he stops moving the next shot shows him staggering 
away; when he later visits his ex-wife who once betrayed him, he witnesses the woman 
committing suicide, but the next morning there is no trace of her body, etc. I suggest not to read 
these montages simply as pure time-images in the Deleuzian sense, capturing the minimal gap 
between actual and virtual by endlessly repeating their collapse and differentiation. What 
shouldn’t be missed is the antagonism between the masculine and feminine uses of these time-
images driving the narrative that mobilizes the latter to move away from the former. This is why, 
in contrast to the shadowy zones of classical noir that were turned into territories of sovereign-
fatalistic knowledge through the noir hero’s confession to an all seeing gaze, Point Blank doesn’t 
reveal any final truth to some imagined divine authority. In Colin MacCabe’s terms, it becomes a 
                                                 
46 This seems to be the canonical reading, see Spicer, Film Noir, 137. 
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revolutionary text that doesn’t construct a reassuring meta-language to cover up the real of its 
contradictions.47 
 On the other hand, this failure of the masculine panoptic gaze to constitute a sovereign-
image may appear as just a failure and nothing more, the ethical rejection of sovereignty going 
undetected (the bad infinity of destruction appearing without its reversal into subtraction). This is 
in fact a strong tendency among neo-noir critics who prefer to focus on the epistemological crisis 
paralyzing the new noir heroes, how their inability to construct a master narrative turns them into 
“impotent private eyes”48 and “losers with failed lives”49 who are unable to restore even the 
illusion of a moral order.50 As Richard Dorfman argues, “the film noir protagonist progressed 
from being the only one to know to the last one to find out”; he is now “jaded beyond cynicism 
and cannot be moved,” unable “not only to direct, but even to affect, his own fate.”51 It’s also a 
commonplace to talk of the omnipotent corporations these new figures are facing, especially in 
conspiracy noirs like The Parallax View or The Conversation,52 missing the films’ exposure of 
how these mysterious organizations still depend on the fundamentally arbitrary (and therefore 
unreliable) support of sovereign individuals. A case in point is Harry Caul, The Conversation’s 
balding loner protagonist who runs a small surveillance and wiretapping business, only caring 
about the quality of the recording he provides for his customers (“I don't care what they are 
talking about. All I want is a nice, fat recording.”) After a job well done, he is about to deliver 
the tapes to the client, who, however, is not present at the meeting, and Harry’s rigid professional 
code prevents him from handing the material over to the man’s assistant. This instinctive no in 
                                                 
47 See Colin MacCabe, “Realism and the Cinema: Notes on Some Brechtian Theses,” Screen 15, no. 2 (1974): 21. 
48 Spicer, Film Noir, 137. 
49 Foster Hirsch, Detours and Lost Highways: A Map of Neo-Noir (New York: Limelight Editions, 1999), 110. 
50 Ibid., 152.; Elizabeth Ward, “The Post-Noir P.I.: The Long Goodbye and Hickey and Boggs,” in Film Noir 
Reader, ed. A. Silver et al. (New York: Continuum, 1996), 237-42. 
51 Richard Dorfman, “Conspiracy City,” Journal of Popular Film & Television 7, no. 4 (1980): 444. 
52 Hirsch, Detours, 169. 
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the name of an abstract universal principle then develops into a complex ethical conundrum 
when he realizes, after listening to the tapes more carefully, that they might trigger a future 
murder. Although he is reluctant to assume responsibility, he also keeps stalling with the 
delivery, pushing the client’s company to eventually steal the recording. As it turns out, the 
wiretap he did on his client’s wife and her lover was used not to kill them as he feared, but on the 
contrary, to lure the jealous husband, the CEO of a large corporation, into a trap to be killed by 
the couple who could then take control of his company. Harry’s mistake was that he tried to 
intervene based on the knowledge he gathered from what he assumed to be an omniscient 
panoptic position (set up by the famous opening of the film, an extreme long overhead shot of a 
square, the camera slowly zooming in to reveal the surveilled couple).53 He ignored the 
fundamental undecidability at the core of the symbolic which cannot simply be eliminated 
through modern technology: he reconstructed what he thought was the definitive version of the 
couple’s dialogue about the jealous husband as “he’d kill us if he had the chance” instead of 
“he’d kill us if he had the chance,” which came to be proven the correct one only after the fact of 
the man’s murder. In other words, Harry’s failure is an epistemological and not an ethical one; in 
fact the final disintegration of his fundamental fantasy of full panoptic control—his inability to 
find the company’s bug in his apartment even after tearing the place apart—is the necessary 
consequence of him doing the right thing earlier in a subtractive act. In the last scene we see him 
sitting in a corner, surrounded by the ruins of his apartment, playing his saxophone while the 
camera slowly pans around, focusing on nothing in particular, signalling perhaps that Harry 
finally learned to let go of his paranoid obsession with total visual domination and embraced the 
                                                 
53 Crucially, the shot is not from Harry’s perspective. It reveals rather the omniscient panoptic gaze that he imagines 
to be watching him while he is working, a gaze for whom his true self and purpose is constructed, a gaze that 
supplements his position as a fully knowing subject. 
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gesture of its feminine decreation (not only his playing music but the circular move of the 
camera itself appears here as a means without an end).54 
 The revisionist neo-noirs most often associated with failed masculinities belong to the 
70s cycle of “impotent” private eye films, most notably Robert Altman’s The Long Goodbye 
(1973), Roman Polanski’s Chinatown (1974), and Arthur Penn’s Night Moves (1975). These 
films can even be called anti-noirs due to their conscious attempt to undermine the hard-boiled 
detective tradition, which, of course, is a sign of nihilism only for those who prefer the sovereign 
authority of masculine reason. The most radical as well as the most utopian of these films is The 
Long Goodbye, a ruthless deconstruction of Raymond Chandler’s dignified petty-bourgeois 
moralist Philip Marlowe and his iconic cinematic representation by Humphrey Bogart in The Big 
Sleep (1946). Altman and his main actor, Elliot Gould, turn the figure of the hard-boiled sleuth 
into a clown, a poor, mumbling loner living with his cat who becomes the laughing stock of the 
police and gangsters alike, running errands for his drugged out hippie neighbours and his upper 
class athlete “friend” Terry Lennox who takes advantage of his blind loyalty to get away with 
murder. Until the very end, Marlowe stoically accepts all the abuse and slowly but steadily 
continues with the investigation, shrugging off the chaos and corruption around him by repeating 
his tagline “it’s okay with me.” In the finale, however, in a radical digression from Chandler’s 
novel that is comparable to Welles’s revision of The Trial, after finding out that he faked his 
suicide, he seeks out the fugitive Lennox in Mexico and puts a bullet in his head for using their 
friendship to cover up the cold blooded murder of his wife (he utters, for the first time: “It’s not 
okay with me.”) 
                                                 
54 A similar post-paranoied, gestural use of playing music occurs at the end of Mickey One (1965) to the film’s 
stand-up comedian protagonist. After his anxious questioning of the hidden agency behind the spotlight directed at 
him on the stage of a dark underground club, the camera zooms in on the light source and we suddenly transition to 
an open rooftop where Mickey is now relaxed, playing the piano while the end credits are rolling. 
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Commentators usually emphasize the ridiculousness of Marlowe’s outdated code of 
honour at play here,55 taking it as the director’s Brechtian gesture to expose the Hollywood 
artifice of a happy ending (the song under the final credits is called “Hurrah for Hollywood”).56 
Altman himself seems to corroborate this reading: “I see Marlowe the way Chandler saw him, a 
loser. But a real loser, not the false winner that Chandler made out of him. A loser all the way.”57 
As Robin Wood notes, he is like one of Antonioni’s heroes, hopelessly alienated from the 
modern world, unable to adjust to it. Nonetheless, he argues, “the effect in The Long Goodbye is 
curious: one has the feeling that Altman despises [whom he referred to as] “Rip van Marlowe” 
yet is very close to him—closer, perhaps, than he would wish to acknowledge.”58 This could be 
because, contrary to the standard modernist interpretations, Marlowe doesn’t stand for some 
unbending pre-modern chivalry going extinct but for the contradiction at the heart of the modern 
itself, for the possibility of a subtractive negation of sovereignty that activates a utopian impulse. 
Contrary to the classical noir hero whose disconnect from the male homosocial community put 
him into a feminized state of exception only to indirectly reaffirm the patriarchal status quo, 
Marlowe’s emasculation is more definitive. First of all, like most revisionist neo-noirs, The Long 
Goodbye doesn’t have a voiceover addressing an omniscient phallic authority. Instead, the 
protagonist mumbles to himself and to random people around him in a resigned, affectless voice 
that lacks the perverse jouissance of someone like Walter Neff, and is always fully immanent to 
the diegetic present rather than offering a guilt ridden confession of the hero’s “dark past” hiding 
the truth of his manhood. Marlowe also lacks the lonely room of the sovereign that would frame 
                                                 
55 Richard K. Ferncase, “Robert Altman's The Long Goodbye: Marlowe in the Me Decade,” Journal of Popular 
Culture 25, no. 2 (1991): 88. 
56 Spicer, Film Noir, 138. 
57 Altman quoted in L. Brackett  (1974) “From The Big Sleep to The Long Goodbye and More or Less How We Got 
There,” Take One 1 (1974): 28. 
58 Robin Wood, Hollywood From Vietnam to Reagan… And Beyond (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 
32. 
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the narcissistic theater of his noir isolation; he lives with his cat and practically with his crazy 
“lesbian” neighbours to begin with, and he is also regularly harassed in his apartment by the 
police and a group of gangsters who then keep following him around, not giving him much 
privacy. His bourgeois ego is further undermined by Altman’s uneven compositions leaving the 
protagonist off center, with the camera sometimes wandering off entirely to capture his 
neighbours dancing naked, dogs copulating on the street, etc.  
Moreover, as Richard Ferncase stresses, “the [film’s] photography by Vilmos Zsigmond 
is unlike the heavy chiaroscuro of traditional noir. Venetian blinds cast no slatted shadows in this 
detective film. Instead, post-flashing technique creates a diaphanous ozone of pastel hues, blue 
shadows, and highlights of shimmering gossamer.”59 Such dissemination of light that softens the 
style of the classical hard-boiled detective film can be read as the lumen of a post-sovereign 
world that left behind (traversed) the fantasy of a real, authentic white masculinity hidden in the 
shadows—the fantasy of an elixir made out of the foreclosed life African-Americans. In this 
context, even Marlowe’s “it’s okay with me” sounds less as a melancholic resignation than the 
affirmation of an imperfect (ontologically incomplete) universe without a phallic anchoring 
point. This is made clear in the opening scene where the hero puts cheap cat food into an empty 
can of his cat’s favourite brand, but the animal refuses to play the credulous gaze of the nurturing 
woman for him: as a stand-in for feminine jouissance, she sees through the trick of the phallic 
signifier (the brand label), and pushes the food off the table, sending Marlowe out in the middle 
of the night to buy her the real deal. He, however, never succeeds with his quest, getting 
distracted by the film’s main plotline, as a result of which his cat, the vestige of his fantasy about 
an all seeing noir gaze, also disappears.  
                                                 
59 Ferncase, “Altman’s The Long Goodbye,” 88. 
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Like most detectives in revisionist noir Marlowe is also unable to solve the case until 
Terry Lennox, the film’s real sovereign, reveals to him the missing pieces of the puzzle. Lennox 
calls him a born loser and invites him to affirm his misogynist violence with one of his stoic 
nods. I suggest reading Marlowe’s final refusal to do this together with the neo-noir history of 
subtractive gestures, as a radical negation of the sovereign-masculine conspiracy he has been 
complicit in—a rejection that turns into an act of what Agamben after Walter Benjamin calls 
“divine violence.” Contrary to the violence of the sovereign exclusion, he argues, such “pure 
violence exposes and severs the nexus between law and violence”;60 “it neither makes nor 
preserves law, but deposes it […] and thus inaugurates a new historical epoch.”61 Divine 
violence, in other words, is the gesture of violence, gesture as violence.62 It is this seemingly 
futile and ridiculous act through which the hero, in a subtraction-image comparable in form to 
the one in The Battle of Algiers, occupies the place of the Lacanian sardine can in Lennox’s (and 
the masculine viewer’s) sovereign fantasy, finally drawing the boundaries between the utopian 
and the non-utopian that have been so far missing from The Long Goodbye. Only by striking at 
the white American sovereign hiding in his Mexican noir space of exception from the position of 
the feminine subject who, in masculine terms, is “a loser all the way” can Marlowe retroactively 
redeem the “failed” lives populating the film’s weird universe: the alcoholic-impotent-suicidal 
writer, the drug addict hippie neighbours, the over talkative cellmate in jail, the Mexican favela 
dwellers, the patients of the mental hospital, etc. Lennox’s death also breaks the endless 
repetition of the melancholic title song containing the last traces of Marlowe’s narcissistic 
                                                 
60 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. K. Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 62. 
61 Ibid., 53. 
62 Or, as Žižek puts it, “when those outside the structured social field strike ‘blindly,’ demanding and enacting 
immediate justice/vengeance, this is ‘divine violence’.” Slavoj Žižek, “Robespierre or the ‘Divine Violence’ of 
Terror,” in Žižek Presents Robespierre: Virtue and Terror, ed. J, Ducange (New York: Verso, 2007), x.; see also 
Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings Volume 1, ed. M. Bullock and 
M.W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 236-52. 
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enjoyment of his wounded manhood (his masculine death drive). This is why the song that then 
takes over during the final credits (Hurrah for Hollywood), evoking the symbolic universality, 
i.e. the glory of the old Production Code, should not be read cynically. It is an appropriate 
supplement to the final shot showing Marlowe dancing with Mexicans on the street, 
acknowledging the authentic utopian dimensions of classical Hollywood now dislocated from 
their white masculinist immunizing limitations by a feminine gesture. One could say that the 
Hollywood ending here has what Žižek calls a symbolic efficiency.63 Its utopian program works 
even if the director himself didn’t believe in it and wanted only push the negation of the noir 
tradition to the logical conclusion. The dialectical lesson of The Long Goodbye is precisely that a 
truly radical (subtractive) negation of noir’s masculine logic is already at the same time the 
articulation of its utopian alternative, and the viewer only needs a minimal shift of perspective 
(the shock of divine violence) to realize this. This also means that there can be no purely 
disinterested gaze observing the chaos of the noir world from a neutral outside. Any withdrawal 
from the status quo either leads to its sovereign reassertion or the articulation of its utopian 
alternative. 
This leaving behind the sovereign masculine ego is similarly associated with a space 
beyond the national borders of the United States in a series of 70s noirs. Traces of this move can 
be found already at the end of Point Blank, where the camera slowly zooms out of the location of 
the final showdown to pan around San Francisco Bay, only, however, to change angle and zoom 
in again on Alcatraz Island with a surveillance beacon on top symbolizing the death of the 
protagonist. The extreme zoom out here is the dialectical opposite to the opening shot of The 
Conversation, the zoom in that embodies the illusions of the masculine individual’s panoptic 
                                                 
63 See Slavoj Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies (New York: Verso, 2009), 142. 
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omnipotence. Later neo-noirs further this zoom out technique to evoke the complexity of late 
capitalist spaces surrounding the protagonist. This way, instead of using the mise-en-scene to 
express psychological states of anxiety and confusion like classical noir does, they offer an 
alternative to the hero’s individualist, sovereign perception of space. At the end of Dirty Harry 
(1971), when the main character throws away his police badge in his disgust with the fascistic 
violence he had been solicited to do to protect and serve San Francisco’s bourgeois citizenry, the 
camera zooms out to an extreme long shot to map the surrounding landscape. While throughout 
the film noir style chiaroscuro night scenes, close-ups, and tilted angles created an subjectivist 
view of the city’s criminal underground from Harry’s sovereign perspective, the final shot, in 
broad daylight, reveals a gravel mine and a highway network outside the city limits; endless 
supply chains as well as the signs of production that remained hidden from within the immunized 
bubble of San Francisco. The zoom out therefore creates what Jameson calls a “totality-effect”;64 
not the image of an organic whole where everything falls into its proper place but the sense of a 
complex, decentered, and deterritorialized world system that emerges precisely when Harry is 
dislocated from his predetermined place in it captured by a sovereign-image.  
Violent City (1970) uses the same technique to abruptly dislocate the viewer from the 
confined space of a car where the hitman protagonist, Jeff, is having a fight with his femme fatale 
girlfriend, Vanessa, accusing her of betraying him. The sudden change of scale turns the couple’s 
car into a stain in the landscape made up of bridges, train tracks, factories, warehouses, and cargo 
ships anchored in the port of New Orleans. The message of leftist director Sergio Sollima’s 
Brechtian intervention is clear: what prevent the viewer from understanding the complexity of 
the global capitalist world are the limitations of bourgeois individualism translating every 
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conflict into the personal domain. In the subsequent scene a fight among dock workers interrupts 
the protagonist’s revenge-rape of the femme fatale in a warehouse holding bags of wheat. To 
Vanessa’s annoyed remark about the workers’ intrusion, “Why is it that whenever I'm with you, I 
always end up in the middle of blood and violence?” Jeff responds: “Well it happens the whole 
city is full of blood and violence, you only see it when you're with me.” This exchange suggests 
that the whole trip to the docks forced on her by Jeff, symbolically redoubled in the scene of 
sexual violence, was an attempt to shake her and the viewer out of their bourgeois ignorance, 
rather problematically opposing feminine short sightedness to masculine critical knowledge. 
Luckily, Sollima’s film is more of a satire of classical noir’s destructive violence than its 
glorification, reproducing the excesses of its male chauvinistic theater only to expose its pathos 
as a dead end. When Jeff eventually kills the deceitful woman with a sniper rifle (we see her 
collapse in slow motion), he also falls on the ground, his body freezing into a catatonic posture. 
Killing her (his objet a) means the end of his own life as well, now deprived of the masculine 
cause that animated it: after the murder he renounces his panoptic advantage and provokes the 
rookie cop arriving at the scene to kill him. The last shot of the protagonist is a close-up of his 
dead gaze, summarizing his incapacity to see beyond his sovereign role.   
 Night Moves (1975) similarly positions the late capitalist geopolitics of space against the 
limited perspective of its petty-bourgeois private detective, Harry Moseby, who is unable to 
think beyond gendered personal conflicts. This is already indicated by the fact that, like many of 
his colleagues in revisionist noir, he specializes on divorce cases—particularly ironic since his 
own wife is cheating on him. After The Conversation, Gene Hackman once again plays his 
balding loser character as the protagonist, a failed athlete turned private eye whose fading code 
of professionalism now resembles more of an automatism than a conviction. At some point the 
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woman he is investigating confronts him: “Do you ask these questions because you want to 
know the answer or it's just something you think a detective should do?”  Jonathan Kirshner sees 
him as an allegory for America’s decade of failure: “post-Vietnam, post-Watergate, down a peg 
and directionless, with the hopes of the sixties long given way to the hollowness of the seventies, 
Harry is defined by disappointment and lost opportunity.”65 Yet, it is not some kind of macho 
denial about his loss of power that makes him unable to grasp the nature of the conspiracy 
around him. In fact he admits, quite openly, his professional failure (“I didn't solve anything.”) It 
is rather this flaunting of his wounded manhood, which he uses to bond with the film’s two no 
less scarred femmes fatale that makes him unable to see beyond the domain of the personal, 
leading to the death of both women. It is this blind spot that the film’s international smuggling 
subplot hidden from Harry beneath the surface noir narrative about love, sex, and betrayal 
signifies. Allegorically, it suggests that getting too caught up in the crisis of the American nation 
as its impotent male citizen makes one miss the bigger picture, the shift from the nation state 
based second (imperialist) stage of capitalism to its global, multinational expansion where a local 
murder case becomes embedded in a complex, unmappable network of international capital.66 
This is the realization that Harry is left with at the end, lying wounded on the deck of a boat 
named the Point of View in the open sea south of the US border, circling around the crash site of 
the smugglers’ airplane that, as a Lacanian stain in his fantasy image, emerged from beyond the 
horizon and ruined his dream of sovereign withdrawal into the personal by killing the woman he 
cared for. The circular movement is an allegory for the masculine death drive of the American 
nation traumatized by its inevitable deterritorialization. The final bird’s eye shot then turns 
Harry’s boat (America’s “point of view”) itself into an insignificant stain on an endless sea 
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without distinguishing landmarks, the reflecting sunlight (lux) slowly turning into a bright blur 
(lumen) until the memory of his wounded petty-bourgeois ego is fully dissolved into an 
atemporal form of being. This is the perspective of a non-existent God, a non-judgmental Other 
indifferent to the authenticity of the protagonist. Like Coppola in The Conversation, director 
Arthur Penn thereby draws attention the unbridgeable gap separating his hero’s intentional act of 
subtraction and its consequences. Unlike Marlowe in The Long Goodbye, Harry does not become 
a tool of divine violence deliberately. In fact he only plays that role for the viewer outside the 
diegesis by leaving the narrative open ended. By turning him into a blind gleam of light for the 
no less blinded viewer, Penn emphasizes that the real effects of his subtraction will always 
remain unknowable in the masculine-panoptic sense. But this is precisely why his subtraction is 
not an act of sovereignty.67  
 
3.1.4 Feminine Labour in Post-Classical Noir 
 The main problem with identifying a utopian impulse in seemingly nihilistic revisionist 
noirs is nonetheless that this almost always means congratulating lone white middle class men in 
their negative achievement to break from the system they used to support: as a rule, non-white 
and female perspectives are missing from these non-heroes of subtraction.68 On the one hand, 
this shouldn’t be surprising if one considers noir as a meta-generic indicator of the hegemonic 
biopolitical body of Hollywood. Looking at the totality of Hollywood Renaissance film 
production, it becomes obvious that during this period American films had empowered more 
                                                 
67 The Long Goodbye, of course, has this very same gap expressed in the delay between Marlowe’s “It’s okay with 
me.” and his final “It’s not okay with me.” He also does not expect to strike with divine violence, he rather finds 
himself in that position as a result of his former stoicism and then lets the violence happen.  
68 In terms of race, a notable exception is Hickey and Boggs (1975), which, however, is more of a post-noir buddy 
movie about the black and white protagonist’s male bonding.   
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female and non-white subjects than ever before. The subtraction of the white male petty-
bourgeoisie in revisionist noir is therefore a necessary correlate to this new consensus. On the 
other hand, one should avoid universalizing the masculine path to subtraction, which in these 
films leads through destruction, dialectically emerging out of the failure to reach a purified, 
authentic masculine self. The problem is that purification is the strategy of those who are already 
“in,” therefore it’s not applicable to the bodies of the excluded.  
I will focus here on the problem of feminine autonomy in post-classical noir films in 
relation to the gradual liberalization of the American labour market in the 60s and 70s as a result 
of the feminist movement as well as the change in the capitalist apparatus towards post-Fordism 
where production increasingly happens outside of the factory and other centrally organized 
disciplinary institutions. According to Scholtz, the crucial shift occurs already in the 50s where 
various processes of rationalization enter the domestic sphere (new technologies of housework 
and control of attention like the washing machine or the television), laying the groundwork for 
integrating women’s hitherto devalued bodies into the regime of abstract labour and the process 
of capital accumulation.69 As a result, contrary to classical noir which responded to the threat of 
women infiltrating masculine spaces, early neo-noirs depict the disassociated sphere of feminine 
activities itself becoming traversed by masculine instrumental reason. In 60s and 70s noirs 
women often sell their sexuality and/or perform emotional and care work: we see female 
prostitutes (The Trial, The Naked Kiss, Klute, The Conversation), strippers (Shock Corridor, 
Point Blank), stewardesses (Seconds), models (Klute), actresses (Night Moves), nurses (The 
Naked Kiss), psychotherapists (Klute), school bus drivers (Dirty Harry), etc. Unlike their male 
counterparts, all these women are moving towards the apparatuses of abstract labour not away 
                                                 
69 Roswitha Scholz, “Patriarchy and Commodity Society: Gender without the Body (2009),” Mediations 27,  no. 1-2 
(2014), accessed December 20, 2016, http://www.mediationsjournal.org/articles/patriarchy-and-commodity-society.  
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from it. They have a clear stake in the sovereign feminist struggle to value their body’s labour 
power, which once again threatens the masculine monopoly on the production of capitalist value, 
leading to neo-noir’s male protagonist to come up with his own counter-sovereign quest for self-
purification, his attempt to find the true masculine source of value. The reason why his quest 
now fails as a rule (while its failure was a rare exception in classical noir) is precisely because 
the real socio-economic conditions have changed, the white male petty-bourgeoisie has started to 
lose its biopolitical and American territorial hegemony. In other words, it’s not his inner 
greatness but the success of his rival sovereigns (feminist and other civil rights movements as 
well as Third World decolonialization) that pushed the neo-noir man into subtraction, much like 
it was her exclusion from the hegemonic biopolitical body that made the classical femme fatale 
reach for the utopian. For this reason, although it is possible that a disempowered petty-
bourgeois man losing his sovereignty meets a not yet fully autonomous woman half way, any 
narrative of withdrawal framing their encounter tends to remain his story, not hers. 
This is in fact a common feminist criticism levelled against films like Klute, where the 
male hero’s puritan moralism influences the rising femme fatale heroine to give up her sex work 
and leave with him to the countryside, to a safe distance from the corrupt capitalist metropolis 
that offered her emancipation.70 Klute’s female protagonist, Bree, is a successful and 
independent prostitute in New York, who nonetheless suffers from depression and panic attacks 
as well as obscene phone calls from a former client now on a rampage killing hookers. By 
contrast, the film’s eponymous male private detective is calm and asexual, with a moralizing 
contempt for the decadence of the urban lifestyle. It is his fantasy of modern sexual corruption 
that Bree comes to embody; it is his ideas resounding in her voice-over captured on tape during 
                                                 
70 Christine Gledhill, “Klute 2: Feminism and Klute,” in Women in Film Noir, ed. E. A. Kaplan (London: BFI, 
1998), 112-28. 
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her psychoanalysis sessions, arguing with her female therapist that love cannot be translated to 
the language of instrumental rationality. As McCabe puts it, “Klute exactly guarantees that the 
real essence of woman can only be discovered and defined by a man.”71 No wonder that in the 
end, Bree is offered the same forced choice as the housewife of Cape Fear: the Father—or 
worse; she can either leave the city for an idyllic bourgeois family with the protagonist, or go 
back to his former pimp who beats his women and turns them into slaves. All in all, Klute is 
more of a post-noir film than a neo-noir; its ideological agenda is to punish a sexually deviant 
obscene father (Klute’s employer, killer of prostitutes and CEO of a large corporation) as a 
scapegoat, indirectly blaming the femme fatale for enabling his perversion, then saving her from 
herself by drawing her into a safe immunized bubble of the bourgeois couple. 
The same can be said about The Getaway’s (1972) focus on the male criminal, Doc’s 
quest to leave behind the institutions of abstract labour (assembly line work in prison). He uses 
his wife, Carol to get out then punishes her for the price she had to pay for it: prostituting herself 
to the prison warden. The film’s scene of female “sovereign” decision is then also about a forced 
choice: Carol is aiming a gun at her husband after their successful heist, about to fulfill the 
promise she made to the warden who funded the operation, but in the last minute, instead of 
betraying Doc, she shoots the other man dead. What in The Manchurian Candidate was an act 
subtracting the male hero from the biopolitical status quo reaffirms here the patriarchal hierarchy 
of bourgeois marriage by constituting the woman as a repenting guilty subject (Doc even beats 
her up after the episode). The rest of the film is a long lasting test she has to pass, proving her 
loyalty once again to her husband. She succeeds, and as a result the couple reconciles in a post-
noir site of heterotopic exception, a garbage dump, where they temporarily become social abjects 
                                                 
71 MacCabe, “Realism and the Cinema,” 11. 
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together, symbolically abandoning their former selves: Doc his imprisonment to industrial 
labour, Carol her emerging feminine autonomy. After a cleansing shower in a border motel they 
set out for a new life in Mexico, which, as the truck they buy from a local farmer indicates, will 
be an attempt to resurrect an agrarian idyll that the forces of modernity already destroyed in 
America.  
 The radical ethics of subtraction in revisionist neo-noirs therefore should be distinguished 
from the puritan masculine moralism of post-noir films that negate the excesses of capitalist 
sovereignty only in designated others.72 While subtractive ethics takes responsibility for men’s 
complicity with the biopolitical hegemony, opening a way towards its feminine-utopian 
alternative, the latter finds a scapegoat to blame and thereby ultimately reaffirms the status quo. 
In revisionist noirs, it is the failure of the classical noir hero’s epistemic complacency—the end 
of his perverse fatalistic assumption that he knows what an all seeing superego authority 
supposedly wants from him—that prepares the ground for an ethics of subtraction, the gestural 
decreation of the sovereign-image. In post-noirs, the male hero disavows his self-doubt and 
externalizes it on his female partner who can redeem herself only by regressing into a traditional 
regime of patriarchy where her autonomy is neutralized.  
 
3.2 Nostalgia and Melancholy in Postmodern Neo-Noir (1974-1995) 
 
3.2.1 Transitory Films 
 If Night Moves is the last masterpiece of noir’s subtractive paradigm, a modernist film 
that, despite its bleakness, indirectly offers a utopian gesture through the eradication of the 
                                                 
72 See also the conservative vigilantism of the Death Wish films. 
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bourgeois ego’s masculine sovereign-image, Chinatown (1974) is the first neo-noir that 
abandons this project for a post-modern reconstruction of sovereignty, turning its hero’s failure 
into the resigned affirmation of the status quo. If Night Moves makes the viewer face the trauma 
of global capitalism’s deterritorializing effects on the US, Chinatown invents new techniques to 
perpetuate the illusion of its territorial consistency. At first sight, the film is just another impotent 
private eye film: the protagonist, Jake Gitties is a former Chinatown cop in Los Angeles who 
quit the force after his negligence led to the death of an innocent woman. As a way to let go of 
his trauma, he is now running a detective agency specializing on divorce cases, the relative 
success of which made him smug and vain. His carefully constructed dandified ego, however, 
soon has to suffer a series of ordeals ending in a full blown return of his repressed past: he falls 
into a sewage canal that ruins his custom made suit; gangsters beat him up and cut his nose so he 
has to wear bandages for the rest of the film; his expensive car gets destroyed by gunfire after 
which he has to hitch rides to move around; and finally the theatrical showdown he unwittingly 
helps to orchestrate not only fails to solve the case he is working on, but his complacency leads 
to the death of another woman he wanted to save. Contrary to The Long Goodbye or Night 
Moves, however, the protagonist’s fall from grace doesn’t invite the empathy of the viewer, 
simply because Jake’s blindness that incapacitates him is not the result of his fidelity to a 
universal ethical code like that of Marlowe or Moseby. Instead, his unconditional commitment is 
of an aesthetic nature: he is fully dedicated to upholding the image of a well-dressed private eye 
from the 30s, revealing director Roman Polanski’s primary focus on creating a perfect 
simulacrum of Los Angeles from that era. We could say that the film aestheticizes Hollywood’s 
glory formerly captured in the now discontinued Production Code—a move that, according to 
Agamben, always serves to cover glory’s sovereign function as arbitrary and contingent, as “pure 
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force and domination.”73 It is this shift to the aesthetic that turns Chinatown into what Jameson 
calls a “nostalgia film,” constructing a commodified, weightless pastiche image of a now lost 
historical period.74 According to Jameson, such nostalgic historicism, the reification and 
cataloguing of dead epochs as fashion styles in fact marks today’s failure of historical 
imagination, the inability to see the present as historically contingent, subject to change.75 In 
Baudrillard’s terms history in postmodernity turns into a hyperreal, all too perfect image that 
misses lack itself,76 the fissure in reality’s ontological fabric where Lacan located the subject. 
What the postmodern subject loses therefore is the ability to live history, to assume the place of 
rupture in the present situation and thereby change the status quo. While Marlowe could still do 
this in The Long Goodbye, for Jake the ethico-political link to the system’s point of inconsistency 
disappears; he is literally stuck in a simulated world where all his actions mimic clichés of hard-
boiled films and novels precisely to shut out the traumatic excess of freedom and responsibility 
(contained in his repressed memory of Chinatown) he cannot cope with, the blindness to which 
would cause his downfall once again. 
 This is why Stephen Docarmo accuses Chinatown of “postmodernist quietism.”77 The 
other side of the film’s flawless 30s simulacrum is an “overdetermined” conspiracy narrative, 
“having more causes than necessary, more explanations than are readily manageable.”78 For 
instance, the film’s primordial father, Noah Cross is not only a murderous oligarch seeking to 
                                                 
73 “We find [...] at the hidden root of all aestheticisms, the need to cover and dignify what is in itself pure force and 
domination. Beauty names precisely the ‘supplementary element’ that enables one to think glory beyond the factum 
of sovereignty.” Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and 
Government, trans. L. Chiesa and M. Mandarini (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 212. 
74 If the tacked on Production Code endings represented the typical form of glory in classical noir, in postmodern 
noir glory appears as nostalgia for the golden age of Hollywood.  
75 Jameson, Postmodernism, 16-27; 279-97. 
76 See Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulations, trans.  S. F. Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1994) 
77 Stephen N. Docarmo, “Postmodernist Quietism in Chinatown and Mulholland Drive,” The Journal of Popular 
Culture 42, no. 4 (2009): 646-62. 
78 Ibid., 649. 
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control the city’s water supply but at the same time the incestuous abuser of his daughter, Evelyn 
Mulwray; he therefore has at least two independently sufficient reasons to kill Hollis Mulwray, 
his son in law and head of the local water control board. This is why he tells Jake: “You may 
think you know what you're dealing with, but believe me, you don’t.” Of course, as I suggested 
in the previous chapter, overdetermined is another name for the fundamentally indeterminate, 
that is to say, for the inconsistent symbolic order in need of an arbitrary, sovereign decision to 
patch it up. If Chinatown is conservative, then, it’s not because it allegorically represents the late 
capitalist system as indeterminate. Modernist conspiracy noirs accomplished this as well with a 
progressive outcome. As Ihab Hassan notes, other than being indeterminate, there is another 
predominant trait of postmodern aesthetics that sets it apart: that of immanence.79 What is 
ideological in the film is the particular combination of mapping an inconsistent system while 
simultaneously disavowing its point of potential self-transcendence, its “inclusive exclusion,” the 
subject as a place of radical negativity. This is most pronounced in the narrative when the 
protagonist, in his nostalgic identification with the pastiche image of the hardboiled private eye 
ends up unconsciously re-enacting noir’s masculine theater of sovereignty that his modernist 
colleagues abandoned. Contrary to the classical noir sleuth like Sam Spade, he doesn’t do it out 
of fatalistic self-subordination to the Law but out of narcissistic complacency about his 
masculine self-image. In a denouement resembling that of Out of the Past, instead of letting the 
victimized Evelyn quietly slip away to Mexico, he draws all the main characters into a 
confrontation in front of her hideout in Chinatown by informing Cross and the police about her 
whereabouts. On the spot, the police arrest Jake for obstructing justice ignoring his explanations, 
                                                 
79 Ihab Hassan, The Postmodern Turn: Essays in Postmodern Theory and Culture (Columbus: Ohio State Univ. 
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while the terrified Evelyn pulls a gun on his father who is trying to take their daughter away, to 
which the police respond by shooting her dead. 
 Polanski presents here the fatalistic, self-castrating theater of the classical noir hero as an 
unintended but necessary consequence of Jake’s simulated life, a return of his repressed primal 
scene he is doomed to repeat unconsciously. This suggests that fatalism and nostalgia about 
patriarchy lead to the same results: to the disempowerment of the feminine subject and the 
perpetuation of the masculinist status quo. The difference is that while the classical noir hero 
openly identified with the impotent homo sacer in the system’s point of undecidability, 
becoming a victim of the patriarchal law to ensure that there could be no escape from it, 
Chinatown’s postmodern male protagonist does the opposite—he starts from a nostalgic 
identification with a hyperreal image of a lost patriarchal epoch, which then guarantees his 
impotence to change anything in the present as a byproduct. Like fatalism, then, nostalgia also 
implies a primordial father (like Noah Cross) in the position of absolute knowledge, with the 
subject unconsciously repeating a repressed fantasy scene of self-castration as a definitive 
answer to what this all-knowing superego wants from him, eliminating the radical undecidability 
of that question (of what the Other wants, what to do with the lack in the symbolic order the 
subject stands for). This is why the location of this castration fantasy, LA’s Chinatown—the 
structuring absence to the film’s hyperreal texture until the very end, a place which characters 
keep referring to as a zone without law and order that nobody understands—is not an allegory for 
the contradictions of late capitalism but rather a fetish that covers them up. It is not a zone of 
indistinction proper but, as John Belton observes, a site of “absolute Otherness”80 supplementing 
the absolutely familiar hyperreal—two faces of the inoperativity that the sovereign apparatus 
                                                 
80 John Belton, “Language, Oedipus, and Chinatown,” MLN 106, no. 5 (1991): 949. 
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divides and quaranteens in separate domains so their free use is prohibited. As a result, the only 
operative form of life that remains available for the postmodern subject is a nostalgic one 
without a horizon of a different future. This is the resigned wisdom captured in the film’s famous 
closing lines: “Forget it Jake, it’s Chinatown.” As the mellow saxophone score and the soft neon-
lights indicate in the final overhead shot of Jake and his colleagues walking away from the crime 
scene, disappearing into the darkness of the Chinatown night, nostalgia and trauma, simulacrum 
and rupture can coexist in an eclectic mix now that the hero’s ambitions to change the world are 
finally abandoned. Ironically, this new postmodern immanence, the protagonist’s abandonment 
of the transcendental place of subtraction coincides with turning the viewer into a Hegelian 
beautiful soul, a detached observer to whom “anything goes.” 
The space of Chinatown is therefore sublime in Lyotard’s sense of the term: it can be 
conceived of (named) but its idea cannot be properly represented.81 For Lyotard the production 
of the sublime sentiment, a pleasure derived from the pain caused by the breakdown of the 
faculty of imagination is at the center of both modern and postmodern aesthetics. The difference 
is that modernism “allows the unpresentable to be put forward only as the missing contents; but 
the form, because of its recognizable consistency, continues to offer to the reader or viewer 
matter for solace and pleasure.”82 The increasingly more abstract forms invented by modern art 
to negate the reigning academic ideals of beauty turned into a universalist counter-aesthetics on 
their own; as such they couldn’t present the sublime, they could merely allude to it as the excess 
missing from the current politico-aesthetic paradigm, but which could perhaps be found in the 
future (Lacan called this objet a—the object sought by Badiouian destruction). We arrive to 
postmodernism proper, Lyotard suggests, when even this negative reference to a point in the 
                                                 
81 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. G. Bennington and B. 
Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 77. 
82 Ibid., 81. 
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future when society’s ills and frictions would be resolved—which for him is nothing but the 
nostalgia for an impossible lost unity in the past—is eliminated and the sublime loses its 
temporal dimension, falling back on the present, putting forward the rupture of the 
“unpresentable in presentation itself.” Postmodern is “that which denies itself the solace of good 
forms, the consensus of taste which would make it possible to share collectively the nostalgia for 
the unattainable.”83 For Lyotard, this postmodern sublime should serve as an ethical testimony to 
the irresolvable inconsistency of all human discourse against the totalitarian terror of 
reconciliation attempted by modern ideologies.84  
The Lacanian question here is which “totalitarianism” does Lyotard aim to eliminate, the 
masculine or the feminine one? The self-purifying sovereign quest for the real exception (what 
he calls the modernist sublime) or the utopian project for a real universalism of form (the 
normativity of the beautiful as purposiveness without a purpose, means without and end)?85 
Destruction or subtraction, sovereign-image or utopian gesture? The answer is: both. What he 
aims to undermine is the particular configuration in which these two, supposedly, mutually 
support each other towards totalitarian ends. Yet, Lacan’s point about sexual difference is 
precisely that there can never be a situation in which the masculine and the feminine totalities 
come together in a higher unity; they remain two irreconcilable, antagonistic attempts to come to 
terms with the lack in the symbolic order, to cope with reality’s fundamental incompleteness. As 
film noir demonstrates, the very basis of the masculine-sovereign quest for objet a (the authentic 
self) is the biopolitical limitation of the scope of universal symbolic norms, while the feminine 
embracing of an open universality comes at the price of abandoning the self-purifying sovereign 
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project. Lyotard’s ethics therefore prohibits something that is strictly speaking impossible, which 
effectively creates the illusion that without such prohibition totalitarian harmony (a sovereign 
self that is somehow also fully universal) would be possible. In other words, Lyotard’s 
postmodern “ethics” of the sublime is a fetish just like Chinatown in Polanski’s film: it’s a screen 
through which a properly nostalgic longing for the beautiful as lost becomes possible,86 not only 
giving the impression that a perfectly harmonious, unchanging past (some kind of organic 
fascism) once existed, but that without the perpetual return to the sublime rupture it would spill 
over to the present. In psychoanalytic terms, this stance is fundamentally melancholic, complicit 
in creating the conditions it pledges to push away. As Agamben argues: “[Melancholy is] the 
imaginative capacity to make an unobtainable object appear as if lost. If the libido behaves as if a 
loss had occurred although nothing has in fact been lost, this is because the libido stages a 
simulation where what cannot be lost because it has never been possessed appears as lost, and 
what could never be possessed because it had never perhaps existed may be appropriated insofar 
as it is lost.”87 Lyotard’s melancholic renunciation of closure, just like Chinatown’s, is therefore 
the very sovereign suture (the political alternative to revisionist subtraction) through which a 
“totalitarian” aesthetic comes to be perpetuated in the background. Postmodern melancholy (i.e. 
the “ethics” of the sublime) and the nostalgia for the hyperreal are two sides of the same coin, 
building blocks of a new postmodern apparatus of sovereignty. By constructing an image of lost 
coherence it effectively reterritorializes the American identity decentered by processes of 
globalization (including the US normalizing trade relations with China in 1972), mediating 
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impotence.”  Žižek, Plague of Fantasies, 103. 
87 Giorgio Agamben, Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture, trans. R. L. Martinez (Minneapolis: 
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anxiety over political-economic deterritorialization through the fetishistic containment of the 
sublime rupture it brings forward.  
We find the same dialectic in Taxi Driver (1976), which, although it starts out as a 
modernist film, soon shifts into the postmodern register. The protagonist, Travis Bickle, is a 
nighttime taxi driver in New York and writer of petty-bourgeois diatribes during the day, 
fantasizing about cleaning “the scum off the streets” of the fallen city. Yet, what is often missed 
by critics reading him as a working class reactionary88 is that initially, he also has a strangely 
affirmative attachment to the corrupt metropolis that echoes Marlowe’s stoicism from The Long 
Goodbye: “I go all over. I take people to the Bronx, Brooklyn, Harlem. I don’t care. Don’t make 
no difference to me.” Like a classical noir hero, he lives in a lonely room, isolated from the 
meaningful communication with others. As a result, he often has trouble expressing himself 
when he interacts with other characters. His discourse is schizophrenically split between 
mimicking the most obscene inherent transgressions of the white liberal bourgeoisie (racism, 
moral panic against pornography and drugs, condoning fascistic disciplinary measures), and a 
utopianism that presumes the innocence of the very same forms of life he judged earlier (he 
naively chooses a porn film for a first date). He therefore exists in a zone of indistinction 
between the sovereign and the utopian, purification and subtraction, but the trajectory of the 
narrative pushes him towards the former through the device of nostalgia.  
What tips the balance is his falling for the idea of classical noir’s redemptive woman, 
now appearing as a commodified cliché-image from the past even wearing a white dress as a 
contrast to Travis’s nightly journeys through urban filth. It is after the porn cinema incident—
                                                 
88 See for instance Matthew J. Iannucci, “Postmodern Antihero: Capitalism and Heroism in Taxi Driver,” Bright 
Lights Film Journal, January 31, 2005, Accessed May 11, 2015. http://brightlightsfilm.com/postmodern-antihero-
capitalism-and-heroism-in-taxi-driver/.  
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when the woman, Betsy, doesn’t want to see him anymore—that he, as a good sovereign, finally 
internalizes the repressed norms of the bourgeoisie that rejected him.89 He becomes a vigilante, 
kills a black man who is robbing a liquor store, and formulates a plan to assassinate a democratic 
senator whose slogan is “We are the People.” Even at this point, however, his position is 
ambiguous: is he about to commit an act of fascistic violence against the underprivileged by 
killing their symbolic representative, or is he, like Marlowe, planning to strike at a false master 
with divine violence precisely from the place of the socially excluded? This contradiction is also 
visible in his Mohawk haircut and his US army jacket, identifying him both with victims and the 
victors of American imperialism (while enigmatically wearing a “We are the People” pin). Yet, 
this (class) antagonism within Travis’s character is never activated; much like Jake in 
Chinatown, he unconsciously sets himself up for failure when he starts a conversation with the 
senator’s body guard while casing the location for the assassination. When he later comes back 
to execute his plan, the same member of the security team spots him and drives him off.  
It is only after his potentially successful divine violence is reduced by the filmmakers to a 
vulgar Freudian theater of unconsciously determined failure that Travis can move on to commit 
an unequivocally fascistic act. Escalating the post-noir discourse of saving women’s bodies from 
their liberation through work, he “rescues” a child prostitute by massacring his pimp and his 
crew, delivering the girl back to her home in Pittsburgh she once ran away from. It is her family 
that finally responds to Travis’s inconsistent “notes from the underground,”90 answering the 
hero’s lonely voice-over with formulaic gratitude and commitment to discipline their prodigal 
                                                 
89 For this reason, although screenwriter Paul Schrader intended his film to be a noir remake of John Ford’s The 
Searchers, the narrative trajectory of the two films’ protagonists is the exact opposite one. While John Wayne’s 
Ethan in The Searchers gets cured out of his racism and misogyny by the end, Travis, on the contrary, is initiated 
into the obscene rituals of the patriarchal bourgeoisie.  
90 The title of the Dostoyevsky novel that influenced Schrader’s script. 
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daughter. As Lacan would say, the letter always arrives at its destination;91 in phallic symbolic 
regimes the ambiguities of the message are always cleared up retroactively—in this case by 
erasing its utopian potential. Unlike in Production Code noirs, here the sovereign suture doesn’t 
even have to be hidden anymore, and as a result, the hero also doesn’t have to die. As 
screenwriter Paul Schrader points out, Travis is in a way even cheated out of the death he wanted 
when he finds no more bullets in his gun to kill himself with.92 After he collapses out of fatigue, 
an overhead shot scans the site of his massacre in the pimp’s apartment, cataloguing the 
gruesome details of disfigured bodies and blood splattered walls, slowly tracking back through 
the hallway to the street to frame the people gathering outside. This tracking shot links the two 
spheres, the everyday and its sublime rupture, into a new postmodern sovereign-image, in which 
the recovering madman Travis can be glorified as a media celebrity for defending the status quo 
of neoconservative values.93 In other words, the two aspects of sovereignty, biopolitical violence 
and glory that were separated in classical noir can now be conjoined through their 
aestheticization as two aspects of one and the same subject. In this new consensus, the hero 
doesn’t need an actual traditional feminine figure to redeem him from urban chaos like his 
classical predecessor did. When Betsy, the woman he used to be obsessed with comes to take a 
ride in his cab to see the hero from the news, Travis keeps his distance, limiting their small talk 
to the minimum. As she wants to pay for the fare, he just smiles and says “so long.” The car 
moves on, and we see the image of the woman on the sidewalk getting smaller and smaller from 
Travis’s point of view (looking into the rear view mirror). Then the credits start rolling with 
Bernard Hermann’s nostalgic jazz score and a montage sequence of the city by night, with 
                                                 
91 Jacques Lacan, Écrits, trans. B. Fink (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2005), 30. 
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different views from Travis’s cab juxtaposed and mirrored onto each other like in a 
kaleidoscope. Turning the actual woman into a simulated image of lost perfection, her becoming 
a crystal image of nostalgia is fixed here by the aesthetic of the sublime.  
 In classical noir the pure time-image was mobilized to restore what Deleuze called the 
action-image (a component of the order of the movement-image in which cinematic time is 
subordinated to the progress of the narrative). The noir hero of the 40s and 50s, standing in the 
rupture of time that his death drive brought about, had to arbitrarily link his present state of 
disconnect to the past and the future of the patriarchal law, thereby guaranteeing its temporal 
continuity (as I argued in Chapter 1, it is the protagonist’s illicit sovereign act that effectively 
restores the functionality of the police in films like The Maltese Falcon, Gun Crazy, or Out of the 
Past). In nostalgic neo-noirs like Chinatown or Taxi Driver, by contrast, the sovereign loop only 
works between the past and the present and the phallic apparatus’s capacity to inscribe itself into 
the future remains suspended. This means that masculine identity is saved, paradoxically, 
through its very loss, through the fetishization of the breakdown of the action image. This is the 
condition that Jameson identified as the postmodern loss of the future and of historical 
consciousness proper.  
If Taxi Driver turns the modernist formula postmodern, smoothing out its contradictions, 
Sorcerer (1977)94 does the opposite, reactivating the antagonisms of capitalism within a 
postmodern universe. It continues where the great revisionist noirs left off and displaces the 
location of its fall and redemption narrative, with the exception of the exposition, entirely to 
South America. Its four international protagonists are postmodern embodiments of crime film 
clichés: a Mexican hitman, a Palestinian terrorist, an American robber, and a French embezzler. 
                                                 
94 William Friedkin’s remake of the French film noir The Wages of Fear (1953). 
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They all went too far with their generic transgressions, and running from the consequences they 
take refuge in the rainforest of a country with no name where their identity and the value of their 
life becomes suspended; they turn into one of many faceless workers building an oil pipeline for 
an American corporation. On the one hand, the jungle functions as an absolutely other sublime 
space, the hell or perhaps purgatory men are thrown into as a punishment for their sins (even the 
local bar is operated by an ex-Wehrmacht commander)—a place from where they can reminisce 
with nostalgia about the lives they had lost. Yet, at the same time, the stories of their personal 
repentance are traversed by the geopolitical conflicts of late capitalism. The company’s oil well 
is blown up by local rebels fighting against American imperialism and the four men are offered 
“the deal of the devil” to restore the international supply chain: they are to drive trucks full of 
highly combustible nitroglycerin through the bumpy mountain paths of the jungle to deliver the 
TNT necessary to put the oil fire out by blowing up the well. In exchange, they get a new 
passport and enough money to leave the country. For them, the trip becomes a mythical rite of 
passage, a test and redemption of their manhood, a ritual repetition of the old colonizer’s 
conquering the green inferno. This is why in the eyes of their corporate masters selecting them 
for the job they are superior to the local proletariat: they have a spiritual attachment to the 
western oikonomia industrial labour, a commitment to carefully take apart and put together their 
trucks piece by piece, an ability to drive them with a steady hand for hours without a break. They 
are focused because they are guilty and they want to repent, unlike members of the native 
population they encounter on the road who seem to be living as part of nature, care free, making 
fun of the foreigners concentrated efforts.  
In a critical move, director William Friedkin makes the fetishistic, spectral dimension of 
the colonial-industrial machinery one of the referents of the film’s ambiguous title: Sorcerer is 
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the name of the main protagonist’s truck that even has teeth in the front. One the other hand, 
sorcerer is nature itself as a magical entity trying to prevent the men from succeeding with 
torrential rainfalls, corroded wooden bridges, or gigantic trees blocking the road (there is even a 
sorcerer totem by the jungle road that resembles the face of the truck). This way, instead of 
isolating the sublime as the immanent Other space to the late capitalist world of the simulacra, a 
point of mythical rupture that prevents its “totalizing” closure like in Chinatown or Taxi Driver, 
Sorcerer’s title refers to the capitalist world system in its totality, revealing the Hegelian identity 
of its culturally opposed, seemingly incommensurable Northern and Southern territories, the fact 
that they are part of the same global economic network.95 It is only through such totalizing, 
Jameson suggests, that the critical potential of the postmodern sublime can come to the fore, by 
becoming an allegory for the impossible (unrepresentable) totality of multinational capitalism 
itself.96 He calls this new critical geopolitical aesthetic cognitive mapping, a method that exposes 
the hidden class conflicts of late capitalism through identifying antagonisms in its all-
encompassing space.97 
To clearly separate this totalizing critique from Lyotard’s postmodern ethics of the 
sublime, one should recall Jameson’s distinction between antinomy and contradiction. While the 
former is an arrested, frozen form of binaries as they appear irresolvable, outside possibilities of 
historical change, the latter is the dialectical-historical interpretation of an antinomy that brings 
out the living and progressing antagonism the binary both expresses and obfuscates.98 For 
                                                 
95 The name Chinatown, insofar as it elevates one aspect of globalization into place of sublime Otherness, that of the 
US opening trade relations with China under Nixon, creates a fetish screen that prevents its totalizing understanding. 
96 Jameson, Postmodernism, 38. 
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(utopian) temporality, himself referring to it as the spatialization of time.  It’s just that instead of focusing on the end 
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(that is, class consciousness) and spatial utopias it opens up. See Ibid., 154-81. 
98 There is a “difference between [the] binary opposition, and what ordinarily . . . would be more properly described 
as a contradiction. The former is a static antithesis; it does not lead out of itself as does the latter” Fredric Jameson, 
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instance, Chinatown’s and Taxi Driver’s opposition between the hyperreal and the sublime forms 
an antinomy, so does the initial binary between modern industrial civilization and the pre-
modern “magic” of the South American rainforest in Sorcerer. Yet, Friedkin’s film overcomes 
this paralyzing antinomy in two steps. First by exposing how the two sides always already share 
their supposedly essential qualities with one another other: magic becomes the quality of the 
machine, its drivers with western instrumental reason regress into raging machete wielding 
tribesmen while the natives turn into organized rebels with machine guns. Second, when the 
binary is thereby deconstructed, he nonetheless undermines the illusion of a third, neutral 
position: the detached postmodern perspective of the beautiful soul. When Scanlon, the only 
surviving driver (the former robber from America) is about to receive his reward from the oil 
company representative for completing the mission, he suddenly loses interest in returning to his 
old petty-bourgeois self. Hearing the man’s suggestion to find work at other western companies 
in the region, perhaps in Managua, now that he has proved himself, he simply answers: 
“Managua? Shit, there is no way I can go to Managua… No, Managua is not good for me.” 
These lines are a reference to an earlier conversation he had with Nilo, the Mexican hitman, who, 
already dying, asked Scanlon to go to a whorehouse in Managua for him once he received his 
money for the job. It is this homosocial pact, the obscene underside of western imperialism that 
he refuses instinctively with his enigmatic no.99 After a blank stare into the camera for a few 
seconds something like smile appears on his face. He excuses himself for a couple of minutes 
and asks the local barmaid for a dance. The camera frames them from the outside through the 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1972), 36.; “the  unmasking of antinomy as contradiction […] constitutes truly dialectical thinking 
as such.” Fredric Jameson, Valences of the Dialectic (New York: Verso, 2009), 43. 
99 His resistance is a sign of his fidelity to the real universal potential inherent to the apparatus of Fordist labour that 
becomes visible after the subtraction of its male homosocial and imperialist limitations. What he refuses is the new 
post-Fordist (neoliberal) subjectivity of the freelance entrepreneur, serving the American Empire while pretending to 
be autonomous. 
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window, then it tracks back just like in Taxi Driver, settling to show the daily life of the shanty 
town in a static overhead shot. Soon a car arrives with the gangsters from New York Scanlon ran 
away from. As they enter the bar, a truck full of soldiers drives by; the army of the country’s US 
backed dictator. Then we hear a gunshot from the bar and immediately cut to the final credits 
with the ominous electronic soundtrack by Tangerine Dream. While the similar final overhead 
shots in Chinatown and Taxi Driver also had an implicit dialectical tension in them, they 
remained at the level of an antinomy, framing an ahistorical, static opposition of essentialized 
qualities conveniently without taking a side. Sorcerer’s final subtraction-image, by contrast, 
works as a cognitive mapping of the concrete historical antagonism between US imperialism and 
the South American resistance to it precisely because it takes an engaged position in this 
geopolitical class struggle.  
 
3.2.2 Postmodern Noir 
 Critics who separate the history of neo-noir into different periods usually mark the early 
80s as the beginning of its second, postmodern cycle.100 According to Spicer, after the revisionist 
trend reaches its apogee in the mid-70s, American film noir is revitalized again in 1981 with the 
erotic noir-thrillers Body Heat (a distant remake of Double Indemnity), and the remake of The 
Postman Always Rings Twice. He sees these films as the first to shift the direction of generic 
self-reflection away from modernist criticism towards a “more commodified reworking of 
classical noir whose seductive, instantly recognizable look—known in the trade as ‘noir lite’—
forms part of a knowing, highly allusive postmodern culture.”101 In the new paradigm, the 
previous two decades’ abstract minimalism turns into neon-lit excess, asexual male heroes 
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become promiscuous again, and the femme fatale returns with a vengeance, finally, making use 
of the abolishment of the Production Code, not as a victim of patriarchy but as the embodiment 
of phallic power, using her naked body as a weapon. Although the new noir form tends to fill in 
the blanks left by censorship, offering to reveal everything that was merely alluded to in its 
predecessor, the gender politics of these 80s erotic thrillers has a lot in common with that of the 
classical noir cycle. On the one hand, they positively incorporate the breakthroughs of second 
wave feminism: female characters get more screen time and agency,102 and, as in Body Heat the 
femme fatale can even get away with crime unpunished. At the same time, these narratives also 
express a backlash against the newly empowered, independent working woman by presenting her 
dangerous sexuality as a threat to the emasculated protagonist who often comes to stand for the 
conservative family values of the Reagan years (Fatal Attraction, 1987)103 nostalgic of the post-
war bourgeois consensus.  
Ironically, as Boozer notes, the excessive greed and sexual appetite the postmodern femme fatale 
was blamed for was nothing but the expression of the decade’s official ideology of pursuing 
one’s economic self-interest.104 Or, to be more precise, the “gender war”105 of 80s erotic noirs 
was a result of the inconsistency between the two dominant bourgeois ideologies of the era, 
neoconservativism and neoliberalism. While the former vowed to protect the immunized 
communities of nation and family from alien intruders (communists, gays, ethnic minorities, 
career women, as well as foreign corporations), the latter encouraged individuals precisely to 
blow up these boundaries and turn their life into a successful business venture on its own (for 
instance, in Gary Becker’s notorious neoliberal economic model, family members were to 
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calculate cost-benefit ratios while investing in each other).106 One could say that the moral 
panics and new militarism/nationalism of Reagan-era neoconservatives were scapegoating tactics 
to steer the blame away from their own neoliberal policies of globalization devastating the 
(Fordist, centralized and localized) social institutions of the post-war welfare state.107 This means 
that for the first time in noir history, the femme fatale of 80s erotic noir thrillers could stand not 
for the devalued life to be dissociated from the masculine biopolitical body of commodity 
producing patriarchy, but for the very sovereign agent grounding capitalism’s new post-Fordist 
impetus. While in classical noir the femme fatale’s death driven narrative trajectory served as a 
cautionary tale about the impossibility of non-patriarchal self-valorization, in neo-noir she 
returns as an entrepreneur of herself, representing the vanguard of the new economic paradigm 
precisely because of her subversion of now outdated Oedipal patriarchy.  
In the new consensus, sexual difference appears within the dialectic of capital: neoliberal 
deterritorialization is gendered feminine while its neoconservative reterritorialization is gendered 
masculine. This is not to say, however, that the femme fatale now stops being fetishized by the 
masculine gaze. Rather it is the strict Marxian separation between value and fetish itself that 
increasingly collapses in neoliberalism where the source of profit is less and less the apparatus of 
abstract labour but what David Harvey called “accumulation by disposession,” a perverse 
redistribution of wealth to the top 1% in a blatant abuse of arbitrary sovereign power.108  
This new role of the femme fatale is in fact the major difference between the early 
postmodern neo-noirs of the 70s and the 80s erotic noir thrillers. As I have suggested, the 
sovereign agent in films like Chinatown and Taxi Driver is the masculine unconscious, setting up 
                                                 
106 See Gary S. Becker, A Treatise on the Family (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981) 
107 On the historical emergence of neoliberalism see David Harvey, The Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005) 
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a nostalgic fantasy scene that prevents the male hero from changing the status quo, while the 
femme fatale is only present in these films as a passive victim. This changes in Body Heat where 
it is the femme fatale herself who actively orchestrates the scene of nostalgia for the male gaze, 
constructing herself as a fetish-image, decapacitating her male rival by exploiting his investment 
in patriarchal stereotypes of women. The film’s denouement reproduces the final scene of Taxi 
Driver but with a twist: when the male protagonist, Ned, already knows that his lover, Matty, is 
planning to kill him with some explosives rigged to the door of a boathouse, he asks her to prove 
her love to him by opening the door herself. The woman calls his bluff and starts walking 
towards the building while the camera remains static, giving us Ned’s point of view—the 
perspective of the naive observer. Before she disappears into the darkness, she stops and turns 
back for a moment; her white dress and blonde hair is lit up by the moonlight she is while 
uttering with a soft voice “Ned, no matter what you think, I do love you!” Once her nostalgia-
image fades into black, a reverse shot shows the growing doubt on Ned’s face. He starts running 
after her, but it’s too late: the boathouse goes up in flames. We then cut to Ned in prison a few 
months after, yet again suspicious about the woman real intentions: now that she has helped him 
lose his freedom (gave him an excuse to stay in his place) he can go on blaming her for it. He 
manages to get a copy of her high school yearbook that proves she stole the identity of one of her 
classmates after most likely murdering her. Matty’s real name is Mary, nicknamed “The Vamp” 
by her fellow students, a serial homecoming queen whose declared ambition was “to be rich and 
to live in an exotic island.” The close-up on her yearbook photo then transitions into Matty lying 
on the beach of an actual tropical island, but instead of satisfaction her face is fraught with 
melancholy. The native man lying next to her asks “Is this what you’ve been waiting for?” 
referring to the cocktail just arrived for her. “What?” she asks without looking, “It’s hot.” he 
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says, to which the distracted woman answers “Yes…” with an empty tone. The camera tilts up 
from her profile, settling on the clouds covering the blue sky while the credits start rolling.  
This new femme fatale both differs from and fundamentally resembles her classical 
predecessor. On the one hand, as a neoliberal entrepreneur of herself she now manages to 
outmaneuver the patriarchal gaze by consciously masquerading as the stereotypical spider 
woman fetishized by noir’s male protagonist. By performing her femininity for a symbolic (part 
blind) rather than a real (all seeing) gaze, she tames the classical noir femme fatale’s death drive 
and avoids being discarded as the devalued double of the male hero, who excludes now only an 
empty shell of patriarchal femininity—a simulation that is not lived anymore in its classical, 
dissociated and devalued form. Yet, as Žižek maintains, despite the transparency of this trick, the 
femme fatale’s enigma prevails.109 At the end of Body Heat, the viewer doesn’t learn what Matty 
really wanted. Her desire is clearly beyond what she had accomplished by duping Ned and 
escaping to the other side of the capitalist world, having a non-white manslave handing her 
drinks. The disturbing possibility of her wanting nothing that American imperialist money can 
buy, emphasized by the last shot of the empty sky, keeps a utopian impulse open through the 
deterritorializing negativity of her feminine desire. It is only a masculinist (sovereign) reduction 
of this indeterminacy that would identify the object of her desire with that of Ned’s nostalgia, as 
in the film’s use of continuity editing to suture Matty’s jouissance together with the image of the 
man she pushed away remaining obsessed with her femme fatale persona. Judith Butler calls this 
phenomenon “stubborn attachment”, arguing that subjects would rather maintain their 
subordination to a power apparatus in an unhappy consciousness than have no attachment at all, 
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which leads them to desire unfreedom even when their masters are gone.110 Moreover, she sees a 
melancholic stubborn attachment, an inability/unwillingness to mourn a lost libidinal cathexis at 
the core of all gender identities.111 While she focuses on the child’s affections for the same sex 
parent that are ungrievable in heteronormative societies, her theoretical framework can be 
extended to the relations of subjectivation and subjection involved in Body Heat’s neoliberal 
identity politics where the mourning (letting go) of the white male patriarch would leave the 
femme fatale’s entrepreneurial scheme without an anchoring point to direct itself against.  
This way, the film offers a dialectical sovereign-image of neoliberalism where the 
immobile man (Ned stuck in prison) and the feminine nomadic subject (Matty travelling alone 
for pleasure) are conjoined in a unity, allegorizing the mutual dependence of the Oedipal law and 
the feminine flight from it, the Fordist and the post-Fordist logic of capital, its deterritorialization 
and reterritorialization. In a temporal synthesis of past and present, America’s mid-century 
regime of patriarchal discipline is pushed away but also evoked with nostalgia. As Fredric 
Jameson observes, “Everything in the film [...] conspires to blur its official contemporaneity and 
make it possible for the viewer to receive the narrative as though it were set in some eternal 
thirties, beyond real historical time. This approach to the present by way of the art language of 
the simulacrum, or of the pastiche of the stereotypical past, endows present reality and the 
openness of present history with the spell and distance of a glossy mirage.”112 It is this nostalgic 
tone of the film that links Matty’s jouissance to Oedipal patriarchy as a zero institution of 
neoliberal entrepreneurship, valorizing it only as the melancholy she feels over leaving men 
behind. 
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We find a similar structure in Blade Runner (1982), where both Decard, the male 
headhunter protagonist, and his target Rachel turn out to be “replicants,” human shaped synthetic 
machines with their memories artificially implanted (they also look like simulations of classical 
noir heroes: he has a trench coat, she is wearing the attire of Joan Crawford from Mildred 
Pierce). The fact that Decard knows from the beginning that Rachel is not a real human doesn’t 
help him cope with the enigma of her feminine melancholy. He falls in love with her, and instead 
of killing her he rescues her from the dystopian nightmare of Los Angeles, taking her to the 
countryside where the trees are still green. Like in Body Heat, this offering of images of pure 
nature as what the femme fatale would supposedly really want should be understood as a strictly 
masculine fantasy, the reduction of feminine desire to masculine nostalgia.113 
The ultimate example of this formula is perhaps David Lynch’s Blue Velvet (1986), a 
film that explicitly opposes the masculine nostalgic fantasy of an ideal small town life to the 
chaos and disruption unleashed by the enigma of feminine desire. The collision starts when 
Jeffrey, an ordinary college student back to his hometown, Lumberton to visit his sick uncle, 
finds a severed human ear on the ground that no one seems to be missing. His curiosity soon 
turns him into an amateur detective, uncovering a surreal plot about a night club singer, Dorothy, 
being terrorized by a local hoodlum, Frank, who had kidnapped the woman’s husband and son to 
blackmail her into a becoming his sex slave. Curiously, although Frank holds total power over 
Dorothy, he doesn’t really know what to do with his position. He regularly visits her apartment 
demanding newer and newer favours from her to prop up his manhood (to make him a drink, to 
call him daddy instead of sir, etc.), then he performs exaggerated gestures of simulated sex 
instead of actually having intercourse with her. Jeffrey, turned into a voyeur, witnesses this while 
hiding in Dorothy’s closet, but when the woman discovers him he also cannot account for what 
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he is doing there, what he wants from her. As Todd McGowan suggests, the space of the 
Dorothy’s apartment stands for the breakdown of any fantasy frame that would make one’s 
desire meaningful.114 It represents a pure negativity which the various male heroes in the film set 
out to domesticate, resulting in a bizarre homosocial bond between Jeffrey and Frank: the 
criminal and his gang forces Jeffrey through a violent hazing ritual to make him symbolically 
one of them (Frank even kisses him on the mouth at the end).115 Significantly, the film’s 
performances of tough guy masculinity are fully exposed as pop cultural clichés of the past (of 
50s and 60s rock and roll culture, TV crime shows, etc.), re-enacted with postmodern quotation 
marks capturing their glorious inoperativity: much like the normal social order of Lumberton 
where the grass is always green and everyone is always smiling, homosocial transgressions in the 
film are nothing but nostalgic simulations. In other words, the modern distinction between 
symbolic and imaginary, universal Oedipal norm and its immunizing transgression collapses into 
the hyperreal which is then opposed to a sublime force of absolute otherness (the real). As Žižek 
puts it, “in Lynch's universe, the psychological unity of a person disintegrates into, on the one 
hand, a series of clichés, of uncannily ritualized behavior, and, on the other hand, outbursts of the 
‘raw,’ brutal, desublimated Real of an unbearably intensive, (self)destructive, psychic 
energy.”116 The masculine quest of the narrative, then, is to tame this feminine real by providing 
a cure for Dorothy’s depression, stop her from becoming the self-enclosed neoliberal femme 
fatale by reuniting her with her son.117 As McGowan summarizes, “[w]hen Dorothy evinces 
maternal concern for her son, she indicates that she has left the terrain of pure desire and entered 
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the world of fantasy. As a mother, she is on male turf: the image of the maternal plenitude is a 
male fantasy.”118 Yet, the elimination of feminine negativity doesn’t simply return us to the 
aseptic simulation of Lumberton. Much like Chinatown, Taxi Driver, or Body Heat, the film ends 
instead with the juxtaposition of the two registers, of what Žižek refers to as the ridiculous and 
the sublime:119 on the one hand, the restored idyll at Jeffrey’s family home is pushed to a point 
of kitsch when a robin, the film’s symbol of love, settles on the ledge of the kitchen window. A 
closer look, however, reveals the bird holding a crawling insect in its beak. After a brief moment 
of disgust, the characters nonetheless continue smiling and Jeffrey’s girlfriend simply says “It’s a 
strange world.” (a variation for “Forget it Jake, it’s Chinatown.”) The 50s pastiche song “The 
Mysteries of Love” keeps playing while we cut to the nostalgia montage of small town life that 
started the film, now ending with a scene of Dorothy playing with her son in a park. Here the 
soundtrack changes to her singing “Blue Velvet,” and when the camera tilts up to show the blue 
sky, the image morphs into the actual fabric of blue velvet she used to be wearing for Frank, 
suggesting that as a mother, she is trapped within the same masculine imaginary that used to 
fetishize her as a femme fatale, that the crystal image short circuiting the sublime and the 
ridiculous, the melancholic and the nostalgic imprisons the feminine jouissance expressed in her 
voice.  
What Blue Velvet, more than Body Heat, makes explicit is that feminine melancholy is 
not a real alternative to masculine nostalgia, but is rather the very form of sovereignty grounding 
it. The infantilized male subjects supposed to believe for whose eyes the new femme fatale puts 
on the mask of noir stereotypes are not merely her patsies; their (Frank’s, Jeffrey’s, and even 
Dorothy’s son’s) naively nostalgic gaze is the objet a that gives the female protagonist’s 
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enigmatic desire a structure, tying it to the lost apparatus of Oedipal masculinity. As an allegory, 
the new femme fatale can mediate American anxiety over losing its territorial groundedness 
through globalization by constructing a figure of the naive observer whose desire points back to 
the country’s lost golden age. At the same time, the fact that she can go unpunished and thus 
survive as a symptom of patriarchy nonetheless signals that a classical era return to the action 
image, a full reterritorialization of the noir state of exception is not possible anymore: the crisis 
of the American Empire can only be managed but not resolved. While classical noir’s fascistic 
scapegoating of the femme fatale founded the organic unity of a patriarchal bios, in postmodern 
neo-noir the white male community remains split from within by the female protagonist (it is 
their different approach to Dorothy’s enigmatic melancholy that break up the homosocial bond 
between Frank and Jeffrey in Blue Velvet, and it’s the void of Matty’s desire that turns Ned 
against his male friends and makes him kill the woman’s husband).  
 
3.2.3 From the Homme Fatale to the Cynic 
The melancholic femme fatale nevertheless is an image that neo-noir’s men don’t fully 
control, which explains the tendency at the end of the 80s to replace her with a more reliable 
agent of patriarchal sovereignty: the homme fatale. As Margaret Cohen argues, the Freudian 
obscene father returns in postmodern neo-noir as defense reaction against the growing female 
equality on the job market where more and more women are occupying a phallic position. The 
specter of the non-castrated man is conjured up as a guarantee that real power will remain with 
those who not only have the symbolic phallus but also an actual penis.120 This new figure often 
appears as a perverse representative of Oedipal law like the sexually overpotent 
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policeman/godfather in Internal Affairs (1990) or Hannibal Lecter’s cannibal psychiatrist in The 
Silence of the Lambs (1991), but he doesn’t reach protagonist status until the mid-90s.  
An early example of the homme fatale instead of femme fatale formula that also reveals 
the cycle’s anti-feminist ideological stakes is Michael Mann’s Manhunter (1986), a neo-noir 
about FBI profiler Will Graham’s unconventional pursuit of a serial killer, the “Tooth Fairy” 
through (over)identifying with him. Like in Taxi Driver, the status of the killer’s violence is 
ambiguous: are his repeated massacres of suburban white bourgeois families the expression of 
divine justice or is he simply praying on the vulnerable? As Graham is drawn into the vortex of 
the man’s sovereign madness, he is faced with the same undecidability: maybe his growing 
alienation from his own family connects him with a darker truth compared to which the idyllic 
images of family life he keeps dreaming about are nothing but simulations. The problem is that 
for the Tooth Fairy, murdering the innocent doesn’t prevent the fetishization of their idealized 
image, on the contrary, he kills in order to preserve their essence on video tape as eternal an 
uncorruptible. The other, utopian potential of his character appears only in a subplot when he 
falls in love with a blind woman who, much like Mary in On Dangerous Ground, doesn’t judge 
him for his masculine perversions. When the killer “shows” her the home videos he stole from 
the murdered families, she just smiles, touches his face and kisses him, probably assuming that 
the man is watching porn to get in the mood before they have sex. It is the gesture of this non-
judgmental touch of the blind woman that stands for the Lacanian feminine jouissance (we also 
see her caressing a sedated tiger in another scene) that decreates the image through a tactile 
relationship to the cinema, while, as Kendall R. Phillips notes, masculine enjoyment in the film 
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follows the logic of the Mulveyian voyeurism.121 It is the latter that breaks their short utopian 
relationship, him misreading the sight of a friendly chat between the woman and her co-worker 
as a scene of seduction, to which he responds by trying to kill both of them. Once the feminine 
plotline is sidelined, the film returns to the central doppelganger conflict between Graham and 
the Tooth Fairy, of which Mann shoots two different endings. While the killer is eliminated in 
both, the first one shows the profiler reunited with his family in their idyllic California beach 
house, reproducing the imagery of his dreams he had while working on the case. In the second, 
“director’s cut” version Graham visits during the night the family that the Tooth Fairy was 
planning to kill next, not really knowing how to account for his presence when they open the 
door (“I just stopped by to see you” he utters awkwardly). The Hegelian identity of these two 
seemingly opposite endings, a crystal-image connecting two modalities of the masculine gaze—
one nostalgic (locked on the lost beautiful), the other melancholic (sublime)—can appear against 
the backdrop of the feminine jouissance they both disavow.  
 It is this utopian potential present even in sovereign noir femininities that gradually 
disappears from erotic noir thrillers in the early 90s through the elimination of feminine 
melancholy. While Basic Instinct’s (1992) femme fatale thrill killer still has an enigmatic lack of 
satisfaction on her face at the end of the film, hesitating whether to murder her detective lover 
she successfully manipulated or let him live a little longer, Last Seduction (1994) offers a vulgar 
capitalist heroine, Bridget, who appears to be fully content with the money she gets at the end. 
When we last see her, driving away with her prize in a limousine, her facial expression lacks any 
ambiguity or melancholy: she fully identifies with the masculine ethos of yuppie success without 
a feminine remainder. Incidentally, the price of her symbolic transformation into a man is that 
                                                 
121 Kendall R. Phillips, “Redeeming the Visual: Aesthetic Questions in Michael Mann’s Manhunter,” Literature 
Film Quarterly 31, no. 1 (2003): 11. 
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the film has to introduce a second femme fatale, a male to female transgender woman left behind 
by the male protagonist when he found out about her sex change. In this way, the film exposes 
the conservative biopolitical baggage of liberal ideologies of gender performativity that became 
mainstream in the 90s:122 true, if gender is discursively produced and lacks an essence, women 
can now reach the status of powerful men simply by putting on the same social mask they are 
wearing, that of the neoliberal yuppie who doesn’t share his success with anyone. On the other 
hand, this means that their female body has to be fully instrumentalized, that is, it has to be 
abandoned in its dissociated, devalued form, which in turn is projected on disenfranchised others 
who cannot hide their inoperative baggage of femininity (such as lower class, non-white, or 
transsexual women). It is this excess of the feminine bare life supplementing the femme fatale’s 
masculine transformation that appears in Last Seduction, paradoxically, through the body of the 
transgender “other woman,” more real than the female protagonist precisely because of her 
inability to fully perform the gender mask she had chosen.123  
The next reactionary move to eliminate the potentially utopian remainders of the 
sovereign female body is then to revoke her sovereign privileges all together and return 
femininity into its classical noir status as a mask put on by the male sovereign. This is 
accomplished in The Usual Suspects (1995) whose protagonist, while exemplifying (as Keyser 
Söze) the trend towards the returning uncastrated father, also represents a new paradigm. He 
mobilizes the image of demonic masculinity (“Keyser Söze is the Devil!” – cries one of his 
victims) as a device of capital accumulation, a game of masquerade that is part of a neoliberal 
                                                 
122 See Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990) 
123 The underlying assumption is that while one can fully become a man if he/she acts like one for long enough, 
becoming a women remains an unfinished project, with the feminine body always bearing a mark of castration (in 
this case, ironically, the penis itself). 
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“abilities-machine”124 attached to the body of ordinary (Oedipalized) white men. It is the return 
of this ordinary manhood as an index of a now hybrid and neoliberal patriarchal power that 
provides the final twist of the film, as if the earlier female driven neo-noir’s unconscious 
stubborn attachment suddenly came back to life, breaking from his quarantine as an impotent 
remainder of a past regime of production. Verbal is a cynic, not a melancholic because, contrary 
to Body Heat’s femme fatale whose stubborn attachment to the Oedipal power apparatus 
remained unconscious, contradicting her open resistance to it, he can openly affirm himself not 
only through his masquerade but also as a part of the biopolitical body of white patriarchy, now 
elevated from the remainder of the Fordist past to the condition of possibility for post-Fordist 
entrepreneurship in the present. 
This way, perhaps for the first time in the history of film noir, The Usual Suspects 
manages to reconcile the tension between the subject’s singular jouissance and the biopolitical 
apparatus needed for its valorization. It finds a way to represent the individual’s unique form of 
life as productive without letting it slip into death driven madness (the problem with classical 
noir), or normalizing it as unhappy consciousness (the shortcoming of melancholic neo-noir). It 
is the image of this reconciliation that could be called the film noir theory of neoliberalism. This 
theory reveals that entrepreneurial self-affirmation is not an ideologically neutral category but is 
overdetermined by the biopolitical status quo (white patriarchy in the case of the US). From the 
perspective of film noir, the key to efficient neoliberal subjecthood isn’t self-exhibition but self-
splitting (self-castration); not the re-appropriation of one’s objet a to reach an authentic, 
complete self, but the installation of a bar between the subject’s entrepreneurial performances of 
                                                 
124 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France (1978-79), trans. M. Senellart (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 226. 
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always shifting social masks and the jouissance of belonging to an unchanging biopolitical 
community. For the noir subject, the entrepreneurial selfhood of neoliberalism means the 
flexibilization of white patriarchy, its non-death driven enjoyment as a zero institution of capital 
accumulation.  
The Usual Suspects exposes the deadlock of postmodern identity politics by revealing its 
unconscious ideological fantasy: the fetish of a white heterosexual homme fatale at the center of 
Oedipal disciplinary power, the transhistorical essence of evil against which all other identities 
are constructed through melancholic resistance. The postmodern femme fatale draws her power 
from such melancholic identity politics, her melancholy ultimately being a temporal form of 
resistance, immunization from a patriarchal past that continues to fascinate from the distance. It 
is the very paradigm of identity politics (that is, postmodern melancholy) that makes the white 
male body exceptional: his identity masks are posited against himself as superego, making his 
performance cynical. Cynicism in the The Usual Suspects is the form of appearance of western 
white heterosexual male identity politics, the symptom/truth of neoliberal identity politics in 
general, in other words: its sovereign-image.  
The real novelty of the film’s form is then that the arbitrary short circuit between the 
classical hegemonic biopolitical body of America’s capitalist patriarchy and the subject in the 
place of a sovereign exception to it is openly assumed through what could be called a cynicism-
image. Now an exceptionally versatile and flexible, but nonetheless white heterosexual male 
individual can embody the glory of neoliberalism’s sovereign power against all generic 
identities, without having to use the detour of nostalgia for a lost golden age it destroyed 
(deterritorialized). This development should be read alongside the contemporary western 
conviction, articulated most famously by Francis Fukuyama, that after the fall of the Soviet 
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Union, humanity has reached a post-historical and post-ideological era where liberal capitalism 
remains the only game in town.125 It is because America had won the Cold War and remained the 
only surviving superpower that its crisis ridden patriarchy can now once again be 
reterritorialized—this time not against globalization like in the Reagan-era but as a synonym for 
it. For the new American sovereign exceptionalism inaugurated by the Bushes and the Clintons 
there is no difference between the neoliberal deterritorialization of the country (deregulation, 
deindustrialization, financialization) and the territorial advancement of US interest over the globe 
(NATO expansion, interventionism, “free trade” agreements). For the loyal subjects of the newly 
expanded American Empire, neoliberal capitalism can now appear as the natural state of things 
without any real alternative—an ideology that Mark Fisher calls capitalist realism, which, as I 
will show in the next chapters, is grounded in the sovereign-image of cynicism.126 While there 
may be alternative forms of life, they are simply not worth investing into: for cynics, the status 
quo is the most profitable of all possible worlds; its maintenance is the true purpose of all 
resistances. As I will argue, cynicism narrowly understood is the name of a new triumphalist 
form of sovereignty that collapses the old-new hegemonic bios of the US with the increasingly 
more abstract global regime of production, aiming to turn the globalized world into the 
playground of a the white western male bourgeoisie. 
 
3.3 Anti-Utopianism in Postmodern Snow Noir 
Since the cynical turn in neo-noir marks an attempt to eliminate the films’ remaining 
utopian impulses (feminine resistances not looped back to patriarchal biopower), it’s worth 
considering here what happens to the utopian programs of snow noirs in this post-historical 
                                                 
125 See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992) 
126 See Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? (Ropley: Zero Books, 2009) 
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context. First of all, while in the classical period noir’s tendency to sublate itself towards snowy 
utopias was limited to a few isolated cases, such films return in the mid-90s as a distinct cycle. It 
is after the financial success of the Coen Brothers’ 1996 Fargo, a “white noir”127 hailed by 
critics for its anti-noir reflexivity, that the autonomous qualities of snow noir are considered by 
Hollywood worthy enough to build a trend around them. This is how Altman’s investment 
scheme theory of genre cycles128 would explain the emergence of the still ongoing movement of 
snow noirs that followed Fargo with films like Affliction (1997), Smilla’s Sense of Snow (1997), 
A Simple Plan (1998), The Pledge (2001), Insomnia (2002), Narc (2002), A Little Trip to Heaven 
(2004), The Ice Harvest (2005), Transsiberian (2008), Max Payne (2008), Frozen River (2008), 
Whiteout (2009), Winter’s Bone (2010), The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo (2011), Deadfall 
(2012), Fargo the TV series (2014-) etc. While the theory about the industry milking its cash 
cow is certainly persuasive enough, it’s interesting to consider that after decades of hiatus, there 
were at least two other snow noir releases in 1996, that is, before Fargo could have made an 
impact, both of them box office flops: Barbet Schroder’s Before and After, a distant remake of 
the noir classic Reckless Moment (1949), and Renny Harlin’s action packed Long Kiss 
Goodnight, written by aspiring Christmas noir specialist Shane Black (Kiss Kiss Bang Bang, 
2005). A further explanation for the snowbound noir cycle could be the growing global influence 
of Scandinavian crime fiction which, however, had its impact on Hollywood only later (partially 
through the international co-production Smilla’s Sense of Snow in 1997, but mainly with remakes 
like Insomnia, 2002 and The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo, 2011).129 
                                                 
127 William Luhr, “Fargo: ‘Far Removed from the Stereotypes of . . .’,” in The Cohen Brothers’ Fargo, ed. William 
Luhr (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 93. 
128 see Rick Altman, Film/Genre (London: BFI, 1999), 49-62. 
129 Although Harlin himself is from Finland and the Coens did emphasize the Swedish-inflicted accent of the small 
Minnesota community of Nordic descent in Fargo. 
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 Besides these factors, then, it’s important to position snow noir’s return within the 
discursive history of American neo-noir as well as in relation to contemporary shifts in the 
capitalist mode of production to answer the question whether there is a utopian program present 
in these postmodern films comparable to the classical examples discussed in the previous 
chapter. At first sight, the three 1996 films digress from the mainstream of the classical noir 
canon in a similar way as On Dangerous Ground or It’s a Wonderful Life did. They share the 
anti-noir aesthetic of a snowy terrain that derails the well-conceived plans of male criminals, 
autonomous maternal protagonists with a sense of justice instead of femme fatales embodying 
male anxieties; weak, morally corruptible male protagonists; small town locations instead of 
urban centers but no less depraved than the noir city, showing the entanglement of local and 
(inter)national capital. Where the three films differ from the classics is their biopolitical ultra-
reflexivity:130 they all depict a corrupt male homosocial network, connecting agents from the 
countryside as well as the city, representatives of the official symbolic law as well as its criminal 
transgressors, in a conspiracy to kidnap a woman (Fargo), cover up the murder of a woman 
(Before and After) or kidnap a daughter in order to kill her and her mother together (Long Kiss 
Goodnight). Yet, in the end, contrary to classical snow noir, although the maternal agent 
successfully intervenes and sabotages the full realization of the conspiracy, she is unable to 
promise an alternative, feminine form of life. The utopian potential of her actions regresses into 
an unconvincing re-enchantment of the bourgeois family unit through rural-agrarian fantasies—a 
simulated idyll in the countryside.  
The Cohen brothers seem to be the most aware of this problem when in a rather cynical 
move they have Marge, the pregnant sheriff of Fargo, naively lecture to the freshly apprehended 
                                                 
130 They are, of course, also full of postmodern allusions to the noir canon (the private detective in Long Kiss 
Goodnight is driving Marlowe’s car from The Long Goodbye, Before and After steals the storyline from The 
Reckless Moment, A Simple Plan restages the Mexican standoff from Nightfall, etc.). 
188 
 
sadistic kidnapper/murderer: “There is more to life than a little money, you know.” Not only do 
these words fall on deaf ears in the diegetic reality, they also betray the female hero’s grotesque 
inability to understand the very events she just uncovered with her otherwise superior deduction 
skills (“I just don’t understand it!” she keeps repeating). In Jamesonian terms, what she is unable 
to cognitively map is the totality of the late capitalist condition allegorized by the vast frozen 
landscape—the complex network of power relations that derailed the apparently foolproof plan 
of Jerry, the film’s unfortunate used car salesman protagonist who orchestrated a “nonviolent” 
kidnapping of his own wife to extort money from his father-in-law. His operation soon turned 
into a bloodbath ostensibly because of unforeseen federal regulations of license plates on newly 
purchased vehicles that got his hired thugs from out of town into trouble with the local police. 
For this reason, Marge’s final words addressed to her manchild husband while watching TV in 
their king size bed: “Heck, Norm, we’re doing pretty good!” can’t but resound with the directors’ 
resignation; the idyllic infantile naiveté of the film’s poor in spirit is quickly countered by the 
heavy pathos of the violin score during the final credits—a knowing wink addressed to the 
audience, inviting them to disidentify from this caricature of an anti-capitalist utopia.  
The other films display a similar ambiguity about their ultimately conservative, post-noir 
project to rehabilitate the ideal of the nuclear family as a counterforce to noir decadence. Long 
Kiss Goodnight features an amnesiac CIA assassin who after a head injury identifies with her 
cover and becomes a small town primary school teacher, gets married and even has a daughter. 
Years later her past starts to haunt her, temporarily reactivating her former femme fatale self, but 
only as an instrument to save her family and lead them symbolically out of the winter that has 
now corrupted even ordinary small town life, into a sunny pastoral idyll in an undisclosed and 
rather unrealistic location in the middle of a desert. A similar change of seasons signaling the 
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reunification of the family appears in Before and After, operating with ideal images of a holiday 
space instead of evoking the sturdiness of the family home which has lost its innocence forever 
when the father found his murderer son’s bloodstained gloves in the garage (a moment 
equivalent to the home wrecking scenes in the other two films, involving an axe in Fargo and 
several machine guns in Long Kiss Goodnight). Perhaps the definitive version of the snow noir 
family’s deadlock occurs in the later A Simple Plan where the protagonist, after murdering his 
own brother for a bag of a million dollars, burns the money in his living room fireplace in front 
of his pregnant but no less greedy wife who suffers a hysterical outbreak while watching her 
husband’s futile attempt to save the empty ideal of their family.  
The idea of bourgeois harmony appears here as a performatively constructed fantasmatic 
supplement to a post-apocalyptic present, a noble feminine lie offering a bit of fake warmth 
amidst the harsh realities of the frozen world that had already corrupted men into a nihilistic, 
self-destructive conspiracy. With their family obsessed maternal protagonists these films are at 
the tail end of a larger anti-feminist backlash in neo-noir against the recently empowered career 
woman of the 80s. The re-emergence of snow noir in the mid-90s is paralleled by the already 
mentioned decline of the erotic noir thriller cycle131 as well as the appearance of the postfeminist 
noir heroine, “the savvy woman,” as Linda Mizejewski puts it, “who no longer needs political 
commitment, who enjoys feminine consumerist choices, and whose preoccupations are likely to 
involve romance, career choices, and hair gels” (Out of Sight, 1998; Taking Lives, 2004).132 The 
postmodern snow noirs above, I claim, offer the genealogy of this new postfeminist heroine, 
                                                 
131 As David Andrews observes, in the early 90s erotic thrillers became increasingly dissociated from noir 
iconography that used to legitimized sex in mainstream films like Body Heat or Fatal Attraction, leading to a new 
cycle of more sexually explicit softcore thrillers produced mainly for the home video market. See David Andrews, 
“Sex Is Dangerous, So Satisfy Your Wife: The Softcore Thriller in its Contexts,” Cinema Journal  45, no. 3 (Spring 
2006): 59-89. 
132 Linda Mizejewski, “Dressed to Kill: Postfeminist Noir,” Cinema Journal 44, no. 2 (Winter, 2005): 122. 
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revealing the price she had to pay for her ironic, post-ideological consciousness. They show that 
by embracing a performatively constructed new traditionalist idyll made out of commodified 
simulacra of a deactivated history, she not only renounces the postmodern femme fatale’s 
phallic-sovereign quest for power but also her still present utopian potential formulated as an 
emancipatory program in classical snow noir. Snow in postmodern noir is not the symbol of the 
utopian outside of capital’s dialectic (of the universality of lumen), but stands for the sublime, 
deterritorializing force of neoliberalism that has reached a global scale (for a kind of globalized 
lux), pushing reterritorialization into the imaginary. 90s snow noir is interesting because, unlike 
the triumphalist narrative of cynical neo-noirs, it exposes the gap between the abstract forces of 
global capitalism and the masculine bios, the fact that men are not in control of the processes of 
deterritorialization and they need the ideological support of women, their nostalgia for a lost 
feminine essence to make their chaotic world minimally livable.133  
And while the films’ final resignation contributes to contemporary capitalist realism by 
suggesting that globalization cannot really be stopped, only escaped in fantasy, this move also 
reveals itself as a performatively constructed anti-utopianism that, in order to be effective, first 
has to evoke the very emancipatory potential of the classical snow noir universe to then disavow 
it and mark it as impossible.134 In Before and After, the mother of the teenage murderer, after 
some hesitation, does intervene and break the obscene masculine pact between her husband, son, 
and the family’s lawyer to cover up the murder the son committed against the film’s young 
femme fatale. It is only at the end that she capitulates in front of the powerful image of an idyllic 
                                                 
133 This way, the new snow noir reverses the gender hierarchy of the postmodern films where men played the 
designated naive believers for femmes fatales.  
134 On such ambiguous relationship of Hollywood to utopian desire see Fredric Jameson, “Reification and Utopia in 
Mass Culture,” Social Text no. 1 (1979): 130-48. 
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family reunion pretending that life can go on like nothing happened.135 In Fargo, Marge’s 
relentless commitment to justice initially also positions her as the representative of a maternal 
law beyond phallic exceptions “that renounces violence and demands nurturance of life.”136 It is 
only when she encounters the real consequences of her universal love challenging the sanctity of 
her bourgeois marriage that she abandons classical snow noir’s feminine ideal. The scene that 
underscores this change of heart the most is her meeting with a former high school class mate 
who used to have a crush on her and whose life is now in ruins after a bad divorce. The 
proximity of this man’s miserable life, his disturbing jouissance she interprets as a sexual 
advance induces her sudden panic, making her shift from the friendly tone of the conversation to 
the official language of a police procedure—a tone overshadowing her “affectionate” words to 
her husband at the end. And finally, Long Kiss Goodnight experiments with a different use of the 
postmodern femme fatale’s phallic skill-set, dislocating it from its former function in the 
neoliberal competition through the device of the assassin protagonist’s amnesia, turning it into 
Agambenian means without and end, the symbolic alternative to the film’s masculine conspiracy 
that used to exploit the heroine herself as a weapon. When in the final scene we see her 
withdrawing into an agrarian idyll with her family, she still has the ability to playfully throw a 
knife into a block of wood, displacing therefore its military purpose. Yet, the price of her post-
phallic use of this object is now at the same time its return to use as a kitchen knife, serving an 
old-new purpose the postfeminist heroine is now perfecting with a knowing wink.   
 
                                                 
135 Interestingly, her former sovereign agency is then displaced onto the critical but powerless voiceover of her 
young daughter who melancholically recognizes the irresolvable loss of the former harmony as well as the family’s 
inability to articulate it. This can be read as the juxtaposition of the old nostalgic-melancholic and the new cynical 
paradigms, indication that the previously dominant female sovereign is reduced to a minor position.  
136 Pamela Grace, “Motherhood, Homicide, and Swedish Meatballs: The Quiet Triumph of the Maternal in Fargo,” 
in The Cohen Brothers’ Fargo, ed. William Luhr (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 51. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
The utopian spaces of films like It’s a Wonderful Life and On Dangerous Ground were 
temporarily suspended autonomous zones outside capital’s constant flux of deterritorialization 
and reterritorialization within America, made possible by the incompleteness of its modernizing 
historical trajectory. By the 60s and 70s the modernizing drive of the United States starts to 
spread across the globe, reaching what Arrighi calls a signal crisis of imperialist capital 
accumulation due to the limits of national infrastructure. Revisionist noir reflects on this crisis by 
reframing utopian territoriality as inoperative national-patriarchal sovereignty. In the Reagan-era 
when the dialectic of national and global is rebalanced through the marriage of neoconservative 
and neoliberal ideologies, postmodern neo-noir exchanges the revisionist utopias of failed 
masculinity for nostalgia for an irredeemably lost organic (pre-globalization) patriarchal order. 
Finally, in the age of global American unilateralism, cynical noir resurrects the Father from his 
living dead status as the object of melancholic desire and returns him to his former glory as the 
representative of the symbolic law and the agent of its sovereign subversion.  
Like the cynical films, 90s snow noirs reflect on the global capitalist fulfillment of 
American modernity’s project that has entirely saturated its former outside. This means that 
while the frozen landscape of classical snow noirs had a redemptive function, in the new films it 
starts to signify a dystopian, worldless terrain beyond American patriarchal control, offering a 
cognitive map of the meaningless chaos of neoliberal deterritorialization. For this reason, 
however, this cycle has a potential to critique contemporary cynical noir’s identification of 
western masculine bios with neoliberal capitalism as such.137 As an imaginary representation of 
                                                 
137 In fact not all contemporary snow noir utopias end up simply failing. For instance, Smilla’s Sense of Snow 
(1997), Frozen River (2008), Winter’s Bone (2010), or The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo (2011) all produce a 
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global deterritorialization, snow noir is a background against which noir’s cynical paradigm is 
exposed as just a particular form of reterritorialization, nothing but the identitiy politics of 
western white men blown up to imperial proportions. As the next chapters will show, snow noir 
continues to haunt its cynical counterpart and has to be disavowed for global capitalism’s 
deterritorializing and reterritorializing impetus to coincide in the hybrid hegemonic body of the 
cynical sovereign.  
                                                                                                                                                             
strengthened feminine consciousness that promises not the imaginary escape from but the real negation of the late 
capitalist status quo. More on the latter in Chapter 6.  
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4 Sovereign Life in a Deterritorialzed Empire: Danny Boyle and the 
Noir of the Digital 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 A quick glance at Danny Boyle’s biggest international successes reveals a versatile 
director who is hard to pin down: his breakthrough Trainspotting (1996) was a dark 
comedy/drama about Scottish heroin addicts, but he is also well known for his post-apocalyptic 
zombie horror 28 Days Later (2002), his Oscar winning oriental love story Slumdog Millionaire 
(2008), as well as the opening ceremony he directed for the 2012 London Olympics with the 
theme “This is for Everyone.” On the one hand, most of his work is territorially and thematically 
rooted in the postcolonial domain of the former British Empire with films made in/about 
Northern Ireland, Scotland, England, the United States, or India.1 On the other hand, he is not 
primarily interested in these countries’ local heritage of the colonial past; his music video and 
new media influenced aesthetic channels rather transcultural affects of today’s global network 
society, looking to create a cinema for a generic postcolonial humanity living in the digital age. 
Perhaps this is why despite the occasional backing of Hollywood studios he never settled down 
in Los Angeles, preferring an international career somewhere between independent and 
mainstream filmmaking (“indiestream” as one critic put it.)2 This way, Boyle suggests, he can 
have both the creative freedom and enough money to make intelligent but emphatically popular 
films, not unlike the Coen brothers or Quentin Tarantino.3 Along these lines, the two book length 
                                                 
1 With the exception of The Beach (2000) which was shot in Thailand.  
2 Simon Hattenstone, “Sink or Swim,” in Danny Boyle: Interviews, ed. B. Dunham (Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 2011), 51. 
3 Monika Maurer, “Trainspotters,” in Danny Boyle: Interviews, ed. B. Dunham (Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 2011), 23. 
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studies of his career celebrate him as a director of the people whose stories are about “ordinary 
heroes”4 with a “lust for life”5—or as he insists, regardless of genre, “[he tries] to put an energy 
in [his] films that’s life-affirming, that’s redemptive.”6 
As I will show, this indeed is the gist of Boyle’s recipe for breaking into the international 
market: combining the hip, youthful aesthetic of the digital age (a certain accelerationist 
vitalism) with a transgeneric narrative formula capturing something like a lowest common 
denominator of humanity transformed by global capitalism, that is, how ordinary people 
worldwide cope with the increasing pressures of neoliberal competition. While populism and the 
push towards a happy ending are principles Boyle shares with classical Hollywood,7 the 
American film industry has always had something that he lacks: it is organically situated in a 
country that has been successfully expanding its political, economic, and cultural hegemony over 
the world since the Second World War. To state the obvious, Hollywood doesn’t have to try hard 
to find universality because it has long been part of the apparatus of US imperialism that kept 
positioning various forms of American life as universal, crushing and coopting local differences 
elsewhere for the purposes of its culture industry—a process that, as I have argued in the 
previous chapter, has intensified since the collapse of the USSR. It is for this reason, as Fredric 
Jameson notes, that what we call globalization has to a large extent been the Americanization of 
                                                 
4 See Edwin Page, Ordinary Heroes: The Films of Danny Boyle (London: Empiricus Books, 2009) 
5 See Mark Browning, Danny Boyle: Lust for Life (Gosport: Chaplin Books, 2011) 
6 Jeffrey Overstreet, “Danny Boyle: The Looking Closer Interview,” in Danny Boyle: Interviews, ed. B. Dunham 
(Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2011), 86. 
7 It’s worth noting that Edwin Page’s use of the term ordinary to describe Boyle’s heroes evokes British Marxist’s 
historian E. P. Thompson’s category “ordinary people,” referring to the working classes, which is consistent with 
Boyle’s own socialist views. By contrast, the populism of Hollywood is that of the middle class, a term which in its 
unique American usage does partially overlap with the category of wage labourers, yet in Hollywood films it’s 
determined in the last instance by bourgeois values of entrepreneurship, property ownership, and white patriarchy. 
See Robin Wood, Ideology, Genre, Auteur,” Film Comment 13, no. 1 (1977): 46-51.  
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the planet.8 Ernesto Laclau calls this hegemony through incarnation where a particular element 
directly stands in for the universal, becoming indistinguishable from it.9 Boyle’s relation to 
postmodern American exceptionalism is interesting because neither did he simply sell out to 
Hollywood, nor did he hold on to an idea of British (or Irish, Scottish, Indian, etc.) national 
cinema resisting Americanization. His wager instead is that globalization is a deterritorializing 
phenomenon that eventually eradicates the identity not only of colonized but also of colonizers. 
It’s an ultimately liberating process that neither the British, nor the Americans can control. This 
is why, I will argue, his films follow the logic of sovereign exception. If they have a 
transnational appeal it’s not because they exemplify either traditional Britishness (Irishness, 
Scottisness, etc.) or classical Hollywood generic formulas so well, but because they enter what in 
the previous chapters I called the meta-generic domain of film noir where heroes are ordinary 
insofar as they are “men without qualities,” purified of their cultural baggage and shared identity 
markers to the point where they lust for nothing but bare life (zoe), driven by their own unique 
brand of surplus enjoyment. The hypothesis that Boyle’s films put forward is that such noir 
isolation today is not merely an exception to generic, shared forms of life but the new global 
norm regulating the neoliberal production, fetishization, and exploitation of sovereign affect all 
over the world. Reflexive of their director’s own position, these films can tell us something about 
the subjectivity required to successfully connect to the global capitalist network insofar as it has 
become increasingly abstract and semi-autonomous, detached from the center of the British and 
American Empire that facilitated its emergence. At the same time, I will argue, his 
                                                 
8 Fredric Jameson, “Notes on Globalization as a Philosophical Issue,” in The Cultures of Globalization, ed. F. 
Jameson and M. Miyoshi (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 54-81. 
9 Such an idea goes back to the European universalism of the 19th century, where, he argues, “there was no way to 
distinguish between European particularism and the universal functions it was supposed to incarnate, given that 
European universalism had constructed its identity through the cancellation of the logic of incarnation and, as a 
result, of the universalization of its own particularism.” Ernesto Laclau, “Universalism, Particularism and the 
Question of Identity,” October 61, no. 3 (1992): 86. 
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accelerationist enthusiasm for the neoliberal transformation is also symptomatic of Boyle’s white 
Anglo-Saxon masculine position, of a biopolitics that remains at the core of the new 
deterritorialized Empire still controlled by the US and its allies.  
 
4.2 “There is no such thing as society”: Boyle’s Cynical Glorification of 
Neoliberal Autoimmunity 
 
4.2.1 Elephant as the Autoimmune Endgame of the British Empire 
 The basics of Boyle’s auteurial project can be already detected in his early collaboration 
with his idol Alan Clarke on the man’s penultimate film Elephant (1989). As a young producer 
for the BBC, Boyle approached Clarke to direct a film about one of the last great decolonizing 
struggles against the British Empire, the ethno-religious violence in Northern Ireland known as 
the The Troubles. As he explains on the DVD commentary, he was interested in the political 
killings that were not reported by the media on the mainland because the victims were ordinary 
people instead of figures of symbolic authority.10 After developing the idea together, they shot 
the film in Belfast, without, however, adding any dialogue or subtitles to explain the link 
between the 18 executions that constitute the plot. Scenes of seemingly random shootings follow 
one another in a mechanical fashion, inducing a state of indifference in the viewer towards any 
ideological cause behind them. Urban space is also abstract, abandoned and lifeless except for 
the perpetrators and their victims, resembling noir’s desolate zones of indistinction where the 
value of human life becomes suspended. Unlike noir proper, however, Clarke and Boyle’s film 
never moves beyond the point of undecidability with regards to which life should be valued and 
                                                 
10 The Firm/Elephant, directed by Alan Clarke (1989; West Hollywood, CA: Blue Underground, 2006), DVD. 
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which shouldn’t. The killers are all white British men of different ages and classes, exactly the 
same as the ones they kill. It is the repetitive structure of the film that links these isolated and 
enigmatic scenes of violence into something like a ritual, a code of human behaviour with a 
certain timing and rhythm that can be reproduced (modulated) in different situations with small 
variations:11 almost all the segments involve the camera with wide angle lens tracking a man 
walking, stopping for a moment when the shooting occurs, then following the killer again for a 
while as he walks away, ending the sequence with a static shot of the dead body. It is this 
abstract geometrical pattern that, like what network theory calls a protocol, connects isolated 
members of the executioners’ tribe, but it also separates them from one another: as the film 
progresses, the roles become increasingly confused; men tracked by the camera at the beginning 
of a sequence end up as the ones getting shot, etc.12 The biopolitical community evoked is 
therefore simply the totality of white men of the British Empire without any other distinctions;13 
their violence, an allegory for the decline of imperial glory, is shown as entirely autoimmune, 
self-annihilating, without the successful stabilization of a group’s boundaries through the 
sovereign exclusion of an other’s bare life.  
 On the DVD commentary Boyle takes issue with this hopeless nihilism of the film, 
indicating that this was Clarke’s idea, he would have ended it on a more upbeat note. Yet, it is 
precisely this apparent nihilism, the construction of a viewer who is indifferent to the masculine 
theater of sovereign violence—rather than fatalistically or melancholically accepting it as 
                                                 
11 Deleuze and Guattari call this the refrain, a rhythmic operation that marks the basic difference between any stable, 
territorialized order and chaos. See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. B. Massumi (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1987), 310-50. 
12 As Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker argue, “protocols are all the conventional rules and standards that 
govern relationships within networks.” “[P]rotocol facilitates relationships between interconnected, but autonomous,  
entities.” It is “less about power (confinement, discipline, normativity) and more about control (modulation, 
distribution, flexibility).” Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker, “Protocol, Control, and Networks,” Grey 
Room 17 (2004): 8-10. 
13 The only spoken word is “shite” pronounced with an Irish accent, but we never learn which faction of the conflict 
the person belongs to.  
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necessary—that carries the utopian connotations of Elephant. It is only the masculine quest for 
the real, men’s the murderous yet banal attempt to perform something like an authentic ritual of 
walking, that is exposed as tedious, never ending, and self-destructive. What is hopeful about the 
film is precisely the lack of any female as well as non-white perspective within the diegesis (the 
Empire’s female and/or non-white subjects are absent entirely); instead, they are situated outside 
of the white masculine universe in the extradiegetic gaze of the viewer who is not libidinally 
invested in this quest for the real phallus, subtracting from its nihilistic regime. The film 
therefore decreates the sovereign-image of imperial masculinity by repeating it to the point of 
abstraction, collapsing the sovereign act grounding it into an empty gesture, liberating the 
inoperativity at the heart of glory from the power apparatus it used to belong to. This is why, I 
will argue, Boyle’s reintroduction of hope and redemption into the field of sovereign power 
struggle in his later work is a fundamentally anti-utopian move, a cynical affirmation of 
sovereign biopolitics as a dead end that nonetheless lacks any alternative.  
 
4.2.2 Normalization through Noir Cynicism: Shallow Grave as Boyle’s Answer to the 
Empire’s Autoimmune Crisis 
 Boyle’s first theatrical release as a director, Shallow Grave (1994) can be considered his 
amendment to his earlier project with Clarke, a shift back into the territory of noir sovereignty. 
Similarly to classical noirs like D.O.A. (1950) or Sunset Blvd. (1950), it opens with the voice-
over narration of a protagonist who is already dead, setting up the whole film as a flashback to 
the events that led to his demise. The difference is that Boyle doesn’t let the viewer know that 
this is what the first shot is about until the very end. At first, we only see the close-up of David’s 
face while lying in bed, lit with strong, warm light, the camera rotating around the vertical axis 
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as he shares his ostensibly life affirming philosophy with us: “I'm not ashamed. I've known love. 
I've known rejection. I'm not afraid to declare my feelings. Take trust, for instance, or friendship. 
These are the important things in life. These are the things that matter, that help you on your 
way. If you can't trust your friends, well what then? What then?” These lines promise a film 
about the strength of friendship, yet, when we return to this sequence at the very end, their 
meaning changes to the opposite retrospectively. By then, David is murdered by his so called 
friends and it becomes clear that the sheets he is lying on belong to a table in the morgue. 
Although his face is now lit with a feeble and cold light, his voice doesn’t change from its earlier 
balance between detachment and enthusiasm; he continues his monologue where he left off: “Oh, 
yes, I believe in friends. I believe we need them. But if one day you find you just can’t trust them 
anymore, what then? What then?” Like the voice of Verbal in The Usual Suspects, David’s 
enigmatic tone also marks him as an unknowable, post-classical character whose identity can 
change based on the narrative situation, that is to say, a character who at his core is 
fundamentally inoperative, lacks an essence.14 The difference is that, contrary to Verbal, he is 
unable to make use of this post-classical existence; he becomes rather the victim of it.  
 Right after the opening voice-over we cut to an accelerated ground level tracking shot 
(using the wide angle technique Boyle admits borrowing form Clarke)15 running through the 
streets of Edinburgh with the pulsating electronic soundtrack of Leftfield in the background, then 
spiraling up the dark staircase of an old tenement building following an unidentified men with a 
paper bag in his hand from low angle. He rings the doorbell of the apartment on top, but instead 
of shooting the person who opens like in Elephant’s porch killing scenes, a reverse shot of the 
                                                 
14 See J. P. Telotte, “Rounding up ‘The Usual Suspects’: The Comforts of Character and Neo-Noir,” Film Quarterly 
51, no. 4 (1998):17. 
15 See the DVD commentary on The Firm/Elephant, directed by Alan Clarke (1989; West Hollywood, CA: Blue 
Underground, 2006), DVD. 
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man’s face reveals a harmless looking young redhead with a bottle of wine who then eagerly 
announces that he is “here for the room.” The looming threat of sovereign violence is averted 
with this gag and we enter generic territories: a subsequent shot frames the three young 
professional protagonists (David, Juliet, and Alex) sitting next to each other like an exam 
committee, facing the interviewed candidate who wants to be their new roommate. They handle 
the numerous applicants with an irony and sarcasm pushed to the point of sociopathic sadism: 
first they make them want the apartment, then they point out their personal flaws (mocking their 
body, religion, or relationship status), demand impossible skills of them (from knowledge of 
highly specific pop cultural trivia to details of corporate finance), and finally they let them know 
that they have failed to live up to their expectations and laugh hysterically after they leave. As an 
obvious metaphor for the neoliberal era job interview,16 the scene immunizes the life of the three 
roommates as if they were part of a cruel business venture built on their shared misanthropic 
disdain for others who are naive enough to believe in the idea of community (naive enough to 
show up). This way their selection ritual puts the famous neoliberal dictum “there is no such 
thing as society” coined by their contemporary, Margaret Thatcher into practice.  
These scenes also show an interesting parallel with what Jeffrey Sconce in the American 
context called “smart cinema,”17 where the generic allegiance of filmmakers, viewers, and 
characters is created through ironic disengagement from social norms presumed to be taken 
seriously by others (as in films of Wes Anderson, Todd Solondz, or David O. Russell).  
To speak in an ironic tone,” he argues, “is instantly to bifurcate one's audience into those 
who 'get it' and those who do not. The entire point of ironic address is to ally oneself with 
sympathetic peers and to distance oneself from the vast ‘other’ audience however defined, 
                                                 
16 Boyle depicts actual job interviews in his next film in a similar way. 
17 It’s worth noting that “smart,” of course, is a popular neoliberal buzzword. 
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which is often the target of the speaker’s or artist’s derision. If I think you are an idiot, I 
can use irony to insult you without getting punched in the face. If I think you are like-
minded, we can use irony to laugh at, or express our disengagement from those around 
us.18  
In the sense that I used the term after Rick Altman in Chapter 1, genres as such are ironic 
constructs, “smart” insofar as they presuppose the Metzian naive observer ignorant of the 
transgressive pleasures offered to those playing their game. Smart films, however, go further 
insofar as they also draw attention to their irony through what Sconce calls a blank style that 
dampens the effects of narrative events (in Shallow Grave David’s flat voiceover or the 
stylization of the roommates’ cartoonish discursive violence are examples of this).19 We could 
say that smart films are self-aware of what constructing a generic community entails (the 
exclusion of other, “stupid” forms of life), and they make precisely this self-awareness the basis 
of their own obscene generic game posited against traditional genre games that lack such open 
“position-taking.”20 This means that contrary to classical genres that exclude (limit) an abstract 
universal that is open to any form of life, smart films limit something that is already limited, 
excluding generic communities that themselves already were the product of their own logic of 
biopolitical exclusion. The applicants mocked by the three roommates in Shallow Grave are 
members of subcultures (like the Goth or the Catholic girl) or represent stereotypes (the 
manchild geek, the middle aged divorced man, etc.). The smart film is therefore the paradox of a 
                                                 
18 Jeffrey Sconce, “Irony, Nihilism and the New American Smart Film,” Screen 43, no. 4 (2002): 351-52. 
19 Ibid., 359. 
20 Ibid., 353. Participants in traditional genre games also know what they are doing, but the rules of the game 
prohibit them from articulating their perverse pleasures in public. They enjoy insofar as the Other doesn’t know they 
do. Participants in the smart discourse, on the contrary, openly lay out their perversion assuming there is no Other to 
understand it anymore. 
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meta-generic genre, performing the genre system’s autoimmune self-destruction to an infinite 
regress, without, however, entering the noir suspension of the generic as such.  
This is how what Sconce identifies as a typical smart film device, the static tableau shot21 
is used in Shallow Grave’s interview scene. After they have finished abusing an interviewee, two 
of the main characters sit next to her on the couch while the third takes pictures with a disposable 
camera for laughs later. These acts break the former division of space and temporarily align the 
protagonists with the person they were laughing at by pretending they are friends. This 
community, lacking any indexical link to an actually shared life, only exists on the photograph, 
which therefore, despite being technically taken by an analogue device, has the ontology of a 
digital image. It’s a snapshot that decreates the image it takes, drawing attention to the gestural 
dimension of human life for a moment before it gets discarded with mockery. To put it 
differently, the smart discourse overwrites generic forms of life with their deliberately 
inauthentic (gestural) simulations, while at the same time trying to make the very knowledge 
(laughter) about this inauthenticity the suturing point of a new community. No wonder that 
Hugo, the man the three roommates finally accept to live with them is someone who doesn’t 
have an identity. He is an enigmatic homme fatale claiming to be a writer but changing details in 
his story as if he was playing a game, quite possibly lying about never having killed a man (the 
supposedly witty exam question David asks him).22  
What the three sociopaths don’t realize is that he is their ideal roommate precisely 
because he doesn’t actually want to become one: the morning after he moves in, they find him 
dead in his room, lying naked on his bed with a bag of money underneath. The tableau shot of 
his corpse, frozen into the position of Christ in Michelangelo’s Pieta, breaks with the earlier 
                                                 
21 See Ibid., 360. 
22 The moment he says no we cut to scene of two gangsters torturing and killing someone. 
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series of simulated images, introducing the radical cut of the real (the postmodern sublime) into 
the narrative. It literally puts an end to the protagonists’ genre game: when, amused by the 
possibility of their new friend playing with them, they break into his locked room and discover 
the scene of suicide, the sudden shock silences their juvenile laughter. They are faced with the 
autoimmune nature of their imaginary smart collective, a realization that disrupts the illusion of 
shared life, throwing them as three individuals into a sovereign zone of indistinction where they 
are forced into a zero sum competition over the value of their lives symbolized by the bag of 
money. We could therefore call this scene an irruption of the noir impulse,23 having a similar 
function as the recurring cuts to the parallel storyline of two gangsters torturing various people to 
death in search of the stolen cash. Although initially repressed, these noir sequences keep 
occurring with higher and higher intensity as the narrative progresses, mirroring the protagonists’ 
increasing isolation and distrust of one another. For instance, when the roommates finally have to 
deal with the decomposing body of Hugo, they visit a hardware store to purchase tools for the 
burial. While Alex’s voiceover is talking about the practical benefits of chopping the body into 
pieces (harder to identify), the camera pans through the various drills and saws on display 
creating the impression of a consumer catalogue. This morbid irony of the smart film, however, 
disappears during the actual burial scene, shot at night with expressionist low key lighting, an 
ominous soundtrack, and with facial close-ups giving a realistic account of the characters’ 
emotional state instead of hiding them behind tableau-style quotation marks.  
This stylistic inconsistency of the film also marks out two spatially separate domains. As 
David becomes the group’s designated sovereign after an unlucky draw of straws (he has to chop 
                                                 
23 Analogously to what Adam Lowenstein calls the “irruption of the documentary impulse” in fiction films. See 
Adam Lowenstein, “Beyond Las Hurdes: Horrific Eruptions of the Documentary Impulse in Late Buñuel,” (paper 
presented the Society for Cinema and Media Studies conference, Sheraton Seattle Hotel, Seattle, WA, March 19, 
2014) 
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up the body), he starts to inhabit a noir world on his own, eventually moving up to the attic with 
the bag of money he vows to protect at any cost. Meanwhile, Juliet and Alex, taking from the 
stash without telling David, go on a shopping spree to push their ironic hedonism to the next 
level. Dressed in drag and surrounded by open boxes of consumer goods, they videotape their 
drunken rampage in their apartment and watch it over and over again, laughing hysterically—this 
time at their own video image. This shows that the generic smart discourse of the roommates 
here has already turned self-referential (autoimmune), pushing the formerly stable boundaries of 
their home and their bodies towards noir deterritorialization. It is when David finds them 
regressed into an infantile state rolling around on the floor that he prohibits any further spending 
and hides the money upstairs. Yet, his sovereign attempt to impose some kind of imaginary order 
on the household from above would only lead to himself lying dead on the floor a few days later 
when the two spheres collapse into each other. At the end (when the credits start to roll), all that 
is left of their shared life is a VHS footage of the three of them laughing without sound, a scene 
from their former, now destroyed life preserved in its inoperativity by a machine without their 
living voice.  
If laughter symbolizes communality in the film, water is a correlate of noir isolation, 
standing for the excess of jouissance in someone’s bare life. The two gangsters looking for the 
money drown a man they torture in a bathtub; Alex pushes the dead writer’s car into a lake; and 
most significantly, David hides the bag of cash in the water tank in the attic. By contrast, the 
bathtub in which Alex and Juliet end up in while messing around drunk is dry, signalling that 
their relationship is sexually unconsummated. In Lacanian terms, sharing a smart discourse 
offers Juliet and Alex the imaginary pleasures of irony but not the real of enjoyment (desire but 
not drive). Meanwhile, David is stuck with the death driven excess of enjoyment in his panoptic 
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noir space without being able to share it with anyone: he seals the bag he is guarding with duct 
tape and hides it under water; then he becomes a voyeur, drilling holes into the celling and 
spying on Juliet. Boyle’s Lacanian insight here (appropriate from an Irish Catholic) is that the 
very ascetic renunciation of ordinary pleasures leads to a “surplus enjoyment” unavailable for 
those simply embracing a culture of hedonism.24 
The twist he nonetheless introduces to this wisdom is that in his film, the discourses of 
hedonism and asceticism eventually become intertwined: towards the end, Juliet leaves her ironic 
position by Alex’s side and switches over to David’s zone of indistinction, the two of them 
turning into a noir couple of the male sovereign and the femme fatale. Juliet seduces David to 
gain access to the money (jouissance), and David lets himself be seduced to make his bare life 
valued as masculine. They promise to run away with the money together, but David becomes 
suspicious when he finds a plane ticket to Rio on Juliet’s name alone. As a digression from both 
the classical and the postmodern noir narrative, Alex then steps in pretending that it was him 
who bought the ticket for Juliet, putting on the mask of the noir victim duped by the illusion of 
love as a deception to push David to take the money and leave. He wants to get rid of him 
because in fact he had already switched the contents of the suitcase for piles of newspaper and 
hid the money for himself. In other words, if David is openly distrusting Juliet while she keeps 
trying to deceive him by pretending to be impressed by his masculinity, Alex’s triple cross 
involves occupying the position of the naive believer for both of them, acting like the dupe who 
takes their performances at face value: he pretends to be intimidated by David’s machismo and 
be in love with Juliet. It is precisely by acting like the idiots excluded by the roommates’ earlier 
smart discourse that he is able to fool David and Juliet into underestimating him, not unlike the 
                                                 
24 See Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (New York: Verso, 2008), 89. 
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way his always suspicious colleagues ignored Verbal because he had been playing the designated 
loser in The Usual Suspects.  
This doesn’t mean that Alex has found some hyper-ironic meta-level of existence from 
which he could safely wait for the storm around him to pass while he remains unaffected by any 
of it. On the contrary, he exploits the fact that, as Žižek puts it after Lacan: “les non-dupes 
errent: those who do not let themselves be caught in the symbolic deception/fiction and continue 
to believe [only] their eyes are the ones who err most.”25 When upon leaving, David, not falling 
for her deception, punches Juliet in the face to to get her out of the way, Alex cannot help but 
intervene (“You shouldn’t have hit her,” he says), getting caught in the role he only pretended to 
play, thereby actually making it more convincing. A brawl ensues between the three, ending with 
David nailing Alex to the floor with a kitchen knife, then Juliet stabbing David to death before he 
could kill Alex, but leaving with what she assumes is the money since she doesn’t want to share 
it with Alex either. The finale shows all three of them in a state of distress but with Alex winning 
the game of triple cross. The police discover him still alive because he called them just before the 
fight, which makes him the successor of classical noir’s sovereign heroes of self-implication 
(like Jeff in Out of the Past), except that there is nothing there to implicate him: we can assume 
that just like Verbal at the end of The Usual Suspects, he will be officially exculpated. He can get 
away with the crime of sovereignty because he is a cynic in Žižek’s definition of the term: 
instead of seeking an ironic distance from the social order like participants in the smart 
discourse, he “fakes a belief that he privately mocks,”26 realizing the importance of symbolic 
appearances (the glorious rituals of sovereign power), ready to even temporarily get caught up in 
them when necessary. By contrast, David is more like the ironist who ends up “[taking] things 
                                                 
25 Slavoj Žižek, “With or Without Passion: What’s Wrong with Fundamentalism?” lacan.com, accessed September 
6, 2015, http://www.lacan.com/zizpassion.htm.  
26 Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (New York: Verso, 2012), 88. 
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more seriously than he appears to—he secretly believes in what he publicly mocks.”27 A person 
like that keeps believing, Žižek suggests, through a proxy that remains his blind spot. What 
David doesn’t see is that he can only purge himself of the belief in Juliet’s love for him by 
externalizing it onto Alex; this is why he is so invested in believing the story that Alex bought 
the plane ticket for Juliet, making him blind to the man’s real agenda. As for Juliet, Edwin Page 
is right that she is like an empty vessel in the film, oscillating between the two extremes 
represented by the male protagonists, “her behaviour and mood echoing that of whomever she is 
spending time with as if she is merely an extension of them.”28  
When the police find Alex they take his picture as he is lying on the floor still bleeding—
a stylization that links the scene back to the smart cinema aesthetic once again as well as to 
classical noir sovereign-images in films like Gun Crazy or Out of the Past. Crucially, he smiles 
but he cannot laugh as he has no one to share his jouissance with (the camera pans downward, 
revealing the money hidden underneath the floorboards marked by Alex’s dripping blood). 
Meanwhile, Juliet is having a hysterical fit in her car after looking into the suitcase (homage to 
the ending of the 1961 British noir Payroll). And then we have the already mentioned cut to 
David in the morgue, framing the film with his flat voiceover. It is as if the roommates’ formerly 
                                                 
27 Ibid. It is worth mentioning here that such a distinction between the cynic and the ironist is not yet present in 
Žižek’s earlier, more well known theory of cynicism that had a significant influence on Lacanian cultural studies. 
For instance, in his first English language book he argues: “Cynical distance is just one way - one of many ways - to 
blind ourselves to the structuring power of ideological fantasy: even if we do not take things seriously, even if we 
keep an ironical distance, we are still doing them.” Žižek, Sublime Object, 30. Here cynicism is basically identified 
with the postmodern irony of the smart discourse. Yet, in the very same book he also talks about cynicism as post-
ironic meta-position: “Cynicism [...] recognizes, it takes into account, the particular interest behind the ideological 
universality, the distance between the ideological mask and the reality, but it still finds reasons to retain the mask. 
This cynicism is not a direct position of immorality, it is more like morality itself put in the service of immorality - 
the model of cynical wisdom is to conceive probity, integrity, as a supreme form of dishonesty, and morals as a 
supreme form of profligacy, the truth as the most effective form of a lie. This cynicism is therefore a kind of 
perverted 'negation of the negation' of the official ideology: confronted with illegal enrichment, with robbery, the 
cynical reaction consists in saying that legal enrichment is a lot more effective and, moreover, protected by the law.” 
Ibid. 26. I will use the term cynicism in this second, narrower sense, following the distinction Žižek himself made in 
his later work. 
28 Page, Ordinary Heroes, 48. 
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shared laughter had split into three isolated components, reconnecting only through the artificial 
prothesis provided by the extradiegetic soundtrack, the song Happy Heart by Andy Williams 
glorifying neoliberal sovereign power. Each of their lives end up in a short circuit between the 
self-destructive sociopathic irony of the smart film and noir’s sovereign self-affirmation, but 
only one of their techniques of sovereignty actually works. David gets to narrate his story while 
dead like the classical noir hero but he cannot conjure up any homosocial community he 
sacrificed himself for, while Juliet travels to Rio alone like a postmodern femme fatale but she 
doesn’t get to be melancholic on the beach since she didn’t get the money. It is Alex who can 
have everything after surviving his knife wound, the scar of castration that symbolizes the loss of 
his friends. His silent smirk is redoubled in the voiceless (inoperative) VHS laughter sequence 
during the final credits, emphasizing how sovereign enjoyment is now captured in a new, 
machinic apparatus instead of a traditional biopolitical community of shared life, an apparatus 
now openly exploiting the naked gestures of human sociality without an apparent preference for 
a particular imaginary identity. As Christian Marazzi insists, neoliberalism should be understood 
as a contemporary form of primitive accumulation exploiting the common social-symbolic 
substance of humanity not yet under capitalist control: “Originary or primitive accumulation, as 
shown by Sandro Mezzandra, i.e., the salarization and proletarization of millions of people 
through the expulsion from their own land, is thus a process that historically reemerges every 
time the expansion of capital clashes with the common produced by social relations and 
cooperations free from the laws of capitalist exploitation.”29 This Marxist notion of “social 
relations and cooperations free from the laws of capitalist exploitation” is precisely what 
Agamben called the gestural, inoperative dimension of human life, the one that sovereignty folds 
                                                 
29 Christian Marazzi, The Violence of Finance Capitalism, trans. K. Lebedeva (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2011), 
42. 
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into its apparatus of power. The primitive accumulation of value is therefore nothing but the 
Marxist name for the arbitrary sovereign violence that occurs prior to the implementation of the 
law of abstract labour but which simultaneously stands as the condition of possibility of work 
and its exploitation.  
 In this context, cynicism appears as Boyle’s answer to the autoimmune deadlock 
presented in Elephant initiating a new cycle of capital accumulation and sovereign 
immunization. Far from being simply the opposite of naive ideological belief, cynicism is rather 
the calculated attempt to resurrect it by grounding it in bodily gestures of pure sociality. It’s a 
contemporary application of Pascal’s motto “kneel down and pray [...] and belief will come by 
itself”30 with the aim to put an end to the bad infinity of postmodern irony through a practice of 
self-glorification.31 Cynicism is what remains of irony after its neoliberal privatization (we could 
even say: primitive accumulation), detachment from the life of a community (bios) for an 
anchoring in the body (zoe) of the individual. What distinguishes Alex from his rivals is that 
Juliet and David remain caught in a discourse of ironic resistance to their official social-symbolic 
position. She is a doctor and he is a chartered accountant, both well respected in their profession, 
but both feeling also bored with it after the bag of money falls on their lap (we see Juliet 
distracted during her work in the hospital and David’s boss actually commends him for being a 
boring but reliable employee, which he doesn’t take well). In other words, like noir heroes before 
them, they seek sovereignty by suspending their work, looking for an autonomous sphere of 
                                                 
30 Pascal quoted in Slavoj Žižek, “In His Bold Gaze My Ruin Is Writ Large,” in Everything You Always Wanted to 
Know about Lacan: (but Were Afraid to Ask Hitchcock), ed. S. Žižek (New York: Verso, 1992), 213. 
31 This should be added to Todd McGowan’s otherwise excellent analysis of cynical reason. He claims: “the cynic 
wants to avoid being naïve, being one of the duped, especially when it comes to the Other’s enjoyment.” [...] 
“Cynicism stems from the belief that one sees through the functioning of power, that one knows fully how the 
system works.” Todd McGowan, The End of Dissatisfaction? Jacques Lacan and the Emerging Society of 
Enjoyment (New York: State University of New York Press, 2004), 121; 126. What is crucial here is that the Other’s 
enjoyment and the system the cynic claims to know so well represent an autoimmune paradigm of power he 
overcomes precisely by embracing a certain non-knowledge, a blind faith in the status quo.  
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existence where they are not being watched by the gaze of disciplinary power. Alex, by contrast, 
is a journalist who already has some autonomy in his job. This is highlighted in the scene where, 
although his office space at the newspaper has the same panoptic structure as that of his 
roommates, the gazes he exchanges with his colleagues are not work related but sexual: instead 
of being reminded of his duties like Juliet and David are, a couple of women are flirting with 
him. His position at work remains exceptional even when his boss eventually does give him an 
assignment: he has to cover the story of the mutilated body in the woods he himself put in there, 
linking once again his quest for sovereign enjoyment with his job. And finally, not only does he 
symbolically use his profession when he puts stacks of newspaper into the suitcase to steal the 
money; he also applies his journalist skills quite literally to make up the story that would fool 
David and Juliet. In other words, he is successful because he never stops working, because for 
him the difference between the time of labour and free time disappears, just like the spatial 
boundary between workspace and home. No wonder that he is never planning to leave; for 
someone like him, exiting the capitalist apparatus is meaningless. 
 This brings us back to the Jamesonian claim that today’s global capitalism is a total 
economic system with no outside.32 As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri suggest, capital 
expansion now becomes intensive rather than extensive, which leads to an unprecedented 
technological revolution establishing new digital systems of control to both intensify and extend 
the working day beyond its previously set limits, allowing for a hitherto unheard of exploitation 
of people’s cognitive and affective capacities through immaterial labour.33 This means, on the 
one hand, that the immaterial (informational and cultural) content of all commodities increases 
as even industrial workers are required now to use computers during the production process and 
                                                 
32 See Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, Or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1991), 399-418. 
33 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univesity Press, 2001), 272; 338. 
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companies spend more on advertising.34 On the other hand, new types of fully immaterial 
commodities are emerging. Ordinary people are now encouraged to play the stock market or 
develop business ideas (profit making algorithms) in a startup that can be later sold to large 
corporations. Social media sites like Facebook, YouTube, or Twitter provide IT companies with 
hundreds of millions of (mostly) unpaid “prosumers,” creating data unwittingly for corporate 
profit while working on their virtual selves to put on display, with smart phones collecting 
fragments of their attention by ensuring permanent connectivity. Franco Berardi calls this new 
regime semio-capitalism as, contrary to Fordism, it is less and less “about the production of 
material goods, but about the production of psychic stimulation.”35 It captures the minds and 
bodies of workers in apparatuses of financialized, digital, networked capital, producing semiotic 
flows as the main source of profit.36 It is to mobilize and exploit even the inner life and 
unproductive bodily gestures of late capitalist subjects 24/7, Hardt and Negri argue, that power 
evolves from its former disciplinary model into what after the late Deleuze they call a society of 
control: 
Disciplinarity fixed individuals within institutions but did not succeed in consuming them 
completely in the rhythm of productive practices and productive socialization; it did not 
reach the point of permeating entirely the consciousnesses and bodies of individuals, the 
point of treating and organizing them in the totality of their activities. In disciplinary 
society, then, the relationship between power and the individual remained a static one: the 
disciplinary invasion of power corresponded to the resistance of the individual.37 
                                                 
34 See Maurizio Lazzarato, “Immaterial Labour,” in Radical Thought in Italy, ed. P. Virno and M. Hardt 
(Minneapolis: Minnesota, 1996), 133. 
35 Franco Berardi, Precarious Rhapsody: Semiocapitalism and the Pathologies of the Post-Alpha Generation, trans. 
A. Bove et al. (London: Minor Compositions, 2009), 45. 
36 Ibid., 118. 
37 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 24. 
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In biopolitical terms, as I have suggested in the previous chapters, disciplinary societies allowed 
for immunized spaces of common resistance to and sovereign sites of individual exception from  
panoptic technologies of power that only had a limited scope, thereby introducing a split into the 
modern subject (public/private, conscious/unconscious, normative/transgressive, etc.). Precisely 
because bare life (enjoyment) was not directly regulated by apparatuses of instrumental reason, 
sovereignty could appear as a form of resistance to the universal, abstract power of some 
centralized, authoritarian institution (ultimately the capitalist apparatus of abstract labour).  
By contrast, when power becomes entirely biopolitical, the whole social body is comprised 
by power’s machine and developed in its virtuality. This relationship is open, qualitative, 
and affective. Society, subsumed within a power that reaches down to the ganglia of the 
social structure and its processes of development, reacts like a single body. Power is thus 
expressed as a control that extends throughout the depths of the consciousnesses and 
bodies of the population—and at the same time across the entirety of social relations.38 
In this new regime... 
[r]esistances are no longer marginal but active in the center of a society that opens up in 
networks; the individual points are singularized in a thousand plateaus. [...] [This is the] the 
paradox of a power that, while it unifies and envelops within itself every element of social 
life (thus losing its capacity effectively to mediate different social forces), at that very 
moment reveals a new context, a new milieu of maximum plurality and uncontainable 
singularization.39 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 25. 
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The global society of control integrates the bios (the “social life”) of various identity groups of 
the planetary population (without a residue of shared resistance outside the system) into a now 
decentralized, non-hierarchical production process, forming a single biocapitalist body out of the 
mutated remains of former immunized communities Hardt and Negri call Empire. On the one 
hand, lacking the visible symbolic authority to immunize themselves against, forms of life 
become increasingly fragmented and isolated; on the other they are (often invisibly) reconnected 
through standardized protocols such as the Internet into a single network that make the global 
control and exploitation of immaterial labour possible.40 As Alexander Galloway and Eugene 
Thacker emphasize, as a new technology of biopolitical governance “protocol facilitates 
relationships between interconnected, but autonomous entities”; it’s “less about power 
(confinement, discipline, normativity) and more about control (modulation, distribution, 
flexibility).”41 This means that while in disciplinary societies, as Foucault notoriously 
suggested,42 subjects became docile servants of power insofar as they believed their life to be 
repressed and began to resist which in turn stabilized (immunized) the status quo, the apparatuses 
of control, on the contrary, capture subjects insofar they believe to be free and autonomous. Yet, 
Hardt and Negri argue, this monstrous biopolitical machine cannot fully contain the creative 
forces of the multitude it “liberates”; just like Capital itself in Marx’s narrative it’s more like a 
vampire “sucking off the blood of the living.”43   
From an Agambenian perspective the question is, then, what the arbitrary sovereign 
decision is that links the bare life (zoe) of the multitude to the new bios of Empire, allowing its 
                                                 
40 As Wendy Chun argues, “[d]igital language makes control systems invisible: we no longer experience the visible 
yet unverifiable gaze but a network of nonvisualizable digital control.” Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Control and 
Freedom: Power and Paranoia in the Age of Fiber Optics (Cambridge, MA: MIT University Press, 2006), 9. 
41 Galloway and Thacker, “Protocol, Control, and Networks,” 8.; 10. 
42 See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. R. Hurley (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1978), 15-36. 
43 Ibid., 62. 
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vitality to be captured in the digital apparatuses of production. It is this decision that I described 
in Shallow Grave as cynicism, one that glorifies the regime of endless immaterial labour. And 
what life does this sovereignty devalue as one that is not worth living? It excludes precisely those 
who are still caught resisting the old apparatus of disciplinary power. In the film, these are David 
and Juliet who represent historically outdated (classical and postmodern) forms of noir 
sovereignty, ones that now have some utopian connotations precisely because they don’t work 
anymore. On the one hand, David’s flat affirmation of friendship fails to conjure up a living, 
immunized community, but as a gesture still evokes the principle of universal equality that such 
community used to limit, for which reason it’s an example of subtraction. On the other hand, 
Juliet’s hysteric outbreak stands for the pure (always unsatisfied) desire of the 80s femme fatale 
without its sovereign reduction to nostalgia—a case of what Badiou would call purifying 
destruction. By contrast, Alex gets to keep the suitcase of cash because he is a good capitalist 
realist: his passion for the real is neither subtractive, nor destructive but a kind of synthesis 
between the two, folding them together into two aspects of the neoliberal status quo that has no 
alternative.  
   
4.3 The Subalterns Who Walked Themselves to the Neoliberal Market: The 
Post-Imperial Cynicism of Trainspotting and Slumdog Millionaire 
  
To further map the historical context of cynical sovereignty in Boyle’s work, let’s look at 
two of his films, Trainspotting (1996) and Slumdog Millionaire (2008), that deal with the shift 
from the old British Empire to the Empire of global, networked capital. I will argue that the 
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narrative trajectory of the two films is in fact so similar that despite their apparent differences, 
the latter can even be considered the unofficial remake of former. At the core both films is a 
social outcast’s emancipation—that of a working class Scottish heroin addict and of a young 
Mumbai orphan from the untouchable caste—in the midst of a large scale socio-economic 
transformation of their postcolonial environment due to the rise of global capitalism. While 
Slumdog Millionaire’s life affirming fairy tale seems to counter the sociopathic opportunism that 
dominates Trainspotting, on a deeper level both films explore the consequences of gaining 
individual autonomy by cutting one’s ties to the organic community he was born into, becoming 
a free floating neoliberal subject of a global multitude who is not pulled down by the gravity of 
his designated role in any outdated social hierarchy. The rapid pace and the poppy, heavily 
stylized imagery of both films are examples of Boyle’s accelerationist vitalism, what Manohla 
Darghis called his “better to swim than to sink” worldview44 identifying with deterritorialized 
capital which the director seems to be both enthusiastic and critical about. While the two films 
represent two different affective extremes of this ambiguity, I argue that they should be read 
together as two sides of the same coin to critique neoliberalism’s emancipatory make-over of the 
body and its glorious deactivation of the disciplinary colonial power of the past. 
Using Lacan’s theory of subject formation, I will map the quest of Boyle’s heroes in 
overcoming their alienation within a traditional, rigidly hierarchical society that condemns them 
to the state of a passive existence at the bottom, to serve as the abjected correlate to bourgeois 
discourses of identity that externalize on their exclusively included other (the homo sacer) both 
the naive belief in and the surplus enjoyment of their own ruling ideology, in other words, the 
fundamental inoperativity of their social symbolic order. Boyle places this dialectical 
                                                 
44 Manohla Dargis, “Orphan’s Lifeline Out of Hell Could Be A Gameshow in Mumbai,” New York Times, 
November 11, 2008, accessed September 6, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/12/movies/12slum.html.  
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relationship into a postcolonial setting both in the literal sense by mapping Scotland’s and India’s 
complex dependency on the remains of the British Empire, as well as an allegory for the global 
shift from the disciplinary logic of power to neoliberal societies of control that solicit rather than 
supress their subjects’ desire for autonomy. He makes his subalterns speak, tell their own story 
as a device to free them from its weight, to disidentify from the biopolitical stereotypes they 
were for their old masters. Mapping the ambiguity of the colonial discourse put forward by Homi 
Bhabha diachronically as a historical antagonism between the old and new forms of colonial 
domination, Boyle shows that his heroes can be successful in subverting the social hierarchies of 
a now bygone era, but only by exchanging the burden of their oppression by disciplinary power 
for the cynical glorification of neoliberalism through their self-commodification, or, as Berardi 
puts it, their “connective mutation,” their enslavement to the digital rhythm of global capital.45  
 
4.3.1 Fixed into an Abject 
At the beginning of both films, the protagonists are positioned as social abjects. The hero 
of Trainspotting, Renton is a heroin junkie in a poverty stricken neighborhood of Edinburgh 
newly devastated by Thatcher’s neoliberal reforms; he is surrounded by a zombified group of 
working class family members and friends, most of them unemployed and addicts themselves. 
Although he has made attempts from time to time to relinquish the drugs, he never quite 
succeeded; the socially more acceptable alternative of a dead end life in misery, only 
occasionally brightened by the pathetic illusions of Scottish nationalism (such as overinvestment 
                                                 
45 Franco Berardi, “Biopolitics and Connective Mutation,” Culture Machine 7 (2005), accessed April 27, 2014. 
http://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/viewArticle/27/34.  
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in local football teams)46 simply cannot compare to the disconnected jouissance of intravenous 
heroin injection.47 His excessive gain of enjoyment, however, is only part of the story as he also 
plays a significant role supporting the identity of various members of the “normal” society 
constantly pressuring him to change his ways and take responsibility for himself. Despite their 
ostensible postcolonial pride, this group of people ironically acts as the voluntary policemen of 
the periphery, channeling the neoliberal discourses of individual autonomy and 
entrepreneurship48 from Empire’s center as if they were demands for discipline from the old 
masters of British imperialism. One of them is his friend Begbie, an ultra-violent, alcoholic 
homophobe macho who calls drugs “shite,” hypocritically opposing the despicable habits of the 
junkies to his supposedly more reputable ways of blowing off steam. As Renton, the narrator, 
comments sarcastically: “Begbie didn't do drugs, he did people, that's what he got off on.” He 
sums up his mother’s valium addiction in a similar way: “My mother, who is, in her own 
domestic and socially acceptable way, also a drug addict.” What Renton is confronted with here 
is not simply the arbitrariness of drawing a line that separates a respectable (ultimately English 
bourgeois) subject’s life from the subaltern’s unacceptable transgressions (of the colonized 
“scum” of Scotland, as he bitterly puts it) but the fact that those norms already include a set of 
immunized practices that violate them in the proper way; practices of inherent transgression that 
the junkie is unable to perform.49 One way to understand the social management of this boundary 
                                                 
46 Grant Farred, “Wankerdom: Trainspotting As a Rejection of the Postcolonial?” The South Atlantic Quarterly 103, 
no. 1 (2004): 207. 
47 As Franco Berardi argues, in a neoliberal economy demanding increasing affective participation from ordinary 
people, “[h]eroin allows for a switching-off, a disconnection from the circuit of uninterrupted over-excitement, a 
kind of attenuation of tension.” Berardi, “Connective Mutation” 
48 As Foucault puts it, the proper subject of neoliberalism is the “Homo oeconomicus as entrepreneur of himself, 
being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] 
earnings.” Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France (1978-79), trans. M. 
Senellart (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 226. 
49 On this notion of inherent transgression see Slavoj Žižek, “The Inherent Transgression,” Cultural Values, 2:1 
(1998): 1-17. 
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in Boyle’s film is by turning to Julia Kristeva’s theory of abjection that explains how the stable 
limits of one’s self are created through the expulsion of a scatological object (symbolized by 
saliva, feces, vomit, etc.), the subject’s internal excess bearing an inherent ambiguity standing 
simultaneously for sameness and otherness, being both intimately connected to the body and 
utterly alien to it.50 When the excess of the abject is projected onto someone else, the illusory 
unity of the self is strengthened. The junkie, not unlike the classical noir hero, thus stabilizes his 
“normal” counterpart by identifying with the surplus of that subject, by becoming, as Žižek puts 
it, someone “who consumes himself utterly, to his very death [drive], in his unbound 
jouissance.”51 Boyle’s emphasis on the postcolonial setting is crucial here as it frames the 
neoliberal norms of self-management as imposed on the imagined Scottish community from the 
outside as a foreign excess to which the locals have an ambiguous relationship, oscillating 
between partial incorporation and refusal (abjection). For instance, similarly to his mates and 
parents, Diane, Renton’s underage “girlfriend” constantly bombards her misfit lover with 
injunctions to reinvent himself and adapt to the constantly changing flux of new opportunities 
while in reality she keeps seeking him out to get high with him (but only on soft drugs), thereby 
gaining a minimal distance to the ruling ideology colonizing her mind. The junkie, in his socially 
designated role of the ultimate transgressor comparable to classical noir femme fatale, enters here 
to resolve the contradiction, performing a more radical withdrawal of belief in the social-
symbolic norms partially swallowed by the majority while at the same time and for that precise 
reason also serving as the perfect embodiment of the foreignness they carry.  
                                                 
50 Julia Kristeva, The Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 2. 
51 Slavoj Žižek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the (Mis)use of a Notion (London: Verso, 
2001), 44. 
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That is to say, upon closer look, Renton’s anti-sovereign choice of the “wanker’s” abject 
body52 (zoe) over the shared bios of Scottish citizenry becomes more ambiguous. Isn’t his 
position not also that of what Žižek calls the subject supposed to believe, similar to the 
supposedly ignorant child for whose sake his parents pretend that Santa Claus exists?53 The child 
here is fixed into the role of the one who really believes as opposed to his parents merely 
pretending, even though, as Žižek points out, for the ritual to work and produce an effective 
fiction, no one actually has to believe in Santa Claus; it is enough if everyone plays their role as 
if they did. In other words, children’s blindness to the inexistence of Santa is not an 
epistemological one but is rather a matter of their position in the symbolic order, the 
consequence of their exclusion from socially sanctioned performances of disbelief, for which the 
sharing of skeptical rumors with one another doesn’t qualify. I would argue that at the beginning 
of Trainspotting, Renton finds himself in a similar position to that of the skeptical child, which 
can be seen already in his opening lines, voiced sarcastically just after shooting a dose of heroin: 
“Choose life. Choose a job. Choose a career. Choose a family. Choose a fucking big television. 
Choose washing machines, cars, compact disc players, electrical tin openers. Choose good 
health, low cholesterol and dental insurance. Choose fixed-interest mortgage repayments… 
Choose sitting on a couch watching spirit-crushing game shows...” These are the words of 
someone who observes the spectacle of late capitalist bourgeois life from a distance without 
seeing the appeal of it (the narration goes on: “I chose not to choose life. I chose something 
else.”) For Renton, from the point of view of the junkie who (supposedly) fully enjoys, the 
choices his mother, Begbie or Diane have made are empty; they represent the symbolic order as 
a mere façade, hypocrisy, a site of neocolonial alienation and death. But in fact it is him who is 
                                                 
52 See Farred, “Wankerdom” 
53 Slavoj Žižek, How To Read Lacan (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006), 30. 
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alienated in a more primordial sense because he cannot master the secret of the (masculine) 
symbolic: its inherent transgression, for which reason he imagines that there really is a big Other 
(like the British Empire) wanting him and everyone else to follow its norms. It is only in the eyes 
of someone like him that these “choices” he cites are conjoined into a consistent image, an 
ideology he passively believes in from the outside, instead of those who are living it. As such, he 
is like the noir femme fatale who has identified with the masculine fantasy about her: he 
imagines possessing the real phallus that completes the symbolic order, unable to see that in fact 
he is standing in the place of its fundamental inconsistency (lack). 
In the Lacanian psychoanalytic theory of child development this subject position is linked 
to the stage of alienation (the mirror stage), which, as Bruce Fink explains, comes about through 
the child’s encounter with the Other’s desire (the lack in the Other), which he interprets as his 
parents’ demand to conform to a socially valued image.54 This image, of course, can never fully 
represent the child as it prohibits, first and foremost, the masturbatory (inoperative) enjoyment in 
the genitals which leads to the child’s first lost battle with the Other: if he wants to be the object 
of his parent’s desire, he has to give up part of himself, he has to see himself as fundamentally 
lacking something.55 This encounter forces the subject into an alienated, imaginary form of being 
in the Other qua social symbolic order, completely lost behind the signifier.56 His ex-istence in 
turn is annulled; it becomes nothing but a lack in the Other, the lack standing for the socially 
negated excess of enjoyment that Renton embodies and from which place he inadvertently 
                                                 
54 Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1995), 52. 
55 Bruce Fink, Lacan to the Letter: Reading Écrits Closely (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 
136. 
56 For Lacan, “[b]eing...is the being of signifierness.” Jacques Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and 
Knowledge. Encore: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, trans. B. Fink (New York, W.W. Norton, 1998), 71. 
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believes in the completeness of the image that negated him as enjoyment.57 The subject’s 
supposed enjoyment and supposed belief are thus interconnected modalities of the alienated 
subject as lack: his lack as ex-istence (his in itself, outside of the symbolic order) is his 
jouissance, while his lack as being (what he is for the Other in the symbolic) is his belief. The 
link between these two modalities is his gaze (or in Renton’s case his voice), simultaneously 
expressing a naïve belief in the imaginary completeness of the social symbolic order, and a secret 
knowledge about the enjoyment that lies beyond it—an ambiguity that makes his blindness 
opaque and mysterious. It is this duality that the feminist critics of film noir identified in the 
opposition between the all too naive “nurturing woman” and the duplicitous and transgressive 
“spider woman.”58 However, in classical noir’s masculine regime this was an antinomic (either-
or) relation that only occasionally developed into a contradiction within one and the same female 
figure, opening up utopian possibilities (played out, for instance, in snow noir). By contrast, in 
Boyle’s protagonist this contradiction is present from the very beginning, serving as the main 
driving force of the narrative—the difference is that, as we will see, its resolution isn’t a utopian 
one.  
The hero of Slumdog Millionaire, Jamal, is also a social abject, a Dalit (untouchable)59 
slum dweller from a Mumbai shanty town, even more alienated from the bourgeois life of the 
emerging global metropolis around him than Renton from English middle class life. There is a 
scene early in the film where he is sitting in an outdoor toilet when a famous Bollywood movie 
star arrives to visit his fans in the slum. Jamal has a picture of him he’d like the actor to sign, but 
                                                 
57 As Lacan suggests, “[t]here is in effect something radically unassimilable to the signifier. It's quite simply the 
subject's singular existence.” Jacques Lacan, The Psychosis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III, trans. R. 
Grigg (New York: Routledge, 1993), 179. 
58 Janey Place, “Women in Film Noir,” in Women in Film Noir, ed. E. Ann Kaplan (London: BFI, 1998), 35-67. 
59 His untouchable status is both implied and disavowed in the film. See Meena Varma, “India’s Elephant in the 
Room,” The Guardian, 11 February 2009 , accessed April 27, 2014. 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/feb/10/india-slumdog-millionaire-caste.  
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he gets stuck in the outhouse and panics that he won’t have a chance to get near the man. He 
improvises using his situation to his advantage, jumping into the toilet, and covered in feces head 
to toe (except for the photograph he holds up in his hand) he runs into the crowd surrounding the 
celebrity. Disgusted by the abominable smell and sight, they can’t but let him through and he 
manages to get his autograph. This scene is another variation on imaginary identification where 
the subject’s being becomes completely alienated in the image imposed on him from above 
(what the subject believes the Other wants him to be) while his existence, his scatological 
jouissance indexed to his untouchable status is entirely negated, abjected in the process (the actor 
doesn’t even seem to notice him, covered in shit or not, he just signs the picture). This scene is a 
repetition of Renton’s immersion into a public toilet for a couple of opium suppositories in 
Trainspotting, the obscene underside of his official quest to give up the drugs. There is also an 
equivalent of the Bollywood actor in the earlier film in the figure of Sean Connery, the main 
source of imaginary identification (of both admiration and mockery) for the junkies, a Scotsman 
whose most famous role appropriately put him in the service of the Queen’s Empire.  
Jamal’s story from here on, much like Renton’s quest to relinquish drugs, is an attempt to 
leave behind this scatological social role and become “normal” like anyone else. In other words, 
it’s a quest for sovereignty. The first major obstacle he has to face, similarly to Renton, is the 
fact that others benefit from his subject position as a naïve believer and want to see him fixed as 
a social abject. When he and his brother Salim are orphaned, a local criminal, the runner of a 
beggars’ operation takes them to a Dickensian compound of abandoned children where they are 
taught how to panhandle by exhibiting themselves as disabled bodies enclosed in their disturbing 
jouissance outside the sanctioned boundaries of the social. Fed with dreams of fame and success, 
little do they know that behind the apparently benevolent mask of their caretaker lies a sinister 
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plan: Jamal’s ability to sing, he figures, would make him a more profitable beggar if he was 
really blind. Luckily, Salim intervenes in the last minute and the boys manage to escape together 
to see the world on their own for the first time, that is, move beyond their role as the blind gaze 
who supposed to believe and enjoy. 
 
4.3.2 Separation and its Failure 
In Lacanian terms, this is the point in Jamal’s story where his separation from the Other 
begins as his naïve trust in his criminal stepfather is shattered. He is able to see him now as 
lacking, wanting something beyond the imaginary ideal ego that Jamal was so eager to perform: 
he wanted to profit from the very maiming and destruction of this ideal image, directly exploiting 
his beggars’ abject existence. As a response, Jamal does what the child does upon discovering 
that his ego-image is not the sole object of the “mOther’s” desire: he now makes a deliberate 
attempt himself to fill the Other’s lack with his own scatological jouissance, hoping to make 
their desire (lack) coincide.60 Through this, the paralyzing negativity of his former existence 
opposed to an imaginary ideal beyond his control is transposed into the gap that opens up 
between different ideal-egos that he can now autonomously play with, identifying with one 
against the other or vice versa. Appropriately, Jamal and Salim become con men, using their 
oriental appearance as bait to get money out of western tourists. For instance, Jamal pretends to 
be a tour guide at the Taj Mahal, offering its “real story that is not in the guidebook” to foreign 
visitors, ultimately coming up with as many horrifying and orientalizing fabrications as possible. 
In the same vein, he brings a couple of American tourists to a slum hoping they would pay him a 
substantial tip after seeing the miserable conditions of life there. His calculations prove to be 
                                                 
60 Fink, The Lacanian Subject, 52. 
225 
 
correct, the effects are even amplified by local kids stealing the tires of the couple’s car and the 
chauffeur beating Jamal up as a response, allowing him to shout “you wanted to see the real 
India, here you have it!”, to which the tourists, in a way satisfied with the spectacle, hand him a 
100 Dollar bill out of pity.  
In other words, Jamal, forming an ironic smart collective with his brother, is moving 
away from his formerly fixed role as the supposed subject of belief and enjoyment to become a 
good neoliberal entrepreneur of his self, living the capitalist dream of postcolonial India, linking 
his formerly untouchable jouissance into a network of global capital. He is, however, soon 
reminded of the radical inequalities and injustices grounding this fantasy land of opportunity 
when he meets one of his old friends from the beggars’ compound; the boy is blinded now, 
playing the role Jamal would have if he had stayed. By giving him the 100 Dollar bill he earned 
only pretending to be disabled, Jamal interpassively61 turns the blind boy into a real abject, 
someone to remain fixed in the role of the scatological object for him, instead of him while he 
puts such mask on and off as he pleases for the sake of his business ventures. The exchange 
shows that, at this point, he still moves within the same regime of power that used to exploit him; 
he merely has turned the tables for the moment. 
In Trainspotting Renton also breaks with his abject role as a junkie by becoming 
something like a con man: he moves to London and starts to work as a realtor (an episode which 
the Taj Mahal scene of Slumdog Millionaire repeats with some additional irony). Following a 
fast paced montage sequence of London’s tourist sites and the skyscrapers of its City with a 
                                                 
61 The term interpassivity was coined by Robert Pfaller to describe the externalization of the subject’s passive 
contemplation of an artwork on the object itself. See Robert Pfaller, “The Work of Art that Observes Itself” (paper 
presented at Amber Festival ’08, Istanbul, Turkey, November 8, 2008), 08.amberfestival.org/public/file_5.DOC. 
Žižek expanded the scope of the concept to include the externalization of belief but also the excess of enjoyment. 
See Slavoj Žižek, “Cyberspace, or, How to Traverse the Fantasy in the Age of the Retreat of the Big Other” Public 
Culture 10, no. 3 (1998): 483-513. 
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pumping euro-disco song repeating the lines “find a feeling” in the background, he cynically 
summarizes the affective mutation of his subjectivity using the language of finance: “I quite 
enjoyed the sound of it. Profit, loss, margins, takeovers, lending, letting, sub-letting, sub-dividing 
[...] cheating, scamming, fragmenting, breaking away.” The neoliberal discourse, much like at 
the beginning of Shallow Grave, is still presented here as a transgression, the shared practice of a 
few smart entrepreneurs bending the rules.62 There is a similar scene of exchange to Jamal’s 
encounter with the blind beggar as well, except that it occurs right before, not parallel to the 
hero’s success, underlining their strong causal relation. Renton visits his old friend Tommy, 
whose life started to fall apart just about when his turned for the better, becoming a drug addict 
at the same time when Renton stopped shooting heroin. After that, Tommy’s life quickly 
deteriorated; his girlfriend left him and he found out he had HIV, making him withdraw into the 
miserable solitude of his dark apartment littered with cat feces. He has become what Renton 
could have been without his lucky break: a living dead waiting his end in noir isolation. He asks 
for money to “pay the rent” and Renton gives him cash with a telling smile on his face; he is 
fully aware that he is supplying his friend with his next dose of heroin.  
It’s worth mentioning here that up to a point Tommy also serves as the prototype for 
Jamal’s character insofar as both of them have a reputation of being too sincere—in this sense 
the equivalent of the openly sociopathic Renton stealing Tommy’s sex tape and showing it to his 
mates is Jamal’s gangster/pimp brother Salim who turns his sibling’s childhood love, Latika, into 
a prostitute. Yet, while Tommy’s honesty led him to oscillate between well-disciplined bourgeois 
decency and extreme, self-annihilating transgression (in other words, he stayed fixed in the place 
of the subaltern who is supposed to believe and enjoy), Jamal’s honest appearance turns out to be 
                                                 
62 This approach resembels Hollywood films like The Wolf of Wall Street (2013) where neoliberal financialization is 
presented as a crime against some normal, regulated economy. 
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the other side of Renton’s cynical detachment (they both end up as tricksters) like in the case of 
Alex in Shallow Grave. What is crucial is that both of them keep an inner distance to the 
dominant discourses while mimicking them in practice and for that precise reason they don’t 
need to destroy themselves through overt transgressions. No wonder that in the end, it is Salim 
who dies a spectacular and violent death similar to Tommy’s, indicating that despite all his smart 
nihilism his separation from the big Other wasn’t as successful as it may have appeared (that 
behind his cold macho demeanor he remained attached to Latika, in an analogous way as David 
remained attached to Juliet after/through externalizing his love for her on Alex).  
Renton and Jamal’s own separation from the Other, however, also doesn’t go as smoothly 
as their initial euphoria might have suggested; they eventually hit the real walls of the late 
capitalist class structure relying on their subordinated social position. After all his youthful smart 
entrepreneurial adventures, Jamal abandons his free floating, nomadic business with Salim and 
moves to Mumbai to find Latika. As a result, he ends up in a place where he merely pretended to 
be: he becomes a servant, an assistant in a call center whose role is to bring tea to senior 
associates. For them, he remains the naïve figure of the subject supposed to believe who knows 
all the silly details about celebrity gossip, about a world he is separated from forever due to the 
India’s new class system taking over / preserving the historical role of former castes. The case of 
Renton is even more telling. Although he manages to make some money in his temporarily 
independent life as a realtor in London, he is reminded who he really is (a junkie) and where he 
is coming from (the defeated Scottish working class) when one day his friends, living as petty 
criminals by now, show up at his doorstep and move in with him. Soon he has to realize that they 
have a plan to use him and his hard earned money to buy and sell a substantial amount of 
drugs—an opportunity they cannot pass on but also cannot take without his support. While 
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apparently not eager to help, it is clear that such shady business venture also fits the 
entrepreneurial spirit of Renton’s new neoliberal self, even though, unbeknown to him, it also 
marks its very real limit, cancelling the illusion of his temporary autonomy (just like the 
opportunities Mumbai’s booming metropolis end up imprisoning Jamal in a call center). Before 
he knows it, the aim of his new life is diverted towards a bag of heroin and it’s him who is 
designated to try it before the deal; just for business, he tells himself, but as Boyle shows with 
bitter irony, a junkie who merely acts like a junkie is still a junkie (or, in Jamal’s case, an 
untouchable who merely acts like an untouchable is still an untouchable). 
As the heroes’ neoliberal quest for individual autonomy reaches a deadlock in both films, 
the disavowed issue of shared resistance through identity politics resurfaces. While Jamal 
regresses into the role of the chai wallah (serving tea for people), his brother becomes successful 
working as a hit man/pimp for the gangster-patriarch of the slum, dreaming of building a rich 
city out of the shanty town. When the two of them meet up after years of hiatus on the rooftop of 
a skyscraper construction site, Jamal nonetheless violently rejects Salim’s offer to join him, 
blaming him for forcing Latika into prostitution. Similarly, when in Trainspotting the group of 
friends take a trip to the Scottish countryside as an act of male bonding and connecting with their 
heritage, Renton quickly undercuts the attempt: “It's shite being Scottish. We're the lowest of the 
low. The scum of the fucking earth. The most wretched, miserable, servile, pathetic trash... that 
was ever shat into civilisation. Some people hate the English, I don't. They're just wankers. We, 
on the other hand, are colonised by wankers.” Such impatience can be read in both films as the 
rejection of old forms of the community linked to Scottish nationalist resistance and organizing 
the life of the slum (perhaps an allegory for anti-colonial militancy) in favor of the individual 
making it on his own, however unlikely his success might be. The strategy that both Jamal and 
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Renton follow after the temporary setback in their journey is thus the overidentification with 
neoliberal ideology, hoping to emancipate from the shackles of disciplinary society by glorifying 
the new digital forms of domination. 
 
4.3.3 The Neoliberal Makeover 
Boyle seems to be aware of this limitation, which is why he uses the language of the 
neoliberal media’s makeover culture to narrate his heroes’ second, now “successful” 
emancipatory attempt.63 This is more explicit in Slumdog Millionaire which ingeniously presents 
the Indian version of Who Wants To Be A Millionaire? as a makeover show for Jamal that helps 
to transform his old colonial untouchable body scorned by the public into a slick new digital self 
ready to connect to Mumbai’s global capitalist economy. This is the new India that attracts 
investors to build skyscrapers in the place of slums, where call centers servicing affluent western 
countries create job opportunities for the unemployed, and where game shows offer huge cash 
prizes for ordinary people who prove to be knowledgeable in an indistinct mash of local and 
international (but British and American dominated) popular culture. The film sets up an 
opposition between an old and a new logic of colonialism, the former based on the hierarchical 
model of disciplinary power while the latter on the decentralized capitalism of global networks 
that Hardt and Negri termed Empire. Boyle seems to condemn the first while celebrating the 
second, mobilizing what Homi Bhabha called the ambiguity of the colonial discourse, its 
simultaneous repressive and emancipatory side. On the one hand, in contrast to his youthful 
phase of trickery with Salim that was full laughter, there is a curious affectless automatism in his 
TV performance as if the voice he was raising wasn’t really his own, but something that the big 
                                                 
63 On the make-over discourse as a neoliberal technology of the self see Angela McRobbie, The Aftermath of 
Feminism: Gender, Culture and Social Change (London: Sage, 2009), 124-50. 
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Other of a colonial discourse wanted him to say, making a spectacle out of his abject life just to 
make fun of him and increase the show’s ratings. In this sense he resembles the applicants 
interviewed by the three roommates in Shallow Grave. The game show host invites the audience 
to laugh at him for being only a chai wallah in a call center, but he is also ridiculed for not 
knowing which banknote has Gandhi’s face on it—the face of the symbolic father of postcolonial 
India who famously resisted the abolishment of the caste system, keeping Dalits like Jamal in 
their subordinated place. And yet, the film ends with his victory over the smug host, as if he 
somehow overcame the colonial stereotype of the chai wallah through his very excessive 
docility.   
For Bhabha, the colonial discourse “is an apparatus that turns on the recognition and 
disavowal of racial/cultural/historical differences. Its predominant strategic function is the 
creation of a space for ‘subject peoples’ through the production of knowledges in terms of which 
surveillance is exercised and a complex form of pleasure/unpleasure is incited.”64 On the one 
hand, it creates the colonized as separate, culturally distant others to maintain the colonizers’ 
sense of superiority. At the same time, however, the governmentality of colonial power relies on 
the constant surveillance of the colonial subjects, on their total visibility and knowability. In this 
dialectic the attempt to fix the oriental other into essential, controllable images, what Bhabha 
calls stereotypes can never be complete, there is always a remainder of otherness escaping 
classification that would then direct colonial power to repeat its identifying act. When we look at 
this relation from the colonizer’s point of view, his desire to fix the colonial subject into a 
stereotype can be read as forcing him into imaginary identification, i.e. alienation.65 However, as 
Bhabha stresses, such identification always fails, there is always a lack, the return of the 
                                                 
64 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994), 70. 
65 Bhabha explicitly refers to the Lacanian theory of the imaginary to explain how the colonizer’s attempt to fix the 
identity of the colonized always fails, how it remains a constant source of anxiety for those in power. 
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unrepresented that makes it unstable. Therefore he also connects the colonizer’s position to that 
of the fetishist, the stereotype serving as his fetish object. “The fetish or stereotype gives an 
access to an ‘identity’ which is predicated as much on mastery and pleasure as it is on anxiety 
and defence, for it is a form of multiple and contradictory belief in its recognition of difference 
and disavowal of it.”66 The colonizer’s desire for and escape from the real then leads to two 
simultaneous but contradictory relations to the colonized, that of narcissism and aggression, the 
desire to identify and to destroy.67 In Trainspotting such ambiguous disciplining is taken up by 
Begbie (internalizing the voice of the English colonial discourse) when his attitude towards his 
junkie mates oscillates between friendly drinking sessions and homosocial debauchery on the 
one hand, and violent outbursts against the “shite” they are using on the other. Similarly, in 
Slumdog Millionaire Jamal is both encouraged as a contestant to reveal his chai wallah identity 
for the audience to cheer and brutally interrogated by the police for doing just that (who reason 
that an ordinary a chai wallah is not supposed to be winning a game like this). If, as Bhabha 
insists, the colonial discourse mobilizes the scopic drive through the gaze that seeks knowledge 
about the other, the ambiguity of this strategy appears when the colonized returns the gaze and 
produces anxiety in the colonizer, indicating that the interpassive gaze of the abject can never 
fully be neutralized or excluded (can never be reduced to objet a).  
It is this ambiguous process of imaginary identification of the colonial subject that is 
performed within Slumdog Millionaire’s game show setting. Jamal doesn’t get further and 
further ahead because he is smart enough to know the answers. What he realizes playing the 
game is that the right answers correspond to the jouissance of traumatic experiences as an 
untouchable and the only thing he has to do is identify them, put them into a narrative. The 
                                                 
66 Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 75. 
67 Ibid., 77. 
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flashback sequences of his memories are both his personal recollections during the game and the 
result of the torture he is exposed to in-between sessions by the police who suspect him of 
cheating. The only way he can clear himself is by telling the story behind each answer to the 
policemen who, along with the host of the show represent the ambiguous gaze of the colonial 
discourse, the scopic drive luring Jamal into identifying with the stereotypes triggered by the 
questions while also punishing him for doing so. His answers can be seen as an alienated, reified 
sequence of self-images, of his scatological life offered as a (commodity) fetish to feed the 
Other’s hunger for knowledge. 
The previously mentioned scene about Jamal getting an autograph while being fully 
covered in shit illustrates this process nicely. It is literally this signed image that he uses to 
answer the question on the show (the name of the actor), that satisfies the desire of the host, who, 
just like after each of his correct answers, suggests Jamal to quit, to be glad that he has gotten so 
far, to remain in the fixed image he is temporarily identified with. There is, however, always an 
excess to his ex-istence (as jouissance), an absence not yet sutured into the scene of visibility 
which pushes him to move on to the next question (the next image). And, of course, this is the 
desire of the host as well whose constant taunting of Jamal is also the expression of curiosity 
about what else the boy’s got in him. Nonetheless, it is unthinkable in the traditional, fixed 
disciplinary regime of colonial power that the questioning of someone like Jamal would ever 
end. Here, however, he is able to answer the final question, which ultimately leads to the 
elimination of the difference between the host, the bearer of western knowledge, the Lacanian 
figure of the subject supposed to know68 and the colonial stereotype as the object of knowledge. 
                                                 
68 See Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, 
trans. A. Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1981), 232. 
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Another one of Bhabha’s key concepts, mimicry, can shed more light on this final 
moment of identity between opposites. “Colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, 
recognizable Other, as a subject of difference that is almost the same but not quite. Which is to 
say that the discourse of mimicry [like that of the stereotype] is constructed around an 
ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, 
its difference.”69 Mimicry involves another aspect of the imaginary relation between colonial 
power and its subject, not the attempt to fix the colonized into stereotypes of difference but to 
make him almost, but not quite like the colonizers as part of their civilizing mission. What’s at 
stake here is the identity of the colonizers, their presence, their originality which is reinforced by 
what is supposedly a mere imitation, mimicry performed by the colonized who will thus be 
always separated by a minimal difference from their dominators—a difference which is not 
substantial like with the stereotype but entirely arbitrary, imposed by a sovereign decision.  For 
Bhabha, mimicry can be subversive of colonial authority as it creates anxiety in the colonizer 
through the production of identity-effects without any claim to originality and presence.70 It 
opens up the possibility of seeing colonial power as arbitrarily constructed by decreating the 
images it relies on, bringing out the gestures shared by colonizer and colonized alike. Or to turn 
back to the movie, while Jamal’s answers to the India related questions (like the one about the 
Bollywood actor) strengthen his place as a colonial stereotype ensuring that he can keep on 
playing, it is mimicking the western way of life, exhibiting knowledge about the west that will 
make him eligible to win the game by showing that there is no essential difference between 
colonizer and colonized.  
                                                 
69 Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 86.  
70 Ibid., 88. 
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 The game show, then, works as a noir zone of indistinction where the host plays the 
classical masculine role of the sovereign and the contestant that of the femme fatale. This also 
means that just because there is no essential difference between the two of them, they are not 
equal: the sovereign, backed by the bios of the hegemonic community, devalues the other’s life 
arbitrarily. In other words, the tactic of mimicry is not a guarantee of emancipation from 
disciplinary power as long as a glass celling separates the subject from the life he mimics. In 
societies of control, however, as Hardt and Negri argued, the western way of life increasingly 
detaches itself from any clearly identifiable bios of the west, becoming deterritorialized. A good 
illustration of this is the question “Cambridge Circus is in which UK city?” Jamal knows the 
answer not because he has knowledge of the UK’s geography, but because the massive offices of 
his call center are divided into more manageable clusters using British city and street signs that 
he had to learn for serving chai. This scene is exceptional in showing us what the new ideal of 
Empire Jamal mimics actually is. As I have suggested, the questions on the show solicit 
identification with an image (either that of the colonial stereotype or the western ideal): the 
answers include a famous Bollywood actor, Benjamin Franklin, the national emblem of India, a 
famous cricket player, Dumas’s third musketeer, etc. This means that they fit into the 
disciplinary logic of the colonial discourse. The question about the Cambridge Circus is no 
different in this regard, but the flashback to Jamal’s memories makes it clear that while it aims to 
recall the image of London, for the young contestant it actually refers to a node in a network that 
has lost its territorial anchoring to the old (British) Empire’s center. For him, the question evokes 
the way in which Empire’s new global networks connect individuals into a deterritorialized 
productive machine that mobilizes the hitherto unexploited cognitive capacities of their brains. 
Jamal can have the right answer precisely because his own brain has already gone through a 
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cybernetic mutation: the flashback shows that he can use it like a computer, searching through 
data in his memory bank for the right combination of city and street signs. This scene therefore 
qualifies as what Patricia Pisters called the neuro-image, depicting a “brain-ride,” making the 
invisible processes of the human mind visible through a new digital imaginary.71 Following 
Laura Marks, she describes the neuro-image as neo-baroque formation, an “algorithmic aesthetic 
experience, in which a certain rational but awe-inspiring structure unfolds images in accordance 
with patterns and rules.”72 This aesthetic, according to Pisters, also realizes some of the late 
Deleuze’s speculations about the new video-electronic images of his time that differ from both 
the movement-image and the time-image. He suggested, first, that space in this new cinema 
becomes omnidirectional, like the virtual cyberspace depicting Jamal’s neural networks. Second, 
instead of being a window to nature, the screen functions as a table of information displaying 
data, just like the images of Jamal’s memory bank. Third, characters lose their classical 
psychological motivations and turn into automata, performers of speech acts, much like Jamal in 
his mimicry.73 And isn’t the whole film in the end such a neuro-image? While at the level of 
narrative content it’s about Jamal’s confrontation with disciplinary colonial power, the very form 
of this confrontation, its nonlinear, omnidirectional progress following the compartmental 
organization of his memories, the steady electrified rhythm of the flashback montages, the 
submission to the game show format demonstrate that he is already connected to the new society 
of control.74 As Agamben stresses, “televised game shows are part of a new liturgy; they 
                                                 
71 Patricia Pisters, The Neuro-Image: A Deleuzian Film-Philosophy of Digital Screen Culture (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2012), 21. 
72 Ibid., 189. 
73 Ibid., 188. 
74 Incidentally, Deleuze argues game shows express perfectly the spirit of the society of control: “In a society of 
control, the corporation has replaced the factory [of disciplinary societies], and the corporation is a spirit, a gas. Of 
course the factory was already familiar with the system of bonuses, but the corporation works more deeply to 
impose a modulation of each salary, in states of perpetual metastability that operate through challenges, contests, 
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secularize an unconsciously religious intention,”75 in other words, they belong to the sphere of 
glory under neoliberalism. And perhaps this is what Deleuze means as well when he suggests 
that game shows express “the spirit” of control society:  
In a society of control, the corporation has replaced the factory [of disciplinary societies], 
and the corporation is a spirit, a gas. Of course the factory was already familiar with the 
system of bonuses, but the corporation works more deeply to impose a modulation of each 
salary, in states of perpetual metastability that operate through challenges, contests, and 
highly comic group sessions. If the most idiotic television game shows are so successful, 
it's because they express the corporate situation with great precision.76   
What Jamal mimics is therefore not simply an image but a spiritual form, the digital rhythm that 
connects the subject to the new, deterritorialized Empire.77 As the anonymous authors of the 
Invisible Committee put it: “Empire is not an enemy that confronts us head-on. It is a rhythm that 
imposes itself, a way of dispensing and dispersing reality.”78  
In Trainspotting, Renton also breaks with his alienated being as the stereotype of a junkie 
through digital mimicry. At first, we see him resorting to its old disciplinary variation. When a 
judge, wearing the traditional wig of British office, gives him a suspended sentence for stealing a 
car radio, provided that he participates in a rehabilitation program, he answers by mimicking the 
solemn glory of the legal discourse instead of resisting it: “Thank you, your Honour. With God's 
help I'll conquer this terrible affliction.” But his real transformation begins right after, when he is 
                                                                                                                                                             
and highly comic group sessions. If the most idiotic television game shows are so successful, it's because they 
express the corporate situation with great precision.” Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” 
October 59 (Winter, 1992): 4. 
75 Giorgio Agamben, Profanations, trans. J. Fort (New York: Zone Books, 2007), 76. 
76 Deleuze, “Postscript,” 4. 
77 See also Steven Shaviro’s suggestion to call the third Deleuzian category of images the “rhythm-image.” ,” Steven 
Shaviro, “The Rhythm-Image,” (paper presented the Society for Cinema and Media Studies conference, Fairmont 
Queen Elizabeth Hotel, Montreal, QC, March 27, 2015) 
78 The Invisible Committe, The Coming Insurrection (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2009), 13. 
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locked into his room by his parents to withdraw from heroin. His brain is reorganized in a 
nightmarish sequence of hallucinations accompanied by monotonous techno music 
(Underworld’s Dark and Long), soon after which he is able to connect to the vibrant finance 
driven economy of London. Not only does the soundtrack become more electronic with Renton’s 
neoliberal awakening, he even has conversations about the change in music trends and the drugs 
accompanying them with Diane, who is surprised the junkies’ old favorite, Iggy Pop is still alive. 
As the film progresses, the soundtrack moves from punk through new wave to electronic dance 
music, mirroring the shift from heroin to synthetic party drugs that help Empire’s old-new 
subjects the pick up the changed rhythm. It is this accelerated deterritorializing rhythm, the 
pressure to constantly be on the move for fear of sinking that pushes Renton through the final 
moment of separation from the big Other of disciplinary power, breaking the gravity of 
resistance that linked him to his reprobate mates.79 When the opportunity offers itself, he takes 
all the money from the drug deal and leaves his alienated life behind (while another Underworld 
song, Born Slippy is playing). For the others, his move is unexpected; after all, he is supposed to 
be the idiot who cannot say no to the seductive stereotype-image of the junkie they hold up in 
front of him as his “truth.” On the other hand, he can get away with the money precisely because 
of his fixed position in the eyes of others as the dupe, because nobody expects him, this meager, 
emasculate, androgynous-looking addict to have the guts to pull it off. 
As a result of his separation from the disciplinary apparatus, Renton’s brain also becomes 
more like a computer. He solves the dilemma posed by his opening monologue, whether or not to 
choose bourgeois life, by demonstrating his capacity to memorize and quickly enumerate the list 
of requirements for that lifestyle, displacing thereby the question of belief in their normative 
                                                 
79 His main abuser is Begbie who treats him like a servant, as an idiot whose function is to strengthen his rather 
pathetic phallic image (demanding Renton to buy him cigarettes, etc.). 
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nature as irrelevant. This is how the return to his opening lines, despite the similarly detached yet 
enthusiastic tone of his voice, can deliver now the opposite message, signalling the end of his 
resistance:  
Now I'm cleaning up and I'm moving on, going straight and choosing life. I'm looking 
forward to it already. I'm going to be just like you. The job, the family, the fucking big 
television. The washing machine, the car, the compact disc, an electrical tin opener, good 
health, low cholesterol, dental insurance, mortgage, starter home, leisure wear, luggage, 
three-piece suit, DIY, game shows, junk food, children, walks in the park, 9:00 to 5:00, 
good at golf, washing the car, choice of sweaters, family Christmas, indexed pension, tax 
exemption, clearing gutters, getting by, looking ahead, the day you die. 
What disappears from his words is the naive belief he had before, the belief in the self-belief of 
the proverbial bourgeois subject whose life he used to describe with resentment. He knows now 
that such a big Other doesn’t exist. This doesn’t mean, however, that he has turned into just 
another hypocrite like Begbie, acting like a respectable member of society only for the eyes of 
the subjects supposed to believe, perhaps the spectators addressed by his voice over, while 
holding on to an authentic identity shared with those who know better. Rather, through his final 
makeover, Renton realizes the potential inherent in the old colonial mimicry; his identity reveals 
itself as a non-identity, as partial presence, and through that, it reveals all identities as fake. In 
the end, neither does Renton believe himself, nor does an interpassive subject-proxy believe for 
him (his address to the audience is both knowing wink and a form of hypocrisy)—and yet, he 
does effectively act as a good capitalist subject. His identification can be described as cynical in 
Sloterdijk’s sense of the term, involving an “enlightened false consciousness,” because the 
gesture of demonstrating his knowledge regardless of its truth value (the bodily automatism of 
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his cybernetic know-how) took over the role of belief and disbelief in connecting him to the 
capitalist apparatus of production. While disciplinary power split its subject into parts of naive 
belief and enlightened knowledge, or, in more general terms, subconscious affect and conscious 
cognition, in the society of control this split is overcome by knowledge moving into the center, 
losing its previous status as resistance and turning into a form of false consciousness. As 
embodied know-how without a critical distance to the ruling ideology it becomes a tool of the 
multitude’s “machinic enslavement.”80  
Yet, free will doesn’t disappear from this digital regime. The biopolitical price of 
Renton’s connectedness is that in an arbitrary sovereign (cynical) decision he has to devalue the 
lives of those he is leaving behind, performatively creating the conditions that position them as 
born losers incapable of his neoliberal transformation. This is even clearer in Slumdog 
Millionaire. Jamal’s last challenge of the TV contest involves his unfulfilled relationship with 
Latika, his childhood love interest from whom, due to unfortunate circumstances, he was 
separated from long ago. The last question of the game asks for the name of Dumas’s third 
musketeer, a character Latika would play with Jamal and Salim when they were kids—without 
any of them knowing the actual name though, for which reason she cannot help Jamal when he 
calls her using the “phoning a friend” lifeline. It is him who has to name her, his final trauma to 
cure, the last obstacle standing between him and his new digital (connected) self. And despite not 
knowing the answer, he does it, in an act of arbitrary signification: “A.” - he says. “Because? – 
Just, because.” The scene is cross cut with Salim lying in a (dry) bathtub he ritualistically filled 
with money, waiting for the retaliation of his gangster boss for letting his property, Latika go free 
                                                 
80 The term was introduced by Deleuze and Guattari to describe capitalism’s subtle, deterritorializing technologies 
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to allow her reunion with Jamal. The criminal’s gunmen find and execute him at the exact 
moment when Jamal wins the game, but the sounds of violence are suppressed by the fanfares of 
victory televised on a multitude of TV screens all over the city.81 This signals how Salim’s 
resistance to the capitalist apparatus he has been serving, his symbolic renunciation of money for 
the real of the sexual relationship (his love for Latika) becomes the subject of a biopolitical 
disavowal. His sacrifice is ignored because it is caught in a regime of disciplinary power where 
money (bourgeois normativity) and the real of jouissance (the state of exception) are 
diametrically opposed. By contrast, Jamal, the new neoliberal sovereign who performatively 
turns disciplinary power outdated can have both money and “love” at the end as the two registers 
become indistinct in control society’s permanent state of exception. Here all bodies can be 
sovereign as long as they keep moving to the rhythm of Empire—a directive appropriately 
summed up by the Bollywood-style dance number Jamal and Latika are performing inside 
Mumbai’s iconic colonial train station, the Victoria Terminus during the final credits. 
It is nonetheless worth examining the question of ethnicity here in more detail. As Rey 
Chow observes, in the neoliberal era “to be ethnic is to protest less for actual emancipation of 
any kind than for the benefits of worldwide visibility, currency, and circulation.”82 Yet, she adds 
that “[h]owever migratory, hybridized, and in flux it might be, is not ethnicity in this context 
                                                 
81 The becoming spectacle of Jamal also exemplifies Baudrillard’s claims about the post-panoptic social link: “no 
longer one of persuasion (the classical age of propaganda, ideology, publicity, etc.) but one of dissuasion or 
deterrence: ‘YOU are news, you are the social, the event is you, you are involved, you can use your voice, etc.’” 
Jean Baudrillard, Simulations, trans. P. Foss et al. (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 1983), 53. 
82 It is interesting to consider here Rey Chow’s counter-argument. She accepts that in the neoliberal era “to be ethnic 
is to protest less for actual emancipation of any kind than for the benefits of worldwide visibility, currency, and 
circulation.” Rey Chow, The Protestant Ethnic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2002), 48. Yet, she suggests that “[h]owever migratory, hybridized, and in flux it might be, is not ethnicity in this 
context finally assigned the value of a referent that confines and immobilizes?” Ibid., 152. In this sense there is a 
clear asymmetry between Renton and Jamal. While the former can escape his body’s association with scottishness 
by mimicking the code of Anglo-Saxon bourgeois culture (he can pass for the universal white subject of the old 
empire), Jamal’s digital self retains its association with Indian ethnicity despite doing the same (the code of the 
Bollywood musical keeps interrupting his noir moment). This could mean that whiteness, precisely because of its 
history of invisibility, remains the privileged skin color of neoliberal, post-identitarian subjectivity.  
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finally assigned the value of a referent that confines and immobilizes?”83 In this sense there is a 
clear asymmetry between Renton and Jamal. While the former can escape his body’s association 
with scottishness by mimicking the code of Anglo-Saxon bourgeois culture (he can pass for the 
universal white subject of the old empire), Jamal’s digital self retains its association with Indian 
ethnicity despite doing the same (the code of the Bollywood musical keeps interrupting his noir 
moment). This means that whiteness, precisely because of its history of invisibility, remains the 
privileged skin color of neoliberal, post-identitarian subjectivity in Boyle’s ouvre. 
 As for the dance number itself, contrary to the traditions of Indian cinema, Jamal and 
Latika don’t sing. Like Alex in Shallow Grave, they are part of a mute multitude of isolated 
individuals (or in Deleuze’s terms: dividuals performing coded speech acts)84 who, although they 
are caught in the same productive machine, don’t have a shared language of resistance. In an 
irruption of the noir impulse, Boyle makes the large group of backup dancers disappear from 
some shots where he applies high contrast lighting and tilted camera angles, only to have them 
reappear in the next shot as if they were merely a digitally added layer, a simulation of 
communal life. This juxtaposition of the noir style with the musical genre is also a footnote to the 
final subtitle in the film, “it is written,” that appears after the lovers reunite in front of the station. 
The line is a reference to a question posed at the beginning: “Jamal Malik is one question away 
from winning 20 million rupees. How did he do it?” The answers offered are: “A: He cheated, B: 
He’s lucky, C: He’s a genius, D: It is written.” While in the film noir tradition what is written is 
one’s fate, in the context of the musical genre this can have a more literal meaning referring to 
the pattern of choreography. What is written for Jamal and Latika is the code of Empire, the 
                                                 
83 Ibid., 152. 
84 “We no longer find ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair. Individuals have become ‘dividuals,’ and 
masses, samples, data, markets, or ‘banks.’” Deleuze, Postscript, 5. 
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algorithms of production controlling their bare lives now that they have left behind their old 
colonial abjection.   
The very form of Boyle’s films seems to celebrate rather uncritically this connective 
transformation of their medium itself by employing, as Igor Krstic notes, “postclassical narrative, 
cinematographic and editing strategies in order to reach out and communicate to its audience.”85 
Boyle achieves this by constantly shifting between a noir style affective realism (close-ups, 
ground level shots, tilted camera angles, intensified continuity, etc.) and knowing winks that 
point at the films’ artifice (the stylizations of the smart film such as tableau shots, the redoubling 
of the audience, blank voiceover, etc.). The films’ steady rhythm is the result of the pulsating 
between these two regimes of meaning, standing for the two models of colonial power. On the 
one hand, there is a constant noir deterritorialization of the generic, an endless channelling of the 
(in)dividual’s libidinal energy gained from the liquidation and fragmentation of the communal 
into the network of Empire. By soliciting the interactive participation of the audience in this 
process, something that as Thomas Elsaesser stresses is itself a form of affective labour,86 Boyle 
makes them glorify the same post-disciplinary regime of production Jamal and Renton end up in. 
On the other hand, this interactivity also means that the generic smart film form never fully 
disappears; it keeps returning and evoking a possibility of shared irony that implies a common 
bios and territoriality resisting the remnants of the old empire. Jamal, after all, doesn’t just take 
the money and leave; he joins Latika and they perform a noir inflicted mute parody of 
Bollywood musicals together.87 Even Renton leaves part of the score for his mate Spud who had 
                                                 
85 Igor Krstic, “Immersion in the ‘Maximum City’? Interactivity, Kinaesthetics and Notions of Embodiment in 
Slumdog Millionaire,” New Cinemas: Journal of Contemporary Film 9, no. 2-3 (2011): 85. 
86 Thomas Elsaesser, “The Mind-Game Film,” in Puzzle Films: Complex Storytelling in Contemporary Cinema, ed. 
W. Buckland (Malden: Blackwell, 2009), 34. 
87 The production of the oriental couple in the finale is ironic also because the idea of an oriental love story staged 
for the western gaze is mocked earlier in the Taj Mahal sequence (the young Jamal and Salim are watching their 
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been previously victimized by Begbie just like him. The last shot of Trainspotting is Spud 
smiling when he finds the money in a locker—it matches Renton’s grin addressed directly to the 
camera earlier, although it was blurred immediately, signalling the impossibility of reciprocal 
exchange. This smile without the shared sound of laughter is Boyle’s cynical variation of the 
crystal-image: it marks both the becoming gesture of the image in an ongoing autoimmune self-
destruction of the old regime of disciplinary power and the becoming (sovereign-)image of the 
gestural by glorifying life’s machinic connection to the society of control. Boyle’s cynic is 
fleeing from the old towards the new, without, however, creating a new territoriality (a new 
social-symbolic order);88 he affirms capital’s accelerating deterritorializing dynamics as its 
“territory,” perpetuating the transitory moment without arriving anywhere. For this reason he 
remains dependent on the continuing existence of a pre-digital other just like the old colonial 
discourse needed the oriental fetish of the colonized. The difference is that while disciplinary 
colonial power wanted its subjects to remain in their place by imposing an identity on them, 
Empire’s society of control mobilizes them to abandon of all fixed identities and become 
enslaved to a perpetually deterritorializing machine instead. In the meantime those still resisting 
“problem individuals” who don’t participate in digital mobilization are left to die.89 
                                                                                                                                                             
marks, western tourists, enjoying an oriental opera the two conmen would later exploit). The film in a way 
reproduces cynically what it ironically mocks earlier, showing that irony needs a community of at least two, and 
after Jamal abandons Salim, as an isolated individual he himself will get caught in the fiction of oriental love 
produced for the viewers of the game show as well as the film itself. 
88 As Maurizio Lazzarato puts it, “with neoliberal deterritorialization, no new production of [social] subjectivity 
takes place.” See Maurizio Lazzarato, Signs and Machines: Capitalism and the Production of Subjectivity, trans. J. 
D. Jordan (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2014), 8. 
89 To quote the Coming Insurrection, “Mobility is this slight detachment from the self, this minimal disconnection 
from what constitutes us, this condition of strangeness whereby the self can now be taken up as an object of work, 
and it now becomes possible to sell oneself rather than one's labor power, to be remunerated not for what one does 
but for what one is, for our exquisite mastery of social codes, for our relational talents, for our smile and our way of 
presenting ourselves. This is the new standard of socialization. Mobility brings about a fusion of the two 
contradictory poles of work: here we participate in our own exploitation, and all participation is exploited. [...]The 
present production apparatus is [...], on the one hand, a gigantic machine for psychic and physical mobilization, for 
sucking the energy of humans that have become superfluous, and, on the other hand, a sorting machine that allocates 
survival to compliant subjectivities and rejects all ‘problem individuals,’ all those who embody another use of life 
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4.4 Cynicism as Capitalist Realism, Anti-Utopianism, and Anti-Feminism 
 Because of its emancipatory biopolitics liberating individuals from being abused by 
communities they don’t fit into, the cognitive behavioural self-therapy of cynicism nonetheless 
has a lot in common with utopianism. As Patrick Hayden and Chamsy el-Ojeili note, the same 
goes for globalization (Empire) itself, which is often seen as a 
 utopia of a ‘world without borders’, encompassing truly free trade, high-tech production, 
progressive equalization between nations, and unheard of individual freedom and choice; 
politically, the idea of the decline of sovereign states, and the simultaneous emergence of a 
cosmopolitan order of multilateral negotiation, human rights, peace, and global 
governance; culturally, the vision of an increasingly cosmopolitan orientation amongst 
world citizenry, where everyone is connected instantly with everyone else, a global village 
of mutual understanding and constructive interchange, where people can pick and choose 
from the wealth of humanity’s diverse, rich cultures.90 
The key difference between such utopianism of neoliberal deterritorialization and the 
Jamesonian-Lacanian concept of utopia developed in the previous chapters is the different 
abstract universal behind them. As I have proposed, utopianism in classical and modernist noir 
was an attempt to imagine a (non-all) social totality where all lives were equally valued, 
bypassing the phallic procedure of sovereign exception. The possibility of such universality was 
opened up by the capitalist apparatus of abstract labour itself, due to its evaluation of human life 
                                                                                                                                                             
and, in this way, resist the machine. On the one hand, ghosts are brought to life, and on the other, the living are left 
to die. This is the properly political function of the contemporary production apparatus.” Invisible Committee, The 
Coming Insurrection, 50-51. 
90 Patrick Hayden and Chamsy el-Ojeili, “Introduction: Reflections on the Demise and Renewal of Utopia in a 
Global Age,” in Globalization and Utopia, ed. P. Hayden and C. el-Ojeili (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 
7-8. 
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based on the potential labour power everyone has (this is why Marx called work the “species 
being” of humanity). In this context, sovereignty was an alternative, biopolitical practice of 
valuing life, both overwriting and supplementing the abstract measure of industrial capital with 
the bios of hegemonic social groups—in classical noir ultimately with that of white petty 
bourgeois men. If the abstract, universal apparatus was blind and indifferent, film noir’s 
sovereign was all seeing and all knowing—he knew which life was really worth living, and 
through the performance of his perverse (fatalistic) knowledge he made sure it stayed that way. 
In the age of the deterritorialized Empire, however, the apparatus of abstract labour and its 
principle of equivalence stops being the dominant axiom of capitalism. As Paolo Virno insists, 
today we are witnessing “the end of the society of work” (in the Fordist sense) and instead 
“[s]cience, information, general knowledge, and social cooperation present themselves as ‘the 
great foundation-stone of production and of wealth’.”91 He notes that in his Grundrisse Marx 
himself referred to the productive potential of socially organized knowledge in a thought 
experiment about “the general intellect,” envisioning a utopian society where all the work would 
be done by machines and humans would share the fruits of their creativity. What actually 
happened, Virno suggests, is something much more dystopian:  
Whereas money, the ‘universal equivalent’ itself [the ultimate embodiment of the axiom of 
abstract labour], incarnates in its independent existence the commensurability of products, 
jobs, and subjects, the general intellect instead stabilizes the analytic premises of every 
type of practice. Models of social knowledge do not equate the various activities of labor, 
but rather present themselves as the ‘immediate forces of production.’ [...] They are not 
‘species’ existing outside of the ‘individuals’ who belong to them, but axiomatic rules 
                                                 
91 Paolo Virno, “The Ambivalence of Disenchantment,” in Radical Thought in Italy, ed. P. Virno and M. Hardt 
(Minneapolis: Minnesota, 1996), 19. 
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whose validity does not depend on what they represent. Measuring and representing 
nothing, these technico-scientific codes and paradigms manifest themselves as constructive 
principles.92 
Conversely, the general intellect, destroying commensurabilities and proportions, seems 
to make everyday life and its forms of communication intransitive. [...] Although the 
general intellect ineluctably determines the conditions and premises of a social synthesis, it 
nevertheless occludes its possibility. It offers no unit of measure for an equation. It 
frustrates every unitary representation. It dissects the very bases of political 
representation.93 
Society as a whole breaks down now into a noir zone of indistinction with digital forms of life 
based on their own a sovereign knowledge that resist reciprocal communication. Virno sees 
cynicism as an adaptation to this circumstance, “making of necessity a virtue:” 
The cynic recognizes, in the particular context in which he operates, the predominant role 
played by certain epistemological premises and the simultaneous absence of real 
equivalences. To prevent disillusion, he forgoes any aspiration to dialogical and transparent 
communication. He renounces from the beginning the search for an intersubjective 
foundation for his practice and for a shared criterion of moral value.94 
Empire is not built on a unified code of production like Fordism but is more of a rhizomatic 
network where incompatible productive practices (from Silicon Valley tech firms to Mexican 
drug cartels) can co-exist as long as they are connected to system using standardized protocols of 
control accumulating their surplus value in the background. Instead of relying on a symbolic 
                                                 
92 Ibid., 21. 
93 Ibid., 23. 
94 Ibid. 
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order of equal measure, capitalism today deploys a non-signifying (machinc) semiotic that 
bypasses meaning and directly mobilizes the death drive of its multitude, exploiting the circular 
movement around their incongruent unary traits. As Brian Massumi puts it, “[t]he more varied, 
and even erratic, the better. Normality starts to lose its hold. The regularities start to loosen. This 
loosening is part of capitalism's dynamic [...] The oddest affective tendencies are OK—as long as 
they pay.”95  
 Boyle’s Millions (2004) is a good example of this new productivity of weird affective 
tendencies that carry a pseudo-utopian promise. It’s about a young boy, Damian, who is obsessed 
with Catholic saints to the point where he regularly has hallucinated encounters with them. One 
day he is playing the hermit withdrawn to his hut made out of paper boxes by the train tracks 
when a bag of money falls on his lap from the sky. Convinced that it’s a gift from God, he starts 
giving it away “to the poor,” that is, various people in his gated community that appear to be in 
need in the eyes of a 7-year old. For instance, he stuffs cash into the mailbox of a group of 
Mormons, which the pious men spend on a pile of consumer goods including a foot spa. The 
same happens with Damien’s own family members who all take their cut from the money to 
pursue their materialist obsessions. Only a tiny fracture goes to those who actually need it, like 
the commuting beggars of the town whom the boy invites for a pizza dinner, or the African 
villagers whom he wants to help dig a well. It is this bitter irony that Mark Browning misses 
when he considers the film as “a more optimistic, child-centred version of the basic narrative 
premise of Shallow Grave, as we move from a Thatcherite universe to a Blairite, New Labour 
view of social justice.”96 Edwin Page similarly sees it as “the positive to Shallow Grave and 
Trainspotting’s negative, showing an individual who is not stricken by greed and material desire 
                                                 
95 Brian Massumi, Politics of Affect (Malden: Polity Press, 2015), 20. 
96 Browning, Lust for Life, 171. 
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and whose wish to help others is granted.”97 True, Millions is indeed like a “white noir,” an 
idyllic obverse of Boyle’s earlier dark and nihilistic neo-noirs. We move from “greed is good” 
Thatcherism to the philanthropic capitalism of George Soros or Bill Gates—we even see Damian 
meeting St. Frances on a lush green meadow with a perfect blue sky above that imitates the 
default desktop image of Windows XP.  
 But the system doesn’t change. It’s still about the cult of the neoliberal self, the 
fetishization of his sovereign affects for their magical value producing capacity. For instance, 
Damian and his brother regularly receive money and treats by playing the “our mom’s dead” 
card. The original source of wealth (work) also disappears from the equation when the 
protagonist thinks God gave it to him to fulfill a charitable mission (which, ironically, ends up 
boosting middle class consumption). In fact Damian gets so disappointed when he learns that the 
money is from a bank robbery and the robbers want it back, that he actually burns most of it 
(“God doesn’t rob banks” he cries). It is important to note that the criminal who comes looking 
for it clearly stands out as working class (and by having a Scottish accent) among the small 
town’s well-protected English bourgeoisie, just like the two brutes in Shallow Grave did. While 
in the earlier film it is David’s psychopathic obsession with panoptic surveillance that stops the 
intruders, here it is community policing, the garden district’s fascism with a human face. Also, if 
in Shallow Grave the writer Hugo stood allegorically for the paradigm of cognitive labour (the 
general intellect) taking capital’s profit from the Fordist system of work, so does the young 
dreamer Damian. It is no coincidence that he shares the first name with the child protagonist of 
The Omen (1976) who turned out to be none other than the Anti-Christ (just like Hugo’s 
messianic pose was deeply ambiguous in Shallow Grave—both being subtle examples of a noir 
                                                 
97 Page, Ordinary Heroes, 187. 
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impulse that can potentially go undetected by the viewer). The money he burns out of religious 
fanaticism is the symbol of general equivalence, the reification of the working class’s labour the 
admittance of which would, however, threaten the fiction of his neoliberal chosenness through 
which he glorifies capital. Appropriately, the ghost of his dead mother appears to Damien by the 
flames and tells him he is special, that giving birth to him was the miracle that granted her 
sainthood. With his messianic fantasy restored, his sovereign voiceover announces the success of 
his philanthro-capitalist mission: it’s his story, he says, he’s going to end it the way he wants to. 
Accordingly, he donates the money he couldn’t burn because his materialistic family skimmed it 
from the pile earlier to the cause of digging wells in Africa. In a neuro-image we see how his 
brain constructs the fantasy of all of them travelling there using his box castle as a teleport, 
joining the local villagers playing in water that now flows in abundance thanks to the white 
saviours. The scene follows the aesthetic of National Geographic Magazine and has a kitschy 
world music song in the background (Nirvana by El Bosco); as the freeze frame of Damien’s 
silent grin, a pure cynicism-image, suggests, these are the codes structuring his jouissance that 
connect his personal affects to the network of Empire. The last shot of water flowing in front of 
the people celebrating dissolves into a gleam of light, which, as it then starts to fade into black, 
turns out to be made up of an infinite number of digital replicas of the film’s artificially lit title. 
In Boyle’s cynical ontology, the light (lumen) which in the modernist noir tradition stood for a 
utopian impulse decreating the image is now sublated into the lux of money, forming digital 
building blocks of a simulated idyll much the same way as the cold but utopian light of classical 
snow noir developed warm, idyllic tones in films like Before and After or Long Kiss Goodnight.  
 The sci-fi noir Sunshine (2007) is Boyle’s ultimate film in this regard since it’s about 
the rebooting of the dying Sun that brought a new ice age to Earth. As Lyotard notes, since the 
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death of our Sun would mean the end of all human life, it is also the absolute limit of our 
thought; it’s inevitable, yet we are unable to properly imagine it: “[h]uman death is included in 
the life of the mind. Solar death implies an irreparably exclusive disjunction between death and 
thought: if there’s death, then there’s no thought.”98 As Fredric Jameson has argued, the same 
goes for imagining the end of capitalism today,99 and we could add that this is because since the 
recent cognitive turn thinking itself is captured in the process of capital accumulation. Whether 
Boyle was aware of this parallel or not, the allegory of keeping the dying Sun alive fits perfectly 
into his series of capitalist realist films about how Empire has no alternative even if it’s in a state 
of permanent crisis.  
 The ideological stakes of Sunshine are framed as a religious conflict between the 
sovereign glory of the neoliberal self and the apocalyptic fundamentalism of radical 
egalitarianism. At the beginning, these two alternatives are not diametrically opposed yet. When 
the crew of the spaceship Icarus II travelling towards to Sun to revive it receives a distress signal 
from its disappeared predecessor Icarus I, it still seems possible to both rescue the survivors from 
the ship in trouble and complete their mission to save humankind. When Capa, the physicist on 
board is entrusted with the decision whether to go off course, he simply has to rely on the central 
computer’s calculations that enable the detour. After a human error in setting the new route leads 
to the explosion of the ship’s oxygen supply, however, the two objectives start to become 
mutually exclusive. In a second sovereign decision the standing members of the crew vote on 
whether to kill their injured colleague recovering in the sick bay so that they would have enough 
air to deliver their load or let him live, in which case the mission fails and humanity eventually 
                                                 
98 Jean-Francois Lyotard, “Can Thought Go on Without a Body?” in Materialities of Communication, ed. H. U. 
Gumbrecht and K. L. Pfeiffer, trans. B. Boone and L. Hildreth (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 289. 
99 He actually claimed that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism. See Fredric 
Jameson, “The Antinomies of Postmodernity,” in Fredric Jameson, The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the 
Postmodern 1983 -1998 (New York: Verso, 1998), 50. 
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dies as well. After agreeing that the vote has to be unanimous, three of them including Capa 
votes for the murder, but Cassie, the melancholic female pilot refuses to (according to her 
backstory in the script she had to have an abortion to be recruited). The majority decides to go 
forward with the killing anyway only to find that the fifth crew member already committed 
suicide. Crucially, it is the “femme fatale” Cassie’s apocalyptic melancholy that comes to stand 
for a universal valuation of life, bringing her close to the Sun worshipper Pinbacker, the sole 
survivor of the Icarus I who does everything in his power to sabotage the mission of Icarus II, 
embracing the extinction of mankind. Boyle calls him an “extreme fundamentalist” on the DVD 
commentary,100 and he is indeed the descendant of Elephant’s executioners caught in an 
autoimmune delirium destroying their own population. The difference between him and Cassie is 
that for him, no life is worth living which is precisely why he has to keep actively murdering 
people, while for her all life has value which is why she remains passive when it comes to the 
choice of sovereignty. Allegorically, we could read her desire as utopian, refusing the blackmail 
that life disconnected from Empire (the Sun) can have no value.101 By contrast, Capa becomes 
the film’s true neoliberal sovereign, affirming that there is no alternative by activating the 
payload that successfully reboots the Sun (perpetuates its domination artificially). While Boyle, 
pointing at the cinematic artifice, shows Pinbacker’s body as a glitch in the film’s digital code, 
the CGI in the final explosion is flawless and awe inspiring. It looks like a neuro-image from 
inside of a supercomputer’s brain, the gigantic structure of the mysterious bomb filled with 
flashing electric circuits stimulating and reanimating the molten body of the Sun (an allegory for 
                                                 
100 Sunshine, directed by Danny Boyle (2007; Beverly Hills, CA: 20th Century Fox Home, 2007), DVD. 
101 In a recent paper on ice planets in Hollywood sci-fi films, Noelle Belanger identifies their common feature of 
unexploited resource abundance. They represent a contradictory imaginary insofar as they cannot maintain life but 
promise its potential. In my Jamesonian-Agambenian reading, this means they embrace a certain anti-capitalist 
inoperativity immanent to resource extraction and exploitation. Noelle Belanger, “Contemporary Hollywood Films, 
Cold War Legacies, and The Politics of Ice,” (paper presented the Society for Cinema and Media Studies 
conference, Fairmont Queen Elizabeth Hotel, Montreal, QC, March 31, 2015) 
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the flesh of the multitude) entering it. Before the fire consumes him, the cynic’s silent grin 
appears on Capa’s face, this time as a sign of quasi-religious ecstasy. We then cut to his sister 
and her kids on Earth who just received his last digital message from a few days ago, telling 
them to expect some extra sunlight soon if the mission is successful. When the rays finally 
arrive, the family stands and smiles in silent awe, repeating Capa’s glorifying gesture in isolated 
connectedness.   
If Sunshine follows Boyle’s cynical ontology of light to its logical conclusion, 28 Days 
Later (2002) goes to the end with his biopolitics of autoimmunity destroying the shared forms of 
modern life. The film is about a handful of survivors of a massive virus infection that turned 
most of the UK’s population into raging human-animals. After escaping the zombie infested 
London to find the source of a radio signal somewhere in the countryside promising food, 
shelter, and the company of others, three of them make it to an army base run by a dozen male 
soldiers planning to rebuild civilization with the help of military discipline and some women 
serving as breeding stock. The group of three, Selena, Hanna, and Jim soon have to realize that 
after the zombie infested London they are yet again trapped in a biopolitical camp, this time with 
a distinctive fascist flavor where their bodies are fully exposed to the sovereign power of the 
military tribe. The soldiers in their obsession with murder, torture, and rape are no different from 
the zombies in the eyes of the main characters who are shocked by their all too direct exercise of 
thanatopolitics without its comforting liberal multicultural mediation they were used to as 
citizens of London. As Anna Froula observes, the obscene practices of the military camp return 
to them the repressed and distanced neoimperial violence of the post-9/11 world that the people 
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of Britain have become—willingly or unwillingly—complicit in.102 The zombies targeted by the 
Queen’s proud soldiers in 28 Days Later stand pointedly for the threat of a racial and cultural 
Other that Britain, along with the US and its allies, has unleashed on itself by turning millions 
into refugees and migrants with its “war on terror.” The living dead in the film are infected with 
a form of rabies, spreading incredibly fast; they are also capable of running unlike their sluggish 
predecessors in the zombie film tradition. For these reasons, their biopolitical separation from the 
healthy is centered on the fantasy of reproduction, with the terror of zombies multiplying without 
any limit opposed to the controlled reproduction of the healthy population.  
Abandoning this autoimmune fascism of the old Empire by becoming a good neoliberal 
subject is the trajectory of the Jim’s character development. When the two women are about to 
involuntarily fulfill their reproductive role, he resists and tries to save them, for which he is 
sentenced to death by the camp’s leader. A couple of soldiers take him outside to the zombie-
infested area where he manages to escape leaving his executioners thinking he is left to certain 
death. Lying on the ground barely alive, he sees an airplane flying by—a sure sign that there is 
still an organized state out there, only one that is indifferent to the plight of its citizens. This 
realization pushes him to take law into his own hands, to act as sovereign in the place of 
exception to the camp’s bios and make decisions about the life and death of others in it. He turns 
into a killing machine, a raging animal much like the zombies themselves, and attacks the 
military base at night to massacre all the soldiers with his bare hands and save the two women 
from forced impregnation. The slaughter is shot with mesmerizing noir imagery (fully digital this 
time), which for Boyle is also an indication that Jim’s sovereign reason didn’t fully dissolve into 
self-annihilating madness. When Selena encounters him fully covered in blood, she looks into 
                                                 
102 see Anna Froula, “Prolepsis and the ‘War on Terror’: Zombie Pathology and the Culture of Fear in 28 Days 
Later…” in Reframing 9/11: Film, Popular Culture and the War on Terror (New York: Continuum, 2010), 195-208. 
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his eyes and after a momentary hesitation, instead of striking him with her machete, she offers 
her helping hand. Jim’s strategic transformation into a human-zombie hybrid successfully 
integrates his bare life into the logic of neoliberal governmentality. Instead of simply excluding 
the mass of precarious bodies (the homo sacer) from the bios of a productive population, 
Empire’s new biopolitical apparatus solicits zombification as an efficient “technology of the 
self” that helps to develop responsible subjects who know how to provide for themselves in the 
absence of the state and social institutions.103  
Significantly, however, Jim’s transformation also complicates the non-hierarchical 
organization of the survivors’ small group. The last scenes show the three of them in a peaceful 
hillside cottage, the women sewing together some linen to signal airplanes while he is recovering 
from his injuries. Boyle shoots these idyllic images on film, as if to suggest that we are back to 
normal after the deviation to digital video that documented the UK’s biopolitical state of 
emergency.104 This normalcy, however, also implies the return to conservative gender roles: two 
women doing housework while the sovereign male head of the family is resting. When Jim 
wakes up and sees that the dress Selena was forced to wear by the soldiers is now sawn together 
with the sheets, he remarks jokingly “You looked all right in this, you know?” Furthermore, the 
sign the women prepared on their own reads HELL, and only when Jim joins them do they add 
the last letter O to the message together. This momentarily visible SOS signal is addressed to the 
former (welfare) state, to the big Other upholding the principle of equality that the neoliberal turn 
rendered inoperative. No wonder that an airplane only appears when through the man’s 
                                                 
103 I rely here on Thomas Lemke’s reading of Foucault in Thomas Lemke, “‘The Birth of Bio-Politics’ – Michel 
Foucault's Lecture at the Collège de France on Neo-Liberal Governmentality,” Economy and Society 30, no. 2 
(2001): 190-207. 
104 Boyle shares Lev Manovich’s conviction about the digital as meta-media, merging its semantic field with that of 
film noir, the cinematic meta-genre. See Lev Manovich, “Understanding Meta-Media,” ctheory.net, accessed Sept 7, 
2015. http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=493.  
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intervention the meaning of the message is changed to its exact opposite, from “Get us out of 
here!” to “Look at us, we’re fine, we have solved all our problems alone!” In Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, this is what the phallic signifier is about: turning what is perceived as negativity, 
lack, 0, into its opposite by giving it a positive symbolization.105 This is the sovereign act that the 
women are unable to perform in Boyle’s conservative universe. Although at the beginning it is 
the militant black anarcho-survivalist Selena who breaks the news about the lack of a functioning 
government to Jim, she is unable to see the anarchy caused by the infection as an opportunity for 
self-expression. As a fierce zombie killer, she still belongs to the autoimmune, self-destructive 
moment of the old Empire just like Salim, Begbie, David, or the soldiers of 28 Days Later. This 
difference is also visible in their reactions to the airplane’s arrival. While Selena voices her 
happiness addressing Hanna (“You think they saw us this time?”) and the two of them exchange 
gazes, Jim is looking up to the sky with his back towards the women who appear blurred in the 
background while the camera focuses on his silent grin.  
Curiously, the original ending of the film had Jim die of his injuries while leaving the two 
women alive, the last scene showing them walk away from his dead body with automatic 
weapons to continue their struggle for survival (Hanna even takes a gun from Jim’s hands). The 
reason why this radical feminist ending was later dropped, as Boyle explains on the DVD 
commentary,106 is because test audiences found it too bleak, getting the sense that the women are 
walking into their certain death. The final shot indeed gives this impression: as they disappear 
into a long hospital corridor, the camera remains static, waiting until an automatic door slowly 
closes behind them, gradually killing all the remaining light. Had the director chosen to stick to 
                                                 
105 Fink, Lacan to the Letter, 135-36. 
106 28 Days Later, directed by Danny Boyle (2002; Beverly Hills, CA: 20th Century Fox Home, 2003), DVD. 
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this version, 28 Days Later would have been closer in tone to Elephant than to his later films. 
But it still wouldn’t have changed the way he typically represents women.  
As a rule, if they appear within a disciplinary regime, they are depicted as the system’s 
autoimmune disease, femmes fatales undermining the stable boundaries of any biopolitical 
community without offering a positive alternative. Juliet in Shallow Grave kills David, betrays 
Alex and leaves; Diane in Trainspotting is an intruder disrupting the junkie’s shared rituals; 
Dorothy in Millions undermines the male homosocial balance of Damian’s family by dating his 
father then planning to leave with part of the money; Latika in Slumdog Millionaire breaks up 
the friendship between Jamal and Salim and causes the death of the latter; and Cassie in Sunshine 
is ready to sacrifice humanity out of melancholic resignation after her personal trauma. We could 
add to the list A Life Less Ordinary’s Celine, a spoiled rich girl who rebels against her father by 
orchestrating her own kidnapping; The Beach’s Francoise cheating on her boyfriend with the 
protagonist Richard, threatening the stability of the desert island commune they joined together; 
and Sal, the commune’s leader who not only does the same, but in her obsession with the idea of 
a perfect paradise she is ready to excommunicate and even murder its members who put it in 
jeopardy. In all these cases, feminine resistance to disciplinary power is shown as a nihilistic, 
potentially self-annihilating force. On the other hand, some of these women can make the 
transition into the neoliberal society of control by renouncing their former critical negativity and 
starting to believe in the glory of the digital through the mediation of the male protagonist. 
Latika has to answer the phone call of Jamal from the game show and witness his transformation 
into a media spectacle, Celine has to be enchanted by a love letter a divine apparatus of angels 
wrote in the name of his kidnapper, Selena has to put her machine gun aside and formulate a 
more life affirming message with Jim’s help, Dorothy has to be caught in Damien’s white 
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saviour fantasy, and Francoise has to believe the cheesy pickup line of Richard about parallel 
universes and send it back to him with a digital photograph after the loss of their real life 
paradise. All these unruly women are educated into the neoliberal way of life through what 
Pisters (after Deleuze) calls “the powers of the false,”107 by learning to shift their attention from 
the destructive search for authenticity to the truth-effects constructed artificially through the 
language of digital media (from images that represent reality to direct brain-images).  
And the same goes for utopianism in Boyle’s films. When it comes to the great modern 
ideological projects, he is the follower of Fukuyama: “I personally accept that we’ve left behind 
ideologies. We’ve decided, as Westerners, that we’ve left behind ideological choices. We’ve 
become what we are—consumers. And we’re all in that race to consume. But within that, there 
remain principles that you do have or you don’t have.”108 Indeed, all of the potentially utopian 
spaces in his films (Shallow Grave’s apartment, The Beach’s desert island, Millions’ gated 
community, 28 Days Later’s military base, Slumdog Millionaire’s slum, etc.) always already 
include a desire to consume. It is consumption that undermines collective utopian projects in the 
modernist sense for Boyle because it is always a matter of individual enjoyment (a sovereign 
“lust for life”) that cannot be unified in any way into a commonly shared bios. Those who try it 
in his films end up with a fascist dictatorship, the autoimmune excess of the old, disciplinary 
model of power. He clearly prefers the neoliberal culture of the self that consumes the very 
affects it produces through the mediation of Empire’s new media.109 As Richard from The Beach 
puts it after he returns from his eventually dystopian vacation on an oriental island to his life as 
an ordinary American: “I still believe in paradise. But now at least I know it’s not someplace you 
                                                 
107 Pisters, The Neuro-Image, 6. 
108 Jeffrey Overstreet, “Danny Boyle: The Looking Closer Interview,” in Danny Boyle: Interviews, ed. B. Dunham 
(Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2011), 86. 
109 As Foucault put it, “[t]he man of consumption, insofar as he consumes, is a producer. What does he produce? 
Well, quite simply, he produces his own satisfaction.” Foucault , Birth of Biopolitics, 226. 
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can look for. Because it’s not where you go. It’s how you feel for a moment in your life when 
you’re part of something. And if you find that moment, it lasts forever.” 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 It is the neoliberal self in becoming that Boyle’s circular narratives keep returning 
to,110 the postmodern nomadic subject embodied by a post-phallic (emasculate, often 
androgynous, and even asexual) man111 standing for the endless noir deterritorialization of 
biopolitical communities and identities, an “eternal recurrence of ‘difference’”112 that finds its 
momentarily reified expression through the digital media apparatus enslaving its affective 
labour.113 We can even talk of a castration by the digital insofar as Boyle’s heroes have to 
renounce an unconnectable abject-remainder of their bodies, the excess of their original 
community’s jouissance to become smooth, free floating neoliberal commodities. While in some 
of his films this castration is symbolic (like giving up heroin in Trainspotting or the Dalit identity 
in Slumdog Millionaire), in others it becomes more literal, forced. In A Life Less Ordinary and 
Sunshine, the physical body of the protagonist has to die to live on in digital form. In 127 Hours 
(2010), the protagonist, Aron records himself cutting off his own hand that got stuck under a 
rock while he was climbing in the Grand Canyon, preventing the free flow of his digital self by 
forcing him “off the grid” for 127 hours. The rock is an allegory for the mold sculpting his 
                                                 
110 Fernando Maldonado calls it Boyle’s “circular nihilism.” See Fernando Maldonado, “Pop Nihilism,” Leigh 
Review 9 (2001): 60. 
111 While most of Boyle’s films have an androgynous male protagonist, it is Trainspotting’s Renton who explicitly 
formulates this move beyond fixed identities of gender: “The world is changing. Music is changing. Drugs are 
changing. Even men and women are changing. One thousand years from now there will be no guys and no girls, just 
wankers. Sounds great to me!” 
112 Pisters, The Neuro-Image, 304. 
113 As Berardi stresses, “[w]hen the relation between labor and value becomes indeterminable, the pure law of 
violence, of abuse, reigns in the global labor market. No more simple exploitation, but slavery, pure violence against 
the vulnerable lives of global workers.” Franco Berardi, After the Future, ed. G. Genesko and N. Thoburn 
(Baltimore: AK Press, 2011), 92. 
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properly neoliberal body, making it flexible by exploiting what Catherine Malabou calls the 
plasticity of the self, the brain’s ability to dynamically adapt by both receiving form and 
destroying it.114 In Boyle’s universe, the former, passive aspect of plasticity is prioritized over 
the “explosive” capacity of the brain, exemplifying what Malabou calls “neuronal ideology” that 
uses neuroscientific metaphors to glorify the new docility of post-Fordist affective and cognitive 
workers.115 Boyle reflects on the masculine nature of this digital coercion in his neuro-thriller 
Trance, where the female psychiatrist Elizabeth is “asked” by her patient/boyfriend to shave off 
her pubic hair entirely claiming that “the hair serves to remind us of our biology, of our origin. 
But without it, there is a perfection untainted.”116 She then erases herself from the mind of her 
partner who turns abusive, switching to a long distance relationship through video messages with 
a more suitable man (one who lives on another continent).  
 Other than noir’s classical stylistic repertoire, then, Boyle frequently uses the language 
of new media (interactive game shows, reality TV, selfies, video games), and neuro-images to 
depict the emergence of the new neoliberal culture of the self. Insofar as they embrace this 
regime’s “powers of the false” his heroes are cynical capitalist realists who affirm their bodies’ 
subordination to Empire’s deterritorialized productive network, their constantly mobile 
subjectivity as the antidote to the endless self-purifying violence of the “real,” territorially 
anchored biopolitical communities they are fleeing from. The meta-violence in this shift, the 
cynic’s decision to devalue any physically shared form of life through a digital sovereign-image 
is masked by this framing of all real life communities as self-destructive. The main character of 
                                                 
114 Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain?, trans. S. Rand (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2008), 5. 
115 Ibid., 11. 
116 As Berardi notes, “[t]he video-electronic generation does not tolerate armpit or pubic hair. One needs perfect 
compatibility in order to interface corporeal surfaces in connection. Smooth generation.” Berardi, After the Future, 
68. 
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Boyle’s films, contrary to the classical noir protagonist, usually ends up physically isolated 
(sometimes dead even) but digitally connected, with his life valued (exploited) in its uniqueness 
by the apparatuses of networked capitalism that, by magically neutralizing biopolitical tensions, 
also bring people together in a supposedly frictionless cyberspace. This way, the new digitally 
castrated self can simultaneously stand for a new masculine strategy to disavow castration. Or, to 
put it differently, instead of confronting the devastating and alienating effects of neoliberal 
deterritorialization on shared human life the director can have his digital cake and eat it, so to 
speak, by ending his films with a male centered cyber-idyll he seems to be affirming while also 
referencing an interminable noir impulse against its temporarily reified expressions, thereby 
indicating his private cynical detachment. 
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5 Men’s Lives Matter: Christopher Nolan and the Bios of the 
Neoliberal Cynic 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 While Christopher Nolan, like Danny Boyle, was born in the UK and made his first 
feature film there with very little money, his career follows a different trajectory towards big 
budget Hollywood productions with each of his last four movies costing more than 150 million 
dollars. What his early black and white indie-noir Following (1998) and his blockbuster comic 
book adaptation Batman series (2005; 2008; 2012) nonetheless have in common is a consistent 
ambition to address the audience as mature and intelligent,1 one that is capable of following 
complex puzzle plots and doesn’t shy away from exploring the darker side of the human 
condition, especially the psychopathologies of the mind. The template of film noir is an ideal 
tool in such pedagogical agenda, something that Nolan keeps falling back on regardless of the 
genre he is working with. His formal rigor and Kubrick-inspired calm,2 coldly serious tone—
unusual for pre-9/11 (or even for early 2000s) Hollywood—has earned him the title of a 
“blockbuster author” from sympathetic critics,3 while his detractors such as David Bordwell and 
Kristin Thompson refer to his films as “midcult,” a “form of vulgarized modernism that makes 
formal experiment too easy for the audience.”4 Either way it’s safe to say that he was at the right 
place at the right time when America’s neoimperialist “war on terror” created mass demand for 
                                                 
1 As Nolan puts it, he likes to “complement the audience’s intelligence.” See “Christopher Nolan: The full interview 
– Newsnight,” YouTube video, 23:41, posted by “BBC Newsnight,” Oct 16, 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VtH6kiPbMBw. 
2 See Scott Collura, “Christopher Nolan on Kubrick as an Influence,” IGN, Apr 8, 2013, accessed Jan 7, 2016, 
http://ca.ign.com/articles/2013/04/08/christopher-nolan-on-kubrick-as-an-influence.  
3 Erin Hill-Parks, “Developing an Auteur Through Reviews: The Critical Surround of Christopher Nolan,” in The 
Cinema of Christopher Nolan: Imagining the Impossible, ed. J. Furby and S. Joy (New York: Wallflower Press, 
2015), 26. 
4 David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson, Christopher Nolan: A Labyrinth of Linkages (Madison: Irvington Way 
Institute Press, 2013), 55. 
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vaguely nihilistic and discretely fascistic blockbusters to replace postmodern Hollywood’s self-
indulgent peacetime pastiche with something “real.” 
His more generous critics call this the confusion of the boundary between Hollywood and 
non-Hollywood cinema,5 but this ambiguous institutional alignment is nonetheless markedly 
different from Boyle’s indiestream position—and not just because of the different budgets at 
their disposal. While Boyle is a populist on a quest to make intelligent movies for ordinary 
people (“for everyone”),6 Nolan has an elitist approach to his viewers who are addressed as 
smarter than the regular filmgoer while in their substance his films may actually be rather 
ordinary. The elitism is in his films’ form, which, combined with a carefully maintained air of 
mystery about the true meaning of their plots as well as about the director himself,7 enhances 
Nolan’s cult as the single auteur of his films far beyond that of Boyle who is often perceived 
sharing creative credit with his collaborators.8 The two filmmakers’ approach to film noir also 
differs significantly. As I have suggested, Boyle uses noir to deconstruct the immunizing form of 
film genres, exposing the autoimmune tendencies of these discursive communities (culminating 
in the postmodern smart film) and their reliance on the inclusively excluded figure of the subject 
supposed to believe and enjoy whom he emancipates into the neoliberal cynic. Nolan, by 
contrast, moves in the opposite direction by infusing film noir with the puzzle film genre and 
preserving the role of the Metzian naive observer as the one who believes in the final explanation 
to the plot’s inconclusive riddles. If Boyle’s solution aims to eliminate the implicit hierarchies of 
the classical cinematic apparatus by democratizing sovereign access to the digital powers of the 
false, Nolan rigidly reaffirms them by attributing the cynical wisdom about a necessary, heroic 
                                                 
5 See Stuart Joy, “Dreaming a Little Bigger, Darling,” in The Cinema of Christopher Nolan: Imagining the 
Impossible, ed. J. Furby and S. Joy (New York: Wallflower Press, 2015), 1. 
6 “For Everyone” was the theme of the Boyle directed opening for the 2012 London Olympics.  
7 Ibid., 3. 
8 Hill-Parks, “Developing an Auteur,” 25. 
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lie covering the lack in the film’s symbolic texture to a small masculine elite (including himself). 
As Todd McGowan astutely observes, “Boyle presents the lie as truth, while Nolan presents truth 
as the product of a lie.”9 While the former shifts the moral and epistemological problem of truth 
to the field of the neoliberal bio-aesthetics of the self, the latter fixes the meaning of truth as 
immoral and resulting from the desire not to know.  
If Boyle’s cynicism is that of liberal multiculturalism, Nolan’s is a right wing reaction to 
it, responding to an inconsistency in the liberal cynic’s position regarding the contours of the 
dominant biopolitical group and those whom they exclude from the list of lives worth living. As 
I have argued in the previous chapter, Boyle avoids this problem by creating an illusion of a new 
universality of deterritorialized neoliberal selves, as if somehow the bare life (zoe) of any 
individual willing to tear himself from his organic community could gain a sovereign value 
through capital’s new digital networks connecting it to a biopolitically neutral virtual multitude 
(bios). Those who are excluded from the glory of the digital and are left to die in his films are 
the beneficiaries of a now outdated and self-destructive disciplinary regime of power, and are 
therefore shown as responsible for their own demise. In Nolan version, on the contrary, cynical 
sovereignty loses its pseudo-democratic connotations and re-entrenches the neoliberal bios as 
white, bourgeois, heterosexual, and male against the bare life of the multitude framed as a threat 
of femininity. For him, the ultimate expression of sovereign power’s glory is not the connective 
mutation of the multitude but the “acclamations, ceremonies, liturgies, and insignia” of the white 
male ruling class. His traditionalist view of noir cynicism is also expressed in Nolan’s notorious 
aversion to digital video and the overuse of CGI, appropriate for his project to return to the body 
of classical Hollywood masculinity as the privileged sovereign. Reading Nolan’s films against 
                                                 
9 Todd McGowan, Fictional Christopher Nolan (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012), 8. 
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the background of Boyle’s oeuvre allows us to start mapping the inconsistencies inherent to the 
ideology of cynicism, how the biopolitical antagonism at the heart of contemporary film noir 
generates a set of incompatible responses in tension with one another.  
 
5.2 Solving Noir Puzzles with the Powers of the False: The Immoral 
Epistemology of the Cynic 
 
5.2.1 Following 
 Critic Jim Emerson suggests that Following, Nolan’s first feature film already contains 
the seeds of the director’s later work,10 but the same can also be said about his earlier short 
Doodlebug (1997). It’s a 3 minute paranoia noir about an agitated young man in a wife beater 
trying to smash a bug crawling on the floor of his dilapidated apartment, but the creature keeps 
getting away to hide in the dark. We hear the clock ticking and the phone ringing loudly as his 
anxiety grows, until he finally discovers that what he thought was an insect is in fact a tiny 
version of himself running around, mirroring his moves trying to hit something, except that the 
little man seems to be a few seconds ahead of him, representing his future self. This is why, 
unbeknownst to him, he can catch up with him only at the moment of his (their) death: when the 
tiny figure stands still for a moment to finally smash his target, providing an opportunity for his 
normal sized double to do the same, only for himself to be killed by his giant alter ego emerging 
behind him a few seconds later. It is as if Nolan read Lacan’s seminar on the gaze as objet petit a 
                                                 
10 Jim Emerson, “Following: Nolan in a Nushell,” Scanners, Jul 22, 2010, accessed Jan 7, 2016, 
http://www.rogerebert.com/scanners/following-nolan-in-a-nutshell.  
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and applied it to the film noir universe.11 The gaze of the Other appears in the film as that 
primordially alienated correlate to the subject, the object cause of his desire, a gaze of the real 
always behind his back that enters his field of vision as the stain (the “bug”) on reality’s 
symbolic texture and that, he believes, he can simply eliminate to become complete. However, as 
I have outlines in Chapter 2, for Lacan there can be no I without a stain, a blind spot,12 which is 
why such pursuit of self-purification, if pushed to its logical conclusion, leads to paranoid 
psychosis: to the autoimmune destruction of the self that Nolan depicts as the bad infinity of 
collapsing parallel universes. From a biopolitical perspective what we see here is an escalation of 
the central conflict of Boyle and Clarke’s Elephant: the inability of the postmodern subject to 
enter into an immunized territory shared with others, one with stable boundaries set up by 
mutually agreed upon norms of inclusion and exclusion (in other words: “a good life”). While in 
the earlier film this impotence is that of the white male community as a whole, in Nolan’s 
version it appears as the lethal dialectic between the self and his double. Doodlebug therefore is 
also about the crisis of the white male sovereign-image, its disintegration into abstract gestures, 
and if it differs from Nolan’s later films it’s because, just like Elephant, it never offers any 
solution. Instead of constructing the smallest circuit between actual and virtual, self and the other 
in a crystal-image of productive time, the film presents us with the collapse of temporality.  
Like with Danny Boyle, Nolan’s subsequent films make an effort to resolve this crisis. In 
fact it’s interesting to consider Elephant as an unacknowledged influence on his next film 
Following,13 which starts with an unemployed would-be writer, Bill, following random strangers 
around for inspiration. His voyeuristic endeavour to find out about their secrets as a way to break 
                                                 
11 see Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, 
trans. A. Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1981), 67-123. 
12 Ibid., 97. 
13 Along with Sophie Calle’s performance art piece. See David Thompson, “Following,” Sight and Sound, Jan 1999, 
accessed Jan 7, 2016, http://old.bfi.org.uk/sightandsound/review/266.  
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his writer’s block is yet another example of the subject chasing his objet a, the mysterious 
ingredient missing from his self-expression. While this relationship initially is merely imaginary, 
a narcissistic incorporation of the other from a distance,14 its failure gradually gives way to its 
opposite, an aggressive breach of the other’s boundaries and its violent destruction comparable to 
the hero’s paranoid outburst in Doodlebug (the two protagonists are even played by the same 
actor) and the executioners’ mayhem in Elephant.15 Bill’s harmless stage of voyeurism ends 
when someone returns his gaze and confronts him, making him suddenly engulfed in shame as a 
result. He is ashamed, however, not because his perverse game is suddenly revealed to the other 
in all its embarrassing detail. On the contrary, shame comes rather from the breakdown of Bill’s 
imaginary relationship to objet a (embodied by the person he has been observing), from the 
disintegration of the fantasy image of a writer at work the lonely man made up for a supposedly 
all-seeing gaze of the Other to hide the fact that he is a failure. As Joan Copjec explains, “shame 
is awakened not when one looks at oneself [...] through another’s eyes, but when one suddenly 
perceives a lack in the Other. At this moment the subject no longer experiences herself as the 
fulfillment of the Other’s desire, as the center of the world [...] In shame [...] one experiences 
one’s visibility, but there is no external Other who sees, since shame is proof that the Other does 
not exist.”16 Cobb, the man Bill’s been watching is now looking at him but he (unlike the Other 
he imagined earlier) cannot see him: his gaze is ignorant of his narcissistic fantasy (with an 
irritated voice he asks Bill whether he’s a cop or a “fag”), much the same way as the sardine can 
was ignoring the pathos of the young Lacan’s roleplaying during his seafaring adventure. Shame, 
                                                 
14 I follow Lacan in his distinction between the small (imaginary) other and the big Other of the symbolic order. See 
Jacques Lacan, The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, 
Book II (1954-55), trans. S. Tomaselli (New York: Nortion, 1988), Chapter 19. 
15 Lacanian psychoanalysis refers to this dialectic as narcissistic rivalry, the oscillation between incorporation and 
destruction of what Lacan calls the ego-ideal, the subject’s imaginary double (the small other). See Alenka 
Zupancic, Ethics of the Real: Kant, Lacan (New York: Verso, 2000), 153. 
16 Joan Copjec, Imagine There’s No Woman: Ethics and Sublimation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 127. 
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in other words, is an affect produced by the decreation of the image that leaves the subject frozen 
into gestures that appear meaningless, stupid.  
Yet, this shameful moment doesn’t last long. Not only is Cobb not interested in shaming 
Bill, he encourages him to take his narcissistic relationship to the next (openly sadistic) level and 
accompany him to break into random apartments to steal what people hold most precious to 
“show them what they had.” He thereby enters Bill’s fantasy and starts to actively engineer it, 
sharpen its contours, put its objective in more exact terms (identifying what they’re after as the 
box of personal items that all people have in one form or another, which, as Todd McGowan 
observes, stands for the hidden kernel of the subject’s existence a.k.a. objet a).17 By acting as 
Bill’s enabler Cobb exemplifies the post-disciplinary figure of authority in the society of control 
who, instead of repressing jouissance actively solicits, manages, and manipulates it.18 As 
Jacques-Alain Miller summarizes, “[w]e are at a point where the dominant discourse enjoins one 
not to be ashamed of one's jouissance anymore.”19 Cobb even mocks Bill for trying, before they 
met, to come up with explicit rules to keep his habit of following under control (such as never 
follow the same person twice, etc.), giving the impression that in his more advanced version of 
the game everything is permitted. He encourages Bill to take anything he wants from the burgled 
homes, have a drink from the owner’s liquor cabinet, etc.—that is, to pick the unary trait that 
would activate his drive and grant him access to jouissance in his own way, without any socially 
determined use value or meaning. 
                                                 
17 McGowan, Christopher Nolan, 22. 
18 See Slavoj Žižek, “You May!” London Review of Books 21, no. 18, 18 Mar 1999, accessed Jan 7 2016, 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v21/n06/slavoj-Žižek/you-may.  
19 Jacques-Alain Miller, “On Shame,” in Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Psychoanalysis: Reflections on 
Seminar XVII, ed. J. Clemens, R. Grigg (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 27. 
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However, as Nolan is quick to show us, this address of the neoliberal subject as an 
autonomous agent is a farce; Cobb is carefully constructing a mousetrap for Bill, slowly setting 
him up to take the fall for a murder he’s about to commit. And the key to getting him into the 
trap is precisely the illusion of free agency. For instance, at their first break-in he lets his young 
apprentice have the satisfaction of finding the key on his own above the doorframe, not realizing 
that it was Cobb who put it there earlier for him to find. To avoid suspicion Cobb even looks 
under the doormat first, to which Bill responds “People don’t really do that, do they?”, but the 
gesture nonetheless makes him look around for the key while Cobb’s trying to pick the lock. As 
McGowan puts it, “[Bill] fails to grasp how the world that he sees includes him within it and 
anticipates his involvement, even though he experiences this involvement as the product of his 
own free act.”20 Cobb similarly sets him up to fall for the film’s femme fatale (referred to as The 
Blonde in the script), the melancholic ex-girlfriend of a local gangster who knows the 
combination of the criminal’s safe. After taking some personal items from her house in a 
burglary arranged by Cobb, Bill becomes obsessed with her, seeks her out and starts a 
relationship with her, not suspecting that she is acting on Cobb’s behalf. Just as Bill is being 
played by The Blonde who gives him the job to break into the gangster’s safe as an excuse to set 
him up (take the fall for a similar burglary she believes Cobb is wanted for by the police), Cobb 
is playing her by omitting the fact that he was hired to kill her by the woman’s criminal ex-lover. 
At the end we have a “perfect crime” in which all the pawns play their part “freely,” 
unknowingly contributing to their own downfall while Cobb remains above suspicion (the police 
don’t even believe he exists).  
                                                 
20 McGowan, Christopher Nolan, 25. 
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Nolan similarly plays with his viewer through the nonlinear development of the story, the 
first example of his later, increasingly more elaborate puzzle narratives. The plot is framed by 
Bill’s noir style confession to the police, and the sequence of the events unfolding represents his 
way of recollecting them, his filling in the blanks in the story as well as incorporating the new 
information he finds out from the detective interrogating him (for instance when he learns that 
The Blonde was murdered, he imagines a flashback scene where Cobb is killing her with a 
hammer). This technique not only restricts the viewer’s range on knowledge to that of Bill, we 
are even more limited as we only have access to the information he already knows one piece at a 
time, forced to follow his hectic form of remembering just like the policeman he is talking to 
(who, as it turns out, already knows more than us about the case). For instance, we see the scene 
of Bill meeting The Blonde in a seedy underground bar before we learn about her connection to 
the break-in that happened earlier in the story, which gives the impression of a chance encounter, 
playing on the classical noir theme of fatalism that later turns out to be a simulation. In other 
words, at the bottom of the chain of manipulation is the viewer herself, trying to posit a coherent 
narrative universe to complete the fragments of information fed to her, and then revising it again 
and again as new pieces come along. In and of itself this cognitive process is not different from 
what according to David Bordwell is involved in following any cinematic plot.21 What makes 
Nolan’s puzzle narrative different is that he foregrounds the role of the filmmaker in deliberately 
misleading the audience by exploiting their desire for meaning (his alter-ego in the film is Cobb 
manipulating Bill, who in turn is a stand-in for the viewer), and finally exposing the quest for an 
objective truth itself as a futile endeavour that only a fool would undertake. Instead, as 
McGowan suggests, in Nolan’s world truth always emerges out of a lie, that is to say, 
intersubjective truth-effects are always anchored in private self-interest; “all knowledge is 
                                                 
21 See David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson, Film Art: An Introduction (New York: McGraw Hill, 2013) 
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necessarily perspectival.”22 This explains why the final scene of Cobb disappearing in the crowd 
is ambiguous. It can mean that Bill is a schizophrenic who created him to cover up his psychotic 
tendencies, but it can also signal Cobb’s successful execution of his plan. The two 
simultaneously possible readings define what Christian Metz called the spectator’s fetishistic 
split between the role of the credulous and the incredulous observer regarding the reality of the 
cinematic image, in this case something like “I know very well that Cobb doesn’t exist at all (that 
he is just a stand-in for the director), but his plan nonetheless worked perfectly in the diegesis.”23  
And isn’t Bill’s mistake precisely that he, like a fully credulous observer, the Lacanian 
subject supposed to believe, naively believes in the existence of Cobb, the master signifier of the 
truth that would fully explain his story and exculpate him in front of the public (the police)? 
Once again, what he doesn’t understand is the shift from the disciplinary logic of authority to the 
society of control. A clear indication of this new state of affairs is the role the detective plays in 
the film. With Bill giving himself up to prove his innocence yet telling a story that fully 
incriminates him, the policeman is offered a version of what in classical detective fiction is 
called a “locked room paradox,” a crime scene that is all too perfect, like a dead body in a room 
locked from the inside. As Copjec stresses, the role of the classical detective upon encountering 
such a case is to question the apparent self-explanatory nature of the evidence and posit “one 
signifier more” that would start the process of investigation. What the detective activates is the 
sliding of the signifier through the lack in the symbolic order, keeping in mind that the successful 
self-signification of the symbolic is always an illusion: “the detective reads the evidence by 
positing an empty beyond, a residue that is irreducible to the evidence while being, at the same 
                                                 
22 McGowan, Christopher Nolan, 4. 
23 See Christian Metz, Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The Imaginary Signifier, trans. C. Britton et al. (London: 
MacMillan Press, 1982), 72. 
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time, completely demonstrated in it.”24 This is the properly public function of the detective (from 
Dupin to Columbo) in modern disciplinary societies where there is an autonomous public sphere 
separated from the private. Public here should be understood in the Hannah Arendtian sense of 
the term as a sphere based on the principle of universal equality.25 As I have argued after Copjec 
in Chapter 1, classical noir deals with the sovereign excess of this regime, the criminal’s 
idiosyncratic jouissance that can never find its expression in the symbolic order, which is why 
representatives of public authority as a rule don’t want to listen to noir confessions.26 The noir 
hero’s abandonment in his lonely room, Copjec argues, therefore supplements the locked room 
opened by the detective.27 Following, by contrast, depicts a neoliberal society of control where 
public and private have collapsed into one another, or more precisely the public sphere has been 
privatized, overflown by private jouissance. This means, on the one hand, that Bill’s noir 
perversion stops being a taboo (an exception) and the policeman is able to have a face to face 
conversation about it. On the other hand, the price the officer has to pay for his post-disciplinary 
(post-public) consciousness is the loss of his ability to be a detective proper and ask the questions 
that could open the locked room paradox to start an investigation (why did Bill give himself up if 
he is indeed the murderer?) The final vanishing of Cobb in the urban crowd therefore also marks 
the disappearance of that “one signifier more” needed to publicly mediate between seemingly 
incompatible forms of modern life by constructing a shared idea of truth qua symbolic fiction. In 
the society of control such signifier loses its public function and is allocated entirely to the 
                                                 
24 Joan Copjec, “The Phenomenal Nonphenomenal: Private Space in Film Noir,“ in Shades of Noir: A Reader, ed. 
Joan Copjec (New York: Verso, 1993), 179. 
25 See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1998), 22-79. 
26 They tend to shoot first as in Gun Crazy, Out of the Past or refuse to take the confession seriously like in Scarlet 
Street. 
27 Copjec, “The Phenomenal Nonphenomenal,” 189. 
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private realm: for the policeman Cobb is nothing but a lie made up by Bill to hide his own guilt 
(we could say he is Bill’s unary trait the encounter with whom activated his death drive).  
If there is a pedagogical agenda to the film it is to confront the viewer with the Lacanian 
forced choice of today’s cynical society of control: one can either stick to his private self-interest 
and lie like Cobb or assume a public role and claim the truth in which case he still will be 
perceived as lying like Bill is. It’s crucial to note that Nolan reverses here Lacan’s classical 
formula (“the father or worse”)28 where the only sensible choice was symbolic castration (the 
Oedipal-disciplinary order) since the alternative was the real of jouissance beyond meaning 
(psychosis). In Following, on the contrary, it is the symbolic castration by a public master 
signifier that is renounced as impossible, and shamelessly sticking to one’s jouissance is 
presented as the only viable option. But choosing enjoyment doesn’t mean the madness of the 
classical noir hero anymore who kept trying to confess the truth of his ex-istence without anyone 
listening. Instead, Nolan’s cynic formulates his self-expression as a lie that very much relies on 
intersubjective communication and only works if it reaches a symbolic agent (Bill) still stuck in 
the disciplinary regime who believes in public truth for him, instead of him. This is why with this 
early version of Nolan’s cynic—Cobb who in a way replicates the director’s own obsession with 
puzzle narratives—we regress into what Heidegger called the correspondence theory of truth,29 
truth as an accurate description of the world: we get from him multiple answers to the 
nonetheless vulgar question of what really happened instead of revealing (“unconcealing”), like 
the classical noir hero did, his existential excess, his “being in the truth” beyond such simplified 
notion of objective truth and falsity. The fact that Cobb remains a psychologically flat character 
throughout the film is therefore a sign of his inauthenticity, his parasitic attachment to the social 
                                                 
28 Jacques Lacan, Television, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss and A. Michelson (New York: Norton, 1990), 46. 
29 See Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Truth: On Plato's Parable of the Cave and the Theaetetus, trans. T. Sadler 
(New York: Continuum, 2002), 1-6. 
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conformism of the Heideggerian “they,” the Lacanian big Other as the subject supposed to 
believe.  By contrast, Bill remains very much stuck in a classical noir universe with a personal 
depth enhanced by affects of shame, guilt, love, jealousy, and impotent rage that make him an 
ideal patsy for Cobb. It also helps him to gain the viewer’s sympathy, allowing us even to read 
Following as a critique of cynicism—a possibility that gradually disappears from Nolan’s later 
films. 
 
5.2.2 Memento 
While Nolan’s second feature film Memento is usually remembered for the backwards 
narration of its primary plotline, it’s less often noted that this formal experiment merges the two 
main character types from Following into two temporarily distinct mental states of one and the 
same protagonist. Leonard is a former insurance investigator who, after the trauma of witnessing 
his wife’s murder by two burglars, loses his short-term memory. He is able to remember his life 
before that moment, but since then everything slips out of his mind after a few minutes. Unlike 
the hero of Doodlebug, however, he is able to manage his crisis of temporality: he develops an 
elaborate self-control system combining tattoos all over his body, Polaroid photos and sticky 
notes to organize his life. He is motivated by one goal only: to find his wife’s second killer, who, 
he is convinced, was ignored by the police investigation. His argument is that there must have 
been a second man who knocked him out from behind while he shot the first attacker, someone 
who then set up the scene as a classical locked room with only one perpetrator. In other words, 
the second man, the mysterious John G., is that one signifier more that Leonard posits, playing 
the role of the detective himself in the absence of an effective public institution of justice. As 
such, he resembles the revisionist private eye from The Long Goodbye or Night Moves defending 
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the public good when nobody cares anymore, except that for him this public quest is reduced 
entirely to personal vengeance: Nolan makes this clear by starting with the temporal endpoint of 
the story, Leonard executing whom he believes to be his wife’s killer in cold blood. While 
Marlowe’s comparable divine violence at the end of Altman’s film had utopian connotations, the 
hero of Memento, I will argue, remains imprisoned into the private sphere.  
There are two main timelines in the film, each with their own specific flashback 
sequences that further complicate the unity of the narrative universe. The primary plotline in 
colour moves backwards in time and explores the events immediately before Leonard’s act of 
vengeance, eventually merging into the one in black and white that develops chronologically and 
leads up to the key scene that set the man on his murderous path. This key event, I will show, is 
none other than the hero’s cynical sovereign decision that tears him out of the disciplinary 
apparatus of power he had previously been caught in and installs him into a society of control.  
The black and white (disciplinary) realm is itself split in two. On the one hand, we have 
Leonard in a classical noir lonely room of a motel talking to someone on the phone but really 
rather monologuing to himself with no apparent response. After a while when he notices a 
“Don’t answer the phone!” tattoo on his arm he becomes paranoid and hangs up, later explaining 
to the man from the front desk that he is not good on the phone, he needs to look people in the 
eye while talking to them. At this point he is a man in noir isolation trying unsuccessfully to 
share the traumatic excess of his life with someone else.  
The correlate to this classical noir subjectivity is the content of his paranoid voiceover, 
his story about a man named Sammy Jenkins, a model husband of an idyllic suburban family 
home who had suddenly started to experience short term memory loss and whose insurance 
claim he was assigned to investigate. In this black and white flashback Leonard plays a detective 
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who still has the dispassion of a public servant, upholding the letter of the law (ironically, that of 
a private insurance contract) against possible fraud. He suspects Sammy of faking because he is 
playing his role all too perfectly, and, although he cannot prove it directly, he manages to argue 
that such behaviour doesn’t fit the description of the actual illness that the insurance covers. The 
letter of the law prevails, but a tragic accident that kills Sammy’s wife after she follows Leonard 
in doubting and testing her husband seems to break something in the protagonist, pushing him 
into noir madness. We could say that he is traumatized by seeing the modern apparatus of the 
Law as a necropolitical machine of the ruling class where the public prevalence of justice is 
always already motivated by private economic interest (of the insurance company in this case) 
and therefore comes at a price of letting innocent people die. This is why, as William G. Little 
observes, “the film’s narrative threads [...] stimulate, but do not satisfy, nostalgic longing for a 
prelapsarian truth.”30 Nolan takes postmodern neo-noir’s nostalgia for an uncorrupted suburban 
America and deconstructs it, empties it of substance, collapsing it with the nihilism of classical 
noir.  
In turn, the spaces of the colour plot are that of a rhizomeatically expanding urban sprawl 
without the neat orderliness of Sammy’s suburban home. We see a bar where local drug dealers 
hang out and the barmaid, Natalie, spits into Leonard’s drink when she sees that he isn’t one of 
them; a labyrinthine trailer park where a local thug chases him around with a gun; a roadside 
motel whose owner cheats him by renting him multiple rooms; a tattoo parlour he uses to 
engrave new memories on his body; and an abandoned oil refinery where a crooked cop, Teddy, 
hides dead bodies, but which is also the site where the protagonist burns the mementos of his late 
wife. Similarly to Leonard himself these spaces seem to have lost their identity; the life they 
                                                 
30 William G. Little, “Surviving Memento,” Narrative 13, no. 1 (2005): 71. 
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contain is overflowing the boundaries set by their traditional social function. They represent the 
memory impaired hero’s attempt to spatialize (territorialize) time, something that Jameson 
associates with the contemporary aesthetic of cognitive mapping emerging after the postmodern 
decline of historical consciousness.31 Leonard indeed has a map of all the locations he visits in 
his motel room wall with Polaroid images and post-it notes of his findings making up for the 
deficiencies of his brain, allegorically standing for the ahistorical working of the postmodern 
mind in an externalized neuro-image.32 This is in sharp contrast to the very same mental disorder 
of Sammy that was framed by a modern disciplinary regime: in the black and white flashback 
sequences we see that his life is organized by the panoptic gaze of a clock on the wall that 
regularly interrupts his watching TV when he is supposed to inject his diabetic wife with insulin. 
This means that through the prostheses of the television and the clock he still has access to linear 
historical time, although, contrary to Leonard, reliance on these apparatuses makes him spatially 
immobile.  
The plotline in colour also has its own flashbacks representing Leonard’s intimate 
memories of his wife as well as the trauma of seeing her being murdered. In contrast to the story 
of Sammy that follows the conventions of classical Hollywood narration, these sequences are 
rather incoherent fragments that eventually end up depicting contradictory versions of events, 
suggesting that Leonard’s voiceover narration throughout the entire movie is unreliable—another 
instance of Nolan’s skepticism about objective (that is, public) truth.33 The meaning of his 
                                                 
31 See Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, Or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1991), 154-81. For more on Memento as an allegory for postmodern temporality see Carlos Gallego, “Coordinating 
Contemporaneity: (Post) Modernity, 9/11, and the Dialectical Imagery of Memento,” Cultural Critique 75 (Spring 
2010): 31-64. 
32 See Patricia Pisters, The Neuro-Image: A Deleuzian Film-Philosophy of Digital Screen Culture (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2012), as well as Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
33 Volker Ferenz groups the film together with The Usual Suspects and American Psycho as in all three cases “[the 
protagonists’] main offense seems to be their epistemological skepticism.” Volker Ferenz, “Mementos of 
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story’s master signifier, John G. also turns out to be relative as we learn that various characters 
(including himself) exploit the protagonist’s obsession with vengeance to have him kill random 
people they want dead by feeding him false information. Therefore, while the official (public) 
goal of people pursuing John G. is to reveal the killer’s true identity, their real (private) aim is 
the exact opposite: never to fix the signifier’s meaning but endlessly circle around the void it 
signifiers, gaining access to jouissance through this very repetition of their drive.34 We could say 
that the cynical use of this signifier allows for a private management of an otherwise 
uncontrollable and paralyzing real at the core of Leonard’s trauma (and the same goes for 
Natalie, the film’s femme fatale who, as the protagonist observes has “also lost someone” and 
manipulates the John G. narrative to avenge him).  
The question is how do we get from the black and white Leonard of classical noir 
isolation and paranoia to the one in colour who re-enters society playing the private detective as 
a source of a never ending, perverse enjoyment? This shift occurs with the event of the sovereign 
decision in which the two main plotlines converge in a crystal-image of cynicism. Teddy, a 
corrupt cop Leonard has been speaking to on the phone appears at his motel and convinces him 
to go after a local drug dealer whose name happens to be John G. Leonard kills the man but has 
doubts about his identity afterwards and confronts Teddy who arrives at the scene to take the 
drug money. Teddy admits setting him up (assuming he won’t remember anyway), claiming that 
he had already helped Leonard kill the real murderer only he forgot about it. He also suggests 
that by perpetuating his revenge fantasy he is in fact doing what Leonard himself wanted when 
he purposefully discarded parts of the police file on his wife’s murder to create enough blind 
                                                                                                                                                             
Contemporary American Cinema: Identifying and Responding to the Unreliable Narrator in the Movie Theater,” in 
Film Theory and Contemporary Hollywood Movies, ed. W. Buckland (New York: Routledge, 2009), 279. 
34 Az Žižek notes, this is the basis of the Lacan’s “distinction between the aim and the goal of drive: while the goal 
is the object around which drive circulates, its (true) aim is the endless continuation of this circulation as such.” 
Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2004), 61. 
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spots in the case that could occupy him forever. As Teddy summarizes, “So you lie to yourself to 
be happy, there is nothing wrong with that, we all do it.” It’s not clear whether Leonard believes 
him or not but he certainly understands the morale of his story: before he forgets what just 
happened he makes notes for himself that will incriminate the corrupt cop as his next John G. 
(his full name is John Edward Gamble). It is his execution that opens the film, a sovereign act 
now revealed as the result of a cynical decision. Teddy/Lt. Gamble had to die because he stood 
for the split subject under the disciplinary logic of power, for symbolic authority as well as its 
inherent transgression (the two versions of his name showing the separation between the public 
and private spheres).35 Unlike the hero of revisionist noir, however, Leonard doesn’t kill to 
refuse the obscene male homosocial pact offered to him. His murderous act signals rather both its 
acceptance and privatization: Teddy has to die so that Leonard can keep living the fantasy life 
they constructed together and enjoy creating false memories on his own terms. Like noir 
sovereigns before him but through other (cynical) means, he “becomes causa sui, the origin of 
his own being,”36 exemplifying the bourgeois myth of a perfectly self-possessed subject37 who 
“decides to ‘posit’ the very traumatic presuppositions of his activity,”38 creating the stains on his 
own visual field.   
In purely formal terms Leonard is the Lacanian pervert, the subject who disavows his 
castration (his confrontation with the lack in the Other) by claiming to know what the Other 
wants from him, and as a consequence having no doubt about what he himself wants.39 This is 
the subject who, like Cobb in Following, has no shame, who would substitute his ego for the 
                                                 
35 We see him switching in front of Leonard to whichever role suits him. 
36 McGowan, Christopher Nolan, 12. 
37 Little, “Surviving Memento,” 82. 
38 Anna Kornbluh, “Romancing the Capital: Choice, Love, and Contradiction in The Family Man and Memento,” in 
Lacan and Contemporary Film, ed. T. McGowan and S. Kunkle (New York: Other Press, 2004), 133. 
39 For an introductory account of Lacan’s theory of perversion see Bruce Fink, “Perversion,” in Perversion and the 
Social Relation, ed. M. A. Rothenberg et al. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 38-68. 
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void of the real and plug the hole in the symbolic order with the jouissance of his own body. 
Yet, Nolan’s pervert belongs to the society of control, which is why he responds to the desire of 
the Other quite differently than his predecessor under disciplinary power. The latter is illustrated 
by classical noir’s male hero who imagines fate ordering him to incriminate himself as a method 
of bringing down the femme fatale with him. He imagines the excess of his bare life to be 
feminine and inherently doomed (marked by some primordial guilt),40 and he keeps living it just 
to condemn it, like an undercover suicide bomber sent by the masculine regime. Today, however, 
in the society of control whose post-disciplinary surveillance regime directly mobilizes the 
previously repressed, inoperative jouissance of individuals’ bare life, the pervert doesn’t have to 
be punished for enacting a sovereign decision.41 The emphasis therefore shifts from the knowing 
what of fatalism to the knowing how of cynicism: instead of knowing (remembering at the 
moment of death) what life is not worth living, what matters is knowing how to get away with 
the crime of such life, how to merge it with a code (an algorithm) that would connect the 
formerly guilty subject’s affective economy to the protocols of a global capitalist network. As 
Thomas Elsaesser argues, Memento “foregrounds the idea of ‘programming,’ as opposed to 
remembering:”42  
Leonard represents not the old-fashioned film noir detective, but the new multitasking 
personality (dissociative, reactive: not rapid reaction, but random reaction force), with a 
subjectivity programmable not through ideology and false consciousness, but 
programmed by a fantasy, or self-programmed through the body (where the body 
                                                 
40 But not shame as that would imply the break in his perverse knowledge and a confrontation with the lack in the 
Other, i.e. his castration. 
41 While the Other of the Other in disciplinary power wanted to punish the subject, the new superego authority wants 
him to enjoy out in the open. 
42 Thomas Elsaesser, “The Mind-Game Film,” in Puzzle Films Complex Storytelling in Contemporary Cinema,  
ed. W. Buckland (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 28. 
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functions as a technology of recording, storage, and replay: the somatic or pathologized 
body as an advanced “neural” or “biological” medium, in its mental instability and 
volatility potentially more efficient than the current generation of electronic media, at 
least for certain tasks.”43 
By cynically letting himself loose in a labyrinth of his own making after a false target, he is able 
to turn his formerly paralyzing paranoia into a “productive pathology”44 “contained and 
constrained within a protocol.”45 Elsaesser sees the film’s mind game narrative doing the same to 
the viewer, testing her repeatedly to exploit her affective labour, make her adapt to the conditions 
of digital, networked production. “Undergoing tests – including the “tests” put up by mind-game 
films – thus constitutes a veritable “ethics” of the (post-bourgeois) self: to remain flexible, 
adaptive, and interactive, and above all, to know the “rules of the game.”46  
The game here refers to the one played by members of a generic community, except that, 
just like the smart film, mind game narratives are self-reflexive of their generic form, 
establishing, as Elsaesser puts it, a meta-contract with their audiences.47 Unlike with the smart 
film, however, this meta-contract is not autoimmune but cynical-sovereign. While, as I have 
argued in Chapter 1, classical genres were immunizing, allowing for a limited expression of 
life/jouissance while remaining tied to the symbolic law repressing it, the postmodern smart film 
activates a quest for an authentic, pure form of life that is downright hostile to any symbolic 
norm, eventually undermining its own conditions of possibility like a parasite killing its host. In 
Boyle’s noirs, the sovereign function of cynicism steps in to put an end to this autoimmune 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 29. 
44 Ibid., 26. 
45 Ibid., 29. 
46 Ibid., 34. 
47 Ibid., 37. 
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madness and steer subjects back towards a stable status quo by limiting the uncontrolled 
proliferation of life to forms that are productive under the new neoliberal economy. Contrary to 
the autoimmunity of the smart film, the cynicism of the mind-game film is not negatively defined 
in relation to traditional genre games as an ironic gesture of “that’s not it,” but simply as the 
knowledge of how genre cinema has always worked as an apparatus capturing and manipulating 
viewers’ attention. Cynics, as Žižek notes, “know very well what they are doing, but still, they 
are doing it.”48 Why? Because the new meta-contract offers them to do it interactively, 
seemingly on their own terms.  
While the classical Metzian spectator was split against his own will between a credulous 
and incredulous part, that is, she was always partially fooled by the cinematic apparatus, Nolan’s 
cynic assumes the film viewer’s fetishistic split as the consequence of his own sovereign act. He 
appropriates the passive state of being captivated by the moving image by interpreting cinema’s 
magic as a lie and then affirming it as such. This means that the new division is not between 
those who are fooled as opposed to those who know better, but between those who are fooled by 
others and the cynics who lie (also) to themselves. The crucial slippage that occurs here is that 
the cynic takes this lie to be ethical rather than epistemological, disavowing the necessary blind 
spot of his perspective by avowing it as willed immorality, like Leonard after he realizes he had 
killed the wrong man. While the smart film’s negative dialectic keeps pursuing an inverted idea 
of public truth in epistemological terms, publicity’s blind spot supposedly embodied by an 
authentic (non-)community of ironic language users, the mind game film embraces cinema’s 
powers of the false and encourages the viewer qua individual to, similarly to Leonard, lie to 
himself and play along taking the open display of generic clichés and film production rules as 
                                                 
48 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (Verso: New York, 2008), 25. 
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original and “real.”49 If the smart film is the paradox of a meta-generic genre that ultimately, as 
Boyle demonstrated, undermines itself, the mind game film is rather a genre that is post-generic, 
doing away with the mediation of a traditional generic community by directly linking individuals 
qua perverts to an immoral production code of lies. While classical genres were living 
communities enabled by the partial exemption (immunity) from codified (“dead”) symbolic 
norms, Memento’s mind game film collapses code and life into a cybernetic organism of its 
participants’ (self-)programmable body.  Former generic conventions turn into a non-signifying 
semiotic of repeatable algorithms (noir clichés) capturing the viewer’s attention through cynical 
interactivity, mirroring Leonard’s endless construction of false games of pursuit using recycled 
memory fragments.    
It is the cynic’s sovereign role in the neoliberal society of control that McGowan misses 
when he considers Leonard a post-bourgeois subject, someone entering an atemporal existence 
of the death drive outside the productive time of capitalism by repeating his empty act of 
vengeance for eternity.50 He suggests that films like Memento respond to the lack of a lack in the 
digital era—the problem of hyperreal, instantly accessible, never decaying objects provided in 
abundance by new media that make traditional consumerist desire for future satisfaction 
increasingly meaningless—by foregrounding the constitutive loss of the subject outside linear 
temporality, the lack that the drive circles around in an eternally suspended present.51 This, for 
McGowan, opens up new possibilities for a free and ethical life by embracing the necessary 
failure for the self to ever become complete.52 While, as I stressed in Chapter 1, I agree with 
                                                 
49 The central rule one has to follow to enjoy mind game narratives, Elsassesser notes, is taking them for real, that is 
to say, disavowing the fictional nature of the cinematic universe. Elsassesser, Mind-Game Film, 35. 
50 Todd McGowan, Out of Time: Desire in Atemporal Cinema (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2011), 
231-39. 
51 Ibid., 25-28. 
52 Ibid., 14. 
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McGowan that the atemporality of the drive has utopian connotations, this should not be 
confused with the sovereign-masculine mobilization of atemporality as a state of exception to the 
temporal. In my reading Memento’s cynical use of the drive does the latter, restoring a zero level 
of linear temporality by embracing the very destruction of the disciplinary regime as a historical 
project, not unlike the way the United States started using global neoliberal deterritorialization 
itself as the means to territorially expand its Empire after the fall of the USSR, speaking the end 
of history discourse to mask a very much historical project of neocolonialism.  
After its ostensible failure, the restoration of the action-image is signalled by Leonard’s 
final monologue. As he drives away from the crime scene his voiceover states: “I have to believe 
that when my eyes are closed the world is still here.” He then closes his eyes and imagines 
himself in bed with his wife with an “I’ve done it” tattoo on his chest—a clearly impossible 
fantasy scene. He continues: “I have to believe that my actions still have meaning, even if I can't 
remember them. Do I believe the world's still there? Is it still out there?” He opens his eyes and 
his voiceover says: “We all need mirrors to remind ourselves who we are. I'm no different.” He 
then stops at a tattoo parlour to carve the clues incriminating Teddy in his flesh. As McGowan 
points out, “[Leonard] implicitly believes in an Other-God, some faceless authority” that 
guarantees the value of his actions.53 What is important here is that he imagines such guarantee 
precisely at the moment when he just cynically destroyed/privatized the public institution of 
justice that used to have that very function throughout modernity. His belief therefore evokes the 
neoliberal ideology of the invisible hand of the market, a fantasmatic entity that magically 
evaluates “each according to his own ability” without (or beyond) the mediation of public social 
                                                 
53 McGowan, Christopher Nolan, 63. 
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institutions.54 In Lacanian terms, Leonard doesn’t believe in the big Other of the social symbolic 
order, nor is he satisfied by its immunizing obscene underside; it is precisely his distrust in 
public institutions (Lt. Gamble) as well as their inherent transgressions (Teddy) that led him to 
take law into his own hands—an action supported by his conviction that there is a real 
(deterritorialized) Other (what Lacan called the Other of the Other) watching him even when no 
one else is, not even himself.55 His cynical lie addressed to the old (territorialized) public realm 
(including part of himself as subject supposed to believe) therefore becomes the condition of 
possibility for his personal jouissance produced by his drive for vengeance to become absolute, 
that is, more valid than the merely objective truth of public symbolic fiction—the same way as 
US hegemony became absolute by overflowing its territorial limits through globalization. This 
could also answer the conundrum noted by Temenuga Trifonova, the inconsistency between the 
memory-impaired Leonard and the unknown subject with an exceptionally good memory whose 
recollections the backwards moving narrative represents to the viewer.56 It is not Leonard 
himself who remembers but the apparatus of an all-seeing, real gaze of the Other-God that 
supplements his cynical subject position, the glorification of whom prevents him from slipping 
into paranoia and psychosis by establishing a zero level ritualization of his life (a “world” as 
Leonard puts it).57 The next section explores the biopolitical dimensions of this reterritorializaton 
performed by Nolan’s cynic.  
 
                                                 
54 Incidentally Adam Smith who came up with the term did not believe the market could work without public 
institutions providing its moral principles. See Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (London: Printed for 
A. Millar, 1761) 
55 Lacan, of course, had famously stated that “there is no Other of the Other,” another way of saying that there is no 
metalanguage, no sexual relationship, no society as an organic whole, no full access to enjoyment. For the original 
quote see his untranslated Seminar VI. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire, Book VI, Le désir et son interprétation (Paris: 
Édition de la Martinière, Le Champ freudien, 2013), 353. 
56 Temenuga Trifonova, The Image in French Philosophy (New York: Rodopi, 2007), 278. 
57 Contrary to Following where the flashbacks are still POV. 
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5.3 The Inception of Cynicism from the Ruins of Sexual Difference: 
The Biopolitics behind Enlightened False Consciousness  
 
5.3.1 Introduction  
Christopher Nolan’s Inception is a science fiction-/heist-/puzzle-/conspiracy-noir about a 
group of corporate spies specialized in “dream extraction” who are hired to do an unusual job: 
instead of stealing secrets from their target’s mind while he’s asleep, they are supposed to plant 
an idea deep enough into his unconscious so that when he wakes up, he would simply assume it 
as his own. In psychoanalytic terms, their task is to alter someone’s fundamental fantasy, the 
primordially repressed original scene of loss constitutive of human subjectivity that serves as the 
necessary blind spot of consciousness, driving everyone to repeat unique patterns of behavior 
beyond their control. In the analytic setting Lacan referred to such life changing event as the 
“traversing of the fundamental fantasy,”58 undoing the existing coordinates of the subject’s 
libidinal economy, liberating her by shattering her ego and its passionate attachment to an 
imagined trauma.59 In the film the role of the analysand is played by Robert Fisher, the soon to 
be heir of a multibillion dollar international corporation whose unconscious the team of spies has 
to manipulate into splitting up his father’s fortune after his imminent death. They accomplish this 
quite literally by performing an ad hoc psychotherapy on him, replacing the resentment he feels 
towards his cold-hearted father for neglecting him with the fantasy of a loving smile hidden 
behind the old man’s mask of rigidity. And indeed, when Fisher wakes up at the end of the film 
                                                 
58 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI, 
trans. A. Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1981), 273. 
59 See Slavoj Žižek, “From ‘Passionate Attachments’ to Dis-Identification,” UMBR(a): A Journal of the 
Unconscious 3 (1998): 3-19. 
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he is magically reconciled with his father; a suffocating weight is lifted off his shoulders. From a 
masculine perspective, this is what the procedure of inception is all about: it offers someone to 
have his cake and eat it with regards to the fundamental fantasy; it helps to gain a distance from 
its traumatic centripetal force but without having to pay the price and go through a painful 
“subjective destitution.”60 As if one only had to find the right angle from which the scene of 
terror reveals itself as an image of happiness. To paraphrase Žižek, inception is the commodified, 
decaffeinated (unmanly) version of the Lacanian traversing of the fantasy that helps the faint 
hearted to avoid confrontation with the traumatic real kernel of their desire, with the fact that 
they never really lost anything, that lack is rather constitutive of their existence.  
Yet, the film is not simply an allegory of the pervasive influence of today’s neoliberal 
ego psychology, cognitive behavioral therapy, identity politics, or interactive new media that 
produce happy idiots pursuing narcissistic pleasures within the invisible walls of the society of 
control. It also offers the genealogy of this credulous subject’s masculine-cynical obverse who 
deliberately chooses his mind’s enslavement to the late capitalist machine in a sovereign act: the 
presupposed infantile (feminine) position of Fisher is only the background against which the real 
drama of Cobb, the protagonist’s life can unfold. Much like in Tarkovsky’s Solaris (1972), the 
official science fiction narrative obfuscates the true libidinal focus of the film, which revolves 
around the main character’s guilt over his wife’s, Mal’s, suicide. Her specter returns again and 
again to disturb Cobb’s well prepared descents into his targets’ (and his own) unconscious.61 The 
dead wife’s spirit drives the plot both as the loved one to be mourned and as the femme fatale 
posing a threat to masculine identity, following the conventions of classical noir. By repeatedly 
                                                 
60 Žižek, Sublime Object, 263. 
61 As Temenuga Trifonova points out the narrative posits a conspiracy within a conspiracy here: “Cobb’s team 
conspires against Robert Fischer by planting an idea in his mind”, while on the other hand “Cobb’s subconscious 
conspires against him.” Temenuga Trifonova, “Agency in the Cinematic Conspiracy Thriller,” SubStance 41, no. 3 
(2012), 121. 
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sabotaging the group’s mission, she serves as the ultimate obstacle to her husband’s wish 
fulfillment: his reward of a clean criminal record in the US enabling him to return home to his 
children. As McGowan points out, she thus occupies the position of the object-cause of the 
hero’s desire (the Lacanian objet a), the constitutive distorting element in his fantasy which, 
precisely by preventing reaching its goal, keeps his desire alive through an infinite postponement 
of satisfaction.62 In a postmodern self-reflexive twist pointing at the rules of the noir genre game, 
the director makes his protagonist (and thereby the viewer) aware of all this from the very 
beginning: Cobb deliberately holds onto Mal’s spectral appearance and the painful emotions 
repeatedly stirred up by it to build a protective fantasy screen against something even more 
traumatic. It helps him to avoid the encounter with the real of jouissance in his fundamental 
fantasy, which the film, through multiple flashbacks, presents as Cobb’s passive (inoperative) 
enjoyment he experiences when he is unable to prevent his wife’s suicide and his subsequent 
forced separation from his children. His masculine-heroic endeavor and the plot’s main objective 
then is to mourn the loss of his wife and confront the traumatic real of his desire by going 
through the fundamental fantasy and then re-instrumentalizing his jouissance by reuniting with 
his children as a reward. What prevents him from doing so is his paralyzing guilt which he can 
redeem himself from, much like the classical noir hero, by transferring it on the femme fatale, 
blaming his wife for getting caught too much in the powerful illusions of her dreams and 
abandoning her family. Significantly, this resolution that eliminates the feminine threat coincides 
with the male hero’s return to his father, underlining the phallic outcome of his crisis. 
In epistemological terms, the solution that Inception offers to his male protagonist’s 
emotional impasse is that of enlightenment; Cobb can awaken from the dream world of illusions 
                                                 
62 McGowan, Christopher Nolan, 158. 
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by renouncing both Fisher’s adolescent naiveté and the irrational lure of Mal’s feminine 
sexuality.63 For this reason, the film works as a postmodern variation of what Horkheimer and 
Adorno identified as one of the earliest western myths of (masculine) enlightenment: Homer’s 
story about Odysseus and the Sirens. There the coordinated effort, that is, the distribution of 
labour between two masculine positions, master and his servants navigated their ship past the 
mortal danger posed by the female voice. On the one hand, his men tied Odysseus to the mast to 
prevent him from jumping into the abyss towards the alluring sound while at the same time 
allowing him to gain knowledge about it. On the other hand, the rest of them plugged their ears 
with wax so that they could keep rowing and get everyone out of there alive.64 The elaborate 
dream-architecture of Inception, I will argue, operates as a similar machine of patriarchal reason 
where one exceptional sovereign figure, Cobb, is designated to investigate the feminine real in 
order to keep the rest of his crew (and especially Fisher) at a safe distance from it, allowing them 
to live a life of illusory happiness. Cobb, like Odysseus, returns from his submersion into the 
vertigo of the real as a tragic hero who, after a glimpse at eternity suddenly loses his taste for 
ordinary living. However, his knowledge is not turned into critical negativity seeking a different 
world in the way that Adorno and Horkheimer’s modernist pathos still could. In the film’s 
postmodern twist, the enlightened Cobb becomes a cynical realist, someone for whom the 
failures and shortcomings of the reigning symbolic order are turned into signs of his authenticity, 
into proof that he is special among the living by carrying the burden of a terrible truth. It is out of 
epistemological narcissism (to keep the truth to himself) that he learns to accept his world as it is 
in the end, cynically embracing the apparent falsity of his moment of reconciliation with his 
                                                 
63 On the allegorical parallels between the film’s multiple scenes of awakening and Western enlightenment see 
Michael J. Bloulin, “A Western Wake: Difference and Doubt in Christopher Nolan’s Inception,” Extrapolation 52, 
no. 3 (2011): 318-37. 
64 Max Horkheimer  and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, trans. E. Jephcott 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 34-35. 
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father and children. His awakening, then, paradoxically coincides with the assumption of a false 
consciousness, a phenomenon that Peter Sloterdijk labeled cynical reason, the ultimate sign that 
the project of western Enlightenment has exhausted itself.65 In other words, Cobb’s quest of 
traversing of his fundamental fantasy ends up re-programming and appropriating it as a lie 
(erasing the traces of Mal from it)—the heroic act of which saves him from the sublime vertigo 
of the feminine real. What is disavowed by this sovereign-cynical conclusion is an alternative, 
feminine organization of the film’s symbolic universe put forward by Mal that has to be 
forgotten for the narrative to appear to the masculine viewer as a game of puzzle solve.  
 
5.3.2 Simulating the Phallic Exception 
 As I have argued in Chapter 1, for Lacan, reality and the real are diametrically opposed to 
each other. While reality refers to the social symbolic order as the site of meaningful fictions 
framing human lives, the real is what escapes symbolization, attesting to the necessary 
inconsistency of every symbolic universe. It is this incompleteness of the symbolic, the fact that 
what Lacan calls the big Other is always necessarily lacking, that leads to the subject’s encounter 
with the alienating enigma of the Other’s desire, the traumatic real of which she tries to filter 
through fantasy. The imaginary of fantasy, the Lacanian “picture” which Jean Laplanche perhaps 
more appropriately calls the mise-en-scene of desire,66 is always an ultimately failed attempt to 
answer the question “What does the Other want from me?” and thereby account for the subject’s 
place in the world.67 In Oedipal-disciplinary societies the function of the symbolic father was to 
                                                 
65 Peter Sloterdijk, The Critique of Cynical Reason, trans. M. Eldred (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1987), 
3-10. 
66 Jean Laplanche, and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, “Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality,” Formations of Fantasy, ed. 
V. Burgin et al., (London: Methuen, 1986), 8. 
67 See Žižek, Sublime Object, 95-145. 
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alleviate the anxiety of the subject facing this overwhelming question by providing some 
answers to it, intervening into the dyadic relationship between the flawed imaginary shield of 
fantasy and the terrifying real by symbolically suturing part of the subject into the big Other, 
stitching together its holes with the signifier. The postmodern crisis of the father function, on the 
other hand, leads to the disappearance of this mediation that, according to Mark Fisher, can be 
seen in Inception as a “general ontological indeterminacy, in which the nature of the whole 
fictional world is put into doubt.”68 For Cobb, the words of his father trying to influence him to 
enter/come back to the real (symbolic) world instead of getting lost in the dreamscapes of his 
fantasy seem to fall on deaf ears; for him, such a stable reality with the comforts of American 
middle class family life is nothing but a memory of a long lost past, the object of nostalgic 
longing, hence when he does return to his children in the end, there is a strong suspicion both in 
him and the viewer that he is still dreaming (Faraci, 2010).69 
This doesn’t mean, however, that the diegetic universe is filled with psychotic 
hallucinations and surreal outbreaks of the repressed unconscious, quite the contrary. As Fisher 
observes, considering its topic, Inception is remarkably un-dreamlike.70 Its dream world rather 
expresses the aesthetic of today’s corporate non-places: anonymous hotel lobbies, conference 
rooms and bars that could be in any financial district in the world; bullet trains, airports, 
elevators, parking garages, etc. As Marc Auge puts it: 
“[A] person entering the space of non-place is relieved of his usual determinants. He 
becomes no more than what he does or experiences in the role of passenger, customer or 
driver. [...] Subjected to a gentle form of possession, to which he surrenders himself with 
                                                 
68 Mark Fisher, “The Lost Unconscious: Delusions and Dreams in Inception,” Film Quarterly 64, no. 3 (2011): 37. 
69 See Devin Faraci, “Never Wake Up: The Meaning and Secret of Inception,” CHUD.com, Jul 19, 2010, accessed 
Jan 8, 2016, http://www.chud.com/24477/never-wake-up-the-meaning-and-secret-of-inception/.  
70 Fisher, “The Lost Unconscious,” 40. 
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more or less talent or conviction he tastes for a while—like anyone who is possessed—
the passive joys of identity-loss, and the more active pleasure of role-playing.”71  
It is this uncanny experience of the de-realized late capitalist space without identity and 
historicity that the film’s dreamscapes draw upon, giving a spatial expression to the crisis of the 
Oedipal order. Fisher is quite right in emphasizing how the affects associated with this 
emphatically contemporary mise-en-scene differ from the suffocating anxiety and paranoia of a 
noir classic like Orson Welles’s The Trial.72 There the crisis of the disciplinary apparatus 
manifests in the panoptic gaze becoming voyeuristic and crossing over to the private sphere, 
adding a sense of claustrophobia as well as obscenity to the labyrinthine corridors of the Law, 
distorting their space into the surreal topography of a nightmare. Here, by contrast, we are 
already in the age of the post-panopticon of decentered, anonymous, automated surveillance 
where, as Zygmund Bauman suggests, the authorities who used to be watching have slipped 
away, making the surveilled masses feel simultaneously abandoned and controlled through 
“liquid” techniques of persuasion that are hard to identify.73 The dense, hallucinatory imagery of 
paranoia noir gives way to the weightless similitude of corporate aesthetic, totalitarian discipline 
to voluntary but empty and meaningless role playing—to the gestures of late capitalism. It is to 
evoke this vague sense of loss that the heist team constructs a dream-maze out of non-spaces for 
their mark. Their elaborate scheme to reconstruct a fantasy-image for Fisher exploits the man’s 
                                                 
71 Marc Augé, Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity, trans. J. Howe (New York: Verso, 
1995), 103. 
72 As I have argued in Chapter 2, paranoia proper appears in the noirs of the immediate post-classical period (1962-
1975) as a result of abandoning the sovereign-fatalistic position of the classical era the perversion of which shielded 
the male protagonist from falling into psychosis. Like in Following and Memento, it is this post-classical noir 
paranoia that Nolan evokes briefly in Inception as a stage his protagonists have to pass through, not, however, to 
subtract from the sovereign-masculine regime like the revisionist noir hero but to cynically reaffirm the status quo 
with no alternative. 
73 Zygmund Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2000), 11. On the other hand, as I have 
indicated in Chapter 2, Welles’s film brilliantly gestures towards this other, postmodern side of the Oedipal subject 
in crisis through the depiction of vast open spaces where the protagonist seems to be abandoned by the panoptic 
apparatus. 
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(and the viewer’s) nostalgia for paranoia itself, a desire for someone, something to reassemble 
the Other’s disseminated gaze that, as a “nonspecific but pervasive pathos,” “hangs over 
Inception.”74  
This is why on the first level of the dream Cobb offers a conspiracy theory to Fisher—not 
a very convincing one, but the sheer fantasy that someone is there watching him still gets the 
man hooked immediately. At that moment the dreamscape around them also undergoes a 
fundamental change: the flat, featureless monotony of brightly lit corporate non-places suddenly 
gives way to dark corridors with looming shadows presented with noir style deep focus 
photography and low-key lighting. The former indistinction between the hotel’s inside and 
outside, produced through mirrors and looped architecture, also becomes undone as explosions 
of unknown origin on the street reveal the vulnerability of Fisher’s habitual bubble. The irony, of 
course, is that although this simulated conspiracy narrative appears crude and obviously 
manipulated, it also happens to be true. Telling Fisher that he’s been put to sleep by hostile 
agents aiming to steal company secrets by controlling his dream, Cobb lies in the guise of the 
truth, exploiting the gap that forever separates the void of the Other’s desire and its particular 
symbolization. He can do this because he knows that his act of arbitrary master signification will 
touch on the personal relationship between Fisher and his father, offering a symbolic frame the 
blanks of which the anxious son can fill in with his own fantasy. At that moment, the trap is 
complete insofar as he, like Bill in Following, misrecognizes his own role in the otherwise true 
plot: he misses the fact that they are not in his dream but in one of the inceptors. The same 
limitation doesn’t apply to the viewer whose knowing participation in the construction of the 
dream/film narrative gives him an epistemic advantage over the duped Fisher—an advantage tied 
                                                 
74 Fisher, “The Lost Unconscious,” 45. 
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to the perspective of Cobb and his team of experts, whose roles, as critics have noted, are 
allegorical of the filmmaking process itself.75 
Nevertheless, this blinding of the subject to a part of the Other’s desire, to its jouissance 
is not simply a technique of deception but precisely the function of the paternal metaphor doing 
the work of symbolic castration so that what formerly appeared to be a lack, a paralyzing 
negativity in the texture of the world all of a sudden appears as a meaningful problem that the 
subject can participate in solving.76 It is such shift that is signaled by Inception’s change to noir 
style and to a new topology: instead of the flat ontological indeterminacy of a universe made out 
of non-places, Fisher is now offered another layer of reality, a transcendental other place (the 2nd 
level of the dream) that supposedly holds the secret that is key to understanding the apparent 
vacuity of the upper level as well as his actual life. This is where we enter what Lacan called the 
masculine logic of language based on a constitutive exception. In this paradigm, as I have argued 
in Chapter 1, normal symbolic reality reaches its completeness only through a cut, an incision 
whereby a little piece of the real, standing in for its inherent inconsistency, is expulsed from it, 
only to appear fantasmatically beyond the horizon in the form of the real phallus of absolute 
power which, like the Holy Grail, magically completes the universe by fulfilling the everyone’s 
desire.77 For Fisher this exceptional object, the McGuffin of his simulated quest, will take the 
form of a toy he gave his father as a young boy—to his mind the fact that the old men kept it all 
along will prove his true affections for his son.  
                                                 
75 See CallSignStarbucks, “Inception as an Allegory for Filmmaking,” IGN, Mar 26, 2011, accessed Jan 7, 2016, 
http://ca.ign.com/blogs/callsignstarbucks/2011/03/26/inception-as-an-allegory-for-filmmaking. Nolan even made 
Leonardo DiCaprio, the actor playing Cobb, look like him in the film. As Žižek notes, “doubt about the efficiency of 
the master-figure (what Eric Santner called the ‘crisis of investiture’) can be supplemented by the direct rule of the 
experts legitimized by their knowledge.” Slavoj Žižek, “Objet a in Social Links,” in Jacques Lacan and the Other 
Side of Psychoanalysis: Reflections on Seminar XVII, ed. J. Clemens, R. Grigg (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2006), 110. 
76 Jacques Lacan, “The Signification of the Phallus,” in Écrits, trans. B. Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), 575-
85. 
77 See Slavoj Žižek, The Indivisible Remainder (New York: Verso, 1996), 155-59. 
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On the other hand, the postmodern, post-metaphysical topology of Inception also 
complicates the standard phallic duality of worlds by positing not one but a potentially endless 
series of exceptions, dreams within dreams that nonetheless follow a clear hierarchical structure 
where every level can be manipulated by one below it. As McGowan notes, this is ultimately a 
paranoid structure of a “bad infinity,”78 which Cobb’s team is trying to contain and turn into a 
productive pathology for Fisher: drop him into a dream labyrinth simulating the Oedipal 
apparatus of masculinity but prevent him from falling into the abyss beyond it. As Žižek points 
out, in a well-functioning symbolic order organized around the phallic exception, the official 
level of normative interaction always has its obscene supplement where the explicit rules of the 
social are transgressed in a no less coded and ritualistic fashion, providing an outlet of jouissance 
away from the ignorant gaze of the symbolic father.79 With the decline of the father function, 
however, the immunizing effect of these generic transgressions also disappears; it is eclipsed by 
the logic of the superego that demands complete obedience without exception, for which reason 
it is never satisfied with the subject’s performance. Fisher’s father is clearly such a figure of the 
superego whose last words to his son are the expression of his general disappointment without 
any specific content (“Disappointed...” he says). The inceptors’ job is then to translate these 
words back into the logic of a (simulated) good, symbolic father, introducing a gap between their 
literal meaning and their intention, suggesting that the dead father’s disappointment was caused 
by Fisher’s inability to transgress against him and defy his explicit orders. Accordingly, Fisher 
can find peace with his father when he is able to accept and enjoy the exception to the old man’s 
legacy offered to him by the dream extractors—the splitting up of the company—as his own of 
phallic act.  
                                                 
78 McGowan, Christopher Nolan, 154. 
79 This is what Žižek calls “inherent transgression.” See Slavoj Žižek, “The Inherent Transgression,” Cultural 
Values no. 2, 1 (1998): 1-17. 
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5.3.3 Disavowing Sexual Difference 
Phallic jouissance, however, is not the only manifestation of the real in the film. In line 
with its film noir core, what disturbs the masculine fantasy about a real phallus existing in the 
state of exception is the specter of Mal, the film’s femme fatale who undermines the masculine 
team’s effort to symbolically castrate Fisher, that is, to endow him with patriarchal authority.80 
What we encounter here is the Lacanian real of sexual difference,81 that is to say, the necessary 
coexistence of two incompatibly “sexuated” subject positions with regards to the totality of the 
symbolic order, representing two irreconcilable ways to relate to its constitutive lack. Contra 
Lacan’s theory, the central ideological procedure of Inception is the disavowal of sexual 
difference as real, that is, as a threat to the masculine logic of phallic exception. Throughout the 
film the feminine Other jouissance of Mal is reduced to phallic jouissance and woman becomes 
a special subspecies of man, his symptom (excess), a memento reminding him that one can 
always descend into further and further states of exception, destabilizing the previous ones. The 
female protagonist’s autonomy is already undermined by the premise of the plot that presents 
Mal as a mere projection of Cobb’s guilt for causing her suicide. As we learn later, the suicide 
was the unintended consequence of an idea planted into her mind by him, the idea that the dream 
world is not real and one can wake up from its illusion only by killing herself. The real question 
is, why was it necessary for Cobb to perform inception on his wife in the first place? According 
to the narrative, while the couple initially constructed a dream world together using their real life 
memories, it was Mal who gradually lost the ability to tell dream and reality apart while Cobb 
                                                 
80 The only female member of the group is Ariadne, the dream-architect (played by Ellen Page) who fully accepts 
the masculine rules of his colleagues, underplaying her femininity.  
81 Jacques Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge. Encore: The Seminar of Jacques 
Lacan, Book XX, trans. B. Fink (New York, W.W. Norton, 1998), 77. 
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always maintained a distance towards their virtual playground. The film thereby reproduces the 
standard male chauvinist myth about women’s diminished capacity for critical thinking but, in a 
postmodern twist symptomatic of the contemporary anti-feminist backlash, identifies this 
cognitive disability with the intoxication with phallic power. Mal’s blindness was the result of 
having full access to the masculine power of imaginary creation and destruction, which she 
enjoyed so much that she never wanted to leave its source, abandoning even her real life duties 
as a mother (flashback sequences show Cobb reminding her, in vain, of her obligations toward 
their children). The male protagonist, by contrast, was able to show restraint and sacrifice part of 
his enjoyment for his family. 
All this, of course, represents Cobb’s interpretation of the events. It is his belief that by 
artificially planting the idea of the dream’s unreality into Mal’s mind he would cure her of her 
irresponsibility, turning her into a rational (castrated) subject like himself. What his move 
accomplishes, however, is the exact opposite: his wife’s phallic obsessions are not cured but 
amplified; now she wants to find the place of absolute exception, and she is ready to kill even her 
physical self for it. Upon closer look it becomes clear that Cobb’s assessment of Mal’s initial 
behavior in cyberspace as irresponsibly, excessively phallic is a retroactive justification of his 
own violence against her, whereby he tries to account for the trauma of her feminine jouissance 
by forcefully integrating it into the masculine logic. What comes to haunt him later, however, is 
not merely Mal’s phallic excess but the very feminine logic he disavowed, a different way to 
totalize each symbolic universe. Mal’s specter appears to him on each level of the dream maze 
asking Cobb to stay with her and accept the necessary inconsistency of every symbolic order 
instead of looking for the exceptional angle from which one of them looks perfect. Cobb, 
however, “heroically” resists this temptation in the name of fatherly responsibility. 
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In this Inception follows Hollywood’s ostensibly post-phallic turn in the early 90’s that 
introduced kinder and gentler male heroes taking over traditionally feminine, often maternal 
roles (Mrs. Doubtfire, 1993; Kindergarten Cop, 1990), abandoning the previous hegemonic 
masculinity of “hard bodies” from the Reagan-era.82 According to Tania Modleski, such move 
all too often leads to the male appropriation of femininity against feminism and thus ultimately 
against women themselves.83 The softness and guilt ridden masochism of the new man can be 
understood as a Nietzschean resentment towards his phallicly empowered female counterpart 
which takes the form of putting the blame on women for the excesses of neoliberal individualism 
now seen as ruining traditional male dominated communities and the patriarchal family unit. As I 
have suggested in Chapter 2, in neo-noir films such panic over the successful self-made woman 
is played out most effectively in erotic thrillers such as Fatal Attraction (1987), Basic Instinct 
(1992) or The Last Seduction (1994). Inception’s corporate non-spaces haunted by a phallic 
woman offer a further variation of this fantasy in its more advanced stage where the feminine 
threat is eventually contained and eliminated.  
The neutralization of feminine jouissance through its reduction to an extreme case of 
phallic exception wouldn’t be complete without the male hero beating his female counterpart in 
the game he forced her to play, the rules of which are rigged in his favour. It may be true, 
according to the masculine mythology, that Woman (as one of the names of the primordial 
father) can control any place of exception to everyday reality; but she cannot re-emerge from 
there like man can. Woman qua femme fatale is the masculine name for a man who got 
intoxicated with phallic jouissance and went too far after it, pursuing exceptions ad infinitum, 
                                                 
82 See Susan Jeffords, Hard Bodies: Hollywood Masculinity in the Reagan Era (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1994) 
83 Tania Modleski, Feminism Without Women: Culture and Criticism in a "Postfeminist" Age (New York, 
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reaching a point of no return. In this she is similar to male psychotics like Kurtz in the 
Apocalypse Now or Inception’s own primordial father figure, the Japanese businessman Saito 
who falls off the edges of the deepest layer of the dream labyrinth (not unlike Mal in her real life 
suicidal jump) into an eternal state of limbo from which Cobb has to rescue him. Contrary to 
Woman and the—in this case orientalized—father of the primal horde, really existing 
masculinity always involves a dialectic between the symbolic and its imaginary (never quite real, 
that is, absolute) exception, which helps men not to get lost at the level of fantasy. Accordingly, 
the final test of Cobb’s masculinity, guaranteeing his triumph over Mal is the traversing of his 
fundamental fantasy after which he can awaken as an enlightened man.  
 
5.3.4 Reprogramming the Fundamental Fantasy  
The film’s reduction of the feminine jouissance to the phallic logic starts by Cobb and 
Ariadne seeking out the former, feminine Mal to find and rescue Fisher whom she’s been 
holding captive since he passed out on level 3. Her domain (level 4) is largely built out of the 
kind of the non-places introduced earlier in the film, except now they are emptied of their 
capitalist function. It’s a metropolis with endless lines of skyscrapers that seems to be dead and 
alive at the same time; near the edges it’s reduced to decaying ruins flooded by the ocean, with 
birds arriving from the sea to reclaim the crumbling urban buildings. Towards the center space 
becomes more sterile, even the simulation of the traditional looking brick house where Cobb and 
Mal used to live is intertwined with blocks of corporate architecture: a rectangular pond with 
metal railings, surrounded by a concrete path and steel pillars supporting an office building. This 
infinite, atemporal, virtual playground of memories, a unique noir zone of indistinction between 
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life and death, past and future, nature and civilization resembles closely what Deleuze, giving his 
own twist to Auge’s concept of the non-place, called any-space-whatever:  
Any-space-whatever [...] is a perfectly singular space, which has merely lost its 
homogeneity, that is, the principle of its metric relations or the connection of its own 
parts, so that the linkages can be made in an infinite number of ways. It is a space of 
virtual conjunction, grasped as pure locus of the possible. What in fact manifests the 
instability, the heterogeneity, the absence of link of such a space, is a richness in 
potentials or singularities which are, as it were, prior conditions of all actualisation, all 
determination.84 
While there is certainly melancholy in the air, the indistinct grey tonality of the sequence is 
strikingly different from Cobb’s own recurring nostalgic memory of his children playing in the 
garden, depicted in vivid colors. Mal’s crumbling-regenerating universe of whatever-spaces 
stands for a life made out of the discarded, abandoned, undead substance of late capitalism, the 
utopia of means without an end organized by the feminine drive, whereas Cobb’s ideal space is 
built on the disavowal of death, which for him is a purely destructive force embodied by the 
female Other. If Deleuze argues that the any-space-whatever suspends the functioning of the 
action-image, halting the progress of the hero’s quest in the narrative space,85 Inception reveals 
the gendered dimension of this spatial conflict. For Cobb to return home to his children he has to 
destroy the whatever-topology of the feminine universe and reinscribe his logic of phallic 
exception into it by positing another (fifth) level of his dream labyrinth.  
                                                 
84 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement Image, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (Minneapolis: 
Minnesota University Press, 1986), 109. 
85 Ibid., 120-21. 
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 The moment of the phallic neutralization of the feminine is worth looking at in detail. 
When Cobb and Ariadne find Mal in the simulation of the couple’s old house, she tries to 
convince Cobb to stay with her, arguing that her world is just as real as any. But Cobb resists, 
maintaining that although he wants to be with her, he simply cannot because he knows the truth. 
He cannot but know because he feels guilty, for he was the one who planted the idea of the 
world’s unreality in her head, causing her suicide. Here we encounter what Lacan called “a 
highly refined way of making up for the absence of the sexual relationship, by feigning that we 
are the ones who erect an obstacle thereto.”86 The threat of sexual difference posed by Mal’s 
feminine whatever-universe is eliminated by evoking the idea of a sexual relationship fully 
possible in the past, and explaining its empirical nonexistence in the present by claiming 
responsibility for its loss. Nolan appropriates here the postmodern sovereign operation of 
melancholy, exercised mainly by the femme fatale in neo-noirs of the 80s and early 90s,87 as a 
male tactic to control women, to keep them at a distance. By imposing this masculine discursive 
frame on Mal’s world, Cobb effectively turns her into a deadly Siren who wants to take the poor 
man’s soul to the underworld with her. Then, in a heroic self-sacrifice, he offers a deal to her: he 
would stay if the woman released Fisher. This deal is never honored, however. Instead, Mal is 
simply (arbitrarily) killed off by Ariadne, the dream architect student of Cobb’s university 
professor father who, as McGowan stresses, acts as the emissary of patriarchal authority.88 She 
intervenes as the third term into the noir couple’s dyadic relationship potentially deadly to men, 
preventing Cobb to be lured into the abyss by the female voice, or, from the feminine 
perspective, to stay in an eternally suspended limbo where the real and the symbolic can’t be told 
apart. 
                                                 
86 Lacan, Encore, 69. 
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The autonomous threat of Mal is neutralized also through its division into two separate 
masculine figures. On the one hand, her femininity is equated with the infantile naivety of Fisher 
as both of them are shown to be incapable of waking up on their own, which is why their mind 
has to be controlled, “enlightened” by someone else. Yet, while Fisher merely needs “the push” 
from a more mature man (someone on an upper level to make his sedated body fall, activating 
his inner ear function that would wake him up), Mal, not being part of the masculine bios, is not 
even capable of such enlightenment by proxy; when she is killed at the deepest level of Cobb’s 
unconscious memory bank—the noir zone of indistinction structured like an any-space-
whatever—she simply disintegrates. On the other hand, when the Mal of feminine jouissance is 
eradicated, she also dies as a masculine fantasy of absolute power: her role as the Woman, as a 
name for the primordial father standing in for the real phallus, is taken over by Saito, Cobb’s 
multibillionaire employer who allegorically stands for the infinite power and flexibility of 
deterritorialized capital itself.89 He plays Inception’s ultimate “subject supposed to know,” 
showing up out of nowhere in the real world always in the right place at the right time, making it 
all too clear to everyone that it is his game they are playing (for instance, when the heist team is 
brainstorming about how to sedate Fisher on an intercontinental flight, he simply buys the 
airline). Cobb’s descent into the last (fifth) level of the dream to confront the real of his 
fundamental fantasy, supposedly even more disturbing than his memory of Mal, is therefore an 
encounter with the real gaze of Saito as the primordial father of corporate capitalism, the Thing 
as the real-impossible object of desire beyond ordinary consumer fantasies. Until that moment in 
the film the Thing primordially lost for Cobb had been symbolized by his children he would 
sacrifice anything to return to. However, the recurring image burnt into his mind of him 
glimpsing at them for the last time while they were playing peacefully, not knowing about their 
                                                 
89 He is the producer in the film crew allegory. 
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father’s imminent departure, is itself perhaps best understood as what Freud called a screen 
memory, covering up the real trauma that cannot be represented.90 Within the film’s diegetic 
universe we never actually see the scene of Cobb’s fundamental fantasy. As Žižek emphasizes, 
such a scene doesn’t have an existence outside the analytic process.91 It can only be constructed 
as the gravitational center of the subject’s other, more manifest fantasies, such as Cobb’s 
inability to say goodbye to his children or prevent Mal’s suicide. A possible construction of his 
(and the narrative’s) primordially repressed fundamental fantasy could involve the death of his 
children out of the negligence of the parents. Maybe this is why Cobb’s father simply tells him 
“come back to the real world” after his son tells him about the last big heist he has to pull in 
order to reunite with his children. It’s possible that the elaborate story about the murder 
investigation against him in the US is yet another screen memory he has built up to keep the truth 
out, perhaps the fact that his children were killed by a train while their parents were busy dream 
surfing (this would explain the sudden intrusion of trains into various dream levels, no doubt 
symbolizing Nolan’s obsession with restoring linear temporality over the feminine atemporal). 
Yet, as Žižek stresses, the fundamental fantasy is definitely not some kind of final truth of the 
subject. It is, rather, “the ultimate, founding lie” holding his libidinal economy together.92 What 
is crucial in such an imagined scene invisible to the eyes of the subject is that he nonetheless, 
insofar as he operates within the masculine regime, acts as if there was a gaze out there for which 
the fundamental fantasy would fully reveal its secret. Incidentally, this is also the significance of 
the large number of audience speculations about the film’s true meaning. While there is no 
consensus about the definitive content of the plot, the very form of these theories indicates a 
                                                 
90 Sigmund Freud, “Screen Memories,” in Sigmund Freud, Standard Edition, Vol. 3, trans. J. Starchey, 301-22 
(London: The Hogarth Press, 1953) 
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shared conviction that there is one, potentially visible if looked at from a unique angle.93 It is this 
real-impossible gaze itself that Lacan identified with objet a in the field of vision, that is to say, 
the missing piece primordially separated from the subject appears to him as an imagined gaze 
beyond the horizon of the symbolic that has knowledge about this very lost object.94 
Consequently, one can traverse the fundamental fantasy by realizing that this transcendental gaze 
of the Other, the ultimate subject supposed to know, is blind, it has no secret to tell: the 
fundamental fantasy is fundamentally inoperative.   
Something similar happens to Cobb on the last level, in the “limbo” of Inception’s 
dream-labyrinth where the time of the male homosocial slows down and enjoyment becomes 
dissociated from phallic object-instruments. He goes there to bring Saito back who fell into a 
coma on level 3 after being fatally wounded. We see Cobb’s body washed ashore of the ocean (a 
properly idyllic one this time); he is half unconscious, hallucinating his children playing in the 
sand, but they don’t turn their faces towards him; he passes out. The next shot is that of a soldier 
waking him up by poking a gun at him; the reverse shot shows the gleam of the sun blinding 
Cobb (and the viewer) until the soldier’s head comes to block it. They take him to Saito’s 
oriental palace where he has to sit at a conference table opposite to him.95 Saito looks a 100 
years old, despite the fact that Cobb just left him a minute ago one level up, indicating how much 
slower time flies down there. He slowly examines the two objects Cobb brought with him, a gun 
and a spinning top, the latter of which is Cobb’s “totem,” an object that can tell whether someone 
is in a dream or not (if it never stops spinning the person is in a dream). He spins the top and 
looks up, but his eyes are completely dark, his eyelids only half open. “Have you come to kill 
                                                 
93 Disavowing, as Elsaesser noted, the fictional nature of the film. 
94 Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts, 67-123. 
95 Wendy Chun refers to this romanticization of the hyperspace using East-Asian symbolism that is common in 
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me?”, he asks with a feeble voice, but it is not an interrogation; it is a request. Cobb then looks 
up and stares at him with horror: the most powerful man he knows, the allegorical embodiment 
of neoliberal capital, is sitting there broken, impotent, waiting for someone to kill him. Like 
Marlon Brando’s Kurtz from Apocalypse Now, Saito is also a primal father without any secret to 
tell. Instead of a hidden meaning, there is only the blind repetitive movement of the totem, the 
stain of the fundamental fantasy standing for Cobb’s death drive, demonstrating that the real of 
“jouissance is what serves no purpose.”96 Cobb then utters the words he told Mal before when he 
tried to castrate/enlighten her by waking her up: “I came back for you to remind you of 
something. Something you once knew; that this world is not real.” – Saito: “To convince me to 
honor our agreement.” – Cobb: “So we can be young men together again.” What didn’t work 
with Mal now succeeds through the symbolic pact between two men that folds the inoperative 
gestures of the two fallen characters into a homosocial ritual. Allegorically, Cobb saves 
corporate capitalism threatened by the excesses of the orient through its re-anchoring in white 
American masculinity. They wake up, and a moment later Saito indeed makes the phone call that 
allows Cobb to enter the US and reunite with his children as his payment for the successful 
inception-job on Fisher. Traversing his fundamental fantasy therefore doesn’t result in Cobb’s 
subtraction from the masculine status quo like it did for the revisionist noir hero; it leads instead 
to the reprogramming of this fantasy on his own terms, literally buying the mise-en-scene of 
patriarchal domesticity as a commodity-image in exchange for his work as a corporate spy.  
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5.3.5 Towards an Enlightened False Consciousness 
On the one hand, such conclusion with the hero’s successful wish fulfillment seems 
utterly alien to the classical noir narrative. As I have argued after Hugh Manon in Chapter 1, that 
noir protagonist is a pervert in the sense that he prefers to forever postpone the realization of his 
desire and fetishizes instead the very obstacle (objet a) that helps him to delay the moment of 
satisfaction. It is this perverse libidinal economy, I proposed, that leads to a spatiotemporal 
suspension unique to classical noir, what Vivian Sobchack calls the chronotope of “lounge time,” 
where men and women idle their life away in the non-places of hotel rooms, bars, cafes and cars, 
cut off from productive work and the safety of home alike, forever fixed in a transitory moment 
without arriving anywhere.97 Conversely, the hero of Inception emphatically does arrive home in 
the end precisely by traversing this quintessential noir fantasy about jouissance as unproductive, 
the pursuit of which that would trap him in an eternally suspended state of limbo. Similarly to 
Alex in Shallow Grave he can succeed because he never stops working, because even the 
traumatic affects of his subconscious life are solicited and rewarded as immaterial labour. As 
Roshaya Rodness notes, Cobb and his team perform their dream-work in what Antonio Negri 
called “tautological time,” symptomatic of the late capitalist extension of the working day 
beyond its Fordist limits whereby “the entire time of life has become the time of production.”98 
Along these lines Drew Winchur calls the film “corporate propaganda” for never problematizing 
the violence involved in serving this new regime of absolute exploitation, the cynical acceptance 
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of which helps Cobb to escape responsibility for the injustice done to Fisher,99 itself only a 
repetition, as I have argued, of what he did to Mal before.   
 On the other hand, the blatant commodification of Cobb’s wish fulfillment also makes the 
ending ambiguous. True, he is able to return to his children but these final images of happiness 
are shot in a way to resemble standard Hollywood depictions of a dream: bright lights, warm 
colors, and people smiling and moving in slow motion. Cobb himself seems to be skeptical about 
their authenticity, this is why upon arriving at his old house—which somehow looks exactly like 
he remembered—he spins the top just in case. But then finally, after repressing their memory for 
years, he sees the faces of his children and he ignores the result in what is the film’s most 
striking cynicism-image. In the last shot the camera zooms in on the top spinning, perhaps just 
about to fall, but then we suddenly cut to the end credits without really knowing. The cynical 
viewer, much like Cobb himself, is encouraged to ignore the outcome of the test while knowing 
very well what result it might bring. That is to say, the top’s previous function as the stain of the 
real undermining one’s fantasy frame doesn’t simply disappear through another primordial 
repression but remains there as part of the picture. After his cynical enlightenment, there is no 
way back to such naiveté neither for Cobb, nor the viewer. For this reason, despite its appeal of a 
Hollywood ending, the final scene of happiness cannot but have something uncanny, unreal 
about it, not unlike the corporate non-places that dominate rest of the film. We could say with 
Auge that just like his previous roles in the dream world, fatherhood itself becomes “a gentle 
form of possession” for Cobb, a self-imposed behavioural algorithm associated with the rather 
sterile and generic looking space of his home that lacks historicity and identity: the dinner table 
resembles the various conference room tables seen throughout the film, and although there are 
paintbrushes soaked in watercolours placed in a couple of jars for the children, the pieces of 
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paper next to them are completely empty. Such de-realization of reality is characteristic of the 
post-panoptic world of full transparency in which the disseminated gaze of the Other is 
simultaneously everywhere and nowhere. It’s a noir universe without shadows, that of the 
Baudrillardian hyperreal simulacra that seems to lack nothing insofar as even the blind spots that 
used to serve as its constitutive outside are now included in it.  
Yet, as a film noir Inception also reveals the arbitrary cynical-sovereign decision that 
grounds such postmodern space of full transparency, differentiating it from the feminine logic of 
the any-space-whatever. The ending shows how Cobb’s (and the masculine spectator’s) cynical 
control over the narrative, his ability to construct its conclusion relies on an act of fetishistic 
disavowal, the split of his consciousness between knowing very well that his world is not real but 
nonetheless acting as if it was, opposing himself to the feminine totem, his fetish object that is 
unable to perform such cognitive distance.100 From the feminine perspective, however, Cobb’s 
false consciousness doesn’t end by deliberately choosing an illusion (his illusion) over the idea 
of the truth. The ideological misrecognition of his situation lies rather in his assumption that he 
could, if he wanted to, go after the truth (mirroring the masuline viewer’s belief in the final 
meaning of the story) that for him remains transcendental, adding one more layer of phallic 
exception to the symbolic status quo. His masculinist conviction is that if he didn’t show restraint 
and lie to himself by looking away from the totem, he would find himself in the bad infinity of 
Woman, and the happy scene of his family home would turn out to be level 6 of an endless 
dream labyrinth. He re-masculinizes the post-Oedipal order by misperceiving the de-realization 
of his reality as the tragic price of his heroic-cynical enlightenment. The traumatic real he is not 
ready to confront, however, is the exact opposite, and this is what the Lacanian feminine subject 
                                                 
100 On the concept of fetishistic disavowal see Octave Mannoni, “I Know Very Well, but All the Same…,” 
Perversion and the Social Relation, ed. M. A. Rothenberg et al. (Durham, Duke University Press, 2003), 68-93. 
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stands for: there is only one world with no states of exception, one in which his children are 
always already dead, so to speak (even if they are alive they are ignorant of Cobb). The ideology 
of cynicism allows him instead to heroically take the boring petty-bourgeois reality as it is, with 
its simulated pseudo-pleasures modeled after corporate aesthetics, and still feel like he was a 
revolutionary by doing so—just like the viewer, who after the self-congratulatory results of his 
cognitive labour of piecing the narrative puzzle together might overlook the clichéd, rather 
unimaginative content of the plot.101  
The top becomes the ultimate support of Cobb’s (and the viewer’s) new cynicism insofar 
as it stands for Mal (the top used to be her totem) after her fatal inception by her husband. As 
McGowan points out, in Freud’s theory the totem is the substitute for the primordial father after 
his death/castration.102 What the endlessly spinning totem provides is the film’s machine of 
inception through which the jouissance of the feminine drive is always already captured in an 
apparatus of phallic exception: the top’s centrality in the final scene neutralizes the audience’s 
doubts about the reality of the happy end by opposing the “real enough” of the simulated images 
to the vertigo of madness beyond the universe of meaning.  
For this reason, Cobb’s walking away from the spinning top sets up the same antinomy 
between the simulacrum and the sublime as the line “Forget it Jake, it’s Chinatown.” in 
Polanski’s classic. The difference is that while in early postmodern neo-noirs the affect holding 
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102 McGowan, Christopher Nolan, 169. 
309 
 
this antinomy together was melancholy, Inception’s ending signals instead the successful 
completion of a process of mourning through a cynical decathexis from the lost object (Mal). If 
in nostalgic neo-noirs the sexual relationship was lost, pushed away by the melancholic so it 
could continue to be libidinally invested in as lost, in Nolan’s film it is rather betrayed, which 
means that desire for (the lack in) the Other itself is given up for a safe but asexual masculine 
existence of immediate gratification. It is such betrayal, McGowan observers, that is the source 
of Cobb’s guilt complex that doesn’t cease with his return to single fatherhood but is rather 
amplified by it: 
For Lacan, guilt does not result from disobeying and killing the father but from 
abandoning one's desire and one's object for the sake of the father and his law. As he puts 
it in his seminar on ethics, "The only thing one can be guilty of is giving ground relative 
to one's desire." This statement appears to contradict every notion of ethics that we have: 
ethics involves the restraint of desire, and we feel guilty when we cede control to our 
desire, not when we give ground relative to it. But Lacan's point here is that the 
development of guilt has nothing to do with transgressive actions. Instead, it develops 
when one opts psychically for the father's law and betrays one's object or one's obstacle. 
Feelings of guilt arise as a result of the father's prominence within the psyche, without 
which one could act guilt-free. In Inception, Cobb chooses paternity over the object, and 
this explains the massive amount of guilt that haunts him throughout the film.103  
“The father’s law” should be understood here as the phallic apparatus of sovereignty and in this 
sense guilt has always been a correlate of masculinity. However, as Lazzarato reminds us, the 
guilt of today’s docile subject is intensified beyond its previous (Oedipal) limits because it serves 
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as the affective support for the neoliberal economy of indebtedness. Today “[e]veryone is a 
'debtor,’ accountable to and guilty before capital,”104 condemned to produce and consume, or as 
Lacanians put it, enjoy 24/7.105 In this context, Cobb’s cynical completion of mourning also 
signals his shift from the passive but limited guilt he suffered from as a result of a particular 
traumatic event (Mal’s suicide) to an actively chosen abstract and absolute guilt following his 
sovereign betrayal: guilt as a productive pathology mobilizing the neoliberal subject. As Copjec 
argues, the alternative to such infinite guilt in front of the superego is shame: encountering the 
lack in the Other instead of shamelessly placing one’s ego as guilty into it to cover it up.106  
 
5.4 From Anti-Utopianism to Authoritarian Capitalism 
 
5.4.1 Undoing Snow Noir 
 Intervening into a feminine utopia by establishing the masculine regime of guilt is also 
the ideological agenda of Nolan’s cynical snow noir Insomnia (2002). It’s a murder mystery 
about a strangled teenage girl set in a fictional Alaska town called Nightmute during the time of 
the year when the sun never sets—an anti-noir location if there ever was one. As Ellie, the local 
police officer explains to the two LA cops arriving to help with the murder investigation, “people 
come here to live the way they want to.” Nobody is judged for their lifestyle: the small 
community operates without imposing guilt. By contrast, the main character Will Dormer, one of 
the outsider detectives, suffers from a bad conscience. There is an Internal Affairs inquiry into 
one of his previous cases where he planted evidence to secure the conviction of whom he thought 
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was a child murderer. Hap, his long-time partner accompanying him to Alaska is supposed to 
testify against him when they return to LA. Their relationship is troubled but sill friendly, which 
is why when during a chase after the killer in heavy mountain fog Will shoots and kills Hap, he 
himself doesn’t know whether it was an accident or not. Either way, his growing guilt makes him 
cover up what happened and frame the killer they were after for the shooting. Walter, the 
pursued murderer, soon finds out about Will’s tempering with the evidence and blackmails him 
into supporting his own agenda: steering suspicion away from himself by planting the murder 
weapon in the house of the victim’s teenage boyfriend.  
 Like many of Nolan’s films (Following, The Prestige, or the Batman series), Insomnia 
fits into the subgenre that David Greven calls the “double protagonist film,” especially popular in 
the Bush to Bush era (1988-2008), where characters representing two types of manhood he calls 
narcissistic and masochistic battle each other until, as a rule, the latter wins the rivalry.107 He 
sees the conflict revolving around the American ideal of self-made masculinity, the inherent 
contradictions of which the narcissist embodies as symptom.108 “The historical problem of self-
made manhood in American life is that the myth of total self-sufficiency threatens to impair or 
even destroy one’s social connections and abilities to have intimate sexual relations.”109 
Masochism, the embracing of a castrated male image is promoted in these films as a tool to 
mitigate the excesses of narcissism. Its true purpose, however, Greven insists, is not to critique 
the bourgeois-individualist notion of American masculinity but to realize it. As the author 
perspicuously notes turning around standard assumptions of psychoanalytic film theory,110 it is 
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the narcissist not the masochist who is more vulnerable to the gaze of the other,111 constantly 
relying on the social recognition of his self-image.112 By contrast, “masochism covers up an 
unwillingness to acknowledge that one is enslaved by one’s own image,” for which reason it is a 
better strategy towards self-made manhood. As Greven summarizes, masochism is nothing but 
“hypocritical narcissism.”113 Or, we could say: it is the narcissism of the cynic who maintains a 
private distance towards his social masks to hold onto the fetish of his authentic inner self.   
 Insomnia certainly reproduces this dynamic. The main difference between Walter and 
Will is not their sovereign-arbitrary use of lethal force, which both are guilty of, but their 
different relationship to the other’s gaze. The weakness of Walter, the middle aged novelist, is 
his dependency on his fans’ recognition, which is why he starts a romantic relationship with one 
of his teenage admirers. It is when the girl, resembling the 80s femme fatale, finally laughs in his 
face after a jealousy dispute that he starts hitting her and eventually strangles her to save his 
wounded ego. A similar narcissism drives him to Will, confessing the intimate details of his 
sovereign crime to him assuming they can build an obscene-homosocial bond. The detective, 
however, refuses to reciprocate and desperately tries to break their involuntary association. He 
also has a different, radically asexual relationship to his female admirers. Not only does he 
actively discourage Ellie from idolizing him, he even pushes her in the right direction in the 
mountain shooting investigation, thereby incriminating himself. Furthermore, he confesses his 
sins to a motel receptionist but, contrary to the film’s Norwegian original, not in order to have 
                                                                                                                                                             
See Mulvey, Laura. “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema.” In Media and Cultural Studies Key Works, ed. M. G. 
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Homophobia: Fear, Shame and Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity,” in Michael S. Kimmel, Gender of 
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sex with her but instead of it. The remake also omits the scene where the detective molests a 
teenage witness to pressure her for information, turning a sleazy protagonist who barely differs 
from the murderer into repenting moralist. To sum up, narcissistic manhood is presented in the 
film as weaker insofar as it’s unable to control the female gaze it’s dependent on, that of the 
empowered, autonomous femme fatale who used to be neo-noir’s melancholic sovereign in the 
80s and early 90s. For Nolan’s cynic in Insomnia as well as in Inception, the option of male 
narcissism (to be an object of female desire) is a trap laid by the melancholic woman driving 
men crazy by looking for her perfect male counterpart while at the same time considering him to 
be always already lost (impotent, castrated).114 The turn to masochism, just like the shift to 
mourning, is therefore a strategy to re-masculinize sovereignty, to cut men’s dependency on 
women by tying the sovereign role not only to a masculine gender performance but also to the 
bios of the male sex. By avowing their castrated public image, Nolan’s cynics let go of a 
masculine ideal they didn’t have control over in the first place, effectively privatizing phallic 
power by detaching it from the site of feminine surveillance. 
 It is nonetheless misleading to reduce the plot to the struggle between two types of 
manhood/sovereignty. What such framing omits is Insomnia’s feminine-utopian universe which 
poses a threat to both men. As J. L. A. Garcia observes, “[s]everal times during the movie, we 
come across a bright glare, which might eventually facilitate vision but at first only blinds and 
dizzies both the characters and us viewers.”115 This blinding gleam of light can be read as lumen, 
as the Lacanian gaze of the Other as objet petit a from his parable about the sardine can, one that 
appears at the moment when the subject’s fundamental fantasy driving his actions disintegrates. 
This is the light shining through the shutters of Will’s motel room, threatening to turn his guilt 
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into shame, making him an insomniac permanently haunted by a disorienting brightness. As a 
response he desperately tries to cover the window to get some rest (to reconstruct the blind spot 
on his visual field), to regain his strength and continue with his masculine quest. In the final 
showdown scene this light appears as the muzzle flash of the guns the two men shoot at each 
other simultaneously, catching up with their objet a at the moment of their death like the hero of 
Doodlebug.  
 Yet, the film doesn’t simply end in a mutual (self-)destruction of the male doppelgangers 
like the classical noir Odds Against Tomorrow (1959) Nolan clearly references with the 
denouement. The detective, although fatally wounded, survives long enough to assure that his 
masculine legacy lives on through Ellie. By now the female police officer has learned about 
Will’s cover-up, but seeing how he’s been willing to repent, she is ready to forgive him and 
discard the evidence implicating him in the shooting of Hap. Will’s cynical move here is to reject 
the offer of redemption in front of the feminine gaze that would be the standard outcome in 
classical snow noir, and have people remember him as guilty for a crime he is not even sure he 
committed. After he dies, Ellie honours his wishes and places the incriminating bullet slug she 
wanted to throw away back into a plastic container, carefully seals it and puts it into her pocket; 
it is now her “totem,” the reminder of the paternal law’s entrance into a world formerly exempt 
of guilt. The final long shot shows her troubled gaze panning the landscape as if she suddenly 
felt watched by a mysterious Other’s presence in it. This is what McGowan misses when he 
sums up Will’s white lie as a proof of “the necessary badness of the good cop.”116 His arbitrary 
lie is necessary only within the masculine universe of guilt based on a constitutive sovereign 
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exception. In the feminine regime that Ellie stood for until the end, in the utopia where everyone 
is always already redeemed, such lie is not only unnecessary: it is meaningless.  
 
5.4.2 Batman, or, The “Inner Greatness” of Cynicism 
 While Insomnia is a snow noir set in the Alaskan summer when the snow has—
symbolically and literally—already melted, in the climax of Nolan’s Batman trilogy (Batman 
Begins, 2005; The Dark Knight, 2008; The Dark Knight Rises, 2012) snow actually falls on 
Gotham City (a fictional equivalent of New York) and even its rivers freeze over. If Insomnia is 
about the successful masculinization of a small and remote utopian collective through cynicism, 
the final installment of the Batman series imagines the opposite scenario in the center of global 
capitalism: a failed revolution against the cynical masculine metropolis the eponymous hero 
struggled to establish. These blockbusters, contrary to the director’s low budget existential noirs, 
focus on the complex political apparatus grounded in cynical sovereignty: a police surveillance 
state controlled by the class of plutocrats Batman/Bruce Wayne belongs to, whose main 
objective is to keep the urban proletariat in check by marking and eliminating their self-
appointed leaders as terrorists. The Batman series is perhaps Nolan’s strongest capitalist realist 
statement to date. It goes as far as suggesting that in today’s escalating conflict between 
democracy and capitalism one should side with the latter to curb the populist tendencies that 
ordinary people develop once they are allowed to govern themselves.    
The first two films deal with the collapse of Gotham City’s liberal democratic law and 
order and the emergence of Bruce Wayne/Batman as a multimillionaire/masked vigilante—an 
ideal neoliberal subject running his privately funded security operation instead of relying on the 
state. This is the main difference between him and his philantrocapitalist father, Thomas Wayne, 
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whose massive empire he inherits: his old man built hospitals for sick children and subway lines 
for the poor, making up for the gaps in public services without, however, interfering with the 
state’s monopoly on violence. Bruce on the other hand is distrustful of the public as such, which 
is why he is taking law into his own hands. He doesn’t use his wealth to prop up an autonomous 
public sphere; instead he privatizes its functions and runs it like and “enlightened despot:”117 by 
the second film the police basically follow his instructions and he even has an (illegal) 
surveillance system covering the whole city that violates people’s privacy. The primal scene that 
sets him on this path features him passively witnessing his parents’ murder by a mugger as a 
young boy. They are killed despite the fact that his father offers his wallet without resistance—
his naive liberal trust in the people blinds him to the class antagonism that makes him their 
enemy. As China Miéville points out,  
[Batman Begins] argues quite explicitly (in what's obviously, in its raised train setting, 
structured as a debate with Spiderman 2, a stupid but goodhearted film that thinks people 
are basically decent) that masses are dangerous unless terrorised into submission (Spidey 
falls among the masses they nurture him and make sure he's ok. Bats falls among them 
they are a murderous and bestial mob because they are not being *effectively scared 
enough*).118 
Like in Inception the protagonist’s character development involves dealing with his feelings of 
guilt through mourning, that is, reconfiguring his paralyzing fundamental fantasy/memory by 
erasing the traces of the hostile masses from it, “terrorizing them into submission” like Cobb did 
to Mal.  
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Accordingly, Bruce’s response to the trauma of his father’s and his own impotence is 
sadistic vengeance: after years of martial arts training by a mysterious warrior sect somewhere in 
Asia he returns home to Gotham and starts patrolling the streets at night wearing the mask of 
Batman. He is like an upper class Travis Bickle on a self-righteous rampage to criminalize the 
poor in the city’s Dickensian ghetto, punishing them collectively for harbouring terrorists, just 
like the US does with the population of Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, etc. In the final showdown he 
symbolically undoes his father’s liberal/social democratic legacy “by the demolition of the mass 
transit system that ruined everything by literally raised the poor and put them among the rich.”119 
For Justin Toh this new Batman is also symptomatic of a post 9/11 regression into a Reaganite 
neconservativism, glorifying hard bodied masculinity and the military industrial complex as 
America’s saviours from terrorism. His gadgets are all military prototypes designed by Wayne 
Enterprises: the Batsuit is essentially a soldier’s armour and the Batmobile is a tank.120 As 
Nicholas Winstead observes, this is a clear digression from Joel Schumacher’s camp version of 
Batman in the 90s that mocked white heterosexual male authority and embraced a queer 
interpretation of the superhero. By contrast, in Nolan’s films “the absence of the hetero-
masculine power structure results in chaos, anarchy, and a world ruled by the lawless. It is the 
white male American dream that needs saving, and Batman shows up to deliver its salvation.”121 
 Along these lines Cynthia Barounis contrasts Batman’s “able-bodied corporate 
masculinity” to the Joker’s “anti-bourgeois crip dandyism” in The Dark Knight (2008), noting 
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how the villain acts like “the kind of BDSM queer whose perversity is the stuff of [...] 
heterosexual nightmares.”122 Like Cobb in Following or the character Jigsaw in the torture porn 
series Saw, the Joker sets up sadistic games for his victims, introducing them with the phrase 
“You know you’re going to enjoy this.” He, for instance, rigs explosives on two hostages at 
different locations but gives Batman enough time to save only one of them. Yet, this also means 
that he is not quite the “agent of chaos” he describes himself to be. Similarly to Nolan’s other 
anti-heroes his weakness is his narcissism, his need for an audience, his care for the other’s 
enjoyment, for which reason no matter how destructive he appears of law and order he 
nonetheless stands for a zero level of the social bond. We could even say that he embodies the 
autoimmune excess of the late Thomas Wayne’s liberal pedagogical agenda, the same self-
destructive “feminine” madness that erupts from Gotham’s honorable district attorney Harvey 
Dent after the Joker burns half his face off—a fascistic force of terror that can only be 
neutralized by a cynical man without a passionate attachment to the people. Batman does it by 
taking Dent’s sins on himself after he kills him, pretending to be guilty of the murders he 
committed to fake an antinomy between good and evil the terms of which he can manipulate, not 
unlike like the way the US state department invented the Axis of Evil with Weapons of Mass 
Destruction to justify its permanent “war on terror.” While in Batman Begins the hero’s 
bourgeois vengeance on the people is limited to cuts in the welfare state, in The Dark Knight 
Batman goes further and engineers a permanent state of emergency suspending civil liberties: he 
pretends to be a terrorist and goes into hiding just to prevent the restoration of democracy. 
It’s interesting to consider here Martin Fradley’s commentary who hesitates to simply 
call Nolan’s Batman films reactionary. He argues with Richard Maltby that in order to maximize 
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its profits and reach a maximum number of viewers, “Hollywood entertainment disavows any 
responsibility for the ideological meanings audiences attach to or extrapolate from its products. 
In other words, rather than having any legible political view point, [the film] deliberately 
concedes to the individual viewer the authority to decide what it means.”123 In the case of The 
Dark Knight this would mean that viewers can read the film both as a patriotic apology for 
George W. Bush’s war on terror as well as its critique; as a heteromasculinist reaction to queer 
politics or its support, etc. While such analysis of the film industry’s investment strategies is 
certainly convincing, it misses the point that ideology is not only in the films’ content but in their 
form as well, that Hollywood’s neutralization of antagonistic value systems into simultaneously 
present sides of antinomies is itself ideological, and is inscribed into the films as a distortion of 
their form, in Nolan’s case as a cynical-sovereign decision in a noir state of exception that 
grounds the seemingly post-ideological consensus. It is the ideological (bourgeois-masculinist) 
nature of this sovereign decision that McGowan also misses when he praises Batman’s anti-
heroic self-sacrifice as an authentic act restoring justice:  
The hero's relationship to heroic exceptionality forms the basis of authentic heroism. If 
the hero adopts the position of the exception as the difficult duty that one must perform 
for the sake of a greater good (the position of Iron Man, President Bush, Superman, and 
most exceptional heroes), then exceptionality becomes an unlimited end in itself that will 
never cease to be required. If, however, the hero adopts the position of the exception as a 
criminal duty, as a necessity that removes him from the realm of heroism altogether, then 
exceptionality can realize itself in justice rather than in the production of an increasing 
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amount of injustice. [The Dark Knight] shows us that authentic heroism necessarily 
appears in the form of evil.124 
In reality, instead of undoing the exceptional masculine heroism of the superhero genre, Nolan 
rather reaffirms the trope cynically. He lets the viewer know that the place of exception is 
artificially constructed (Batman has no superpowers, only his wealth), but he also shows that he 
who can afford to put himself in this place (the bourgeoisie) is de facto exceptional anyway. 
The Dark Knight Rises, the final installment in the saga is the first in which the class 
dimension of Batman’s sovereign reign is explicitly challenged. The film’s main antagonist, 
Bane, enters the scene as a Wall Street occupier, and by arming and mobilizing the homeless in 
the city’s the underground sewer system he soon establishes his “dictatorship of the proletariat,” 
taking Gotham hostage with the help of a nuclear bomb. He reveals the lie about Harvey Dent 
and releases the prisoners who were sentenced under the Dent Act, that is, during the state of 
emergency (the “dictatorship of the bourgeoisie”) devised by Batman. Instead of becoming the 
sovereign leader of the people, however, he simply tells them: “Gotham is yours! None shall 
interfere, do as you please!” The people indeed take over and as winter arrives they organize a 
city state out of the snowy Gotham that looks like a bourgeois caricature of the Paris Commune: 
show trials, terror against the rich, rationing, curfew, and armed gangs patrolling the streets. The 
real ideological move on the part of the filmmakers, however, is to make Bane’s hidden agenda 
apocalyptic: he doesn’t want communism, he is just using its rhetoric as a distraction while he 
prepares blowing up the entire city. “Some people just want to see the world burn,” says Alfred, 
Bruce’s butler about the Joker in The Dark Knight, summarizing the bourgeoisie’s paranoid fear 
of a proletarian revolution that determines the representation of Bane as well.  
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Nevertheless, as Žižek observes, the film, reactionary as it may be in the end, cannot but 
leave traces of Bane’s authenticity intact, most importantly his unconditional love for Talia, his 
terrorist comrade and the femme fatale of The Dark Knight Rises played by the same actress 
(Marion Cotillard) who played Mal in Inception.125 As Karthick RM puts it: 
Bane, [...] with all the tough veneer, reveals the source of his hardness – love. In a 
fleeting, but touching moment, through a tear, the ‘monster’ tells the story of his 
becoming that Che Guevara so eloquently phrased decades back: “Hay que endurecerse 
sin perder jamas la ternura”. One must endure, become hard, toughen oneself, without 
losing tenderness. While Batman was brought into his line of work through a personal 
loss, Bane’s initiation was an unselfish act of love [helping the child Talia escape 
slavery], which came with enduring terrible suffering and sacrifice [torture as punishment 
from his slave masters]. The ideal was not limited to his personal fetishes. As love goes, 
the ideal in itself was total and absolute. Contrast a Batman, inconsistent with both his 
personal and political lives, and a consistent Bane who saw no difference between the 
two. In this sense, Badiou is right in saying that the truly subversive thing in the world 
today is not sex, but love. No wonder, the chap who sleeps around represents the liberal 
system while the committed lover, the terrorists!126 
Like Batman’s bourgeois cynicism, the authenticity of Bane’s revolutionary commitment is also 
more than just one of the films conflicting value systems exploited by Hollywood. Its appearance 
is tied to a distortion of the film’s formal texture into snow noir, a utopian negation of the 
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masculine law that separated jouissance from the site of politics. It shows that the film is the site 
of a meta-ideological struggle between the sovereign-masculine and the feminine-utopian 
organization of its symbolic order, one that could go either way but not both at the same time. In 
the regime of snow noir Talia is with Bane, and their political commitment and love for each 
other are indistinguishable. In Gotham’s masculine noir order, by contrast, Talia sleeps with 
Bruce, both posing as eccentric philantrocapitalists, equally deceiving the other about their true 
political agenda. In his other role as Batman, the bourgeois counterrevolutionary, he teams up 
(but doesn’t have sex) with Selena (aka Catwoman) whose ideological and class alignment he 
finds more appropriate: after getting arrested for stealing jewellery, she accepts the deal offered 
by the police to fight Bane alongside Batman, effectively betraying, as Karthick stresses, her 
working class origins.127 Her acceptance of the bourgeois-masculine rules is similar to Ariadne’s 
entry into Cobb’s men only team of corporate spies in Inception, and like her, she is the one who, 
as a freshly turned agent of patriarchy finishes off the villain (Bane in this case) threatening the 
male protagonist.  
But it is Batman who restores the glory of the ancien regime by releasing Gotham’s 
police force from captivity and repeating his fake sacrificial act from the end of previous film: he 
flies away with the nuclear bomb towards the sea just minutes before it detonates, making 
everyone believe that he died in the explosion. The city’s grateful bourgeoisie builds a statue to 
honour the anti-communist hero and his example inspires a young policeman to quit the force 
and be the city’s next masked vigilante. These scenes of restoration are cross cut with Alfred 
getting a table in an upscale café somewhere in Italy, surrounded by renaissance statues and 
marble pillars. As he looks up from his newspaper, to his surprise his eyes meet Bruce Wayne’s 
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sitting not far from him with Selena. The two men smile and nod at each other without Selena 
noticing, and Alfred stands up and leaves without saying anything. This is Bruce’s 
reprogrammed fundamental fantasy: a silent homosocial exchange between male aristocrats from 
which the proletariat is finally excluded (they are outside of the frame playing their designated 
role as waiters) and which women are ignorant of.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
The final scene of The Dark Knight Rises evokes the ending of classical noirs like Out of 
the Past, except that there the homosocial exchange is an impossible one between the dead noir 
hero and his mute assistant saluting the sign displaying his name, making it clear that the excess 
of the protagonist’s bare life (zoe) can never be integrated into the masculine bios: even if he in 
the end helps to restore its status quo he has to die for his sins. Contrary to classical noir’s 
doomed protagonist, Nolan’s cynic can survive and even be accepted by a masculine community. 
This is what also happens at the end of Inception, where after they complete their mission and 
wake up on the airplane, members of Cobb’s team silently and surreptitiously exchange gazes 
with one another while remaining seated, not to let Fisher know they’ve been cooperating—then 
they split up to live in their own fantasy worlds. This is Nolan’s version of the bios that cynical 
sovereignty grounds. While Boyle downplayed the masculine homosocial dimension of the 
neoliberal multitude leaving us with the grin of his isolated but digitally connected androgynous 
heroes, for Nolan a strong masculine biopolitical community remains the condition of possibility 
for realizing private consumer fantasies. Without its safety net, the unbridled jouissance that 
neoliberal capitalism solicits in the people can lead to chaos and (self-)destruction, a bad infinity 
clearly marked as feminine. This is why Nolan is hesitant to simply embrace digital media. He 
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supports the simulacrum’s powers of the false only insofar as they are grounded in the bourgeois 
white male body.  
For Boyle cynicism means the viewer’s/protagonist’s emancipation from generic forms 
of life that reach an autoimmune crisis in the postmodern smart film. Nolan, by contrast 
resurrects the masculine generic as the mind game film that lays out the algorithms of 
filmmaking as audience manipulation to the open but invites the cynical viewer to participate in 
them anyway, insofar as they are false so that they can secretly hold onto their inner authenticity 
confirmed by their restraint of not seeking (and not speaking) the truth. This is why mind game 
film’s contract with the viewer is not ironic. There is no shared laughter and mockery of the 
clichés of Hollywood filmmaking, only a cold pathos of taking it all for real while knowing very 
well that it’s not. While Boyle offers his viewers an amoral spectatorship where truth is 
indistinguishable from a lie, Nolan prefers an immoral contract where truth and falsity remain 
distinct options but only an idiot or a madman would choose the truth.  
If Boyle’s version of neoliberal capitalism is a frictionless cyber-idyll, the horizontal 
networked existence of a connected multitude, Nolan’s ideal is rather what Žižek called 
capitalism with “Asian values,” that is, a blatantly hierarchical authoritarian form of power.128 
After all, Batman himself can only save the liberal-decadent Gotham after his oriental training, 
just like Cobb needs the Japanese businessman Saito to make him a good father again. What 
should be emphasized here is that the desire for such non-democratic capitalism is not nostalgic 
but future oriented, reflecting the current reality that it is China whose GDP is projected to 
surpass that of the US in the near future while economic growth in the liberal west is stagnating. 
This is the paradigm forming the male protagonists even in those Nolan films that don’t 
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explicitly fetishize the orient. Insomnia’s Will Dormer, for instance, is played by Al Pacino 
whose iconic roles include both megalomaniac criminal oligarchs (Godfather, 1972; Scarface, 
1983) as well as honest cops “above reproach”129 fighting late capitalist decadence (Serpico, 
1973; Heat, 1995). Some of his films (typically noirs) even have him play the two archetypes 
simultaneously in a split personality (Cruising, 1980; Sea of Love, 1989). We could say that his 
screen persona embodies the postmodern crisis of Oedipal masculinity, its inevitable sliding into 
the position of the primordial father, a move that creates nostalgia for a now extinct benevolent 
fatherhood. Nolan, instead of looking back melancholically, offers a cynical synthesis of the 
antinomies at the heart of Pacino’s roles, having him inaugurate a new epoch of patriarchy by 
lying out of an “ethical” duty. The return to American frontier masculinity of settler colonialism 
in the science fiction Interstellar (2014) is similarly presented as a future oriented project, as a 
means to save humanity from a zero growth economy forced on it by global warming.130 
Arguably, even Nolan’s Victorian period drama The Prestige (2006) resurrects a pre-liberal 
rugged masculine individualism properly separated from the feminine sphere as a precondition 
for the effective use of new crowd-pleasing (and crowd-controlling) technologies, ultimately that 
of the cyberspace allegorized in the film as wireless electricity and teleportation. As a double 
protagonist film about two rival magicians, The Prestige tells a cautionary tale about the 
narcissist Angier buying a teleportation machine from the inventor Nikolai Tesla that replicates 
rather than transports an object to another location, making his Transported Man stage trick to 
result in a growing number of human doubles. Although he ends up developing an automatized 
mechanism for killing them, what he cannot comprehend and what his masochist rival Borden 
knows all too well, is that masculine sovereign violence is not the byproduct of a good magic 
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trick (allegorically: a good society of control) but its very basis.131 Without it one would end up 
with the uncontrollable multitude of the people ruining the show (we see the first double of 
Angier causing him trouble, demanding higher wages, etc.) Borden knows this because his 
version of the Transported Man relies on his twin brother—possibly the product of his own 
earlier visit to Tesla the film alludes to—whose existence he keeps a secret even from his wife, 
driving her to suicide by making her shared by two men rather than letting her in on the project.  
On the other hand, despite their differences, at the end of the day both Nolan and Boyle 
affirm what could be called the chronotope of cynical neo-noir: the post-historical metropolis 
where the neoliberal entrepreneur of the self floats around in his monadistic bubble. According 
to the anonymous authors of the Invisible Committee, the metropolis is the new territoriality of 
global capitalism that collapses the modern distinction between city and countryside into a new 
fluid, transparent, neutral, and uniform space. Corporate non-places collide with the rhyzomatic 
architecture of urban sprawl, simulated replicas of former neighborhoods and rural resorts push 
out the poor into constantly displaced shanty towns in an endless process of gentrification and 
low intensity class warfare.  
[But] the metropolis is not just this urban pile-up, this final collision between city and 
country. It is also a flow of beings and things, a current that runs through fiber-optic 
networks, through high-speed train lines, satellites, and video surveillance cameras, 
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making sure that this world keeps running straight to its ruin. It is a current that would 
like to drag everything along in its hopeless mobility, to mobilize each and every one of 
us. Where information pummels us like some kind of hostile force. Where the only thing 
left to do is run. Where it becomes hard to wait, even for the umpteenth subway train. 
With the proliferation of means of movement and communication, and with the lure of 
always being elsewhere, we are continuously torn from the here and now. Hop on an 
intercity or commuter train, pick up a telephone-in order to be already gone. Such 
mobility only ever means uprootedness, isolation, exile. It would be insufferable if it 
weren't always the mobility of a private space, of a portable interior. The private bubble 
doesn't burst, it floats around. The process of cocooning is not going away, it is merely 
being put into motion. From a train station, to an office park, to a commercial bank, from 
one hotel to another, there is everywhere a foreignness, a feeling so banal and so habitual 
it becomes the last form of familiarity. Metropolitan excess is this capricious mixing of 
definite moods, indefinitely recombined. The city centers of the metropolis are not clones 
of themselves, but offer instead their own auras; we glide from one to the next, selecting 
this one and rejecting that one, to the tune of a kind of existential shopping trip among 
different styles of bars, people, designs, or playlists. "With my mp3 player, I'm the master 
of my world." To cope with the uniformity that surrounds us, our only option is to 
constantly renovate our own interior world, like a child who constructs the same little 
house over and over again, or like Robinson Crusoe reproducing his shopkeeper's 
universe on a desert island-yet our desert island is civilization itself, and there are billions 
of us continually washing up on it.132    
                                                 
132 The Invisible Committe, The Coming Insurrection (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2009), 52-55. 
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Without exploring its class dimensions, Patricia Pisters calls this networked existence mobilizing 
the subject’s affective economy the “brain-city,” or “brain-world,” represented by digital 
cinema’s neuro-images.133 I have referred to it as the cynic’s isolated connectedness in the 
previous chapter, which applies to Nolan’s and Boyle’s heroes as well, with Boyle putting more 
emphasis on connectedness (deterritorialization through the digital) and Nolan on isolation 
(reterritorialization through a self-made masculine bubble).  
 
 
 
                                                 
133 Patricia Pisters, The Neuro-Image: A Deleuzian Film-Philosophy of Digital Screen Culture (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2012), 33. 
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6 Sovereignty as Perpetual Self-Erasure of White Masculinity in the 
Films of Nicolas Winding Refn 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 While Nicolas Winding Refn is often hailed as a central figure in the New Danish 
Cinema of the 90s,1 his later, more cosmopolitan career has a lot in common with Danny Boyle’s 
as their deterritorialized oeuvres map out the affective landscape of global capitalism from a 
generic western white heterosexual male perspective. Refn was born in 1970 in Denmark as a 
child of a film director and a cinematographer, but moved to New York with his family at the 
age of 8, which is why he considers the strongest cultural influences of his youth to be Reagan-
era action and horror films—the ones, he fondly remembers, that glorified the violence of 
American capitalism, allowing him to rebel against his “hardcore Scandinavian socialist” 
parents.2 Ironically, it is precisely his lasting commitment to a US centric global genre cinema 
that made him an ideal candidate to revitalize the national film industry of his country of origin, 
adding to it what Mette Hjort calls a “glocal” dimension with his 1996 debut film Pusher, a low 
budget gangster-noir inspired by Martin Scorsese’s Mean Streets (1973).3 Unlike his colleagues 
in the Dogme 95 movement who had similar ambitions for Danish art house cinema, what Refn 
advocated for was the creative appropriation of global genre formulas and Hollywood-style 
marketing techniques targeting specific audience groups.4 While this strategy worked in making 
Pusher a hit in Denmark, its global release was still a gamble as a straightforward genre film 
                                                 
1 See Mette Hjort, Small Nation, Global Cinema: The New Danish Cinema (Minneapolis: Minnesota University 
Press, 2005), 4. 
2 Tasha Robinson, “The most important films in Nicolas Winding Refn’s path from Pusher to the present,” The 
Dissolve, June 15, 2015, accessed April 9, 2016, http://thedissolve.com/features/5-10-15-20/1065-the-most-
important-films-in-nicolas-winding-refns-.   
3 Hjort, Small Nation, 14.  
4 Ibid., 261. 
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from a small nation was a hard sell in the international festival circuit. It was the British 
distributor’s move of calling Refn “the Danish Danny Boyle” that broke the path in legitimizing 
him for foreign viewers.5  
 Despite his affection for American genre cinema, however, contrary to Boyle Refn never 
quite made it to Hollywood. His first English language film Fear X (2003) was funded 
independently, shot in “Hollywood North” (Canada’s Winnipeg standing in for Montana) and 
not only was it a major box office flop, it even made Refn personally indebted for years, risking 
foreclosure on his family home. He was forced to go back to Denmark and make two sequels to 
his by then cult movie Pusher that eventually restored his good standing financially and as an 
independent filmmaker, but he hasn’t been successful securing Hollywood funding ever since. 
20th Century Fox pulled out of his next American project Drive (2011) in the last minute, and 
although the film subsequently won the best director’s award in Cannes and brought in 76 
million dollar screening revenue worldwide on a 15 million budget,6 Refn’s plans to follow it up 
with a blockbuster remake of the 70s sci-fi classic Logan’s Run fell through due to creative 
differences with the producers.7 Since then, he has continued making English language films 
(Only God Forgives, 2013; The Neon Demon, 2016) but with mostly European money and an 
international cast including Hollywood actors like Ryan Gosling, Carey Mulligan, or Elle 
Fanning. 
                                                 
5 The film since then has been remade twice, once in India and once in England. See Danny Leigh, “Pusher 
returns—again,” The Guardian, October 11, 2012, accessed April 9, 2016, 
http://www.theguardian.com/film/2012/oct/11/pusher-remake-nicolas-winding-refn.  
6 “Drive (2011),” Box Office Mojo, last modified June 6, 2016, 
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=drive2011.htm.  
7 See James Marsh, “Interview: Nicolas Winding Refn On Sci-Fi And The Genius Of JODOROWSKY'S DUNE,” 
Twitch, September 29, 2013, accessed April 11, 2016, http://twitchfilm.com/2013/09/interview-nicolas-winding-
refn-on-sci-fi-and-the-genius-of-jodorowskys-dune.html.  
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 If Danny Boyle is an “indiestream filmmaker” with a solid if unspectacular position both 
in mainstream Hollywood and the British independent film scene while Christopher Nolan is a 
“blockbuster auteur” who has successfully merged his artistic ambitions with that of the major 
American film studios, Refn remains something like a European art house director “inclusively 
excluded” from Hollywood who has put on the mask of a genre filmmaker to get there but 
couldn’t fool the industry’s executives. A generous critic could say that he was unwilling to 
compromise on what he likes to call his “feminine European sensibilities,”8 his non-classical 
style of filmmaking he facetiously sums up as “I really like it when I don’t really know where 
things are going.”9 As Refn reveals in a documentary about his career, in the initial stages of the 
creative process he prefers to write down ideas for scenes or just single shots on index cards 
without having any story prepared to connect them.10 What interests him is the intensity of 
sounds and images, their potential for a violence on the senses that is unlike real life violence—a 
fetishistic quality of cinema he refers to as “unreal realism.”11 “I don’t consider myself a very 
violent man,” he says, “but I have a fetish for violent emotions, violent images.” [...] “I do think 
that art is an act of violence.”12 Justin Vicari usefully contrasts this ars poetica to what Mark 
Fisher called capitalist realism, the cynical claim “to have stripped the world of sentimental 
illusions and seen it for ‘what it really is’: a Hobbesian war of all against all, a system of 
perpetual and generalized criminality.”13 Refn is a filmmaker looking for new illusions, a new 
sentimentality even; the aesthetic redemption of the late capitalist world of noir decadence 
                                                 
8 “Nicolas Winding Refn: Biography and Film Analysis Part 1-Auteur Theories,” YouTube video, 23:32, posted by 
“Big Dracula Cinema,” October 26, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EaJwb9o8cI0.  
9 Justin Vicari, Nicolas Winding Refn and the Violence of Art: A Critical Study of the Films (Jefferson: McFarland, 
2014), 4. 
10 The Gambler, directed by Phie Ambo (2006; New York, Magnolia Home Entertainment, 2006), DVD. 
11 Peter Sobczynski, “Interview: Nicolas Winding Refn on ‘Drive’,” eflimcritic.com, September 16, 2011, accessed 
April 11, 2016, http://www.efilmcritic.com/feature.php?feature=3293. 
12  Refn quoted in Vicari, Nicolas Winding Refn, 38., 21.  
13 Mark Fisher quoted in Ibid., 25. 
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through cinema’s powers of the false. If for Nolan such falsity meant the necessary immorality at 
the heart of the moving image while in Boyle’s reading cinema was an amoral machine, Refn 
discovers a new morality in the viewer’s masochistic submission to the violent affective powers 
of the cinematic image. 
 Contrary to Boyle and especially Nolan, Refn has little interest in complex narratives, 
almost always presenting his stories in chronological order, albeit often with unexplained gaps in 
the plot and surrealistic interludes in the tradition of David Lynch, Alejandro Jodorowski, or, in 
his latest film, Dario Argento. When asked about these, he doesn’t pretend to have a final 
interpretation in mind, inviting the audience to “fill in the dots” their own way instead.14 This 
democratic approach to interactivity is the exact obverse of Nolan’s carefully devised narrative 
labyrinths where the viewer’s cognitive involvement amounts to nothing more than a forced 
consent to the director’s rigid blueprint for the film. As Refn argues, “the idea that you can 
control art and make the perfect solution is the enemy of filmmaking.”15 Indeed, formally as well 
as thematically his films lack any moralizing about the postmodern loss of the center, the decline 
of disciplinary power and patriarchal authority, and seem to embrace an anti-Oedipal and even 
post-apocalyptic aesthetic. While Boyle and Nolan responded to the white male homosocial’s 
autoimmune crisis by recentering masculinity in the cynic’s entrepreneurial self who consciously 
betrayed and used others for personal gain, Refn sticks to aestheticizing the neoliberal collapse 
of trust in the male bond and affirms it as the paradoxical sovereign-image of western 
sovereignty’s never ending self-deconstruction. If Boyle and Nolan’s heroes needed to cynically 
perform a Pascalian wager to attune their bare lives to the new deterritorializing rhythms of 
                                                 
14 R. Kurt Osenlund, “Interview: Nicolas Winding Refn,” Slant Magazine, July 17, 2013, accessed April 11, 2016, 
http://www.slantmagazine.com/features/article/interview-nicolas-winding-refn-2013.  
15 “The Director Behind "Only God Forgives" and "Drive" | Meet Nicolas Winding Refn,” YouTube video, 7:03, 
posted by “The Creators Project,” July 19, 2013, accessed April 11, 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DnLEllBcLEc.  
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capitalism they didn’t necessarily understand, Refn’s characters, on the contrary, take 
retrospective cognisance of the fact that their bodies had already been submitted to a pattern that 
is fundamentally self-destructive, and they can only accept their fate in an inevitable yet 
strangely redemptive self-sacrifice. As he puts it, “there is no negative, only positive. If you hate 
something so much you must really love it.”16 This way, however, far from overcoming 
cynicism, Refn ends up glorifying the inoperative, dying white male body as the authentic agent 
of neoliberal deterritorialization.  
6.2 The Autoimmune Crisis of the Action-Image in Refn’s Early Films 
 Like Boyle’s Elephant or Nolan’s Doodlebug, Refn’s first film Pusher is also about the 
autoimmune crisis of white western heterosexual masculinity, depicting how the unwritten laws 
connecting the members of a homosocial community turn destructive to their well being in a 
neoliberal environment. Frank, a small time drug dealer in Copenhagen gets in trouble with his 
Serbian supplier Milo when, chased by two policemen, he drops the heroin he took from him on 
credit into a pond to avoid incarceration. We never learn for sure who called the police on him—
whether his partner Tonny was the informer or his old prison buddy Hasse set him up for a fake 
drug buy as part of a deal with the authorities. In any case, the bond of trust that holds together 
the fragile symbolic economy of the city’s masculine underworld isn’t violated by overly 
ambitious gangsters like in the genre’s Hollywood incarnations from Scarface (1932) to The 
Usual Suspects (1995), but by the intervention of the state apparatus itself severing men’s ties to 
their criminal brotherhood, throwing their intimate relationship with the territory of the city off 
balance. It is the sudden appearance of the drug squad that blocks Hasse’s car from cruising the 
streets of the metropolis in an attempt to synchronize with the rhythm of its traffic and look 
                                                 
16 “Full Nicolas Winding Refn Interview - Cannes 2013,” YouTube video, 21:55, posted by “FSinterviews,” May 
30, 2013, accessed April 12, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4_m4BrTPB0.  
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inconspicuous during the heroin deal. In the ensuing on foot chase the shaky, handheld camera 
tracks an anxious Frank running from the lawmen like an athlete, but his somewhat overweight 
body cannot keep up with the frantic pace of the power pop soundtrack: arriving at the edge of a 
lake on his last breath he lets gravity pull him into the water. The detectives catch up with him, 
but, although he gets rid of the dope right in front of their eyes, they cannot charge him with 
anything without hard evidence. The true function of the police in the film turns out to be not 
determining the particular crime for which the justice system could impose a certain amount of 
punishment and thereby uphold the law of disciplinary power but making Frank guilty beyond 
any measure, having him throw away the object (empty the bag of heroin) that could serve to 
assess the quantity of his guilt as well as his debt to his creditors. This literally turns the discrete 
object of his desire into the Lacanian objet a, the embodiment of lack that he will be doomed 
trying to fill in for the rest of the film.17 The cops know this and let him go assuming that since 
he owes the drug money to someone his despair over his inability to pay it back would 
eventually drive him into their hands as an informer. This is how, as Agamben stresses, the state 
of control deals with crisis in general; it doesn’t try to solve social problems like crime but lets 
them proliferate while managing their effects, to the point where the law itself becomes directly 
complicit in its own transgression, perpetuating lawlessness in a permanent state of exception.18 
Among the criminals it is the drug lord Milo who represents this new post-disciplinary superego 
of control: the moment Frank confesses to him that he lost his heroin, instead of punishing him 
based on the principle of equivalence he arbitrarily increases his debt from 120.000 to 180.000 
Crowns and gives him an unreasonably limited time to deliver. As a result, the temporal horizon 
                                                 
17 If classical noirs like Double Indemnity depicted objet a derailing the linear narrative progress of the film as a 
fetish object like Phyllis Dietrichson’s ankle bracelet, drugs, the ultimate fetish objects in Refn’s film are a stand-in 
for the void from the very beginning.  
18 See Giorgio Agamben, “From the State of Control to a Praxis of Destituent Power,” Roar Magazine, February 4, 
2014, accessed April 28, 2016, https://roarmag.org/essays/agamben-destituent-power-democracy/.  
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of the protagonist’s life built on exchanges of trust shrinks drastically; his future is cancelled by 
an imminent catastrophe he can now only try to postpone as his ability to control time through 
measurable labour becomes suspended. The political economy established by this new technique 
of governance is that of neoliberalism, based on a never repayable debt/guilt that makes people 
incessantly active yet always precarious, unable to ever balance the sheets.19 
 This duality underlies the film’s narrative form as well. On the one hand, Pusher qualifies 
as a Deleuzian action-image in which each step the hero takes to pay back his debt modifies the 
situation he was previously in, and the new situation pushes him towards a new action.20 As a 
hopelessly indebted man Frank has no choice but to start collecting the petty loans he himself 
handed out in his social network, transforming his bonds of trust in the community governed by 
a fiction of equality and shared futurity into monetized power relationships between creditor and 
debtor demanding immediate repayment, thereby gradually destroying the form of life he shared 
with these people that has been the condition of possibility for his own financial solvency. The 
chronologically unfolding story is a sequence of his encounters with various junkies and other 
lowlifes of Copenhagen who are either unable or unwilling to pay him anything, provoking his 
increasingly more violent but ultimately impotent outbursts that do nothing but further alienate 
him from his friends. That is to say, his situation certainly changes from episode to episode, but 
instead of getting him closer to his objective it changes from bad to worse, turning him more and 
more into an isolated noir hero driven towards his death. The trajectory of Frank’s narrative is 
therefore a spiral one, representing an autoimmune crisis of the generic and more specifically of 
the action-image insofar as his violent acts, by turning against the biopolitical community that 
                                                 
19 On the relationship between neoliberal debt and guilt see Maurizio Lazzarato, Making of the Indebted Man, trans. 
J. D. Jordan (Amsterdam: Semiotext(e), 2012) as well as Chapter 4 of this dissertation.  
20 Deleuze calls this the “large form” of the action image, “SAS' [that] move[s] from the situation to the action, 
which modifie[s] the situation.” Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement Image, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. 
Habberjam (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1986), 160. 
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could guarantee their instrumental function, become increasingly empty gestures of acting out, 
contributing to the endless postponement of their positive outcome.21 The generic forms of 
satisfaction that followed the action of a successful drug deal at the beginning of the film, the 
jouissance Frank shared with his friend Tonny (hitting on girls together in a bar, talking about 
their sex lives), Milo (tasting the food he cooked) as well as the junkie-prostitute Vic (getting 
high and passing out together), are now abandoned for an affect that Lauren Berlant calls “cruel 
optimism,” 
a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility whose realization is 
discovered either to be impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible, and toxic. What's cruel 
about these attachments, and not merely inconvenient or tragic, is that the subjects who 
have x in their lives might not well endure the loss of their object/scene of desire, even 
though its presence threatens their well-being, because whatever the content of the 
attachment is, the continuity of its form provides something of the continuity of the 
subject's sense of what it means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the 
world.22  
In Lacanian terms, cruel optimism is the name for the masculine subject’s death drive under 
neoliberalism where the unary trait he is doomed to repeat to give a zero level of consistency to 
his existence is the mark of his singular encounter with an unpayable debt, an unfillable object-
                                                 
21 For Andras Balint Kovacs spiral narrative trajectories are characteristic of some European art films made between 
1950 and 1980 like Germany Year Zero (1948) or Jules and Jim (1962). They are “stories in which the initial 
problem, although partially solved, triggers another conflict that reproduces the initial problem in a different 
situation. The characters go through a series of attempts to resolve the problem but each time they reach only a 
temporary solution. They constantly replicate new situations where the same problem remains to be solved. The 
conflict reemerges over and over again. The solution in these stories is typically not the elimination of the conflict 
but the elimination of the characters who cannot solve the conflict.” Andras Balint Kovacs, Screening Modernism: 
European Art Cinema, 1950-1980 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2007), 80. As I will show, Refn’s version of 
the spiral is different insofar as the character is never fully eliminated; the problem rather disappears through its 
normalization as an aesthetic spectacle.  
22 Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 24. 
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cause of desire symbolized for Frank by the plastic bag emptied out of heroin. Cruel optimism is 
therefore an example of glorification: it’s an attachment to the sovereign power apparatus that is 
quasi-religious rather than merely instrumental. This is why after a series of fiascos to round up 
the money, despite his growing panic he nonetheless returns to Milo with an optimistic facade, 
forcing a compliant smile on his face when the man eventually takes his jewelry and watch (the 
apparatus for the measurement of time) counting them well under what they are worth to cover a 
fracture of his debt. Then, when a moment later he receives a phone call from yet another of his 
unreliable debtors, his reward for being cooperative earlier is to get beaten up and tortured by 
Milo’s henchmen.  
 Pusher therefore represents a different kind of crisis of the action-image from what 
Deleuze envisaged in his cinema books: not the breakdown of the sensory motor scheme of the 
classical Hollywood movement-image into pure optical and sound situations through the time-
image of postwar art cinema in which characters become incapacitated to act, but the exposure of 
an atemporal, meaningless death drive as the motor of the chronological narrative progress of the 
movement-image itself.23 What Angelo Restivo writes about the classical noir Kiss Me Deadly 
(1955), that it’s “a detective film in which there is no real detection, but just a kind of jerking 
forward of self-contained spasms of action”24 applies to Pusher as well: the anticipated moment 
of reckoning never comes but the passage a l’acte, the impulsive violent action that fills its lack 
                                                 
23 If, as Gregory Flaxman suggests, “the sensory-motor schema insinuates itself in the cinema as a pleasure principle 
(Lustprinzip),” its autoimmune crisis in Pusher reveals its drivenness by a surplus-enjoyment (jouissance) beyond 
the pleasure principle. See Gregory Flaxman, “Introduction,” in The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the 
Philosophy of the Cinema, ed. G. Flaxman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 21. 
24 Angelo Restivo, “Into the Breach: Between the Movement-Image and the Time-Image,” The Brain is the Screen: 
Deleuze and the Philosophy of the Cinema, ed. G. Flaxman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 
188-89. 
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keeps the narrative going.25 If, as David Martin-Jones argues, “[t]he movement-image can be 
seen to exist on what Deleuze and Guattari referred to as the reterritorialized 'plane of 
organization', while the time-image emerges on its interactive partner, the deterritorializing 
'plane of consistency',”26 Pusher’s autoimmune action-images reveal how the territoriality of the 
gangster film’s movement-image is already anchored in its own plane of noir deterritorialization. 
What Pusher stands for is not the breakdown of the sensory motor function but the normalization 
of its crisis into a new neoliberal form of precarious existence.27 Frank doesn’t so much lose his 
ability to perform actions as he falls out of step with the refrain of the city, of the rhizomatic 
space of informal social links he shared with his misfit friends. According to Franco Berardi, 
[t]he refrain is an obsessive ritual that allows the individual—the conscious organism in 
continuous variation—to find identification points, and to territorialize herself and to 
represent herself in relation to the surrounding world. The refrain is the modality of 
semiotization that allows an individual (a group, a people, a nation, a subculture, a 
movement) to receive and project the world according to reproducible and communicable 
formats.28 
                                                 
25 In his seminar on anxiety Lacan distinguishes acting out from what he calls passage a l’acte. While the former 
remains tied to the social symbolic order and should be understood as a message to the big Other, the latter is the 
sign of the psychotic abandonment of the social link. In biopolitical terms, acting out is immunizing while passage a 
l’acte is autoimmune. In Pusher, as in film noir in general, however, this distinction collapses and we have a 
glimpse at the psychotic core of the social link.  See Jacques Lacan, Anxiety. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book 
X, trans. A. R. Price (Cambridge, MA: Polity, 2014) 
26 David Martin-Jones, “Schizoanalysis, Spectacle and the Spaghetti Western,” in Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of 
Cinema, ed. I. Buchanan and P. MacCormack (New York: Continuum, 2008), 75-76. 
27 Perhaps Pusher also offers a noir meta discourse explaining a phenomenon observed by David Martin-Jones, how 
“[i]n the 1990s and 2000s [...] mainstream cinemas around the world have begun to produce films that are, broadly 
speaking, hybrids of Deleuze’s two image categories.” For him, a film like “Fifty First Dates is caught somewhere 
in between movement and time-image, in a suspended moment where, for the most part, characters’ actions are 
unable to change a situation for the better as they would in the movement-image, yet without their being as entirely 
incapacitated as characters in the time-image.” David Martin-Jones, “Demystifying Deleuze: French Philosophy 
Meets Contemporary U.S. Cinema,” in Film Theory and Contemporary Hollywood Movies, ed. W. Buckland (New 
York: Routledge, 2009), 217; 219. 
28 Franco Berardi, The Uprising: On Poetry and Finance (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2012), 130. 
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Frank’s rhythmic detachment starts with his fall into the pond that marks his symbolic rebirth as 
an indebted man and gradually turns him into an affectless automaton repressing what Berardi 
calls sensibility, “the faculty that makes empathic understanding possible, the ability to 
comprehend what words cannot say, the power to interpret a continuum of non-discreet 
elements, non-verbal signs and the flows of empathy,”29 “the ability to harmonize with the 
rhizome.”30 It is his growing impatience with his monetarily non-quantifiable human relations 
that leads to his violent outbursts like beating up Tonny with a baseball bat, destroying the 
workshop of a friend who cannot pay him, or hitting his prostitute “girlfriend” for showing 
affections for him. In one crucial scene when he sees her passed out on the couch after shooting a 
dose of heroin, he starts caressing her legs, but getting scared of the sudden intimacy triggered by 
his distracted gesture he decides to wake her up (in the middle of the night) by sonically abusing 
her with loud guitar music. Here as in elsewhere his violence is an attempt to regain rhythmic 
control over his life while at the same time disavowing its condition of possibility: a refrain 
shared with the other. He forces the tired woman to witness his performance of a virile solo 
routine (his self-image) which remains a masturbatory display of masculine jouissance as Frank 
then quickly leaves, avoiding dancing or having sex with her. The blaring rock music continues 
non-diegetically as he leaves the building, but outside a vertigo inducing series of 360 degree 
point of view shots reveals the growing panic behind his facade of self-confidence (his nighttime 
stroll yet again fails to bring any results).  
 The final scene then translates this loss of spatial orientation into sovereign images of 
time. After a successful sale of a small amount of stolen drugs for 9000 Crowns in a dance club, 
                                                 
29 Franco Berardi, Precarious Rhapsody: Semiocapitalism and the Pathologies of the Post-Alpha Generation, trans. 
A. Bove et al. (London: Minor Compositions, 2009), 124. 
30 Berardi, The Uprising, 121. 
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Frank reneges on his promise to run away with Vic to Spain, planning to offer the money as 
partial payment to Milo instead in yet another cruelly optimistic decision. The woman, instead of 
quietly accepting his betrayal like she always has, grabs the money and runs away. Frank chases 
her outside but she jumps into a cab and disappears. He now stands motionless on the street in 
the middle of the night, hopelessly out of step with the pumping techno music and the flickering 
lights of the disco behind him. As a return of the repressed, images of his former friends turning 
against him pop up in his mind: Milo and his hitman preparing a body bag, the drug dealer he 
robbed loading a gun, and Vic driving away alone. These crystal images of time capture the zero 
level of neoliberalism’s autoimmune economy of debt as a self-destructive masculine bios 
posited against a feminine line of flight—sovereign-images that re-instrumentalize Frank’s body 
even at the moment of its final collapse into a gesture. The close-up of Frank’s half lit face 
frozen into silent despair, his blank upward gaze into the void is like a cynical homage to 
Dreyer’s Joan of Arc. As the “reverse shot” to a black screen before the final credits makes it 
clear, instead of divine transcendence there is literally nothing for Refn’s male hero outside the 
noir city.31  
  Although he never leaves the force field of the masculine law, contrary to the protagonist 
of Nolan’s films, Frank cannot restore his patriarchal authority to curb the deterritorializing 
momentum of capital. At the same time he doesn’t succeed adapting to it either like Boyle’s 
heroes who after a connective mutation are able move in synch with the machinic rhythm of the 
neoliberal economy. In Refn’s early films, neoliberalism has no refrain; when Frank’s bare life 
becomes detached from the homosocial community of Copenhagen’s criminal underworld it 
                                                 
31 It’s worth contrasting this ending with that of another well known Danish film from the same year, Lars von 
Trier’s Breaking the Waves in which the final reverse shot does make God exist within the diegesis. However, as I 
argue elsewhere, the apparatus of the masculine gaze mobilized by von Trier is no less cynical than the outcome of 
Refn’s film. See Tamas Nagypal, “The Postfeminist Masquerade and the Cynical Male Gaze: The Disavowal of 
Sexual Difference in Lars von Trier’s Breaking the Waves.” E-rea 12, no. 2 (2014) 
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doesn’t turn into an entrepreneurial self like Renton’s or Jamal’s. And yet, just like the capitalist 
realists in Nolan’s and Boyle’s films, he effectively cannot imagine an alternative to the status 
quo. Instead he masochistically fantasizes about the violent death he will have to suffer so that 
things can continue as they are.  
 Both a digression from and a return to Pusher’s themes, Bleeder (1999), the second of 
Refn’s four Copenhagen noirs is a slacker comedy infused with a family melodrama about 
incest—“[t]wo stories for the price of one” as the IMDb blurb puts it.32 One of the protagonists, 
Leo, is played by the same Kim Bodnia who was Frank in Pusher, and his plotline is about a 
comparable violent unravelling of his homosocial environment, this time caused by his anxiety 
about fatherhood. He becomes obsessed with the thought that his friend Louis, the brother of his 
pregnant girlfriend Louise, is the real father of his unborn child, which puts him on a path of 
impotent acting out. Violence escalates when he starts beating the woman uncontrollably, to 
which Louis responds by kidnapping and torturing him, and finally injecting him with HIV—a 
very literal signifier for the male homosocial’s autoimmune disease. It’s important to note here 
that for Eve Sedgwick who coined the term, homosocial means male to male social relationships 
that, while potentially homoerotic, repress explicit homosexuality.33 Slavoj Žižek makes a 
similar argument about patriarchal apparatuses mobilizing homoerotic rituals such as army 
hazing practices to support an otherwise rigidly heteronormative regime.34 The point is that 
homoeroticism can have an immunizing function within reactionary ideological regimes only 
insofar as the performance of the homosexual act itself remains a taboo. And while Refn’s film 
gets close to breaking it, it doesn’t, in fact both the grotesquely theatrical HIV injection scene 
                                                 
32 “Bleeder (1999),” Internet Movie Database, accessed June 6, 2016, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0161292/?ref_=nv_sr_2.  
33 See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1992) 
34 See Slavoj Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies (New York: Verso, 2008), 31. 
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and the verbal references to brother-sister incest, that is to say, the autoimmune implosion of 
heterosexual patriarchy only reinforces the homosexual act as impossible. Autoimmune violence 
is also substituted for gay male sex when the HIV infected Leo shoots Louis in the stomach, and 
instead of finishing him off he lets his diseased blood drip into his wound before turning the gun 
on himself. His self-sacrifice is therefore not a subtractive one in Badiou’s sense of the term35 
because instead of affirming a universal community by abandoning his ties to the homosocial, he 
perpetuates them in their state of autoimmune dysfunction, purifying and preserving them as 
the bios of dying men.36 Appropriately, we don’t see the moment of his death either; before he 
could pull the trigger the screen dissolves into a red blur.  
 This noir plotline unfolds against the backdrop of a tight group of male friends, Leo, 
Louis, Lenny, and Kitjo hanging out after work, doing nothing or watching violent movies in the 
private screening room of Kitjo’s video store. As a counterpoint to the always agitated Leo 
worrying about the economic future of his family, Lenny, the introvert video store attendant has 
no ambitions to become anything but a slacker. Despite his social awkwardness it is him who 
eventually develops a successful romantic relationship with a lonely waitress, Lea, working in a 
local diner. In not so subtle ways Refn suggests that the temporality of cinephilia can create 
shared habitual bubbles and protect human bonds from autoimmune self-destruction under the 
psychic pressures of neoliberalism. Lenny, like his predecessor Travis Bickle, asks the girl out 
for a first date to the cinema. But unlike Travis or his buddy Leo, he is too nervous to assume a 
masculine role; after watching her from a distance for a while waiting for him in front of the 
building he turns around and spends the evening with his male friends instead. They watch a 
                                                 
35 See Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
36 This is why Vicari’s assessment of the scene is misleading. For him, the denouement is “drawn straight from 
ancient mythos, a spectacular sacrifice summoned forth to cleanse inexpiable sin, a blood guilt.” Vicari, , Nicolas 
Winding Refn, 72-73. Primordial guilt is not eliminated but normalized after Leo’s sacrifice.  
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horror film, but their homosocial viewing experience is ruined when Leo stands in front of the 
screen and pulls a gun on Louis as a clear sign of his inability to embrace imaginary over real 
violence, the passive (“feminine”) pleasures of being acted upon by violent images during the 
unproductive time of film viewing over the masculine acting (out) on the body of the other. That 
is to say, for Refn, just like for Deleuzian film theorists like Gaylyn Studlar or Steven Shaviro, 
the spectator is not Laura Mulvey’s sadistic voyeur occupying the diegetic world’s 
transcendental lack to gain phallic control over the screen but a masochist playfully regressing 
into a state of pre-Oedipal submission to a maternal Other of plentitude, a subject position 
characterized by “fantasy, disavowal, fetishism, and suspense.”37 As Vicari summarizes, 
“[c]inema is the real mother, or mother-substitute, in Bleeder.”38 However, this shift from a 
phallic to a “feminine” relationship to cinema, from ideologically invested image to “post-
ideological” affect, from the territorialized identity of the spectator to her deterritorialized 
becoming also reflects the historical change from disciplinary societies to societies of control. It 
is this shift in the form of capitalism that Refn often betrays a rather uncritical ideological 
investment in (“I don’t make movies, I make experiences,” he quips)39 which complicates his 
“feminine,” and occasionally genuinely utopian take on the cinema.   
In Bleeder, it is the law of the mother that Lenny chooses when he refuses to attend Leo’s 
funeral, or when sitting idly on the pavement with Kitjo in one of the film’s slacker comedy 
scenes he announces he won’t take a better paying job in a competitor’s video store because he’d 
have to change buses to get there. As in Pusher, agitated bodily posturing in Bleeder is 
                                                 
37 Gaylyn Studlar, “Masochism and the Perverse Pleasures of the Cinema,” Quarterly Review of Film Studies 9, no. 
4 (1984): 268. On a Deleuzian, masochistic concept of spectatorship see also Steven Shaviro, The Cinematic Body 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993) 
38 Vicari, Nicolas Winding Refn, 82. 
39 “Nicolas Winding Refn & Christina Hendricks Exclusive Interview - THE NEON DEMON (JoBlo.com),” 
YouTube video, 3:25, posted by “JoBlo Movie Trailers,” June 20, 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tDR48s8YZ1E.  
344 
 
associated with the futile attempt to pick up the accelerated pace of neoliberal life, perhaps best 
illustrated by Leo and Louis walking fast next to one another at the beginning of the film, 
seemingly enjoying the synchronized rhythm of their upper body’s a masculine swing—an 
illusory harmony akin to Elephant’s autoimmune tracking shots resulting in deadly violence. By 
contrast, Lenny quickly abandons his manly attempt to walk Lea home from a bus stop sensing 
how ridiculous his performance is, but as the smile that appears on both of their faces after he 
turns around and leaves suggests, this is not the end but the beginning of their relationship. When 
he revisits her in the diner the day after he similarly failed to act like a man on their date, she is 
not mad at him for standing him up; after Lenny offers to wait there until her shift ends, she 
agrees to go to another film with him. The final shot frames them standing together quietly, 
passing the time with some empty gestures like wiping the counter or taking a sip of water. Then, 
to underline the artifice of the movie set, what appeared to be natural light from the outside is 
turned off and the two of them are now surrounded by darkness, lit only by two spotlights from 
above like a noir couple in a classical Hollywood film. The scene then dissolves into red just like 
before Leo’s suicide, creating an equivalence between these two ideologically opposed narrative 
conclusions insofar as they both mobilize cinema’s powers of the false when their action-image 
threatens to fall apart into pure gestures. In both cases the red screen is a fetish substitute 
for/protection against an inoperative real threatening to reveal itself to the viewer through the act 
of sovereign violence in the first storyline, and by reflecting on the unproductive time spent in 
the cinema in the second one.40  
                                                 
40 In his essay Fetishism, Freud defines the fetish as “a token of triumph over the threat of castration and a protection 
against it.” He suggests the fetish object is a result of the disavowal of castration, the confrontation of the lack of the 
mother’s penis—the lack that Lacan later identified as the real. Sigmund Freud, “Fetishism,” in The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud Volume 21, ed. and trans. J. Strachey (London: 
Hogarth Press, 1961), 156. 
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 Refn’s experimentation with a synthesis between noir and anti-noir formulas continues 
with his snow noir Fear X (discussed in detail in the next section), which opens a new chapter in 
his career not only as his first English language film but as his first venture into the territory of 
slow cinema. The Danny Boyle-esque wide angle stylizations and tableau shots of Bleeder were 
already a departure from the gritty, low budget realism of Pusher with its shaky camera and lack 
of artificial lighting. Fear X continues on this path but reaches a temporary dead end due to its 
massive financial failure that forces Refn to take a step back towards a more conventional film 
form and direct two sequels to Pusher. Pusher 2 (2004), which the director likes to refer to as 
“the girly Pusher,”41 follows Frank’s former partner Tonny (played by Mads Mikkelsen—Lenny 
from Bleeder), after he is released from prison, in his futile attempt to prove his worth to his 
gangster father Smeden. He finds himself stuck in-between the man’s sociopathic male tribe of 
criminals who don’t accept him (they have him ride in the trunk after successful robbery—in the 
interstitial space within a classical noir non-place) and the women they abuse, exploit, and 
control through drugs, and who viciously mock him for being an impotent loser (when he cannot 
get an erection with two prostitutes they laugh at his “hobbit dick”). While in prison, Tonny also 
became a father without his knowledge, and now his anxiety over child support payments pushes 
him into risky drug deals. After they fail, he almost strangles his girlfriend when she finds her 
snorting cocaine during a wedding/bachelor party while leaving their baby on the floor in a dark 
corner of the bar.42 Yet, despite his momentary misogynistic outburst he doesn’t comply with 
Smeden’s order to kill the mother of the man’s other son, a prostitute asking for too much child 
                                                 
41 See Danny Leigh, “Pusher returns” 
42 The apocalyptic scene of a prostitute’s striptease to monotonous techno music in front of a whole wedding party 
including children and the subsequent abandonment of the baby for snorting cocaine in the kitchen is Refn’s nod to 
Trainspotting’s use of the dead baby as a symbol of the deadlock of parenthood under neoliberalism. 
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support. He kills Smeden instead, then picks up his own baby and runs.43 They get on a bus in a 
hurry to leave everything behind, the last shot showing the back of Tonny’s head as they are on 
the move, inverting the final image of Pusher. Nevertheless, we cut to the credits before they 
could leave the city.44  
  If Pusher 2 complicates the gender dynamics of the original by feminizing its male 
protagonist, Pusher 3 (2005) does the same to the ethnic composition of Copenhagen’s criminal 
underworld by problematizing the hero’s whiteness. The main character this time is Milo, the 
Serbian drug lord from the first film but in a significantly more vulnerable position: he is an 
aging heroin addict participating in a twelve step program, his young Arab competitors are trying 
to squeeze him out, his supplier from Amsterdam just gave him fake ecstasy instead of the heroin 
he ordered, and on the top of it all, he’s in charge of organizing his rather spoiled adult 
daughter’s expensive birthday party. The only way he can keep it all together is by smoking a 
heroin cigarette from time to time, then feeling guilty and running to the addicts’ meeting to 
confess. In one scene he is sitting exhausted in a café when an old friend walks in, offering him 
some heroin. He says no, but, as the friend notes, his eyes say yes: he takes the dope and smokes 
it in the bathroom. This is the routine of cruel optimism he lives by that turns negation into 
affirmation, preventing his escape and perpetuating his pain. The final image sums it up with 
showing him standing at the edge of his empty pool smoking, the camera facing him in a long 
shot to capture the magnitude of the void he risks falling into.  
 Refn also has some clever commentary about the biopolitical regimes of imperial 
violence intersecting with Milo’s neoliberal enterprise. As Hjort points out, one of the 
                                                 
43 The scene is homage to John Woo’s heroic bloodshed films. 
44 Furthermore, the bus seems to be local public transport not a coach.  
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consequences of New Danish Cinema’s glocalization in the mid-90s was what he calls an “ethnic 
turn,” “transforming film culture into a site for public debate about questions of citizenship and 
belonging.”45 The Pusher Trilogy does this, he suggests, through an ironic exaggeration of 
Danish stereotypes about the ethnic other, a technique that aims at defusing xenophobia rather 
than reinforcing it.46 This explains why Milo’s henchman-torturer is called Radovan, after the 
chief Serbian orchestrator of Srebrenica massacre killing thousands of Bosnian Muslims in 1995, 
and for those viewers who may not make the connection immediately Refn throws in a small 
shrine with the photo of Radovan Karadžić in Milo’s house, indicating the war criminal’s quasi-
religious worship. In the third film which was made after yet another enthno-nationalist conflict 
in the Balkans, the NATO bombing of Serbia after an (allegedly) attempted genocide of (also 
predominantly Muslim) Kosovo Albanians in 1999, two Albanian gangsters make their 
appearance, taking over Milo’s heroin supply line and dragging him into the prostitution 
business. They fulfill the stereotype (and to a large extent fact) of the Albanian mafia taking over 
the EU’s drug trade and human trafficking, exploiting the fact that Kosovars were given refugee 
status after the war by western countries.47 Milo’s other competitor, the hotheaded Arab drug 
dealer Lille Muhammed is also a caricature, playing on the Danish fear of immigrants and 
islamophobia when announcing his people will take over the old man’s territory simply because 
there are more and more of them. What makes this web of ethnic micro-conflicts complicated is 
that they are not simply based on the distinction between ethnic (white) Danes and immigrants, 
but they are overdetermined by often contradictory western imperial objectives. The fact that 
Milo and his Serbian crew find themselves in a both precarious and powerful position in the 
                                                 
45 Hjort, Small Nation, xii. 
46 Ibid., 267. 
47 See Jana Arsovska, Decoding Albanian Organized Crime: Culture, Politics, and Globalization (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2015) 
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criminal underworld is not unrelated to the similarly ambiguous role of Serbia in global 
geopolitics as a staunch ally of Russia and thus the enemy of NATO on the one hand, and the 
forefront of “Christian” Fortress Europe’s battle against the Muslim threat on the other. In the 
90s the clash of civilizations agenda had lower priority for the west than the NATO expansion to 
the East into the territory of the former USSR, to the point that, after Afghanistan, the US 
actually deployed Mujahideen fighters (Wahhabi Islamic radicals) both in Bosnia and in Kosovo 
to advance its interests against Russia and its allies in the region.48 After 9/11 the accents 
changed a little, of course; however, Russophobia (the co-signified of Serbophobia) didn’t 
disappear as much as Islamophobia appeared by its side. This is how the perfect noir role for 
Milo opened up by 2005: while his people have been the enemy of the west in the previous 
decade, the very reason (or rather pretext) for their othered status, the killing of Muslims, now 
makes them uniquely qualified to defend the borders of western civilization. This is how Milo 
finds himself in a biopolitical zone of indistinction mandated to reenact, as a sovereign, the 
torture and murder of Muslim bodies with the help of the by now retired Radovan who comes 
back to his old habits one more time to help out an old friend.49 They kill the Kosovar Rexho, as 
well as Lille Muhammed, throwing in a Polish pimp as a third who turned violent after a Danish 
madam refused to buy his underage prostitute-slave—in his case the Danish cultural racism 
towards Eastern European migrants also conflicts with western imperial interests as Poland, just 
like Kosovo, is a firm ally of the US. This, of course, is what sovereignty is about: to exclude 
those who are formally included in the political community while standing in its Agambenian 
                                                 
48 See Peter Dale Scott, “The US-Al Qaeda Alliance: Bosnia, Kosovo and Now Libya. Washington’s On-Going 
Collusion with Terrorists,” Global Research, July 29, 2011, accessed June 6, 2016, 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-us-al-qaeda-alliance-bosnia-kosovo-and-now-libya-washington-s-on-going-
collusion-with-terrorists/25829.  
49 The rest of Milo’s crew are decapitated by stomach problems after eating a supposedly authentic Serbian dish 
made by their boss—yet another example of an autoimmune disease.  
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zone of indistinction50 where the official law and order is suspended (we even see a Danish 
policeman deliver Muhammed to Milo on the condition that he doesn’t hurt him, in other words, 
that hurting him doesn’t implicate him). Refn goes over the top with the scene of biopolitical 
violence as well, shooting it as an extended homage to his favorite film, The Texas Chain Saw 
Massacre (1974). Milo and Radovan slaughter the men like pigs, hang them upside down on 
meat hooks to bleed them dry, then gut the bodies and chop them into pieces—all this in the 
backroom of Milo’s restaurant on the night of his daughter’s birthday feast next door, literalizing 
the price of a southern immigrant’s integration into the symbolic order of Empire.  
 After the success of the Pusher sequels Refn leaves Denmark again, playing it safe this 
time by directing a couple of indie films in the UK before trying his luck in Hollywood again. 
The first of these is Bronson (2008), a biopic of “Britain’s most violent prisoner” Michael 
Gordon Peterson, better known by his fighting name as Charles Bronson. He was put in jail for 
armed robbery in 1974 but is still in in prison today due his ultraviolent behaviour, spending 
most of his life in solitary confinement in various penitentiary and mental health institutions. 
Refn turns the man into a performance artist of the white male body’s blissful self-destruction, a 
kindred spirit exploring the jouissance of extreme violence that serves no purpose outside of 
itself. Abandoning the documentary realism of Pusher 2 and 3 he builds on Bleeder’s Danny 
Boyle inspired stylized film language with static tableau shots, an oversaturated colour palette, 
an overbearing soundtrack combining dynamic pieces from Verdi and Wagner operas with 
hypnotic synth pop, and a Brechtian direct address of the viewer by the protagonist wearing 
clown make-up, narrating and occasionally singing his life story on a theater stage.  
                                                 
50 See Chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
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This turn to experimental form is part of Refn’s increasingly more conscious framing of 
his cinematic project as schizoanalysis, an endeavour Deleuze and Guattari defined as following 
“the machinic indices of deterritorialization” as opposed to (a narrowly understood) 
psychoanalysis that “settles on the imaginary and structural representatives of 
reterritorialization.”51 As Amy Herzog explains, “[r]ather than interpreting pre-constituted 
subjects, schizoanalysis maps the nexus of forces that work to make subject formation possible. 
The goal is to expose the repressive operations of such systems, dismantling them and opening 
them to unforeseen connections with outside elements.”52 Applied to the film viewer’s 
experience, schizo cinema emerges out of the crisis of the generic. As Anna Powell argues, it is a 
technique of filmmaking that “breaks down our immune defences, infecting and living in us on 
all levels, sprouting new growths of sensation, perception and thought.”53 In Bronson, Refn 
chooses resistance to two classical Foucauldian repressive institutions, the prison and the asylum 
to explore the becoming schizo of the western white heterosexual male subject, the possibility of 
his body’s disentanglement from Empire’s biopolitical apparatus. For the protagonist, the prison 
offers “madness at its very best,”54 a permanent opportunity to resist disciplinary power (guards, 
doctors, prison bureaucrats, the riot police, etc.) through the repeated performance of violence 
                                                 
51 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. R. Hutley et al. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 316. This, of course, limited view of psychoanalysis is summed 
up by Ian Buchanan as the analytic discourse that “emphasizes the imaginary and the symbolic at the expense of the 
real.” Ian Buchanan, “Introduction: Five Theses of Actually Existing Schizoanalysis of Cinema,” in Deleuze and the 
Schizoanalysis of Cinema, ed. I. Buchanan and P. MacCormack (New York: Continuum, 2008), 8. By contrast, 
Žižek argues that the Late Lacan’s turn towards the real actually overlaps with Deleuze’s interest in anti-Oedipal 
desiring machines. See Slavoj Žižek, Organs without Bodies: Deleuze and Consequences (New York: Routledge, 
2004) 
52 Amy Herzog, “Suspended Gestures: Schizoanalysis, Affect and the Face in Cinema,” in Deleuze and the 
Schizoanalysis of Cinema, ed. I. Buchanan and P. MacCormack (New York: Continuum, 2008), 64.  
53 Anna Powell, Deleuze, Altered States and Film (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 116. 
54 As he himself puts it in the film. 
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for its own sake, without any positive results.55 As he puts it in his stage monologue, “I knew I 
was made for better things. I had a calling. I just didn't know what it is.” “What do I want?” is 
his recurring question throughout the film for which his violent acts themselves are just 
variations, addressing the big Other in a hysteric acting out, while at the same time undermining 
the social link in a psychotic passage a l’acte. In other words, his becoming schizo is an 
autoimmune process not unlike the one Refn’s other protagonists like Frank and Leo go through, 
the result of which is the loss of the hero’s ability to talk: the film ends after guards in riot gear 
beat Bronson into a bloody pulp and lock his naked body into a cage, responding to his 
inarticulate howling with turning the lights off. Yet, this ending, breaking with the otherwise 
chronological narration, is then looped back to the beginning of the film where, still 
accompanied by the protagonist’s voiceover, we see him training for the next fight in the very 
same cell, then the guards reopen the door to brutalize him once again.  
In Foucauldian terms, it’s safe to say that Bronson’s relation to disciplinary power is 
agonistic. It is 
“…a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle, less of a 
face-to-face confrontation which paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation.”56 
[…] “Every power relationship implies, at least in potentia, a strategy of struggle, in 
which the two forces are not superimposed, do not lose their specific nature, or do not 
finally become confused. Each constitutes for the other a kind of permanent limit, a point 
of possible reversal. A relationship of confrontation reaches its term, its final moment 
                                                 
55 As Vicari notes, “Bronson is also refusing to internalize the Foucauldian panopticon, the self-censoring structure 
at the heart of the punitive social order,” meaning that he doesn’t confess the reason for his violence. Vicari, Nicolas 
Winding Refn, 143. 
56 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” trans. L. Sawyer, Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (1982): 790. 
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(and the victory of one of the two adversaries), when stable mechanisms replace the free 
play of antagonistic reactions.”57  
As Brent Pickett notes, in Madness and Civilization Foucault suggests that before the modern 
era, discourses of reason and unreason had such an agonistic relationship, each with their own 
autonomous meaning serving as the other’s limit, co-existing in the same discursive space, often 
entering a dialogue with each other. With the rise of bourgeois reason, however, unreason was 
increasingly transformed into madness, a mere pathological lack of its opposite to be excluded 
from meaningful discourse as such, separated from it in a never ending process of interrogation 
where abnormal bodies were made to confess the rational truth of their deviation.58 It is only 
through confessional techniques of power that madness was constructed as a site of absolute 
otherness, fixed as the unconfessable remainder of the “stable mechanism” of reason. By 
contrast, Refn’s film turns back the modern notion of madness into unreason, restoring its 
agonistic play with the discourse of reason and eliminating the transcendental illusion of its 
unrepresentable difference responsible for its ontological subjugation.  
Ironically, though, it is through its redefinition as autoimmune violence that madness is 
once again normalized in Bronson, becoming immanent to the same field of power that 
bourgeois reason occupies today, the field that Deleuze called the society of control. This 
moment of transition from disciplinary to control society is precisely captured in the film (as 
well as in the real life of Bronson): after spending years heavily medicated in lunatic asylums 
throughout the 70s, part of a neoliberal anti-welfare state measures of the Thatcher-era they 
certify him sane in the early 80s and let him out. As his voiceover comments: “Apparently I 
                                                 
57 Ibid., 794. 
58 Brent L. Pickett, “Foucault and the Politics of Resistance,” Polity 28, no. 4 (1996): 448-49. 
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managed to cause the system tens of millions of pounds in damage, and her majesty no longer 
wanted to pleasure herself with Britain’s most expensive prisoner.” The expression “pleasure 
herself” is worth looking at more closely here as it reveals a libidinal link between the body 
politic of Britain and its unruly (“mad”) subject reduced to the status of bare life, medicated into 
a vegetative state in an asylum. It refers to the masculine jouissance gained from excluding the 
homo sacer from the bios of the Queen’s Empire, the sovereign act performed by the doctors and 
bureaucrats turning Bronson’s incapacitated body into the Lacanian real phallus, inclusively 
excluded from the community of language users. Under a disciplinary regime, such subject, 
although bombarded with the normative rhythm of productive life, is prevented from actually 
synchronizing his or her body with it (this is why women in classical noir had to be punished 
arbitrarily). In an emblematic scene that functions as a vanishing mediator between the regimes 
of discipline and control, all the patients of the asylum are locked into a large mess hall, trying to 
dance to the Pet Shop Boys synthpop song It’s a Sin—a metaphor both for the old regime’s 
exclusion of undisciplined bodies and the emergent neoliberalism’s machinic 
enslavement/mobilization of that very same excess through an affirmative economy of guilt. The 
result is a chaotic mess in which everyone is out of step with the beat in their own way, Bronson 
being the most extreme of all, staggering like a zombie due to the heavy dose of sedatives. 
Frustrated with his half-paralysis, he turns his head towards the skylight and, in yet another 
Refnian nod to Dreyer’s Joan of Arc, he growls inarticulately.  
As a sign of the changing times, however, his mad plea to “God” is actually answered: he 
is released under the new government policies, which redefines his relationship to the Queen’s 
self-pleasuring body politic. When he visits his queer uncle to seek his support, the man 
introduces him at his house party with the line: “ladies and gentlemen in ladies attire, allow me 
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to present my favourite nephew, newly relieved of her majesty’s pleasure.” Not only is the word 
queen resignified here as a male transvestite, the entire biopolitical apparatus of the British 
Empire becomes “queered” from here on as an institution held together by gay male desire. 
When Bronson meets his old flamboyantly queer prison mate who now runs bare knuckle pit 
fights, the man simply says “let’s fuck” instead of “let’s talk business” when he wants to hire 
Bronson as a boxer to beat up “poor gypsies” for money.59 Significantly, the hero remains firmly 
heterosexual in this environment openly queer in performance only (just like in Bleeder, actual 
gay sex remains a structuring absence). It is for stealing jewellery for his girlfriend that he is 
incarcerated again; to the prison warden’s question what he’s been doing outside he 
enigmatically answers: “I’ve been building an Empire!” And he is quite right; with his release 
his formerly homo sacer body was transformed into neoliberalism’s new sovereign, his madness 
now mobilized to support an increasingly deterritorialized neoliberal Empire. Instead of heavy 
sedatives, he now receives a gay art instructor encouraging him to express himself. One of his 
drawings is of a naked male torso bent over on the prison floor; it has multiple heads of 
Bronson’s likeness with phallic noses attached to it, some coming out of his anus and other body 
cavities while others are linked through twisted umbilical cords. An animated sequence shows 
this anal machine making repetitive, masturbatory movements, its enlarged penis with a life on 
its own posing for one of the many surveillance cameras and camera-human hybrids in the room. 
Various phallic shaped birds, insects, and excremental beings carrying Bronson’s body parts 
move around the fecal spectacle as if they were animated by its self-pleasuring drive. To put this 
blueprint into practice, the hero then takes the art teacher hostage; tying him to a pole he turns 
him into a statue-replica of himself while plugging his mouth with an apple, creating a kind of 
totem figure instituting the taboo of homosexuality. It is necessary so that his homoerotic 
                                                 
59 Homage to the Walter Hill/Charles Bronson classic boxing film Hard Times (1975). 
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sadomasochistic play with the prison staff could continue: he puts on black body paint and jumps 
at the armed guards naked as if to re-enact the colonial resistance to the British army, or perhaps 
the coal miners’ battle with Thatcher’s police force. Another time he asks the guard himself he 
just took hostage to rub his naked body with grease as a preparation for the fight he thereby 
provoked. In other words, homosexuality, much like madness, is only normalized as the 
autoimmune violence of western white heterosexual masculine bios on itself, as the masochistic 
complicity with its never ending deterritorialization.60 This is how one should read Vicari’s 
observation that in Bronson “violence is no longer posed as an explicit denial of inter-male 
sexuality. In fact, with homoerotic tensions now full blown, so to speak, the violence which they 
usually, in genre terms, prefigure and summon forth can naturally be full blown as well.”61 Inter-
male sex is not so much denied by inter-male violence anymore as it is postponed by it; not 
repressed but disavowed in a sovereign decision to perpetuate an always pre-coital masculine 
bios through autoimmune violence. Or, to put it differently, homoeroticism in Bronson is 
absorbed entirely into homosocial violence as an end in itself, which prevents it from becoming a 
gesture, pure means without an end.62   
 
                                                 
60 As Marco Abel stresses: “Masochism is a practice—one that is not about the hope to overcome enslavement but 
about regulating the moment of enslavement.” Marco Abel, Violent Affect: Literature, Cinema, and Critique After 
Representation (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 24. 
61 Vicari, Nicolas Winding Refn, 66. 
62 The distinction comes from Agamben who argues that “what is relayed to human beings in gestures is not the 
sphere of an end in itself but rather the sphere of a pure and endless mediality.” Giorgio Agamben, Means Without 
End: Notes on Politics, trans. V. Binetti and C. Casarino (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2000), 58-59. 
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6.3 The Sovereign Self-Erasure of the Sovereign in Refn’s Slow Cinema 
Period 
 Bronson is the ultimate film of Refn’s first auteurial period dealing with the autoimmune 
crisis of the action-image under neoliberalism. By finally turning the pursued goal itself into a 
taboo, it redefines action as acting out/passage a l’acte, substituting its instrumental function 
with a form of unreason that never yields any positive results. Once all pretenses to change the 
hero’s situation are eliminated from the narrative in a process of purification, accents in the film 
form also shift to the suspense before action sequences, what in Deleuzian terms could be called 
the interval between the perception-image and the action-image, a place that in the sensory-
motor schema of the movement-image is normally filled out by an affection-image linking them, 
but which is now emptied out to give way to pure optical and sound situations in a time-image.63 
Most often throughout the film Bronson’s face is frozen into an expressionless state purified of 
any affect that could betray his motives. He is ready to act but neither he, nor the viewer knows 
why. On the other hand, since real action never comes, the film deploys static tableau shots, time 
lags in the middle of dialogues, and slow motion sequences to create a suspended temporality. 
These are the devices that dominate in Refn’s second, post-action or slow cinema period that 
starts with Fear X (2001), and after a little detour back to the action-image continues with 
Valhalla Rising (2009). His new style of filmmaking can be understood as a shift in his approach 
to an unrepresentable real (death, homosexual encounter, etc.). As Žižek usefully argues,  
                                                 
63 As Deleuze argues, in the opsigns and the sonsigns (pure optical and sound situations) of the time-image “[t]he 
interval of movement [is] no longer that in relation to which the movement-image was specified as perception-
image, at one end of the interval, as action-image at the other end, and as affection-image between the two, so as to 
constitute a sensory-motor whole. On the contrary the sensory-motor link [is] broken, and the interval of movement 
produced the appearance as such of an image other than the movement-image.” Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The 
Time-Image, trans. H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1986), 34. 
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[there] are two fundamentally different ways for us to relate to the Void, best captured by 
the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise: while Achilles can easily overtake the tortoise, 
he cannot ever reach her. [...] We either posit the Void as the impossible-real Limit of the 
human experience which we can only indefinitely approach, the absolute Thing towards 
which we have to maintain a  proper distance – if we get too close to it, we get burned by 
the sun – our attitude towards the Void must then be thoroughly ambiguous, marked by 
simultaneous attraction and repulsion. Or else we posit it as that through which we 
should (and, in a way, even always-already have) pass(ed).64 
For Žižek, the former approach is what Badiou called purification, the peeling away of layers of 
imaginary reality to get to the kernel of the real, while the latter is the method of subtraction that 
“starts from the Void, from the reduction of all determinate content, and then tries to establish a 
minimal difference between this Void and an element which functions as its stand-in.”65 I’d like 
to argue, first of all, that this distinction also summarizes what in the previous chapters I called 
the opposition between the masculine and the feminine form of the death drive. The masculine 
version emerges as an autoimmune madness immanent to the logic of desire, as a drive to spiral 
towards the void on a collision course, capturing objet a, its fantasmatic stand-in that normally 
propels the subject’s actions insofar as it remains beyond the horizon of meaning. In the feminine 
drive, by contrast, the subject circles around this non-signifying remainder, enjoying it in its very 
meaninglessness without opposing it to the symbolic order. While the former is trying to recover 
the void as the lost sense grounding the self, the latter embraces it as the lack constitutive of a 
                                                 
64 Slavoj Žižek, “From Purification to Subtraction: Badiou and the Real,” in Think Again: Alain Badiou and 
the Future of Philosophy, ed. P. Hallward (London: Continuum, 2004), 167. 
65 Ibid., 166. 
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common sense. In the cinema, the masculne drive reaches its pure form in the sovereign-image 
while the feminine drive through the decreation of the image into gesture in a subtraction-image.   
 Harry, the protagonist of Fear X lives in a post-traumatic universe: his wife had been 
brutally murdered by an unknown assailant in the parking lot of the shopping mall where he 
works as a security guard. He now spends his free time looking through surveillance footage 
hoping he’d spot someone unusual. He soon gets a hold of a low quality VHS tape showing the 
homicide itself, but the face of the murderer is too blurry to identify. It would be easy to suggest 
that his libidinal economy is dominated by a drive to know, much like his cinematic 
predecessors’ in Blowup (1966) or The Conversation (1974). The hero’s attempt to get close to 
the site of his traumatic loss, however, is not the only way he responds to his encounter with the 
void. Fear X also captures a frozen stillness of Harry’s lifeless world with a snow noir imagery, 
for instance in the slowly turning 360 degree shot of his snowbound street in the suburbs that has 
a similar function to the final shot of On Dangerous Ground (1951): they both express the 
(im)potentiality of the feminine subject to negate the masculine fantasy of an authentic life, 
countering the drive to know with a non-imagination, substituting something like a “positively 
charged void”66 for the sovereign subject’s fundamental fantasy. These shots operate in a utopian 
mode of atemporality, circling around an eternally unchanging site, offering an alternative to the 
capitalist time of abstract labour anchored in sovereign-images. In their very form they are 
cinematic gestures that negate the logic of suture, erasing the extra-diegetic space of the Absent 
One. At the same time, Brian Eno’s eerie drone ambient score reveals a sublime tension holding 
this temporary refuge together, emphasizing that it’s an artificial construct, there is nothing 
natural about it. In fact the utopian panning shot works only in opposition to the film’s opening, 
                                                 
66 A “positively charged void” is how Žižek notoriously describes the universe in the opening monologue of the 
documentary Žižek! (2005). Žižek!, directed by Astra Taylor (2005; New York, Zeitgeist Films, 2006), DVD. 
359 
 
Harry’s jealousy fantasy of slowly pulling the curtain of his bedroom and watching his wife walk 
across the street in the snowfall, then disappearing into a mysterious house next door. The two 
scenes represent antagonistic, feminine and masculine reactions to his wife’s death within the 
protagonist’s mind: the drive to spin around a fixed place with a surrounding that is 
fundamentally lacking as opposed to the drive to cross over to another site where a loss that 
caused this world’s lack had supposedly happened, and relive its trauma by gathering knowledge 
about it. In another scene, Harry is watching surveillance tapes at home when the video feed 
gradually turns into static. He keeps staring at the TV screen until his dead wife appears in the 
periphery of his vision moving about in the kitchen. We see the frame divided from his point of 
view between the kitchen and the TV, a reverse shot showing his eyes wonder between the two 
sites, a scene promising access to his fundamental fantasy and a place where fantasy is already 
traversed, voided. As the woman disappears behind a wall he stands up and follows her into the 
bathroom, where he relives his memory of finding out about her pregnancy. In Vicari’s reading, 
“Fear X seeks to posit some kind of inchoate transcendentalism (in the form of pregnancy, snow, 
vast landscapes) as an authentic if elusive refuge from duplicitous image and word.”67 Is this 
binary, however, really so simple? Isn’t the paradox of this scene precisely that it is the 
electronic noise of the television that stands for a utopian refuge corresponding to 360 shot in the 
snow earlier while the recollection image activates a masculine drive to inhabit an impossible-
lost other place? Crucially, it is not the video electronic image that provides the clues pushing the 
narrative forward (the blurred face of the perpetrator proves to be a dead end), but Harry’s entry 
                                                 
67 Vicari, Nicolas Winding Refn, 103. 
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into his fantasy world, a David Lynchian parallel universe of his memories, dreams, and 
hallucinations filling in the gaps of his reality.68  
 Ironically, it is an (imaginary) analogue photograph that starts Harry’s fantasy-
investigation in this alternative world inside his head, an image that unlike the useless CCTV 
footage he can blow up to find hidden clues in it—a process representing his drive to know 
rather that an actual indexical link to reality.69 Expecting to find traces of his wife’s 
unfaithfulness he uncovers a masculine conspiracy instead the contours of which, however, are 
unclear: she had to die either because she witnessed the unlawful execution of a crooked cop 
collectively organized by the male police force, or the cop was silenced by the conspirators after 
he performed his illegal task of femicide. We learn this from a rather cryptic scene in which the 
police chief explains to Peter, the cop who was designated to do the cover-up murder, how 
important the work they are doing is, without saying what it is exactly: “You knew, we all knew 
and accepted the possibility of this event happening. Innocent people are hurt and killed every 
day. This is how the world works. We have to keep our focus on our goals, on our ideals. He was 
a corrupt cop.” Like with most dialogues in the film, there are long pauses between his lines, 
underlining the presence of the unsayable within the symbolic order. The real Harry is faced 
with in his dream world is therefore the obscene secret of masculine sovereignty, the 
unbridgeable (arbitrarily bridged) gap that separates the patriarchal bios from the bare life of the 
                                                 
68 As Donato Totaro argues, Refn’s uses what Pier Paolo Pasolini called “free indirect discourse” “where, through a 
series of interlocked discursive strategies, the author, Refn in this case, gives the viewers the necessary material 
to imagine the world through Cain’s subjectivity (which is not the same as saying that the viewer experiences the 
world as if he or she were in Cain’s shoes). To quote Pasolini, “[free indirect discourse] is, simply, the immersion of 
the filmmaker in the mind of the character and the adoption on the part of the filmmaker not only of the psychology 
of his character but also his language” Donato Totaro, “Fear X: An Obsessive Inquiry into Knowledge, Art and 
Uncertainty,” Off Screen 17, no. 3 (2013), accessed June 7, 2016, http://offscreen.com/view/fear_x.  
69 Lacan called the knowledge that the drive seeks “acephalic,” headless, as it ultimately coincides with subjective 
destitution, the disintegration of the fantasy scene orienting the subject. See Jacques Lacan, The Ego in Freud's 
Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II (1954-1955), trans. S. 
Tomaselli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 169. 
361 
 
subjects supporting it. When he finally asks Peter who possibly killed his wife the question 
“Why?” the man is unable to respond; he just starts shaking and shoots Harry in the stomach.  
 The bullet doesn’t kill the protagonist, however, as much as it makes him part of the male 
tribe through a ritual of unsayable violence. When he sees the blood seeping from his wound, his 
formerly stoic demeanour finally breaks down: he clenches his hand into a fist and, boiling with 
rage, he goes after Peter. The space around him becomes increasingly de-realized, and as he 
enters a dark room, we cut to a minute long sequence of abstract red images; pulsating digital 
shapes with the occasional contours of a female face barely visible,70 the dark ambient 
soundtrack now erupting with a screeching noise as if Harry had disappeared into primordial 
chaos. When we finally see the reverse shot from inside the room, he is indeed gone; the elevator 
door he came through is closing and the vast interior is filled with nothing but a mysterious dark 
fluid. After an abrupt cut, the next scene shows Harry in a hospital bed surrounded by members 
of the local police. He confesses he killed a man, but he cannot remember his name, and after an 
inaudible conversation with someone off screen the cops tell him they didn’t find a body, 
therefore no crime had been committed. Another long pause, after which one of them cryptically 
adds: “We know what happened to you. You cannot change what was. What used to be.” Harry 
starts crying, for the first time in the film, as a sign that he finally accepted the loss of his wife. A 
policeman then drives him outside of the limits of the imaginary city to his car somehow parked 
there, gives him his keys and leaves. Harry throws away the photo-clues of his investigation, gets 
into his car and disappears into a now empty and arid landscape where the snow has apparently 
melted.  
                                                 
70 In fact it becomes visible only when viewing the scene at a slower than normal speed. See Totaro, “Fear X” 
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 The trajectory of the hero’s journey in Fear X follows the Hegelian logic of Aufhebung, 
passing through a thesis and an anti-thesis towards a synthesis. He starts from an atemporal 
position of the feminine drive, gaining a minimal distance from the void of his trauma through 
subtraction (by embracing lack in the world), he then shifts to the purifying logic of the 
masculine drive, looking to uncover his fundamental fantasy with regards to his wife, and finally, 
after he is confronted with the unrepresentable real of his fantasy (arbitrary sovereign violence), 
he returns to ordinary reality except now it is loss he embraces not lack. That is to say, we move 
from the feminine non-all of snow noir to masculine noir with a state of exception. In the former, 
Harry’s dead wife is omnipresent in the form of the frozen world itself while in the latter, she is 
excluded from both the now divided actual (symbolic) and fantasmatic (imaginary) layers of the 
world and becomes an element of primordial chaos (the real). While femininity is associated 
with a virtual (potential rather than actual) realm of atemporality in both cases, it is only in the 
masculine logic that it is separated from ordinary reality into the domain of violence for its own 
sake grounding the actualized patriarchal bios—a separation that turns Woman into one of the 
names of the (primordial) father.71 In the feminine mode, by contrast, woman refers not to an 
ontologically separate Other but to every subject insofar as they have the potential not to become 
sovereign (not to become a man in the Lacanian sense). If in the masculine regime atemporality 
is associated with a transcendental realm of chaos, in the feminine logic it’s always already 
immanent to this world as the potential of all human beings to stop contributing to the capitalist 
flow of productive time, to find a different use of time.  
It is this Lacanian-Agambenian distinction between different uses of the atemporal that 
Berardi’s post-Deleuzian association of atemporality with the sphere of exploitation under digital 
                                                 
71 On the Lacanian notion of Woman as one of the names of the primordial father see: See Slavoj Žižek, The 
Indivisible Remainder (New York: Verso, 1996), 155-59. 
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capitalism misses. He suggests, first, that since “[t]here is no such thing as a time of virtuality, 
because time is only in life, decomposition, and the becoming-death of the living, [therefore] 
[v]irtuality is the collapse of the living; it is panic taking power in temporal perception.”72 
Second, for him, panic is the symptom of the digitalization and acceleration of sphere of 
production; it’s a result of psychic overstimulation under semio-capitalism which the human 
body cannot tolerate.73 The part of the film that follows Harry’s quest for knowledge certainly 
fits this narrative; he, like the dream-workers of Inception, enters his mindscape to perform 
cognitive labour (in his free time after his shift in the mall), playing the private investigator when 
the police are unable to find his wife’s killer. In this virtual realm of tautological time, a moment 
before his subjective destitution into digital chaos, he in fact gets a panic attack; his 
hyperventilating stops only when his anxiety is overtaken by rage. For Lacan, panic and anxiety 
in general is caused by the proximity of the maternal other; it’s a fear of engulfment the subject 
overcomes by introducing lack in her place, like Freud’s grandson did through his Fort-Da game 
with a cotton reel standing in for his mother.74 In a similar way, Harry’s panic and violence are 
two sides of the same masculine apparatus substituted for the suffocating incestuous unity with 
the maternal other of the digital, drawing the subject into a vortex of deterritorialized surplus-
labour and offering him sovereign violence as the only way out.  
On the other hand, however, Berardi’s critique doesn’t apply to the film’s moments of 
utopian atemporality in which time doesn’t so much collapse through panic as it stands still as a 
result of a double negation of the deterritorializing as well as the reterritorializing impulse of the 
masculine regime. The Agambenian concept of impotentiality better describes this use of 
                                                 
72 Franco Berardi, After the Future, ed. G. Genesko and N. Thoburn (Baltimore: AK Press, 2011), 51. 
73 Berardi, Precarious Rhapsody, 44-45. 
74 For Lacan’s account of the Fort-Da game see Jacques Lacan, Écrits, trans. B. Fink (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Co., 2006), 103. [E. 318-19] 
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atemporality than the Deleuzian category of the virtual as it places the potential not to be(come) 
at the center of human freedom: for Agamben, “to be potential means: to be one's own lack, to be 
in relation to one's own incapacity. Beings that exist in the mode of potentiality are capable of 
their own impotentiality; and only in this way do they become potential.”75 By contrast, 
Deleuze’s notion accounts for potentiality in purely positive terms, as the motor of constant 
change driving the flux of becoming beyond what is actual that, as Berardi is right to point out, 
comes dangerously close to the neoliberal ideology valuing the flexibilization and constant 
reinvention—ultimately a digital mutation—of the self.76  
It’s this latter use of the virtual that leads to the semio-capitalist mental disorders 
Berardi’s identifies that explain the sovereign-masculine dynamics of Fear X. He insists that 
there is a dialectic today between the “[i]ntensification of nervous stimuli [and the] retreat of 
libidinal investment,”77 between the “the pathologies caused by overload (panic, attention 
disorders, dyslexia) [and] the ones caused by disinvestment (depression and even autism).”78 
Harry’s drift towards panic and murderous acting out exemplify the former,79 while his quiet 
isolation belongs to the latter. We could also say that panic and violence are part of a his 
                                                 
75 Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities, trans. D Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 182. He 
continues: “if a potentiality to not-be originally belongs to all potentiality, then there is truly potentiality only where 
the potentiality to not-be does not lag behind actuality but passes wholly into it as such. This does not mean that it 
disappears in actuality; on the contrary, it preserves itself as such in actuality. What is truly potential is thus what 
has exhausted all its impotentiality in bringing it wholly into the act as such.” Ibid., 184. 
76 As Brian Massumi explains, “Deleuze and Guattari, following Bergson, suggest that the virtual is the mode of 
reality implicated in the emergence of new potentials. In other words, its reality is the reality of change: the event. 
This immediately raises a number of problems for any domain of practice interested in seriously entertaining the 
concept. If the virtual is change as such, then in any actually given circumstance it can only figure as a mode of 
abstraction. For what is concretely given is what is--which is not what it will be when it changes. The potential of a 
situation exceeds its actuality. Circumstances self-abstract to the precise extent to which they evolve. This means 
that the virtual is not contained in any actual form assumed by things or states of things. It runs in the transitions 
from one form to another.” Brian Massumi, “Sensing the Virtual, Building the Insensible,” in Hypersurface 
Architecture, ed. Stephen Perrella (London: Academy Press, 1998), 16. 
77 Berardi, Precarious Rhapsody, 115. 
78 Ibid., 116. 
79 As Berardi stresses, “explosively violent behavior follows the loss of control over the relation between 
informational stimuli and emotional elaboration.” Ibid., 115. 
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purifying attempt to synchronize his bare life with a digital real, while depression comes after the 
failure of this connective mutation, as a result of a minimal level of subtraction from the 
hallucinated digital collapse of the organic body. Depression, of course, is not what either 
Badiou or Žižek mean by subtraction, “the affirmative part of negation” that actualizes a 
universal collective without exclusions. In Berardi’s words: 
[D]epression can be understood in relation to the circulation of sense. Faced with the 
abyss of non-sense, friends talk to friends, and together they build a bridge over the 
abyss. Depression questions the reliability of this bridge. Depression doesn’t see the 
bridge. It falls off its radar. Or maybe it sees that the bridge does not exist. Depression 
doesn’t trust friendship, or doesn’t recognize it. This is why it cannot perceive sense, 
because there is no sense if not in a shared space.80  
Depression is a kind of subtraction without a universal; it negates the shared sense that links 
together members of a community but neither does it fall into psychosis, nor does it affirm a new 
utopian collective. Instead, in a performance of cruel optimism it affirms non-sense (non-
belonging) itself as a zero level of sovereign belonging. This is how Harry can join a 
masculine bios after his non-communication with the policemen, entering a space of depressed 
solitude by abandoning the signifiers of sense (the analogue photographs representing his 
relation to a common world) that retroactively annuls the utopian alterity of his snow noir 
experience. As in Inception, the narrative of mourning, the letting go of the hero’s libidinal 
attachment to his dead wife is an ideologically charged one masking an affirmation of neoliberal 
capitalism.  
                                                 
80 Ibid., 116-17. 
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 Reading depression in Refn’s films as a productive pathology sustaining the biopolitical 
apparatus of control society also frames his use of the slow cinema as organically linked rather 
than opposed to digitally accelerated forms of storytelling that prioritize the panic moment of the 
neoliberal self. The term “cinema of slowness” was coined by Michel Ciment in 2003 to identify 
a countermovement in global arthouse cinema against what he called the “technological 
fetishism” of contemporary Hollywood film production: fast paced, digitally altered spectacles 
that undermine the temporality of classical cinema spectatorship with their sensory overload.81 
This binary opposition was then accepted by most critics, regardless of which side of it they 
positioned themselves. According to Matthew Flannigan, for instance, the viewer of slow films is 
“[l]iberated from the abundance of abrupt images and visual signifiers that comprise a sizeable 
amount of massmarket cinema, [...] free to indulge in a relaxed form of panoramic perception.”82 
For Steven Shaviro, by contrast, slow cinema is “a way of saying No to mainstream Hollywood’s 
current fastedit, postcontinuity, highly digital style, simply by pretending that it doesn’t even 
exist [...] In a world that has been so profoundly changed over the past 30 or 40 years by 
globalization, financialization, and technological innovation, it’s simply an evasive copout to 
make movies as if none of this had happened.”83 Refn’s films help us understand this opposition 
as part of a dialectic in which the “the employment of (often extremely) long takes, decentred 
and understated modes of storytelling, and a pronounced emphasis on quietude and the 
                                                 
81 “Angelopoulos in Greece, Nuri Bilge Ceylan in Turkey, de Oliveira and Monteiro (who died a few weeks ago) in 
Portugal, Béla Tarr in Hungary, Abbas Kiarostami in Iran, Tsai Ming-liang and Hou Hsiao-hsien in Taiwan, 
Philippe Garrel and Bruno Dumont in France, Souleymane Cissé and Idrissa Ouedraogo in Africa, Sharunas Bartas 
in the Baltic state, Aleksandr Sokurov in Russia, and several directors in Central Asia have been proponents in 
recent years of a resistance to the fetishism of technology.” Michel Ciment, “The State of Cinema,” Unspoken 
Cinema, October 30, 2006, accessed June 7, 2016, http://unspokencinema.blogspot.ca/2006/10/state-of-cinema-m-
ciment.html.  
82 Matthew Flanagan, “Towards an Aesthetic of Slow in Contemporary Cinema,” 16:9 6, no. 29 (2008) 
83 Steven Shaviro, “Slow Cinema Vs. Fast Films,” The Pinocchio Theory, May 12, 2010, accessed June 7, 2016, 
http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=891.  
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everyday”84 as well as “the characters’ ‘flat’, affectless manner”85 are not expressions of pre-
digital nostalgia for the contemplation of the Bazinian real, but, on the contrary, signs of a post-
digital depression, reflecting the state of a post-traumatic subject whose terrifying dissolution in 
the void of the digital has always already happened.  
 After a detour with the Pusher sequels and Bronson, Refn returns to slow cinema with 
Valhalla Rising (2009), a digitally shot medieval story about Vikings travelling to America 
which he classifies as post-apocalyptic science fiction.86 The film starts where Bronson ends, 
with the mute warrior One Eye (played once again by Mads Mikkelsen, Refn’s go-to guy for 
autistic male roles) held captive by a group of pagans who exploit his superior ability to fight in a 
primitive tribal economy built on raw violence. Instead of remaining trapped as a caged 
sovereign like Bronson, however, he soon breaks free from captivity after slaughtering his 
masters. His story is therefore not about autoimmune violence but its aftermath; it’s about the 
post-traumatic subject who has survived the death of the male homosocial and is now wandering 
around in a post-apocalyptic landscape (the hills of Northern Scotland de-realized through digital 
filters) in a state of depression, isolated from others. He is then joined by an orphan boy and a 
group of similarly lost Christian Vikings looking for the Holy Land. They set sails to Jerusalem, 
but after getting lost at sea in a mysterious fog they arrive to a godforsaken America instead. 
Threatened by the muteness of an alien world and the arrows of its natives, the Christians’ 
remaining ambition to colonize the New World slowly dissipates; the men split up and start to 
wonder around aimlessly, gradually losing their ability to communicate with one another. As 
images of a Refnian red universe of atemporal chaos keep interrupting the narrative’s 
                                                 
84 Flanagan, “Towards an Aesthetic of Slow” 
85 Ira Jaffe, Slow Movies: Countering the Cinema of Action (New York: Wallflower Press, 2014), 3. 
86 See James Rose, “Valhalla Rising: A Viking Odyssey,” Off Screen 17, no. 3 (2013), accessed June 7, 2016, 
http://offscreen.com/view/valhalla_odyssey#fn-1-a.  
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chronological time, some of them fall into madness, some turn on each other, some wait quietly 
for their death. The final scene shows One Eye and the boy cornered by the natives wearing red 
warrior paint when the protagonist offers himself as a sacrificial lamb to appease the tribesmen 
and save the kid from being slaughtered.  
 As Jean Pierre Dupuy maintains, in every violent founding ritual of the social order there 
is an intimate relationship between sacrifice and murder: “sacrifice contains the outbreak and 
spread of murder; though it is in one sense just another murder, it promises to put an end to 
violence.”87 As usual with Refn, we don’t see the final act of murder/sacrifice itself, only its 
consequences: the natives don’t hurt the boy, who now stands on a cliff alone overlooking the 
ocean, framed like Caspar David Friedrich’s paintings of romantic depression. The image then 
fades into blue instead of red, suggesting that One Eye’s act successfully contained the eruption 
of violence, and the boy can now die peacefully, his body merging with the sea. We even see 
now, as the hero’s hallucination-image right before his death, a variation of an earlier scene 
where the he tried to build a phallic tower out of rocks to institute some kind of order into the 
deterritorialized chaos, but the structure fell apart. That scene was cross cut with images of male 
rape among the Christians, Refn’s most explicit depiction of a homosexual act to date, signalling 
both the disintegration of the homosocial into a Hobbesian state of nature of all against all as 
well as its minimal sustenance as autoimmune violence. Now, after One Eye’s self-sacrifice the 
tower stands erect and we see him submerging into the water next to it in a ritual resembling 
baptism. His body never resurfaces, however; like the boy, he merges with nature, the final shot 
is of his floating profile fading in and out of the white mountain fog—an image recalling the 
snow bound stillness of Fear X’s utopian moments. The film therefore ends without any 
                                                 
87 Jean-Pierre Dupuy, The Mark of the Sacred, trans. M. B. DeBevoise (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 
5. 
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reterritorialization, embracing instead what speculative realists call the “truth of extinction,” the 
unavoidable end of, if not the human race, at least its white western male representatives.88  
 At the end, at its generic core, Valhalla Rising is not so much a science fiction as it is a 
kind of meta-western (i.e. a noir-western) about the impossibility of founding the territory of 
American Empire through sovereign violence. As Robert Pippin argues, “many great Westerns 
are [...] about the founding or the early, struggling stages of modern bourgeois, law-abiding, 
property-owning, market economy, technologically advanced societies in transition from, 
mostly, lawlessness (or corrupt and ineffective law) and war that border on classic state-of-nature 
thought experiments (or mythic pictures of origins).”89 Insofar as westerns thematize the 
emergence of a sovereign political community out of a lawless zone of indistinction, they come 
close to film noirs. The difference is that while westerns deal with the historical origins of 
modern American biopower, noirs focus on its perpetuation in the present. Furthermore, the 
western as a genre is a post-noir phenomenon in the sense that I defined the term in Chapter 2: it 
represses the arbitrary nature of law constituting violence, that is, the fundamental equality of the 
sovereign and the homo sacer before the former comes to exclude the latter to stabilize a closed 
body politic.90 Instead of a sovereign decision proper we have a moral negotiation of the 
boundaries of the white settler community that always already presupposes and represses the 
original act of arbitrary violence: the colonization of the New World through the genocide of 
Native Americans. This is why the figure of the sovereign in westerns is so often a post-
traumatic subject: a strong but silent male loner with a dark past, like John Wayne’s Ethan in The 
                                                 
88 On the speculative realist notion of the “truth of extinction” see Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and 
Extinction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 205-40. 
89 Robert B. Pippin, “What is a Western: Politics and Self-Knowledge in John Ford’s The Searchers,” Critical 
Inquiry 35 (2009): 225. 
90 Western is a post-noir phenomenon also in a more literal sense as after the decline of the classical noir cycle many 
Hollywood noir directors like Howard Hawks, Anthony Mann, or Delmer Daves contributed to the golden age of 
American westerns in the 50s.  
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Searchers (1956) who fought in the civil war for the confederacy, helping to massacre African as 
well as Native Americans. Such hero shows signs of depression precisely because he cannot talk 
about the unsayable at the heart of sovereign violence,91 for which reason he tends to remain an 
outsider even after he successfully strengthens the cohesion of the settler community by killing 
its enemies.92 It is in spaghetti westerns that the trope of the quiet outsider is pushed to its logical 
conclusion with the figure of the “man with no name,”93 someone whose very existence is erased 
from the symbolic order—a fate not unlike the one some noir heroes suffer after surviving their 
sovereign act as living dead like Edward G. Robinson’s Chris Cross in Scarlet Street (1945).94  
 What makes Valhalla Rising a meta-western is that its noir ending retroactively equates 
the sovereign’s primordial repression in the western genre (One Eye’s namelessness, muteness 
and half-blindness) with a sovereign act of self-erasure. It reveals that, to paraphrase Carl 
Schmidt, the sovereign is the one who decides on primal repression.95 Refn’s film, of course, is 
also an anti-western insofar as it reverses the biopolitics of the classical American genre: the 
community the hero’s sacrificial act helps come together is that of mute natives living in 
harmony with nature after the elimination of the white colonizers (when they kill One Eye their 
                                                 
91 Contrary to the noir hero whose voiceover tries to talk about it incessantly, performatively turning sovereign 
violence into a necessity.  
92 See for instance Will Wright’s description of the classical plot of the western as “the story of a hero who is 
somehow estranged from his society but on whose ability rests the fate of that society. The villains threaten the 
society until the hero acts to protect and save it.” Will Wright, Sixguns and Society: A Structural Study of the 
Western (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 40. 
93 See Clint Eastwood’s Man with No Name in Sergio Leone’s Dollars Trilogy.   
94 As Pippin notes, something similar happens to Ethan in the final scene of The Searchers after the hero helped to 
reunite a settler family by saving their daughter from the Indians: “it is somewhat shocking that the characters file by 
Ethan as if he were invisible. No one hugs him or thanks him and certainly no one invites [him] inside.” Pippin, 
What is a Western, 239. Actually, Refn’s One Eye in Valhalla Rising is a mixture of such nameless hero and another 
spaghetti western character, that of a blind warrior (Blindman, 1971), an even clearer example of post-traumatic 
subjectivity—a figure that also appears in some Japanese chambaras featuring a blind swordsman (The Tale of 
Zatoichi, 1962). 
95 For Carl Schmitt, “sovereign is he who decides on the exception.” Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four 
Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. G. Schwab (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 5. 
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bodies lose their red colour and like shadows they disappear into the landscape). However, it’s 
important to bear in mind that, as Žižek stresses,  
“[t]his is the fundamental subjective position of fantasy: to be reduced to a gaze 
observing the world in the condition of the subject's non-existence-like the fantasy of 
witnessing the act of one's own conception, parental copulation, or the act of witnessing 
one's own burial, like Tom Sawyer and Huck Finn. ‘The world without us’ is thus fantasy 
at its purest: witnessing the Earth itself regaining its precastrated state of innocence.”96 
The post-apocalyptic universe of Valhalla Rising is therefore not the utopian alternative of the 
male homosocial’s unravelling in autoimmune panic in Refn’s earlier films, as much as it is its 
transcendental supplement: it is a fantasy that supports the white masculine subject’s purifying 
self-destruction, the never ending downward spiral of his death drive from the other side of the 
void. It is the fantasy of white masculinity deified, existing, like the God of Christianity, in the 
pure inoperativity of his glory. This is why the film remains a sovereign-image of cynicism 
actualizing, as an empty placeholder, the bios of western masculinity.97  
 While critics like to call Refn’s next film Drive (2011) a “stripped-down, ‘pure’ genre 
piece,”98 it is in fact a significantly more mainstream, that is, less abstract variation of the meta-
western formula the director developed in Valhalla Rising: an L.A. “sunshine noir”99 homage to 
(neo)noir-westerns like Jean-Pierre Melville’s Le Samourai (1967), Walter Hill’s The Driver 
                                                 
96  Slavoj Žižek, “Censorship Today: Violence, or Ecology as a New Opium for 
the Masses,” lacan.com,  accessed September 1, 2013, http://www.lacan.com/zizecology2.htm.  
97 Refn here only pushes the logic already present in Nolan’s and Boyle’s films to its logical conclusion. The 
downward spiral of the hero’s death drive in Inception or 28 Days Later is also supplemented with a post-traumatic 
fantasy of original harmony, the formal qualities of which make these scenes ambiguous, akin to an imagined 
afterlife.  
98 Jaimie N. Christley, “Drive,” Slant Magazine, September 11, 2011, accessed December 21, 2016, 
http://www.slantmagazine.com/film/review/drive.  
99 See J. Hoberman, “A Bright, Guilty World: Daylight Ghosts and Sunshine Noir,” Artforum (February, 2007): 315. 
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(1978), or John Woo’s The Killer (1989). It’s a return to the glossy fashion video aesthetic and 
hip millennial synth pop soundtrack of Bronson but without the experimental narration and the 
heavy dose of irony. Marko Bauer calls it a humourless pastiche nostalgic not of any particular 
historical period but of postmodernism itself, expressing a commodified desire for stylization 
and sterilization: the “[o]rgiastic decadence of the Empire.”100 The eponymous hero is now 
played by Ryan Gosling with a metrosexual deadpan—he is a quiet, nameless, but always stylish 
outsider, a mechanic/stunt driver during the day and freelance driver for criminals at night. He 
keeps the latter under control by abiding to a 5 minute window rule: that’s how long he’d wait 
for a client on the job before leaving him behind. Like the hero of Pusher, he gets in trouble 
when the neoliberal economy of debt overtakes his practice based on strictly measured labour 
time. After befriending his neighbour Irene, a young mother raising her small boy Benicio alone, 
he offers his help when the woman’s husband, Standard comes home from prison owing a favour 
to some gangsters. The robbery they have to do turns out to be a set-up, they are the designated 
fall guys for someone trying to steal from a mafia bank. Soon enough all members of the heist 
team are exterminated except for Driver who is trying to give back money to the mafia head 
directly in exchange for Irene and her son’s life. The crime boss agrees, but he says he cannot 
promise the same deal for the protagonist. When they meet, the man stabs Driver in the stomach, 
who stabs him back and kills him, then gets into his car and drives away into the sunset.  
 As Anna Backman Rogers and Miklós Kiss observe, Drive plays with the tension 
between the Deleuzian movement-image and the time-image. They note how sequences of “dead 
time” in which hero’s everyday routine (waiting, driving, grocery shopping, taking the elevator, 
walking in hallways) is captured in slowly moving long takes are contrasted to sudden outbursts 
                                                 
100 Marko Bauer, “Pure West: Drive, Nostalgia for Postmodernism,” Senses of Cinema 63 (2012), accessed June 7, 
2016, http://sensesofcinema.com/2012/feature-articles/pure-west-drive-nostalgia-for-postmodernism/.  
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of (violent) action shot with rapid editing techniques.101 What is striking in Refn’s application of 
the slow cinema – intensified continuity (depression – panic) dialectic here is that it’s more 
aestheticized than in any of his previous films. Instead of depicting an ugly downward spiral of 
the neoliberal subject’s autoimmune death drive, Refn now seems to suggest that these 
contradictory qualities can synchronize in a refrain but only for the post-traumatic body. True, 
the labour time based microcosm of Driver collapses with the intrusion of the neoliberal logic, 
but we have the feeling that this happened to him before. Unlike the other men around him, he 
cannot be killed by the homosocial’s autoimmune disease because he is already dead; he is a 
living dead who has survived his own subjective destitution, the unnamable encounter with 
sovereign violence. At first it might appear that he can prevail because, like his predecessors in 
Le Samourai, The Driver, or The Killer, he times his actions perfectly, surprising his 
disorganized enemies. Upon closer look, however, it becomes clear that Driver lives outside of 
time, literally embodying the atemporality of the Lacanian drive. He never sleeps; he is always 
available to help out his friends or just hang out despite working day and night. In short, he is a 
myth of a perfect neoliberal subject who has already gone through a connective mutation,102 
synching with the digital regime of production and now his task is to push other men into the 
void as well. Tellingly, he is wearing the jacket of the hero from Kenneth Anger’s Scorpio Rising 
(1964), which makes him a kind of queer angel of death, signifying his post-traumatic silence as 
post-coital.   
Crucially, what supplements the hero’s harmony with the post-territorial rhythm of the 
neoliberal economy is a fantasy scene from which the classical white male bios (including 
                                                 
101 Anna Backman Rogers and Miklós Kiss, “A Real Human Being and a Real Hero: Stylistic Excess, Dead Time 
and Intensified Continuity in Nicolas Winding Refn’s Drive,” New Cinemas: Journal of Contemporary Film 12, no. 
1-2 (2014) 
102 Which makes the lyrics of the title song, “he’s a real human being, and a real hero” all the more ironic.  
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himself) is erased. His self-sacrifice protects a single mother and her son, an interracial family 
without a father. Like in Valhalla Rising, the content of this fantasy is politically progressive, but 
its very form perpetuates the masculine logic of sovereignty. This is how one can read Refn’s 
proclaimed interest in the hero of myths and fairytales “who comes in and protects the innocent 
from evil, sacrificing himself for purity.”103 As Laura Shamas notes, the relationship between 
Driver and Irene follows the medieval logic of courtly love:104 it’s never physically 
consummated, but centers rather on a ritual whereby the courteous male hero becomes the lady’s 
unconditional servant (first by helping her with groceries and driving her home, then by 
sacrificing himself for her). For Žižek, courtly love is a prime example of hetrosexual male 
masochism through which “in her very elevation to the undisputed Master, whose every whim 
the masochist is obliged to obey, the Woman is turned into a puppet effectively controlled by her 
slave, who controls the game, writing its rules—the explicit asymmetry of the masochist contract 
(at the level of enunciated: man's subordination to woman) relies on then opposite asymmetry at 
the level of the position of enunciation.”105 The elementary procedure of courtly love, he argues, 
is to put the Other through a distanciating and dehumanizing abstraction: “the coincidence of 
absolute, inscrutable Otherness and pure machine is what confers on the Lady her uncanny, 
monstrous character,” which is then followed by an “idealization of the Lady [that] is strictly 
secondary and narcissistic.”106 We could say that Irene’s loving face is such a secondary 
idealization of the monstrous, mute otherness of the American natives One Eye surrenders 
himself to in Valhalla Rising, both expressing a masculine fantasy about a fully self-contained, 
non-castrated, or as Žižek put it, “machinic” Other. As Vicari notes, it is her idyllic unity with 
                                                 
103 Refn quoted in Vicari, Nicolas Winding Refn, 23. 
104 Laura Shamas - Drive. (2011). 239. 
105 Slavoj Žižek, “Notes on a Debate ‘From Within the People’,” Criticism 46, no. 4 (2004): 663-64. 
106 Slavoj Žižek, The Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Woman and Causality (New York: Verso, 1994), 90. 
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her son that Driver falls in love with when he overhears Irene saying “I love you” to Benicio in 
the grocery store.107 When the three of them later hang out by the L.A. River, the camera yet 
again frames the scene of mother and son playing from his perspective, then in the upcoming 
objective shot the contours of his body disappear in the reflecting sunlight as if to erase him from 
the diegesis and equate his point of view with the viewer’s transcendental ego. Once again Refn 
offers the pleasurable self-erasure of the cine-fetishist (a kind of Metzian naive observer) as an 
antidote to the painful cruel optimism of the neoliberal subject, best exemplified in the film by 
Driver’s auto shop owner boss (played by Breaking Bad’s Bryan Cranston) seeking to make 
deals with the mafia who once maimed him until he they finally kill him off. Through this 
aestheticization of (bio)politics, the white male sovereign is erased from the field of 
representation but he survives as a voyeur, a Hegelian beautiful soul for whom the ruptures of 
late capitalism can produce aesthetic pleasure.  
 Refn’s next film, Only God Forgives (2013), is a great summary of his second artistic 
period. It’s another noir-western now set in contemporary Bangkok, following the imperialist 
destruction of the local community by an American crime family controlling the drug trade and 
the Thai box scene. The two male heirs of the criminal enterprise, Billy and Julian (Drive’s Ryan 
Gosling) stand for the two trajectories available for white men in Refn’s films. Billy, on the one 
hand, is a violent sadist who rapes and kills a brothel owner’s 12 year old daughter in an 
autoimmune outburst (undermining the Thai brothel’s stereotypical immunizing function as a 
temporary refuge for westerners). Julien, on the other hand, is a quietly depressed man who 
prefers to be tied up during sex by her Thai girlfriend and has a generally more passive 
(masochistic) relationship to the natives. The two of them, of course, embody what Bhabha 
                                                 
107 Vicari, Nicolas Winding Refn, 184. 
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called the ambiguity of the colonial discourse: the oscillation between the sadistic destruction of 
the colonized and the fetishization of her oriental otherness.108 Instead of treating this dialectic as 
part of the same totality like Danny Boyle does in Slumdog Millionaire, Refn simply privileges 
its latter moment over the former. He opposes an authority figure of oriental wisdom to the 
western neoliberal superego, the tough but fair local policeman Chang to the insatiable and 
incestuous maternal femme fatale of Crystal. If Crystal’s demands of excessive retribution for his 
son’s death exemplify the neoliberal logic of a never repayable debt, Chang represents the 
principle of equivalence, seeking an eye for an eye to contain rather than escalate the cycle of 
violence started by Billy.  
 The film is mostly narrated from Julien’s perspective and, along with Valhalla Rising, it’s 
Refn’s slowest: it’s essentially nothing but a prolonged suspense leading up to the highly 
anticipated, but eventually anti-climactic fight scene between the hero and Chang. When the two 
finally meet up in a Thai box club for the showdown, the policeman is standing firmly in the 
center of the room while the camera is slowly circling him, giving us the point of view of Julien 
who is spiraling around his opponent until he is close enough to engage. The moment they touch 
it becomes clear he has no chance against Chang: he is beaten severely until he passes out on the 
floor. This sequence is perhaps Refn’s clearest rendering of the masculine death drive on a 
collision course with the void and the subjective destitution that follows the encounter. Like in 
Valhalla Rising and Drive, this masculine drive is not autoimmune anymore like it was in the 
Pusher Trilogy but is pacified through masochistic and here also homoerotic submission to the 
fetish of an absolute Other.109 The white male subject’s masochistic fantasy of self-erasure is 
                                                 
108 See Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994), 77.  
109 As Refn discloses in an interview, he used the gesture of a fist opening and closing as a metaphor for a sexualized 
submission of one man to another (the idea clearly taken from the famous rape scene of David Lynch’s Wild at 
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then fulfilled in the final scene where Chang performs karaoke in Thai for a local audience. 
While earlier in the film the same bar was frequented by westerners and even had a picture of 
Michelangelo’s David on the wall as a stamp of white biopower, the foreigners as well as the 
picture are now conspicuously missing and the performance lacks any subtitles. The presence of 
the western subject is reduced to the gaze of the voyeur for whose pleasure the enigmatic scene 
is constructed: to the viewer outside the diegesis.  
 While the paradigm of male self-sacrifice seemed to have reached its conclusion in Only 
God Forgives, with his last film to date, The Neon Demon (2016), Refn is nonetheless able to 
push it to the next level through a dialectical reversal, by granting protagonist status to the figure 
who, as a fetish-Other, drove masculine self-erasure in the earlier films. It’s the director’s second 
L.A. noir, now told from the perspective of a female character, Jesse—an innocent looking 
teenage orphan moving to the city to start a modeling career only to be chewed up and spit out 
(literally) by the fashion industry. Like Refn’s previous films, The Neon Demon proudly wears 
its trash and exploitation influences on its sleeve, perhaps most importantly that of Dario 
Argento, whose notorious quip “I like women, especially beautiful ones. If they have a good face 
and figure, I would much prefer to watch them being murdered than an ugly girl or man.”110 
could very well have served as the first treatment for the film (that and the Italian maestro’s 
audiovisual tour de force horror fairy tale Suspiria). On the surface the final product reads as a 
postmodern complicitous critique of Hollywood’s image production regime in which the 
fetishistic reification of the heroine’s underage body by sleazy male photographers and would be 
rapists in the diegesis blissfully reproduces the voyeuristic gaze of the cinematic apparatus 
                                                                                                                                                             
Heart). “Summer Talks | Nicolas Winding Refn, ‘Only God Forgives’,” YouTube video, 1:01:10, posted by “Film 
Society of Lincoln Center,” July 18, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5TKEmF0dbC8.  
110 Argento quoted in Carol J. Clover, Men, Women, and Chain Saws: Gender in the Modern Horror Film 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992), 42. 
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without any Mulveyian overtones of bad conscience. As Refn puts it in a recent interview, “the 
more pleasing [the film] is for the eye, the more it penetrates the mind. The more you sexualize 
something, the deeper it resonates.”111 Despite the film’s blatantly male chauvinistic aesthetic, 
Refn also tries to deconstruct the traditional gender binary of its power dynamic,112 for instance 
by simultaneously positioning himself on the side of the object in this asymmetrical visual 
economy, maintaining that Jesse’s character is autobiographical. He describes himself as 
“narcissistic and self-absorbed,” but also “passive, submissive, sadomasochistic,” and 
“completely dominated by women”113—just like his young heroine who, after being called a 
“natural beauty” in a city held together by plastic surgery, is initiated into full submission to the 
fashion apparatus by a covenant of young female cannibals who eventually tear her body apart 
and eat it. Besides reproducing the sadistic-voyeuristic pleasures of the masculine viewer Laura 
Mulvey associated with classical Hollywood cinema, The Neon Demon therefore also explores 
the “becoming-woman” of that very same subject, his masochistic identification with a body in 
pieces deterritorialized by the delirious encounter with the cinematic image.114 This latter mode 
of spectatorship is produced not only by the Cronenbergian body horror of the finale but also 
through numerous hallucination and dream sequences in which bodies of models become 
fragmented by mirrors and flickering strobe lights, eventually dissolving into abstract 
geometrical shapes and a Refinian red chaos.  
                                                 
111 Anne Thompson, “‘The Neon Demon’: Nicolas Winding Refn Reveals Why His Cannibal Model Movie Is 
Autobiographical,” IndieWire June 22, 2016, accessed October 10, 2016, http://www.indiewire.com/2016/06/the-
neon-demon-nicolas-winding-refn-reveals-why-his-vampire-model-movie-is-autobiographical-290231/.  
112 Whether it is convincing or not is another matter, see for instance Adam Nayman, “The Neon Demon,” Cineaste 
41, no. 4 (2016), accessed October 10, 2016, http://www.cineaste.com/fall2016/neon-demon/.  
113 Thompson, The Neon Demon 
114 Becoming-woman is one of the terms Deleuze and Guattari use for the deterritorialization of the body. See Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. B. Massumi (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press), 321. 
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 The Neon Demon therefore reveals the speculative identity of two formerly distinct 
figures in Refn’s second period: the self-erasing masculine hero and his feminine fetish object 
appear now on the same continuum as two faces of one and the same sovereign, one whom the 
anarchist collective Tiqqun called the “Young-Girl.” The Young-Girl, they argue, is not a 
gendered concept but captures abstract ideals of “Youthitude” and “Femininitude” that are 
“raised to the rank of ideal regulators of the integration of the Imperial citizenry” insofar as they 
express post-Fordist capitalism’s colonization of the formerly dissociated feminine sphere as 
well as a purely consumptive relation to the social associated with adolescence.115 In this new 
figure, sovereignty, not work, appears as the direct source of a commodity’s value: “The Young-
Girl would thus be the being that no longer has any intimacy with herself except as value, and 
whose every activity, in every detail, is directed to self-valorization. At each moment, she 
affirms herself as the sovereign subject of her own reification.”116 She is the “living currency 
[that] has come to take the place of money as general equivalent, that in light of which its value 
is established. Living currency is its own value and concreteness. The purchasing power of living 
currency, and a fortiori of the Young-Girl, has no limits.”117 In Marxian terms, the Young-Girl is 
an extreme form of a commodity fetish, one that has detached itself entirely from the socially 
mediated apparatus of abstract labour, or, more precisely, exists only in a permanent flight from 
it, in a never ending autoimmune destruction of all value producing bios. As Tiqqun’s text 
argues, “[e]very Young-Girl is her own modest purification business.”118 “[She] dreams of a 
body that would be purely transparent to the lights of the Spectacle. In all, she dreams of being 
                                                 
115 Tiqqun, Preliminary Materials for a Theory of the Young-Girl, trans. A Reines (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 
2012), 14-16. 
116 Ibid., 18. 
117 Ibid., 91. 
118 Ibid., 111. 
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nothing more than the idea THEY have of her.”119 Or, to put it differently, “[s]he aspires to a 
perfection that would consist in having no body.”120 The Young-Girl is an anorexic subject 
trying “in vain [...] to give herself form as bare life,” to be the bios of her own zoe—a process 
that eventually leads to her death.121  
 In The Neon Demon, Jesse embodies such an impossible regulative idea of the Young-
Girl for everyone else in the fashion industry. Her first photo-shoot that opens the film already 
makes this clear by having her pose as a dead body with her throat slit. The camera slowly 
dollies back from her close-up to reveal the studio, then, after a reverse shot of the photographer 
we track back towards the set, which, however, is now empty, with only a pool of blood marking 
the heroine’s presence a moment ago. Like in Fear X, the initial subtractive move that 
establishes a minimum distance from the void (of death) initiates a sequence of purification 
(starting with the make-up girl wiping the fake blood off the protagonist’s neck) that serves as 
the narrative trajectory of the film, only to end with a loop back to the beginning with Jesse’s 
actual death. After she is called a natural beauty by a star photographer, she becomes the object 
of envy of the other models who—despite their eagerness to subordinate themselves to the 
industry’s anorexic Young-Girl standards (in one scene they have a waitress read out the food 
menu for them only to settle with coffee)—appear imperfect next to her (too old, too many 
plastic surgeries, etc.). Eventually, three of them (Ruby, Gigi and Sarah) murder Jesse, carve up 
her body and eat it, as if to perform a postmodern version of the Christian Eucharist through 
which believers would glorify God by ritualistically merging his body with their own. Like with 
other forms of cynical sovereignty, necropolitical violence on the other’s bare life coincides here 
                                                 
119 Ibid., 127. 
120 Ibid., 129. 
121 Ibid., 128. The authors suggest that “anorexia could be seen as a tragic caricature of the disconnected, self-
sufficient female, unable to affiliate and driven by an obsessive desire for power and mastery.” Ibid., 124.  
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with the glorification of oneself as the monadic embodiment of the heavenly oikonomia (the self-
purifying economy of the Young-Girl). The stabilizing effect of this sovereign moment, 
however, doesn’t last long: the girls’ feeding frenzy soon turns into bulimic excretion and 
vomiting.122 We see Ruby, now alone, lying naked in the moonlight while a pool of simmering 
blood starts to ooze from her body, until the camera settles on her (possibly dead) face frozen 
into ecstasy.123 The other two go to a photo-shoot the next morning, but Gigi, having to wear a 
tight girdle, soon starts dry heaving and runs for a bathroom break. When Sarah finds her in a 
room with swastika patterned wallpaper, she vomits up one of Jesse’s eyes, then starts to slice 
her belly up with a pair of scissors crying: “Get her out of me!” In Lacanian terms, she vomits up 
the gaze of the Other as objet petit a, the fantasmatic embodiment of the void the subject can 
never incorporate as long as she is alive. As the Tiqqun book puts it, “the Young-Girl manages 
only to express the void, the living void, seething and oozing, the humid void—until she 
vomits.”124 After she dies, Sarah picks up the eye and swallows it with mild disgust and 
bemusement on her face, then walks away with a determination to go back to work. We then cut 
to the final credit sequence with her walking in the desert alone, but after a cut she disappears 
altogether and the film ends with a fade to black as the sun sets. To quote Tiqqun again, “[t]he 
apparent sovereignty of the Young-Girl is also the absolute vulnerability of the separated 
individual.” 
6.4 Conclusion 
It is self-erasure in front of a self-contained, machinic Other that constitutes the white 
masculine subject’s sovereign act in Refn’s films. While in his first auteurial period the hero 
                                                 
122 Demonstrating how “anorexia is the truth of bulimia.” Ibid., 127. 
123 “The Young-Girl aims at total inexpressivity, at ecstatic absence.” Ibid., 126.  
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anticipates his moment of disappearance in panic after his autoimmune process of purification 
leaves him isolated from the male homosocial community, the later films treat the encounter with 
the digital void as something that has always already happened by normalizing the state of 
masculine depression. While the early films are about self-destructive protagonists with a 
sickness unto death, the later ones feature men (and finally women) who have survived their 
symbolic death and hover around namelessly in an atemporal universe as beautiful souls, angels 
of death. Films of the first period are about neoliberalism’s overstimulation of the male body, the 
fundamentally autoimmune demand for hyperproduction that undermines the social basis of 
masculine productivity: the homosocial community. Films of the second period, by contrast, 
increasingly aestheticize and glorify the very anti-social dimension of neoliberalism: the former 
films’ spasmic movement from one anxious acting out to the next is now synchronized into a 
new designer aesthetic through the meta-language of slow cinema. Refn’s heroes still oscillate 
between violent outbursts and depressed withdrawal from the social, but this oscillation now has 
a rhythm: it constitutes a zero level territoriality through which the white masculine subject, by 
becoming Young-Girl, can appropriate the atemporal void of the digital, turn it into his (or 
indeed her) productive machine.125  
At the end, then, Refn’s theatrics of sacrificing the body of the white masculine sovereign 
is a cynical one that serves to perpetuate his rule through other, deterritorialized means. It’s a 
Pascalian ritual that aims to restore his (and the viewer’s) belief in the glory of this world 
through the aestheticization of its destruction and the subject’s alienation from it. As Žižek 
reminds us, “sacrifice and castration are to be opposed: far from involving the voluntary 
acceptance of castration, sacrifice is the most refined way of disavowing it, i.e. of acting as if one 
                                                 
125 Depression and masochism are productive here in the sense that they are presented as the necessary building 
blocks of sovereignty. 
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effectively possessed the hidden treasure that made me an object worthy of love...”126 And, as 
Freud already observed, the elementary function of the fetish is precisely to prevent the 
(masculine) subject from encountering the real of castration (for Freud, the fact that the mother 
doesn’t have a penis, for Lacan, the inconsistency of the symbolic order). Refn’s sacrificing of 
the masculine sovereign and his fetishization of the machinic-digital, that is, non-castrated Other 
are therefore two sides of the same coin, components of a new bios of neoliberal biopower.  
                                                 
126 Salvoj Žižek, On Belief (New York: Routledge, 2001), 73. 
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7 The Exhaustion of the Sovereign-Image: The Neo-Noirs of David 
Fincher 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 Let us summarize our findings so far about the cynical form of the sovereign-image in 
contemporary North Atlantic film noir. I called ‘sovereignty’ the knot that ties together 
necropolitical violence, immunization, and glorification, corresponding to the Lacanian registers 
of real, imaginary, and symbolic, as well as the Hegelian singular, particular, and universal—one 
phallic-masculine apparatus of power with three topological layers. Cynicism refers to the 
historical moment when the rhetoric of a substantial link between these separate levels is 
abandoned and the arbitrariness of the sovereign procedure is laid out in the open. Under the 
auspices of the neoliberal paradigm of self-entrepreneurship, noir’s new sovereign isn’t seeking 
to cover up the incommensurability of his bare life (the excess of his jouissance) with the bios of 
a hegemonic (male homosocial) community but aims to bypass the level of generic 
immunization altogether, establishing his private-monadistic economy as the glorious mirror 
image of a transcendental oikonomia. This is why the premise of cynicism is post-ideological. In 
contemporary neo-noir, the cynic occupies the place where classical noir’s nurturing woman qua 
subject-supposed-to-believe and the femme fatale qua subject-supposed-to-enjoy once were: 
devalued through their exclusion from the apparatus of abstract labour yet fetishized for that very 
reason. In the neoliberal post-work society where these formerly excluded positions are reframed 
as the source of biocapitalist value, they become two sides of the cynic’s libidinal economy 
connected through a Moebius-strip that performatively transforms his idiosyncratic jouissance 
into living currency through Pascalian auto-suggestion into self-belief. Cynicism seems to 
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function as a self-glorifying machine, giving value to the body out of thin air, selling not one’s 
socially constructed labour power but his dissociated bare life, his privatized surplus-enjoyment 
in the post-ideological marketplace in which the principle of equivalency is suspended. Such a 
neoliberal market, instead of mediating between commensurable units of reified labour, is merely 
there to express the “intrinsic” value of singular commodities. As a form of cinema, the 
cynicism-image offers itself as a new transcultural meta-language for a supposedly post-
historical, post-ideological era of global capitalism, a cinema for everyone but no one (group) in 
particular. The cynicism-image is the suture of the neoliberal cinematic apparatus, interactively 
mobilizing the spectator as the sovereign arbiter of the film’s biopolitical value.  
 The critical wager of this dissertation has been, however, that the self-enfoldment of the 
cynic is an ideological fantasy and that bios, the particular social mediation of life’s bioeconomic 
value under Empire, is not so much eliminated but repressed in these films, only to return in 
various forms of western masculinity’s hybrid hegemony: hard-bodied and hetero-bourgeois in 
Nolan, flexible and androgynous in Boyle, and always (on the verge of) becoming-queer and 
becoming-woman in Refn. The different failures of these masculine heroes to cynically collapse 
bios and zoe (to present their bare life as its own bios) can be mapped on a Greimasian semiotic 
square (Figure 5): 
    BIOS + ZOE 
Danny Boyle 
    
 
BIOS + NOT-ZOE 
Christopher Nolan 
BIOS   ZOE 
     
NOT-ZOE          NOT-BIOS 
 
 
ZOE + NOT-BIOS 
Nicolas Winding Refn  
    
    Figure 6.    
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As I have argued in Chapter 3, Boyle’s films conceive of the neoliberal cynic as an 
isolated subject who is nonetheless connected to a multitude of fellow monads indirectly through 
the digital protocols of networked capitalism. The director therefore resolves the fundamental 
antagonism between bios and zoe by affirming both at the same time, which is why in the 
semiotic square he occupies the place of the “complex term,” a synthesis between two contrary 
elements (bios + zoe). For Jameson, such synthesis is always an ironic caricature of a properly 
dialectical one, having “[the] cake both ways” as a result of getting fixated too much on a 
particular content behind the opposing terms instead of letting their conflict unfold on the formal 
level.1 In Boyle’s case, zoe tends to signify individual consumption, while bios refers to the 
liberal multicultural ideal of diverse consumers in frictionless coexistence—the two of which can 
only be synthesized in an ironic caricature of collective life.  
 We can see now how Nolan’s solution that re-introduces the classical patriarchal bios to 
manage the multitude’s life under digital capitalism is at a higher level of dialectical abstraction 
insofar as for him, the re-masculinization of the social (as well as the post-classical Hollywood 
narrative) results from a formal necessity to tame individuals’ autoimmune drive after the value 
of their singular bare life. In our semiotic square he therefore stands for the positive deixis 
combining the affirmation of the positive seme (bios) with the negation of the negative seme 
(zoe). On the other hand, Refn’s resolution of the neoliberal bios – zoe antagonism, while 
entering a similar level of abstraction, moves in the opposite direction. His films attribute formal 
necessity not to the return of the paternal metaphor but to an endless autoimmune self-
destruction of the social link, which he posits as the form of life perpetually resisting the 
                                                 
1 Fredric Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions (New York: 
Verso, 2005), 177-179. 
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system’s Oedipal reterritorialization. In our Greimasian field, he thereby performs a negative 
deixis, affirming the negative term (zoe) while negating the positive one (bios). The limitation of 
both of these approaches is their fetishistic valorization of the particular content of their affirmed 
seme: for Nolan, the white heterosexual male bourgeoisie who is supposed to rule over the 
multitude by their superior cynical wisdom, and for Refn a bare life uncorrupted by western 
white male influence like that of native americans, the people of Thailand, or the Young-Girl 
(ultimately: the Young-Girl). To put it differently, their weak point is that they don’t go far 
enough with their formalism, that they keep separating bios qua form of life from zoe qua bare 
(formless) life, unable to think their contradiction together in what Agamben calls a form-of-life, 
a life that is not caught in the sovereign apparatus of power.2  
 It is this form-of-life that the fourth, yet to be explored position in our Greimasian 
semiotic square should bring us insofar as it offers a synthesis of the negation of both semes in a 
“neutral term” (not-bios + not-zoe). As Jameson summarizes, neutral means 
[n]either one nor the other, without any third possibility in sight. This neutral position 
does not seek to hold two substantive features, two positivities, together in the mind at 
once, but rather attempts to retain two negative or privative ones, along with their mutual 
negation of each other. [...] They must neither be combined in some humanist organic 
synthesis, nor effaced and abandoned altogether: but retained and sharpened, made more 
virulent, their incompatibility and indeed their incommensurability a scandal for the 
                                                 
2 As Agamben writes, “[b]y the term form-of-life [...] I mean a life that can never be separated from its form, a life 
in which it is never possible to isolate something such as naked life.” Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End: Notes 
on Politics, trans. V. Binetti and C. Casarino (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2000), 3-4. 
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mind, but a scandal that remains vivid and alive, and that cannot be thought away, either 
by resolving it or eliminating it.3 
For Jameson, such double negation is the form of utopia par excellence, a view—as Rudolphus 
Teeuwen points out—he shares with structuralists like Roland Barthes or Maurice Blanchot. For 
Barthes, Teeuwen notes, the semiotic square’s neutral synthesis is utopian insofar as it brings 
about a certain weariness of the mind and “a celebration of the good for nothing.”4 Similarly, 
Blanchot praises it for inducing “an enormous fatigue, a weariness, a sort of trance;” a “lack of 
exactness” in signification he referred to as “uncommunication.”5 In Agambenian terms, all these 
authors saw a profane potential in the neutral term, a possibility for an inoperative use of binary 
oppositions. I will argue that noir cynicism can be neutralized in a similar way and that the films 
of the seemingly conventional Hollywood director David Fincher are worth examining for traces 
of such dialectical fatigue of sovereignty.  
 What, then, makes Fincher different from his fellow midcult auteurs of Empire discussed 
in the previous chapters, besides being the only American born among them? As someone who 
(unlike the others) became famous for his commercials and music videos, he is often seen as a 
“technical artist” primarily interested in the new modalities of cinema emerging with the digital 
revolution, someone who has pioneered techniques like the virtual camera cutting through bodies 
and objects (Fight Club, 1999), shooting an entire film on a hard drive (Zodiac, 2007), projecting 
an actor’s face on another’s head (The Curious Case of Benjamin Button, 2008), or compositing 
phone messages on the top of the image of people typing them (House of Cards, 2013). As Mark 
Browning puts it, Fincher’s work “focuses very explicitly on what movies can show and how 
                                                 
3 Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future, 180. 
4 Rudolphus Teeuwen, “An Epoch of Rest Roland Barthes’s “Neutral” and the Utopia of Weariness,” Cultural 
Critique, no. 80 (2012): 7. 
5 Ibid., 3-4. 
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they do that,”6 often drawing attention to the cinematic artifice like his commercials starring 
Hollywood celebrities playing themselves (The Director, 1993; The Run, 2005; or Downtown, 
2013), various mise-en-abyme themed music videos redoubling the screen or the frame (Paula 
Abdul, It’s Just the Way that You Love Me, 1989; Billy Idol, L.A. Woman, 1990; Nine Inch Nails, 
Only, 2005), and films reflecting on the mise-en-scene as a construct (The Game, 1997), even 
trying to “alienate” the viewer through direct address or splicing the image of (allegedly) the 
director’s penis into the film stock (Fight Club, 1999). Accordingly, Fincher likes to position 
himself as something of a Hollywood Brechtian, asserting that “[s]ome people go to the movies 
to be reminded that everything's okay. I don't make those kinds of movies. That, to me, is a lie. 
Everything's not okay. [...] You have a responsibility for the way you make the audience feel, 
and I want them to feel uncomfortable.”7 
 For scholars like Neil Archer, however, his play with the medium is not so much a 
modernist exercise as it is a neo-classical move, a prime example of what David Bordwell saw as 
contemporary Hollywood’s tendency for “an audacious style that parades virtuosity while 
remaining within the ambit of a stable system.”8 There is indeed another side to Fincher the 
auteur whose primary interest is not to disrupt but to strengthen and purify the classical 
Hollywood narrative, to make it flow more seamlessly after a digital upgrade. On various DVD 
commentaries Fincher claims that filmmaking is “all about parsing out information,”9 and that 
his “process is a process of limiting, trying to figure out the rules what not to do.”10 He is known 
                                                 
6 Mark Browning, David Fincher: Films that Scar (Praeger: Santa Barbara, 2010), 179. 
7 Brian Mockenhaupt, “The Curious Case of David Fincher,” Esquire 147, no. 3 (2007): 159. 
8 Bordwell quoted in Neil Archer, “The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo (2009/2011) and the new ‘European Cinema’,” 
Film Criticism 37, no. 2 (2012): 10. 
9 Zodiac, directed by David Fincher (2007; Los Angeles: Warner Home Video, 2007), DVD. 
10 Seven, directed by David Fincher (1995; Los Angeles: Warner Home Video, 2010), DVD. 
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in the business as an obsessive compulsive “control freak”11 making his actors do dozens of 
takes until the repetition erases, as he puts it, their “muscle memory” and they start to become 
their role.12 “He wants puppets. He doesn’t want actors that are creative,”13 one critic writes, 
which seems to rhyme with his avoidance of close-ups and preference for a steady, machinic 
rhythm of the narrative using static shots and dollies rather than handheld camera, and (digital) 
compositing instead of classical shot-reverse shot sequences. Along these lines, Daniel Kasman 
and Ignatiy Vishnevetsky talk about the process based aesthetic of Fincher’s films: “[he] seeks 
mechanisms that allow him to show a series of things—usually construed as events, usually 
construed as specific meetings between people” stretched out in time like stages of a police 
investigation (Seven, Zodiac), a lawsuit (The Social Network), or encounters between lovers 
(Benjamin Button). “This technique eliminates the need for full-fledged, evolving scenes of 
melodrama and replaces it with a montage-based cinema of this happened and then this happened 
and then this.”14 Or, as Vishnevetsky puts it, “Fincher converts drama into data, and then orders 
it in sequential order.” “The result is a constant sensation of convergence, of piece falling into 
place”— one editor even compared him to a Swiss watchmaker—supported by the films’ visual 
style of “hyperrealistic lighting” and an “authoritatively crisp framing.”15   
 As a “process-based” filmmaker, Fincher’s work seems to exemplify what Sean Cubitt 
calls neobaroque film in which self-enclosed monad-like worlds unfold according to an 
underlying pattern which protagonists are trying to decipher—a process which the films turns 
                                                 
11 James Swallow, Dark Eye: The Films of David Fincher (Richmond: Reynolds & Hearn, 2003), 32. 
12 “David Fincher: A Life in Pictures Highlights,” YouTube video, 13:03, posted by “BAFTA Guru,” Dec 18, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rpHIzEm6058.  
13 Mockenhaupt, “The Curious Case of David Fincher,” 159. 
14 Daniel Kasman, “David Fincher and the Sad Facts.” Notebook October 1, 2010, accessed October 19, 2016, 
https://mubi.com/notebook/posts/david-fincher-and-the-sad-facts.  
15 Ignatij Vishnevestsky, “In the Process of the Investigation: David Fincher and 'The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo’," 
Notebook December 13, 2013, accessed October 19, 2016, https://mubi.com/notebook/posts/in-the-process-of-the-
investigation-david-fincher-and-the-girl-with-the-dragon-tattoo.  
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into a spectacle (as in Groundhog Day, 1993; The Truman Show, 1998; or The Matrix, 1999). He 
sees the neobaroque film as a symptom of a general algorithmic mutation of Hollywood cinema 
whereby “image becomes composition, narrative becomes pattern, and the whole comes to a 
moment of gestalt coherence.”16 This “subjection of hyperindividuals to artificial worlds,” 
condemning them to ahistorical repetition in windowless monads signals, according to Cubitt, 
the disappearance of the modern subject once capable of temporal existence (change) “into the 
arabesques of spectacular coincidence.”17 By contrast, what I have called cynical neo-noir is 
more like a meta-commentary on such neobaroque enslavement of the self that makes it clear 
that far from disappearing, the sovereign subject keeps returning in neoliberal capitalism, making 
biopolitical decisions about society’s future much like his modern predecessor did. Fincher, I 
will argue, should also be placed within this dialectic: he is both the author of algorithmic 
processes and of the subject’s sovereign excess over them, an antinomy visible in his films 
through the co-presence of digital and analogue media; an austere, crisp, corporate style and an 
abject, trashy, grunge aesthetic; hypercontinuity editing and “Brechtian” alienation effects. What 
distinguishes him from his fellow cynics is that instead of picking either or both sides of this 
antinomy, he shows both of them as a dead end, amplifying their dialectical tension, thereby 
decreating the sovereign-image linking them together. 
 
                                                 
16 Sean Cubitt, The Cinema Effect (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 243. 
17 Ibid., 244. 
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7.2 From the Crisis of Masculine Glory to the Contradictions of the 
Sovereign-Image 
 Like Boyle’s Elephant, Nolan’s Doodlebug, and Refn’s Pusher, Fincher’s first film The 
Smoking Fetus (1984) also explores the problem of autoimmunity. It’s a commercial he made for 
the American Cancer Society, which, as the title suggests, features a fetus smoking inside its 
mother’s womb—a dialectical image juxtaposing the safety of the prenatal immunized bubble 
with the body’s autoimmune death drive pitted against it. This is also the basic conflict in 
Fincher’s first feature Alien 3 (1992) that starts with an alien parasite causing the protagonist’s 
space pod to crash, putting an end to her cryosleep in her artificial womb. While thematically and 
aesthetically consistent with his other work, the film almost put an end to Fincher’s career in 
Hollywood due to its financial and critical failure. Always the perfectionist, the young director, 
high on his recent MTV fame, didn’t tolerate the studio’s meddling with the production process 
and ended up walking off the set forfeiting the right to final cut. It was only in 2003, after his 
later box office hits established him as sought after a Hollywood auteur, that Twentieth Century 
Fox put together a 30 minute longer “assembly cut” based on Fincher’s original notes and 
released it with the Alien series DVD box set. While not quite a director’s cut, it is this version 
of this underrated film that I will look at here, remarkable in its clear and uncompromising non-
resolution of the tension between autoimmunity and sovereign immunization, the contradiction at 
the heart of Fincher’s entire oeuvre.  
 Alien 3 is set on Fury 161, a prison planet that used to operate as a toxic waste disposal 
site for the ominous Company, but where now only a small crew watches over shutdown rigs 
rusting away. Once a colony of 5000 ultraviolent convicts, disease has cut the population to just 
25 souls—men who have survived their becoming obsolete and the disintegration of their 
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industrial habitat by finding solace in apocalyptic Christian fundamentalism. It is this remnant of 
Fordist patriarchy that the arrival of the female protagonist Ripley threatens with final extinction 
as she is bringing with her the larva of an alien life form that uses humans as pods to procreate, 
destroying them in the process. While Barbara Creed’s well known psychoanalytic reading of the 
Alien series (mainly based on Alien, 1979) posited the monster as the embodiment of phallic 
femininity threatening patriarchal communities with its castrating vagina dentata,18 in Fincher’s 
film sexual difference comes to be framed less in horror and more in noir terms. Not only is the 
male homosocial community already dying on its own by the time the alien arrives, the heroine 
herself, far from being the amazon of the previous films, is nothing but a living dead waiting for 
the creature that infected her to burst out of her stomach. There is a pervasive death drive in the 
air from the very beginning conveyed by the sepia coloured images of rust and decay that 
eventually levels the differences between various forms of life stuck in Fury 161’s biopolitical 
zone of indistinction (even Bishop, Ripley’s benevolent droid asks to be switched off 
permanently). If, as Creed suggested, in Alien the monster stood for the abject excess to be 
expulsed from the human body and (we could add) from the immunized sphere of productive 
life,19 Alien 3 imagines an inoperative community of male abjects, cast out aliens themselves 
living in anal looking tunnels “at the rats ass end of space” who, as Dillon, the prisoner’s 
religious leader puts it, “tolerate[s] anybody, even the intolerable.” No wonder Amy Taubin 
reads the film as an AIDS allegory.20 
                                                 
18 Barbara Creed, The Monstrous-Feminine: Film, Feminism, Psychoanalysis (New York: Routledge, 1993), 16-31. 
19 The crew of first film’s spaceship is depicted as a well-oiled blue collar worker’s community, derailed by an 
S.O.S. signal from an alien spaceship.  
20 “Aids is everywhere in the film. It's in the danger surrounding sex and drugs. It's in the metaphor of a mysterious 
deadly organism attacking an all-male community. It's in the iconography of the shaven heads. Exhorting the 
prisoners to defy The Company, Ripley shouts. ‘They think we're scum and they don't give a fuck about one friend 
of yours who's died.’ an Aids activism line if ever there was one.” Amy Taubin, “Invading bodies: Alien 3 and the 
Trilogy,” Sight and Sound (July, 1992): 10. 
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The term tolerance, fashionable in the 90s post-political climate of liberal 
multiculturalism, is of course deeply ambiguous as one usually tolerates, to quote Žižek, 
“something one does not approve of, but cannot abolish,” not unlike how the body can develop a 
tolerance for poison in a small dosage.21 This means that tolerance is a category of immunization 
par excellence,22 which places the enigmatic notion of “tolerating the intolerable” in the 
autoimmune register of the death drive where the tolerated toxin eventually destroys the body, 
unless a sovereign establishes a separation from it. Initially, the intolerable refers to the sin of the 
flesh in the film, the temptation amplified by Ripley, the female intruder disturbing men’s ascetic 
quest for spiritual purity: a group of convicts almost gang rapes her were it not for Dillon’s 
intervention with a tire iron. Once the alien reveals itself, however, she is gradually accepted by 
the community of male sinners with whom she shares a predicament of being abandoned by the 
Company (with her head shaved like the others’ she even looks like a repenting monk), and the 
monster takes her place as the tolerated intolerable abject. After the creature kills the prison 
warden, having experience about how to fight it, Ripley becomes the colony’s de facto leader 
(the highest ranking male officer has an IQ of 85), and she devises an operation that, although 
almost undermined by male incompetence, successfully traps the alien in a toxic waste disposal 
chamber. This isolation of alien bare life with the assistance of the female sovereign’s 
intellectual labour (echoing the powers of the 80s femme fatale) momentarily returns the lost 
glory to the homosocial community: Fincher shoots the exhausted men walking away from the 
site of the hard won battle in slow motion, with a medieval aria in Latin as the sound bridge to 
the following victory ceremony performed by Dillon.  
                                                 
21 Slavoj Žižek, Living in the End Times (New York: Verso, 2010), 46. 
22 We could say, using Esposito’s categories, that immunization is the tolerance of life in a small dosage. 
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The men’s sovereign moment, however, doesn’t last long: escalating the autoimmune 
madness of the colony’s apocalyptic religion, one of the convicts releases the monster he 
worships as a god—only to be slaughtered immediately. Moreover, after a radio exchange with 
the suddenly highly involved Company, it becomes clear that they value the alien’s life more 
than that of the humans, willing to sacrifice the entire population to get their hands on such a 
unique commodity. After Ripley finds out about her noir indistinction from the alien (carrying a 
larva inside her makes her share the creature’s abject status), she convinces the remaining 
survivors that they, just like her, are already dead: if the creature doesn’t kill them the Company 
will upon arrival to cover up the traces of their discovery. Accordingly, their objective now is not 
to isolate the alien but to die with it, to embrace it as their own death driven libido-substance 
(Ripley makes Dillon promise he will execute her once they are done).23 In other words, if the 
first hunt for the monster followed the bios + ~zoe formula seeking to exclude the excess of 
sacred (bare) life from the homosocial community, the second one emerging after its failure 
inverts this logic into ~bios + zoe and it appropriately ends with Ripley’s self-sacrifice (her jump 
into a molten pit of lead after the alien, with its larva still in her stomach). Yet, unlike the 
sacrificial act in Refn’s films, Ripley’s autoimmune leap into the void doesn’t restore sovereign 
power to anyone: only one convict is left alive, mindlessly grinning at his failed corporate 
masters as they take him away in chains to shut down the outpost for good.  
The denouement therefore exposes a fundamental contradiction at the heart of 
postmodern sovereignty: while neoliberal capitalism fetishizes bare life as the ultimate source of 
profit, this very paradigm undermines itself by pressuring subjects to endlessly purify themselves 
                                                 
23 Žižek reads the creature in the Alien films as the example of what Lacan called lamella, the myth of a libido organ 
beyond castration that “is indivisible, indestrucable, and immortal - more precisely, undead in the sense this term has 
in horror fiction: not the sublime immortality of the Spirit, but the obscene Immortality of the 'living dead' which, 
after every annihilation, reconstitute themselves and shamble on.” Slavoj Žižek, How To Read Lacan (New York: 
W. W. Norton & Co., 2006), 62. 
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into such precious commodities—a quest that can only be realized through suicide. In Lacanian 
terms, Ripley, like Refn’s Young-Girl, refuses to separate herself from her agalma, objet petit a 
as the hidden treasure at the core of the subject she imagines being valued for by the Other (the 
Company who wants to surgically remove the alien inside her). By pushing the sovereign 
privatization of her bare life to the end, Ripley effectively undermines the possibility of its 
valorization. Unlike Neon Demon, however, where the Young-Girl lived on as a specter of the 
capitalist value destroying one body after the next, Alien 3 imagines the deactivation of this 
value-form itself (allegorized by the creature). In other words, Fincher’s framing of sovereignty 
as a contradiction points beyond its apparatus of power relying on the separation of bios and zoe.  
Such undoing of the sovereign isolation of sacred life begins with the release of the alien 
from captivity. Far from simply worshipping the monster as sacred Other, the mad convict’s act 
is rather what Agamben calls profanation: “[t]o profane means to open the possibility of a special 
form of negligence, which ignores separation or, rather, puts it to a particular use.”24 Profanation 
is a form of play that “distracts humanity from the sphere of the sacred, without simply 
abolishing it;”25 by extending sacred inoperativity to instrumental processes it transforms them 
into means without an end.26 This is how the second hunt for the alien, while officially aiming at 
the creature’s destruction, looks more like a game of tag where the lines between hunter and 
hunted, hunt and play become blurred. The convicts are running around in the colony’s 
labyrinthine tunnels, luring the monster their way while others try to shut the doors behind them 
so the creature ends up in the furnace room along with Ripley, Dillon and, as it turns out, all the 
others. Point of view shots of the anxious humans are cross cut with subjective shots of the alien 
(an early example of Fincher’s experiments with unmanned cameras), often misleading the 
                                                 
24 Giorgio Agamben, Profanations, trans. J. Fort (New York: Zone Books, 2007), 75. 
25 Ibid., 76. 
26 Ibid., 86. 
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viewer about their source suturing them (at one point it’s two men bumping into each other when 
we were expecting an encounter with the creature).  
The temporality of this process also differs from the chronological time of the action-
image dominating the first half of the film that led to a momentary sovereign resolution of the 
narrative. As characters now assume they are already dead no matter what happens, they are 
stuck in a strange inoperative time (time without an essential purpose) that remains until the 
Company spaceship arrives to finish them off, knowing they cannot change their situation for the 
better. Agamben, in his reading of Saint Paul’s Letters to the Romans, calls this “messianic 
time,” which designates neither chronological (secular) time, nor the time of eternity (the end of 
time), but rather “the time that time takes to come to an end” after the messianic event 
inaugurated its imminent conclusion.27 The messianic is an operation that brings forth something 
inherent yet covert in our everyday representations of chronological time:  
It is as though man, insofar as he is a thinking and speaking being, produced an additional 
time with regard to chronological time, a time that prevented him from perfectly 
coinciding with the time out of which he could make images and representations. [...] [A] 
time within time—not ulterior but interior—which only measures my disconnection with 
regard to it, my being out of synch and in noncoincidence with regard to my 
representation of time, but precisely because of this, allows for the possibility of my 
achieving and taking hold of it.28  
                                                 
27 Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2005), 67. 
28 Ibid., 67. 
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Messianic time is therefore time “in its pure state of potentiality”29 interior to any actual 
representation of time; it is “the time we take to bring to an end, to achieve our representation of 
time.”30  
 Insofar as a film is a representation of time, on the top of its duration it too includes the 
surplus of messianic time which could be defined, paraphrasing Agamben, as the time the 
thinking subject takes to achieve her cinematic image of time, which can be inscribed at the level 
of the plot’s chronological unfolding as the time the film takes to come to an end after its story is 
already over. And one way to reveal this pure potentiality of cinematic time is film noir’s 
suspension of the action-image in a death driven narrative where the protagonist’s “death on 
arrival” (like Ripley’s in Alien 3 or Walter’s in Double Indemnity) is the messianic caesura 
initiating “the time that remains” in which characters as well as the viewer experience the radical 
freedom of inoperativity. This atemporality of the death drive, as I have argued in the previous 
chapters, can then be mobilized both for sovereign and utopian purposes; its freedom can be 
freely disavowed through fatalism, melancholy, or cynicism, or alternatively embraced as pure 
(im)potentiality. Fincher opts for the latter by drawing attention to the contradictory form of 
sovereignty: Ripley’s fall into the flames with a Christ-like posture fails to glorify corporate 
capitalism, offering a spectacle that decreates the sovereign-image instead.31  
 The director’s second feature, the both critically and financially successful Seven (1995) 
continues to explore the crisis of masculine glory and attempts at its sovereign-religious 
restoration in late capitalism. It’s a serial killer noir set in an unnamed metropolis with biblical 
levels of crime and decadence, and a gloomy aesthetic created through the silver-retention of the 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 66. 
30 Ibid., 67. 
31 Until the sequel made 5 years later that recreates the sovereign link by resurrecting Ripley as well as the alien 
inside her. 
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film stock—a technique that, as Taubin explains, “produces more luminosity in the light tones, 
and more density in the darks.”32 If Alien 3 displaced Fordist masculinity’s crisis narrative 
through feminism, Seven does something similar by introducing a racial split within its 
traditionalist masculine discourse represented by the three male protagonists: the white serial 
killer John Doe, a Christian fundamentalist seeking mass media attention for his gory murder 
series themed after the seven deadly sins; the young white detective Mills, hotheaded, 
homophobic, with a stay at home wife; and detective Somerset, the wise elderly black man who 
lives alone and can’t wait to retire to the countryside from the corrupt city. Somerset is not the 
only African American presence in the film, however. As Paul Gromley suggests, Seven exhibits 
signs of a “mimetic contagion” by black culture as it was imagined by America’s white 
population in the 90s. The film imitates the video aesthetic of true-crime TV series featuring 
mainly black suspects with its extreme shallow focus providing a paranoid view of the city 
where danger can come from anywhere at any moment, and through its exploitative display of 
carnage both revolting and seductive.33 Similarly, Steven Macek reads the moralizing narrative 
about the fallen city as a white middle class suburban prejudice “toward a (mostly poor, mostly 
of color) inner-city understood as essentially unruly and beyond hope.”34 In this sense Seven is 
somewhere half way between classical noir’s foreclosure of urban African American presence 
and postmodern neo-noirs of black revisionism (Suture, 1993; Devil in a Blue Dress, 1995) that 
reveal noir’s former structuring absence. Instead of black identity politics Fincher’s film offers 
the white imaginary as a contradiction.  
                                                 
32 Amy Taubin quoted in Paul Gromley, The New Brutality Film: Race and Affect in Contemporary Hollywood 
Cinema (Portland: Intellect, 2005), 171. 
33 Ibid., 170-71. This affective appropriation of black culture is acknowledged with a knowing wink when Mills’ 
wife Tracy invites Somerset for dinner, she puts on an album of Marvin Gaye.  
34 Steve Macek, “Places of Horror: Fincher's ‘Seven’ and Fear of the City in Recent Hollywood Film,” College 
Literature, 26, no. 1 (1999): 89. 
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 Unlike Alien 3’s uneven and sometimes (refreshingly) incoherent plot, Seven is a feature 
where the director’s perfectionism and obsession with a process based narrative can finally be 
satisfied. John Doe’s well prepared plan arranging for clues and bodies to be found by the police 
in a timely fashion is also a meta-commentary on his filmmaking process, just like the killer’s 
cry: “wanting people to listen, you can't just tap them on the shoulder anymore, you have to hit 
them with a sledgehammer” is a snippet of Fincher’s ars poetica (“I’ve always been interested in 
movies that scar”).35 The murderer’s quest to perform a sacred religious ritual that would restore 
the glory to America’s sovereign biopower undermined by liberal hedonism (the seven sins of 
the jouissance) therefore mirrors the director’s attempt to make the classical Hollywood narrative 
work its magic once again on the postmodern market of images where everything is permitted 
and no one believes in the Production Code anymore. Yet, although every piece of the puzzle 
gets into its place in the end, Seven is more than a neobaroque (or rather: neoclassical) mind 
game film causing sublime shock and awe through the algorithmic unfolding of its gruesome 
plot. In the finale, the serial killer, after giving himself up, requests the two detectives to 
accompany him to a place in the desert where, he claims, he had buried his last two victims. 
These are the only representations of the countryside in the film, which is far from the agrarian 
idyll Somerset is longing for: as the endless grid of electric pylons indicates it had already gone 
through a metropolitan transformation. Soon after their arrival to the designated location a 
delivery truck appears and Somerset runs ahead to stop it while Mills is holding Doe at gunpoint. 
The postman hands over a cardboard box addressed to Mills and after some hesitation Somerset 
opens it, only to find the severed head of his partner’s wife Tracy. Factoring in the shock on his 
face, Doe starts to confess to Mills what he had done to his wife while Somerset is running 
towards them, yelling “throw your gun down!” but saying nothing like “don’t listen to him, he is 
                                                 
35 Fincher quoted in Browning, David Fincher, vii. 
401 
 
lying!” When he arrives back, he doesn’t deny Doe’s claims that Tracy’s head in the box either, 
which predictably makes Mills shoot the killer dead in a performance of wrath that completes the 
sacred ritual he orchestrated.  
 Who, then, is the real noir sovereign of this biopolitical machine closing in on itself in 
front of our eyes? Since both Doe and Mills killed their victims for substantial reasons (for their 
“sins”), not arbitrarily, it is Somerset, the man of cynical wisdom and an escapist fantasy whose 
sovereign decision to open the box triggered the suture of the plot. In an earlier scene, when 
Mills is assigned to him as partner, Tracy invites Somerset over for dinner to their family home 
which, after considerable resistance, he finally accepts, just like the woman’s subsequent request 
to meet for coffee when she tells him about her pregnancy her husband doesn’t yet know about 
as well as her fears of raising a child in the city. Here, like in the finale, he is posited as the gaze 
who is supposed to witness the autoimmune tension within white people’s immunized bubbles: 
the repeated shaking of the Mills’ apartment when a subway train passes by, the abortion talk of 
Tracy, Doe’s self-destructive loop of necropolitics, or even the apocalyptic medieval literature 
from Dante’s Inferno to Milton’s Paradise Lost he is an avid reader of.36 It is this seemingly 
passive position of the subject supposed to believe (standing in for the film viewer as naive 
observer) that is revealed to be a result of a sovereign decision in the finale when his cutting the 
box open exposes his libidinal investment in white autoimmune decadence. His act initiates a 
sequence of time that remains in which both him and the viewer are forced to experience 
themselves as radically free subjects because, although they know what is about to happen, they 
also cannot but sense that their observing gaze is somehow included as a condition of possibility 
for this “necessary” event in the future. True, Somerset plays along predictably, but, 
                                                 
36 As Gromley notes, “[w]hat is interesting about Somerset though is that the knowledge that this movie grants the 
black character has its source in a humanistic tradition which has predominantly been perceived as white.” Gromley, 
The New Brutality Film, 174. 
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paradoxically, fulfilling the role of a cynical sovereign to its logical conclusion, experiencing his 
own long held cynicism about white biopower as a result of a truly free decision actually has the 
opposite effect on him: it cures him of his cynicism. As his final voiceover summarizes, 
implying the cancellation of his retirement plans: “Ernest Hemmingway once wrote, ‘the world 
is a fine place, and worth fighting for.’ I agree with the second part.” 
 Fincher continues to deconstruct the self-enclosed loop of sovereignty in The Game 
(1997), which posits the inconsistency of biopower within the ruling class of Empire: as an 
internal crisis of Nicholas Van Orton, a white heterosexual investment banker with a perfect 
protestant work ethic who more than successfully transformed himself into a manager of finance 
capital, dedicating his entire life to his job. When his derelict brother gives him a subscription to 
an exclusive game organized by the clandestine Consumer Recreation Agency as a birthday 
present, he is not particularly intrigued. After a company representative tells him the game is 
supposed to “provide what is lacking,” his response is “and what if nothing is lacking?” This 
way The Game reimagines the premise of Frankenheimer’s Seconds: the protagonist in both 
films suffers from a lack of lack, having no state of exception from the sphere of bourgeois 
operativity: Nicholas relaxes by watching the business news on his couch while eating the food 
prepared by his maid, and although living alone in his mansion, he considers even the yearly call 
from his ex-wife on his birthday a nuisance. Playing the game, however, doesn’t give him respite 
either: he is rather forced into even more frantic activity as his life is suddenly turned into the 
manipulated mise-en-scene of a conspiracy narrative in which he is the designated victim. An 
ominous superego agency now throws disparaging remarks at him through the TV image of his 
favourite newscaster; his pen leaks ink on his expensive shirt; he cannot open his briefcase with 
important legal documents; his acquisition deal is sabotaged; and someone vandalizes his living 
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room with punk graffiti. In Agambenian terms, a certain amount of inoperativity is introduced 
into his perfectly functioning life—for his enjoyment, but he is not particularly amused. He 
nonetheless plays along out of a sense of class duty (in an early scene he overhears the 
conversation of fellow bankers talking about CRA who then reassure him it was the best thing 
ever happened to them).  
 Fincher cleverly puts Michael Douglas in the role of Nichoals, whose stardom, as J. 
Hoberman summarizes, “depends on his capacity to project simultaneous strength and weakness. 
He is the victim as hero—a bellicose masochist, aggressive yet powerless, totally domineering 
while battered by forces beyond his control.”37 As such, he perfectly embodies the contradictions 
of cynical sovereignty. In the finale, driven into paranoia by the conspirators/game masters, he is 
cornered on the top of a skyscraper, waiting for a group of armed men to find him and finish him 
off. As the door opens, he shoots at the emerging figure with his gun, only to recognize in him 
his brother, bringing champagne and a group of Nicholas’ acquaintances to celebrate the hero’s 
valiant performance in the game. Triggered by the overwhelming sense of guilt and helplessness 
that brings back his memory of witnessing his father’s suicide, he jumps off the roof like his 
father once did to his death, which, of course, turns out to be the move factored in by the CRA. 
After breaking through a glass celling of an elegant gala room with all the characters in the film 
dressed up ceremoniously, he falls into a giant airbag, and the guests, his brother among them, 
start clapping. It takes him some time to adjust but soon he continues to play along as if it was 
his regular birthday party. As Browning notes, “the one emotion we do not see but which he 
would be fully justified in expressing is anger.”38 
                                                 
37 J. Hoberman quoted in David Savran, Taking it Like a Man: White Masculinity, Masochism, and Contemporary 
American Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 206. 
38 Browning, David Fincher, 168. 
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 While not Fincher’s strongest, The Game, like Alien 3 and Seven, plays with the effects of 
an extreme narrative closure on the viewer, this time without a diegetic stand-in to reject the 
sovereign loop. For this reason, it’s almost like a parody of the mind game film genre, revealing 
itself as an artificially constructed world whose claims to realism seem entirely absurd from the 
extra-diegetic outside. Its monadic self-enclosure appears to us as an internal matter of the one 
percent, something the ordinary viewer cannot relate to. As an exercise in ideology critique, it 
maps a neoliberal power apparatus that Alexander Galloway calls ludic capitalism, “one in which 
flexibility, play, creativity, and immaterial labor [...] have taken over from the old concepts of 
discipline, hierarchy, bureaucracy, and muscle.”39 For Agamben, this only brings out to the open 
tendencies inherent in capitalism from its onset, that “[it] is nothing but a gigantic apparatus for 
capturing pure means, that is, profanatory behaviors,”40 that the motor of the modern sovereign 
power is not instrumental reason but the controlled and limited exercise of inoperative play, the 
primitive accumulation of humanity’s common gestures into a separate sphere of glory managed 
in the film by a Veblenian leisure class.41  
 The director’s next feature, Fight Club (1999), is by far his best known and most 
analyzed one about the postmodern crisis of masculine glory—a film that renders the fascism of 
the neoliberal self-purification paradigm as the autoimmune violence of a masochistic 
boxing/terrorist cult for white, heterosexual, petty-bourgeois men. The hero, the unnamed 
Narrator, is a young white collar professional stuck in a debilitating damage assessment job for a 
major auto company, which consists of applying a mathematical formula determining whether a 
model should be recalled after a deadly accident or not. His complete detachment from the 
Fordist labour apparatus that employers like his pioneered a century ago is further underscored 
                                                 
39 Alexander R. Galloway, The Interface Effect (Malden: Polity, 2012), 27. 
40 Agamben, Profanations, 87. 
41 See Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (New York: The Modern Library, 1934) 
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by his insomnia: he drones on in the somnambulistic state of tautological time, unable to tell 
work and leisure (i.e. consumption) time apart. Fincher sums up his condition in the opening 
montage sequence, a flashback to fragments of the Narrator’s memories linked together by his 
voiceover, images of him half-asleep in his office, on an airplane, at the doctor, in various self-
help groups, and, most famously, composited into a CGI-animated IKEA catalogue that turns 
into his apartment as he walks around ordering various items on the phone. His mind perceives 
everything, he complains, as a “copy of a copy of a copy.” In Franco Berardi’s terms, he suffers 
from the fatigue of psychic overstimulation under digital (semio-)capitalism.42  
 This, of course, is merely half of his story because, as we learn only once the final piece 
of the narrative puzzle is revealed at the end, he suffers from multiple personality disorder. His 
alter-ego, Tyler Durden, is a grunge glam anarchist who, after burning down his sterile upscale 
condo, starts squatting in a rotting Victorian mansion, founds a men only bare knuckle fight club 
cum anti-corporate direct action group (“Project Mayhem”), and preaches the cult of real 
manhood that can be achieved only through self-destruction. If, as a productive member of 
society the Narrator had been machinically enslaved to the rhythms 24/7 capitalism, his 
resistance to it as Tyler in turn is autoimmune. What is entirely missing from the film is the level 
of generic immunization, a community that is not death driven: even the early support groups the 
Narrator visits faking his belonging are for the terminally ill, and the other faker, Marla, his 
(Tyler’s) occasional lover also has a death wish: she crosses busy streets without looking, takes 
pills to kill herself, and declares to Tyler (in the original script): “I want to have your abortion.” 
As the Narrator who prefers the company of Tyler—the company of himself—puts it: “If I had a 
tumor, I’d name it Marla,” recalling the interpassive symptomatology of the classical femme 
                                                 
42 Franco Berardi, Precarious Rhapsody: Semiocapitalism and the Pathologies of the Post-Alpha Generation, trans. 
A. Bove et al. (London: Minor Compositions, 2009), 45-46. 
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fatale. In other words, we are in the meta-generic domain of film noir, only Fincher puts the 
classical formula on steroids, turning it into a satire. Noir’s “dead on arrival” flashback structure 
is set up during the opening credits with the frantic neuro(n)-image ride through the Narrator’s 
brain, the virtual camera gradually shifting from microscopic to macroscopic scale, exiting the 
man’s head with a bead of sweat, tracking back to settle on the barrel of a gun in his mouth. The 
(meta-)genre’s characteristic gender dynamics, its repressed homoeroticism and flight from the 
feminine is mocked through its framing as a Victorian anachronism.43 As for noir’s expressionist 
style of affective realism, not only does Fincher manipulate the film stock to get a dirty, grainy, 
high contrast look,44 he even splices in the image of a penis a few times (and points at it through 
the Narrator’s direct address of the audience), as if to literalize the canonical reading of the noir 
aesthetic as the expression of phallic jouissance. The classical noir theater of self-castration is 
also made explicit as Tyler, predicting his other half’s impulse to sabotage his apocalyptic terror 
plot, orders the neutering of the Narrator in case he goes to the police. Oedipal themes are also 
blown over the top: Tyler preaches about his generation of men being abandoned by their real 
and symbolic fathers, their becoming effeminate like the former wrestler Bob who got testicular 
cancer from massive steroid use, and the hormonal treatment gave him “bitch tits.” (Tyler 
himself parades around the house in fluffy pink slippers and a woman’s robe). Finally, and 
perhaps most interestingly, Fight Club also reproduces the Production Code style tacked on 
endings of the classical period along with ther characteristic cognitive dissonance, having the 
Narrator shoot himself in the head to get rid of Tyler, then, with a bleeding head wound, he holds 
                                                 
43 As David Greven observes, besides the repressed love triangle between the Narrator, Tyler, and Marla, the hero’s 
crumbling mansion and the resurrection of the 19th century tradition of bare knuckle boxing clubs, Tyler’s handmade 
soap business has also a Victorian-era referent in the cult of masculine artisanship. David Greven, Manhood in 
Hollywood from Bush to Bush (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009), 167. 
44 “We talked about making it a dirty-looking movie, kind of grainy. When we processed it, we stretched the 
contrast to make it kind of ugly, a little bit of underexposure, a little bit of re-silvering, and using new high-contrast 
print stocks and stepping all over it, so it has a dirty patina.” Fincher quoted in Swallow, Dark Eye, 143-44. 
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hands with Marla while they are witnessing the conclusion of Project Mayhem’s terror plot: the 
demolition of the headquarters of various financial institutions. 
 Fight Club provoked an incredible number of academic responses, a vast number of them 
highly critical either of the film’s reactionary gender dynamics (seeing its masochism as a ruse in 
the glorification of white male fascism),45 or of its pseudo anti-capitalism limited to a hip 
consumerism bashing instead of reflecting on class and relations of production.46 What these 
readings share is a certain paranoid view of the America’s white patriarchy as indestructible, able 
to co-opt forms of life that appear the most fiercely antagonistic to it. Krister Friday claims that 
this new man in Fight Club is the product of what Sally Robinson called “the dominant or master 
narrative of white male decline” in the 90s. “In the context of the cumulative ‘threats’ of identity 
politics, minority gains in the academy and in the workplace, the decline of single wage earner 
households, and a waning of the white male’s monopoly on political power, these narratives have 
sublated the aforementioned cultural shifts into a new identity position—the embattled underdog 
and/or victim.”47 This way, she suggests, the very narrative of defeat can serve the purpose of 
white men staying in power. Perhaps the most succinct summary of this formula is Claire Sisco 
King’s notion of “abject hegemony” that views the masculinity exemplified by Fight Club’s 
                                                 
45 David Greven, Manhood in Hollywood, 160-76.; Andrew Hewitt, “Masochism and Terror: Fight Club and the 
Violence of Neo-fascist Ressentiment,”  Telos no. 136 (2006): 104-31.; Krister Friday, “’A Generation of Men 
Without History’: Fight Club, Masculinity, and the Historical Symptom,” Postmodern Culture 13, no. 3 (2003); 
Claire Sisco King, “It Cuts Both Ways: Fight Club, Masculinity, and Abject Hegemony,” Communication and 
Critical/Cultural Studies 6, no. 4 (2009): 366-85.; Nicola Rehling, “Fight Club Takes a Beating: Masculinity, 
Masochism and the Politics of Disavowal,” Gramma: Journal of Theory and Criticism 4 (2001): 187-205.; Brian 
Locke, “’The White Man’s Bruce Lee’: Race and the Construction of White Masculinity in David Fincher’s Fight 
Club (1999),” Journal of Asian American Studies 17, no. 1 (2014): 61-89.; Jennifer Barke, “’A Hero Will Rise’: The 
Myth of the Fascist Man in Fight Club and Giadiator,” Literature/Film Quarterly 36, no. 3 (2008): 171-87. 
46 Henry Giroux and Imre Szeman, “Ikea Boy Fights Back: Fight Club, Consumerism, and the Political Limits of 
Nineties Cinema,” New Art Examiner (December 2000/January 2001), 32–37, 60-61.; Jacob Mertens, “Parting 
Words: The Problem with Perfection,” Film International 12, no. 4 (2014): 143-44.; Mark Bedford, “Smells Like 
1990s Spirit: The Dazzling Deception of Fight Club’s Grunge-Aesthetic,” New Cinemas: Journal of Contemporary 
Film 9, no. 1 (2011): 49-63.; George L. Henderson, “What was Fight Club? Theses on the Value Worlds of Trash 
Capitalism,” Cultural Geographies 18, no. 2 (2011): 143–70. 
47 Friday, “Men Without History” 
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protagonist as “an abject ‘body’ whose perpetuation and expansion depend upon its ability to 
open up, double itself, and transgress its own boundaries.”48 As King writes, “[w]hite 
masculinity prevails not by expelling that which is Other, but by sacrificing its own fictions in 
order to absorb, assimilate, and make room for Otherness.”49 There is an interesting slippage 
here between white masculinity and the dialectic of capital itself that, as Deleuze and Guattari 
argued, expands beyond its former limits through endless cycles of deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization. It is George Henderson who notes that Fight Club’s Tyler is first and 
foremost an allegory for capital. His urban guerilla acts of vandalizing and demolishing 
buildings, his moving into a dilapidated area, his ability to extract value from trash (making 
expensive soap out of discarded human fat) along with his grunge chic outfit stand for capital’s 
logic of creative destruction (deterritorialization) that precedes urban gentrification and the 
opening of new fields of consumption (reterritorialization). This is why, the author suggests, 
“[t]he film offers a non-alternative. It smashes capital in the very ways capital smashes itself, so 
that what it means to smash has already been invented by capital. Namely, in the capitalist world 
objects are smashed, not capitalist social relations.”50  
 Yet, don’t such criticisms fall into the trap of what Samo Tomsic calls the vitalist 
misreading of capitalism, the notion that it’s an autonomous productive machine, a kind of “life 
without negativity”?51 This view, Tomsic argues, results from the conflation of the level of 
production and the level of fantasy that leads to a fetishistic theory of value.52 For Marx the 
highest form of this vitalist delusion was the bourgeois idea of money begetting money, i.e. 
                                                 
48 Sisco King, It Cuts Both Ways, 367. 
49 Sisco King convincingly argues against earlier notions of hegemonic masculinity established by R. W. Connell 
and James W. Messerschmidt that opposed it to “subordinated masculinities.” Ibid., 371. 
50 Henderson, “What was Fight Club?”, 152. 
51 Samo Tomsic, The Capitalist Unconscious: Marx and Lacan (New York: Verso, 2015), 7. 
52 Ibid., 5-6. 
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creating value ex nihilo, by multiplying its magical substance. He offered M – M’ as the formula 
of such money fetishism but it might as well describe the ideology of self-made masculinity 
(what Michael Kimmel calls “marketplace manhood”).53 It is only through neoliberal cynicism, 
however, that the secret of such fetishism, the indistinction between finance capital and the 
masculine sovereign, is openly assumed, with the entrepreneurial self operating his own private 
federal reserve by turning his bare life into living currency. Or, to be more precise, this is the aim 
of the neoliberal sovereign, but his project—and this is what Fight Club’s critics seem to 
forget—is doomed to fail (creating value ex nihilo, after all, is not possible). The real question, 
therefore, is how this failure is inscribed into the film’s form. Consider, for instance, the scene of 
the Narrator quitting his job: he beats himself into a living pulp in front of his boss, and when 
security arrives, he is able to make the scene appear as workplace abuse, the legal settlement of 
which would guarantee him lifetime income without work. Yet, as we learn in the end, after he 
settles for a life of idleness and playful self-destruction in the local fight club, while he sleeps, 
Tyler keeps on working (nightly jobs as a projectionist, waiter, and most importantly as the 
organizer of a nationwide revolutionary group). His labour time in the apocalyptic movement (a 
“time that remains” in the Agambenian sense that the Narrator cannot account for) is invisible to 
the viewer: these blanks are not filled in with explanatory flashbacks, we only learn about them 
indirectly when the hero, panicking what he might have done while not under sovereign self-
control, revisits the places he started terrorist cells as Tyler. His effort to close the gaps in his 
memory and shut down Project Mayhem is therefore an attempt to disavow the messianic time of 
pure potentiality, the same way as his sovereign act of shooting the Tyler in him, and the 
                                                 
53 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, trans. B. Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 
256.; Michael S. Kimmel “Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame and Silence in the Construction of Gender 
Identity,” in Michael S. Kimmel, Gender of Desire: Essays on Male Sexuality (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2005), 23-43. 
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subsequent reassuring of Marla, shocked by his gaping wound, that “everything is going to be 
fine.” This sovereign disavowal, however, doesn’t work: the next moment the skyscrapers do 
blow up, startling both of them, initiating a new messianic time by “erasing the debt record,” and 
“levelling the playing field,” as Tyler put it before. In other words, once again, Fincher’s 
protagonist, by pushing the neoliberal logic of sovereign self-purification to its logical 
conclusion, ends up exploding its supposedly closed loop into a contradiction. As the couple 
stands there watching the CGI spectacle of destruction from behind a glass window now framed 
as a movie screen, neither claiming, nor disavowing ownership over it, the Narrator merely says: 
“You met me at a very strange time in my life,” while The Pixies’ song Where is My Mind starts 
playing in the background.  
 This final frame within frame works as an interface between the analogue and digital 
elements of the film, but instead of guaranteeing their smooth connection, it rather draws 
attention to their discord, implying the impossibility of a sovereign appropriation of the digital 
(before we cut to the end credits, we once again get a splice of Tyler’s penis as a reminder of an 
analogue excess of bare life). This is in sharp contrast to the use of virtual camera in the film’s 
opening, the already mentioned brain ride sequence and the following shot that falls from the top 
of the office building where Tyler is holding the Narrator captive, cutting through the pavement 
and multiple floors of the parking garage in a split second to settle on various charges of 
explosives hidden in a van and attached to the building’s foundations. While the first sequence 
lacks any interpretative guidance and makes sense only retrospectively, the second shot is 
accompanied by the Narrator’s voiceover explaining it as the setup for Tyler’s “theater of mass 
destruction” about to commence in 2 minutes. The entire film is thereby framed as the time that 
remains before the apocalypse, a radically equalizing event anticipated by a fully digital image 
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sequence. For William Brown, these two shots are examples of digital cinema’s flat ontology and 
post-human political aesthetic: “[t]he ability of the digital camera to pass through bodies 
suggests that human bodies are 'meaningless', or just a(nother) part of the continuum,”54 which 
creates “an equality among [diegetic] elements.”55 He sees the film as a whole developing on a 
similar “a ‘schizophrenic’ continuum” between fantasy and reality, man and woman, inside and 
outside, space and time, offering “new modes of thought, new becomings” beyond established 
identities.56 Yet, doesn’t such Deleuzian schizoanalytic reading57 erase the traces of the 
dialectical tension in the film, the way in which the Narrator’s attempt to suture (or, we could say 
interface) his body with the digital explodes in a contradiction? What Brown misses is that the 
digital zone of indistinction of the opening shots is always already supplemented with the 
sovereign masculine jouissance expressed in the Narrator’s noir style voiceover that tries to 
capture its utopian potential for its own capitalo-patriarchal purposes, using the digital to glorify 
his self-image. It’s worth recalling here that in Agamben’s theory, glory is the quality of a 
perfect, self-sufficient, unchanging God who, paradoxically, nonetheless needs sovereign 
glorification from its earthly subjects imagining him as their flawless ruler. In this sense, the 
hypercontinuous digital sequences of Fight Club Brown praises for lacking lack (lacking a cut) 
and ontological differentiation are glimpses into a contemporary fantasy about an atemporal 
God-substance, one that Fincher’s film sets up as the neuro-image of its noir hero, that is, the 
glory of his private sovereign apparatus constituting him as a neoliberal monad. The ending, 
                                                 
54 William Brown, Supercinema (New York: Bergham, 2013), 66. 
55 Ibid., 39. 
56 William Brown and David H. Fleming, “Deterritorialisation and Schizoanalysis in David Fincher's Fight Club,” 
Deleuze Studies 5, no. 2 (2011): 275-99. 
57 See also Kevin Mitchell, “’A Copy of a Copy of a Copy’: Productive Repetition in Fight Club,” Jeunesse: Young 
People, Texts, Cultures 5, no. 1 (2013): 108-31. 
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however, rather than suturing this sovereign continuum between the Narrator’s zoe and digital 
glory in a Deleuzian crystal-image, ends up decreating it into a dialectical contradiction. 
 This is also why the political aesthetics of Fight Club’s ending is not sublime but rather 
“stuplime,” to use a category developed by Sianne Ngai. The sublime feeling, in its classical 
Kantian sense, is triggered by the failure of the mind to contain an overwhelming phenomenon 
(like a storm or a catastrophe) in a sensuous form. This shock and awe is then neutralized, turned 
into its opposite (tranquility) by imagining its source to be the transcendental moral Law 
guaranteeing the rational order of humanity.58 The experience of the sublime is then like 
watching a terrifying event unfold from a safe distance, for instance a storm through a 
windowpane. In Agambenian terms, the Kantian sublime can be described as the sovereign 
containment, i.e. glorification of chaos. In stuplimity, by contrast, “the initial experience of being 
aesthetically overwhelmed involves not terror or pain (eventually superseded by tranquility), but 
something much closer to an ordinary fatigue—and one that cannot be neutralized, like the 
sublime’s terror, by a competing affect.” As a result, the stuplime “does not, in the end, confirm 
the self’s sense of superiority over the overwhelming or intimidating object.”59 Furthermore, by 
holding the opposing affects of astonishment and boredom together without resolution, 
“[s]tuplimity also evades the kind of wholly anti-absorptive, cynical tedium often used to reflect 
the flattening effects of cultural simulacra.” It is an “anti-auratic, anti-cynical tedium that at 
times deliberately risks seeming obtuse, as opposed to making claims for spiritual transcendence 
or ironic distance.”60 By its ending Fight Club reaches such a stuplime exhaustion of its 
sovereign-image, holding together its contradictory poles in their comically obvious antagonism 
                                                 
58 Immanuel Kant, “Selections from Critique of Judgment” in Basic Writings of Kant, trans. A. W. Wood (New 
York: Random House, 2001), 306-307. 
59 Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 271. 
60 Ibid., 278. 
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(the Narrator with a gaping head wound and without pants acting as the reassuring male hero 
only to be contradicted a moment later; the excluded bare life of Tyler returning as a splice of his 
penis, etc.).  
 
7.3 States of Sovereign Exhaustion 
 If the stuplime ambiguity of Fight Club’s final sovereign-image allowed many critics to 
ignore its failure to suture together analogue and digital layers of the film, Zodiac (2007) 
conveys the same irresolvable antagonism as an unmistakable dialectical fatigue running through 
its entire narrative about the decades-long but ultimately futile manhunt for the Bay area’s 
notorious Zodiac Killer. As Amy Taubin observers, “Zodiac is less a film about characters than 
about processes,”61 or more precisely about the becoming process of its male characters, their in 
the end failed endeavour to synchronize their lives with the emerging cybernetic paradigm of 
power allegorized by their quest to crack the serial killer’s coded messages and pattern of 
behaviour. This tension is once again inscribed at the ontological level of the medium itself: 
while (almost) entirely shot with cutting edge Viper digital cameras, the images were given a 
more analogue look in post processing not to feel too alienating to the viewer.62 A similar 
discord appears between classical montage sequences and parts of “intensified continuity”—in 
Brown’s, not in Bordwell’s sense of the term, that is, digital editing techniques that avoid cutting 
through the use of compositing, CGI time lapse scenes, or impossible tracking shots with a 
virtual camera.63 As a result, at one level, the film seems to unfold in an atemporal, neobaroque 
universe according to an underlying algorithm indifferent to the scale of human lifetime: the 
                                                 
61 Taubin quoted in Browning, David Fincher, 74. 
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Zodiac himself returns in different decades, and the passage of time is often spatialized for a kind 
of machine vision fit for processing data, as in the time lapse sequence showing the construction 
of San Francisco’s Pan-Am building in a few seconds, the intertitle reading “7 and a half years 
later,” or the blank screen with only a sound montage of news recordings from subsequent years. 
On the other hand, the film is about masculine exhaustion after decades of failed and mostly 
unpaid detective work performed by a few exceptional men willing to dedicate their time beyond 
what is required by their Fordist workplace (a newspaper office or a police station) to chasing the 
Zodiac’s algorithm. As such, they exemplify the new neoliberal entrepreneurial selfhood 
emerging in the 70s, which in turn makes them lose their job and family (San Francisco 
Chronicle cartoonist Robert Graysmith), their job and mental health (Chronicle columnist Paul 
Avery), or their job and reputation (Inspector David Toschi, once the real life model for 
Detective Callahan of the Dirty Harry films). While at the level of the diegesis the men’s 
autoimmune efforts seem to pay off at the end, connecting enough dots to find a likely killer, the 
concluding intertitle makes their failure unequivocal: DNA testing proved their candidate was 
not the Zodiac.  
 For Sam Dickson, this inability to locate the villain serves as an allegory for the lack of 
indexical referent in digital cinema the film itself pioneers with some anxiety.64 In biopolitical 
terms, this missing index refers to the absent (real-impossible) sovereign who could suture 
together an apparatus of digital biopower, making neoliberalism’s productive algorithms 
coincide with masculine bare life. Like in Fight Club, the contradiction between these two levels 
is exposed through what Galloway calls an “interface effect,” the becoming visible of the 
                                                 
64 Sam Dickson, “Zodiac and the Ends of Cinema,” Senses of Cinema 78 (March, 2016), accessed October 31, 2016, 
http://sensesofcinema.com/2016/feature-articles/zodiac/.  
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boundary between “two different mediatic layers within [a] nested system”65 the “moment where 
one significant material is understood as distinct from another significant material.”66 For Žižek, 
the cinematic interface effect signals the breakdown of the classical suture’s shot – reverse shot 
logic where a chain of signifying images continuously folded the viewer (the “Absent One” or 
“lack” of the diegesis) into the narrative. “[T]he interface effect occurs when [...] signifying 
representation fails. At this point, when the gap can no longer be filled by an additional signifier, 
it is filled by a spectral object, in a shot which, in the guise of the spectral screen, includes its 
own counter-shot.”67 This spectral distortion within the shot is the result of the Lacanian objet 
a—the becoming absent (becoming the gaze of the Absent One) of which was a condition of 
possibility for a classical Hollywood scene’s imaginary coherence—falling back into the image 
as its stain of the real. And since objet a is nothing but the subject in objectal form (the 
fantasmatic piece of the subject that had to be cut off for the ego to maintain its coherence), the 
elementary form of the interface effect, Žižek asserts, is “the subject somehow enter[ing] his/her 
own picture,” like the protagonist giving a speech in front of his own giant poster in Citizen Kane 
(1941).68 In Zodiac, this occurs for instance in the scene where a local TV talk show host is 
trying to have the killer call him during a live broadcast to lure him into giving himself up. The 
scenes of preparation in the studio are already split by an interface effect: in one shot we see the 
anxious Detective Toschi in the control room, separated by a glass window from the set visible 
both on the monitors looked at by the technicians next to him and as a reflection on the 
windowpane he is gazing through. Nevertheless, the image of the set is then sutured by a reverse 
shot of various characters watching the show with anticipation on their television set. When the 
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66 Ibid., 33.  
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68 Ibid., 39. 
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presumed killer calls in, however, the scene collapses once again into an interface: instead of a 
cut to the Zodiac we see the studio set from behind the TV camera directed at it, with the scene 
redoubled in the tiny monitor of the cameraman. Predictably, the police sent to the caller’s 
location discover that the call was made from a lunatic asylum.  
The killer is therefore not merely the structuring absence of the film as Dickson would 
have it as the absence of such signifying absence, the lack of a lack that could be sublated, 
sutured through phallic signification. He is the symptom of the sovereign-image, the specter of 
pure bare life like the xenomorph in Alien 3 or Tyler in Fight Club that resists to be isolated and 
co-opted by sovereign power into its abject hegemony.69 For a serial killer film, Zodiac 
conspicuously lacks the genre’s obsession with wounds as indexes of authenticity that would 
replicate what Mark Seltzer calls our “pathological public sphere” turning trauma into a 
spectacle.70 Not only do we have little to no gore, the blood shown is CGI, and when the 
presumed killer claims a murder by enumerating the details of the violence suffered by the 
victim, it turns out to be a verbatim reiteration of what appeared on the news. We also don’t learn 
anything about the Zodiac’s traumatic past as all the suspects with their pathologies of everyday 
life are eventually cleared by forensic evidence. While somebody certainly committed the 
murders, the Zodiac Killer in Fincher’s film is just an empty signifier grouping them together 
around a nonexistent pattern.  
 If in Zodiac the figure of the sovereign who could suture human life and digital algorithm 
together is ultimately missing, in The Social Network (2010) he seems to be all too present: the 
protagonist is none other than Mark Zuckerberg (played by Jesse Eisenberg), inventor of 
Facebook, the number one biocapitalist interface of our time. Like Fight Club, the film maps the 
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connective mutation of the male body, but this time in the upper echelons of neoliberal 
biopower. The setting is Harvard, the 21st century meritocrats’ laboratory of pure innovation, the 
breeding ground of what McKenzie Wark calls “the vectoralist class,” the new post-Fordist 
rulers of global finance and information flows.71 Accordingly, the main antagonists are the old 
and the new ruling classes themselves, the high born and well-connected aristocrats with their 
centuries old symbolic rituals of inoperativity (a cappella singing groups, rowing clubs, freshman 
hazing), and the new creative class of computer programmers and venture capitalists for whom 
glory lies not in the exclusive ceremonies of high society but in the dissemination of the digital 
code they own. For the vectoralists like Zuckerberg and his investor Sean Parker, Harvard’s 
traditionalist social milieu is a relic of the past, which is why they eventually move to Silicon 
Valley to start their tech company, where they party with Young-Girls (a little too young in the 
case of Parker) instead of aging aristocrats who represent the Oedipal-disciplinary regime. The 
old world’s now superfluous masculine ideal is parodied in the muscular bodies of the (former) 
Harvard boat race champion Winklevoss twins,72 who, although they come up with its core 
concept, imagine Facebook as an ivy-league university yearbook, applying their elitistic 
prejudices to the new medium, unable to think the inherent populism of the digital’s flat 
ontology. It is their lawsuit against Zuckerberg that connects various flashbacks to the past into a 
linear narrative, a classical cinematic device illustrating the old power apparatus leeching off 
new capital. Beyond the plaintiffs, Fincher also mocks the bloated army of lawyers on both sides 
with Zuckerberg repeatedly ignoring them during the hearings, considering the whole process a 
waste of time compared his ground-breaking work on Facebook.  
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 Instead of simply glorifying the vectoralists or expressing nostalgia for the old ruling 
class, The Social Network is first and foremost about the excess of inoperativity that neither can 
control. The film depicts Facebook’s predecessor, Facemash as the obscene underside of the life 
of the Harvard bourgeoisie, as a program Zuckerberg wrote in a moment of misogynistic 
vengeance after his girlfriend broke up with him. His website that allowed for the rating of the 
university’s female students against one another got so popular it caused Harvard’s servers to 
shut down—a symbolic victory over a disciplinary institution unfit for the digital age (when the 
Winklevoss twins later seek out the president of the university to support their legal claim 
against Zuckerberg based on the Harvard’s centuries old student code of conduct, the man 
doesn’t know how to deal with the issue seriously). Yet, the same way as the Winklevoss twins 
boat racing reveals itself to be an empty gesture (that is, inoperativity without glory) when they 
lose, Zuckerberg himself is left in disconnect from his own apparatus of power despite settling 
his lawsuits to his advantage. In the last scene, he is sitting in front of the interface he invented, 
trying to add his ex as a Facebook friend. The shot – reverse shot sequence between the close-up 
of his distracted face and his Facebook profile, however, ends without a suture: he keeps clicking 
on the refresh button with no result, the repetition revealing his gesture as a means without an 
end.  
 If the process leading to sovereign exhaustion in Zodiac was a never ending investigation 
and in The Social Network a never ending trial, in Gone Girl (2014) it is a couple’s separation 
procedure that doesn’t want to come to an end. The film, more explicitly than The Social 
Network or The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo (2011) is an allegory for the post-2008 crisis of 
capital: the opening montage of a North Carthage, Missouri showing empty streets, boarded up 
storefronts, abandoned warehouses, and FOR SALE signs on various real estate already makes it 
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clear that we’re in recession territory. This way, when we subsequently learn that the male 
protagonist Nick’s wife Amy had disappeared that morning, her absence works as a signifier for 
capital flight. More precisely, Amy is the embodiment of neoliberal capital taking the form of the 
Young-Girl: she became moderately wealthy from the royalties of the “Amazing Amy” 
children’s book series her parents wrote about her quite literally as a young girl. As relatively 
successful magazine writers, she and her husband started out as New York hipsters, 
synchronizing their lives through hedonistic rituals of ironic consumption (at one point they buy 
each other the same gift for their anniversary, both thinking of the same inside joke, to which 
Amy reacts: “We’re so cute I want to punch us in the face.”). Then the financial crisis hit, 
making Nick lose his job, and when his father fell ill they were forced to move back to the man’s 
hometown. Amy became a bored housewife and Nick took a job as an adjunct professor teaching 
English at the local college—not enough to support the family, which is why he had Amy use her 
trust fund to buy him and his sister a bar (named “The Bar” with tedious urban hipster irony, 
rather unfit for the southern small town clientele)—an investment yet to turn any profit. The 
growing tension within the couple therefore mirrors the one between two moments of capital’s 
dialectic that normally constitutes its Oedipal apparatus: deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization. Derailed by the financial crisis, these two have failed to properly synchronize 
ever since: the surplus liquidity of global finance capital has been reluctant to move into 
communities to create jobs and build infrastructure, preferring investments into fictitious capital 
instead (the rentier economy instead of production), which only led to newer and newer crises.73 
Perhaps it’s no coincidence that Amy mentions Greece as the ideal destination of her flight she 
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never reaches in the end: the collapse of the Greek sovereign debt in 2010 marked the second 
wave of the global financial crisis that started in 2008.  
The film maps this deadlock of today’s global capitalism through the generic form of 
what Stanley Cavell called the Hollywood comedy of remarriage. Cavell describes the classical 
cycle of these films of (It Happened One Night, 1934; The Awful Truth, 1937; His Girl Friday, 
1940, etc.) as “fairy tales for the Depression” because in their depiction of the crisis, dissolution 
and subsequent restoration of marriage as a civilizatory institution they imagine couples capable 
of transformation and self-perfection through conversation and mutual recognition.74 These 
films, he argues, can be understood “as parables of a phase of the development of consciousness 
at which the struggle is for the reciprocity or equality of consciousness between a woman and a 
man, a study of the conditions under which this fight for recognition (as Hegel put it) or demand 
for acknowledgment (as I have put it) is a struggle for mutual freedom, especially of the views 
each holds of the other.”75 Like film noir, the comedy of remarriage has a battle of the sexes 
narrative attempting to realize the principle of equality formally included in the idea of the 
bourgeois couple. Unlike film noir, however, where real equality is possible only in death, the 
remarriage comedy offers a generic script of temporary transgression for both protagonists 
without turning autoimmune. Common to the genre, according to Cavell, is the initial opposition 
between a safe but boring married life as a bastion of civilization and a hostile but exciting 
outside world without law and order.76 Symbolic equality opposed to a radical inequality in the 
real. The quest of the protagonists is then to have a “glimpse at the failure of civilization,”77 and 
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incorporate the “realm of the demonic”78 they experienced into the institution of marriage, but 
not so much as its obscene underside repressed below the surface as in post-noirs, but as an 
unresolved tension keeping the relationship alive. “It is a premiss of farce that marriage kills 
romance. It is a project of the genre of remarriage to refuse to draw a conclusion from this 
premiss but rather to turn the tables on farce, to turn marriage itself into romance, into adventure, 
[...] to preserve within it something of the illicit, to find as it were a moral equivalent of the 
immoral.”79  
 In Gone Girl, the dark comedic tension of the remarriage genre is pushed over the top 
through the film's neobaroque mind game narrative. Amy doesn’t just leave Nick to cheat on 
him, but conceives an elaborate plan to set him up as her murderer through the carefully timed 
release of clues that not only implicate him as a killer but construct his media image as an 
unfaithful, violent manchild (she stages a murder scene cover-up by spilling then cleaning up her 
own blood, writes a fake diary, builds a “mancave” with consumer goods worth tens of 
thousands of dollars ordered under Nick’s name, fakes a pregnancy, etc.). All the details of her 
scheme are marked on a large calendar attached to the kind of crazy wall we usually see in serial 
killer’s homes in Hollywood films, the timeline ending with the rubric “Amy’s death,” depicted 
in an anticipation image as her actually drowning in a lake. This final event, however, never 
comes, which makes the entire film yet another noir meditation on the messianic time that 
remains before the end of time. We could also say that Amy’s plan and its chart is an attempt to 
represent the deterritorializing algorithm of neoliberal capital as a vital force, something that 
would gain jouissance out of the autoimmune self-destruction of the form of life it temporarily 
attached itself to. In Cavell’s terms, it stands for the specter of the demonic codified, for 
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committing evil out of principle by relying on a nihilistic counter-code to the territorialized 
social-symbolic fiction of marriage. The neo-noir femmes fatale of Body Heat or The Last 
Seduction who manipulated men for personal gain pale in comparison to Amy whose 
predecessors rather include apocalyptic figures like the alien monster, Tyler Durden, or the 
Zodiac Killer.  
 And yet, just like capital needs reterritorialization to survive, Amy also cannot seem to 
exist without the social-symbolic institution of marriage. As Cavell observes, the classical 
remarriage comedy starts with the heroine’s “demand for education,” which “has to do with the 
woman’s sense that her life asks for some transformation, that she stands in need of creation, or 
re-creation.”80 This demand is for an institution that would guarantee real equality, for a use of 
language that would provide mutual recognition—something that traditional bourgeois marriage 
in its patriarchal bias cannot do. In Gone Girl, Amy recounts how she was formed by her 
husband into a “cool girl” archetype, adapting to the man’s consumer habits, pretending to like 
the beer he drinks, the movies he watches, and, of course, offering her hairless body for sex 
whenever he wanted it. In short, she was educated into a postfeminist woman, expected to give 
up her critical agency and self-commodify for the male gaze out of free will.81 And her way to 
explode this neo-patriarchal prison was to become a Young-Girl, to identify with the neoliberal 
value-form itself, the life that lies, supposedly, beyond any gendered bios. Yet, contradictions 
arise in this master plan when, in order to lay low, Amy chooses the guise of a battered woman 
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running from an abusive ex. Instead of keeping people away, this gender stereotype in fact draws 
unwanted attention to her, leading to her actually being beaten and robbed. Similarly, when, out 
of despair, she repeats the routine with her finance capitalist ex-boyfriend Desi, she finds herself 
trapped into a the same postfeminist nightmare she had been fleeing from, now amplified to 
creepy proportions (the man keeps her locked in his heavily surveilled holiday home “for her 
own protection”). Reaching a deadlock, her plotline finds its way back to the remarriage genre 
when she watches Nick giving a well rehearsed TV interview to amend his disastrous public 
image, appearing genuine in the role of a concerned husband, asking Amy to come home. Like in 
the classical films, the man finds a way to “educate” his wife by playing with the idea of 
marriage, deconstructing its rigid patriarchal hierarchies by profaning its symbolic institution, 
presenting it, with the help of the utterly corrupt media, as a construct that lacks an operative 
essence, thereby making it available for free use by his partner. And Amy responds accordingly, 
fabricating evidence of her abuse by Desi for the security cameras and slicing his throat in an 
opportune moment when they are not watching, then running back home to her husband in a 
blood-soaked nightgown to provide a spectacular finale for the TV cameras waiting outside their 
family home. 
 This is not to say that with her return, their romance is rekindled, or even that their basic 
trust in each other is restored. They are rather stuck with one another playing the happy reunion 
in front of the cameras because they both have a lot to lose by telling the truth—Amy more, of 
course, but she gradually convinces Nick that he does too (the public would turn against him if 
he abandoned her now, she reasons). Their staying together is therefore presented as a deadlock 
rather than a solution, leaving the tension in their interface image earlier in film—in which an 
unenthusiastic Nick stood in front of “Amazing Amy’s” missing poster at a press conference—
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unresolved.82 Neither does Amy qua neoliberal capital leave with Desi to Greece to abandon the 
territory of the US altogether, nor does she fully return to the American heartland. The last shot 
captures this contradiction by showing her respond with an enigmatic smile to Nick’s hesitant 
gesture of caressing her hair, while the man’s voiceover, accompanied by the eerie noise music 
score ponders: “What are you thinking? How are you feeling? What have we done to each other? 
What will we do?” 
 
7.4 The Co-Immunism of the Matrixial Borderspace 
 Gone Girl’s deadlock results from the failure of sovereign immunization, the 
impossibility to imagine a clearly bounded bios for the Oedipal couple—once capitalism’s basic 
territorial unit—a safe productive space set up against the outside threats of lawlessness. 
Interestingly, Nick’s inoperative marriage is measured against his close relationship with his 
twin sister Carrie, one that the media distorts into a scandal of incest. Knowing that Amy is a 
sociopath, Carrie is devastated by her brother’s plan to stay with his wife after her return. Asking 
for emotional support, Nick tells her “I need to know that you’re with me,” to which Carrie 
responds crying “Of course I’m with you, I was with you even before you were even born.” 
These two immunological bubbles, the incestuous being together in the womb and the purely 
symbolic unity in bourgeois marriage indicate two limit concepts of Oedipal biopolitics, both 
threatening its patriarchal hierarchies with the radical equality among the men and women 
valued differently by its apparatus. Instead of reproducing neoliberalism’s monadistic logic of 
sovereign immunization, they both explode it towards what Peter Sloterdijk calls co-immunism, 
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the co-existence of heterogenious bodies in a protective bubble the prototype of which is the 
womb.83  
Bracha Ettinger sees such co-immunism as the very form of the Lacanian feminine 
jouissance, a notion she expands on (under the influence of Felix Guattari and Emmanuel 
Levinas) in an unambiguously anti-Oedipal direction. Her theory has great film-philosophical 
implications since she grounds it in Lacan’s Seminar XI, using and critiquing the passages that 
introduce the shift from gesture to image. As I have argued in Chapter 1, Lacan distinguishes 
here two ways of relating to the Other in the visual field, both ultimately reducing otherness to an 
alienated piece of the self. In the first, one encounters the imaginary (small) other as an “evil 
eye” that, like Medusa’s gaze, freezes life into a “gesture.” Lacan posits the evil eye as the 
fascinum of the subject’s fantasmatic self-image; it is the uncanny element in one’s picture that 
point to an excess beyond it. As Lacan famously claims, this fascinum-effect results from a 
necessary anamorphic distortion of the fantasy-image, the undoing of which would lead to 
disintegration of the subject’s libidinal coordinates. Thus the move to a second, symbolic-
Oedipal relation to the Other through a castrating “moment of seeing” which presupposes the 
fascinum (the Other’s gaze as objet a) as forever lost from the picture, thereby re-activating life 
as a desiring flow of equally lacking images. In Chapter 1 I suggested an Agambenian 
rehabilitation of gesture beyond this Oedipal dialectic of imaginary and symbolic as the real 
element of a non-signifying semiotic, our shared, inoperative linguistic substance that the 
medium of cinema puts forward by decreating the images of Oedipalized everyday life. With 
different terminology, Ettinger moves in the same direction by introducing a non-Oedipal, 
feminine relation to the Other, one that doesn’t treat its gaze as the little piece of the self, as the 
fascinum to be evicted from the field of vision to avoid paralysis and gain meaning, but as 
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fascinance, the affect shared by two not fully bounded, equally vulnerable subjects during their 
encounter event in the real, in the space-time she calls the matrixial.84 “As a feminine sexual 
difference,” she argues, “the matrixial designates ‘woman’ not as the Other but as co-emerging 
self with m/Other, and link a rather than object a, not as lack or a figure of rhythmic scansion of 
absence/presence but as a borderlinking figure of differentiation in co-emergence.”85 In what she 
calls “a matrixial encounter,” “the private subjectivity of the individual is momentarily 
unbounded. The psyche momentarily melts, and its psychic threads are interwoven with threads 
emanating from objects, images, and other subjects.”86 The bullet time sex scene between Tyler 
and Marla in Fight Club is a case in point—a hallucinatory dream sequence in which the two 
bodies indeed seem to blur into one another, circled by a virtual camera with no preference for 
any body part in particular. Nevertheless, although Ettinger, like Sloterdijk, sees the womb as the 
original bubble of co-immunity, she is quick to add that the matrixial’s undoing of Oedipal 
separations is about “transgression and not fusion, braiding and not melting.”87 She considers 
such feminine “incest” “that circumvents the phallic law [...] a primordial psychic field of 
transgressions between several participants who render and temporarily loosen their Oedipal 
borderlines, thus creating crossings between their traumas and jouissances, phantasms, and even 
desires, and enabling the trans-scripting of traces of the links in an assembly of the several (in 
‘‘severality’’) outside of linear Oedipal time.”88 In other words, the matrixial time-space 
suspends the sovereign separation between bios and zoe that grounds the Oedipal regime of 
biopower and establishes a utopian form-of-life of co-immunism.  
                                                 
84 “Fascinance is an aesthetic affect that operates in the prolongation and delaying of the time of encounter-event and 
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86 Ettinger, Fascinance, 62. 
87 Ibid., 78. 
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Matrixial co-immunity is present in Fincher’s work from the very beginning, and it 
always appears in conflict with sovereign immunization—an antagonism that divides masculine 
and feminine forms of the death drive in his film noirs. In his films, the image of co-immunity 
arises out of a dialectical contradiction of the sovereign-image, as a result of its “exhaustion.” 
Consider the smoking fetus, the alien creature in Ripley’s womb, Nicholas Van Orton’s suicidal 
jump into safety, the “living dead” couple holding hands at the end of Fight Club, or the 
inoperative marriage of Nick and Amy. We could add to the series Panic Room (2002), a film, as 
Dietmar Kammerer argues, about “monadology and motherhood,”89 that is, rival (masculine and 
feminine) paradigms of immunization. On the one hand, the panic room refers to a luxurious 
state of exception designed for the one percent, the ultimate safe space protecting their class 
privileges symbolized in the film by government bonds worth millions of dollars hidden in it. 
Fincher gives a distinctive Oedipal flavour to this bourgeois sphere of immunity by assigning it 
to a recently divorced single mother Meg and her daughter Sarah whose existence (their ability 
to buy a New York City mansion with the panic room) is dependent on a wealthy ex-husband’s 
settlement money. Their struggle with three home invaders therefore starts on distinctly class 
terms, amplified by the fact that Burnham, the burglers’ African American leader has worked all 
his life installing panic rooms for rich people. When the three enter, a virtual camera maps the 
space they occupy without a cut, marking their intrusion as the threat of the digital’s equalizing 
ontology on the upper classes who withdraw from the house’s infected territory into their secured 
state of exception, viewing the outside through the interface of surveillance monitors. Biopolitics 
comes into the picture when Meg and Sarah’s safe space starts to function more like an 
extermination camp: the burglars try to gas them through the ventilation system, and they also 
exploit Sarah’s need for regular insulin shots. As a result, when the rigid boundary of the panic 
                                                 
89 Dietmar Kammerer, “Video Surveillance in Hollywood Movies,” Surveillance and Society 2, no. 2-3 (2004): 471. 
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room finally comes down, all the invaders find inside representing the glorious life of the one 
percent is a child half passed out from diabetic shock—a clear disconnect from the financial 
wealth hidden in a safe next to her. This is when the film’s most characteristic image of matrixial 
borderlinking occurs: the mother locked outside with a gun begging the burglars stuck inside 
with the insulin to help her daughter, while one of the invaders, his hand crushed into pulp by the 
automatic door, is yelling inarticulately. Burnham then plays a similar role to Detective 
Somerset’s in Seven, trying to prevent the autoimmune self-destruction of the white bios. He 
gives Sarah an insulin shot, then, when he has the chance to get away with the bonds, he once 
again goes back to save Meg and Sarah from the revenge of his white partner he left behind—a 
selfless act that leads to his arrest. This is why the final shot of the female protagonists 
discussing the acquisition of their next property on a New York City bench, with the daughter’s 
head lying in the mother’s lap, is deeply ambiguous. Did Burnham’s gesture save their matrixial 
bond, or was it a sovereign act maintaining the privileges of the one percent?  
The Fincher film that explores the utopian potential of matrixial co-immunism to the 
fullest is his only snow noir, the adaptation of Stieg Larsson’s Nordic crime bestseller about a 
misogynistic serial killer, The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo (2011). As Sarah Niblock observes, 
while the novel’s Swedish film version sets up an opposition between the misery of the modern 
city and the domestic family setting of a rural cottage, in the American adaptation Stockholm’s 
high tech modernism, both civilized and corrupt, is supplemented by a non-idyllic countryside 
enclosed in perpetual winter—an imagery characteristic of the Hollywood snow noir.90 Like so 
many of Fincher’s films, The Girl also maps the tension between capital’s old, territorialized, 
“masculine” form and its deterritorialized, “feminine” expansion through neoliberal 
                                                 
90 Sarah Niblock, “Journalism and Compassion: Rewriting the On-Screen Crusader for the Digital Age,” in Stieg 
Larsson’s Millenium Trilogy: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Nordic Noir on Page and Screen, ed. S. Peacock 
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globalization—opposing paradigms represented also by the two investigator protagonists, Mikael 
Blomkvist and Lisbeth Salander. While Mikael is played by a muscular Daniel Craig, star of the 
recent James Bond reboot, thereby an icon of old imperial glory, Lisbeth’s character (Rooney 
Mara) looks like a typical Young-Girl: petite and anorexic, with a goth-punk appearance and a 
predilection for self-harm/self-adornment (with piercings and tattoos all over her body). If 
Craig’s Mikael carries the charms of middle aged (hetero)bourgeois machismo, Mara’s Lisbeth 
is a queer anarchist—although one that, as Kirsten Mollegaard stresses, goes through a “guy-
friendly sexualization,” a postfeminist aestheticization compatible with Hollywood’s patriarchal 
gender norms.91 While he is a classical investigative journalist working by interviewing people 
and mapping the results on a wall of evidence, she is an antisocial hacker with a photographic 
memory, a kind of cyborg who can turn her brain into a digital database.92 The institutions of the 
old world are epitomized by the remnants of Sweden’s welfare state capitalism: the now fading 
industrial empire of the Vanger family full of ex-Nazis, the public intellectual Mikael’s ad-free 
political journal Millenium on the verge of bankruptcy (bailed out by the Vangers), and the state 
guardianship Lisbeth is forced to endure in the form repeated sexual abuse. This is not to say, 
however, that the networks of new capital receive a more flattering portrayal: Lisbeth makes a 
living doing illegal surveillance and computer hacking for a private espionage company, 
Mikael’s life and journal is temporarily ruined by a lawsuit of the corrupt banker Wennerström 
he tried but failed to expose, and Harriet Vanger, while emancipating herself from her rapist-
murder father and brother through work in London’s City, she fails to report them to the police, 
contributing to the death and suffering to dozens of innocent women. If the old, disciplinary 
                                                 
91 Kirsten Mollegaard, “Signs Taken for Warnings: Body Modification and Visual  Pleasure in The Girl with the 
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regime of power is shown as nationalist patriarchy bordering on fascism, the new neoliberal 
society of control in turn is underpinned by post-political nihilism, very much compatible with 
the same old biopolitical violence. If in the former apparatus the ultimate sovereign figure was 
Gottfried Vanger, an avowed Nazi, serial killer of local Jewish girls around his family’s country 
estate, in the late 70s (at the onset of the neoliberal era) his son Martin takes over (after killing 
him), now specializing on the torture and murder of prostitutes and migrant women trafficked to 
Sweden from all over the world—women nobody cares about.  
Unlike Fincher’s later male – female double protagonist film Gone Girl where the main 
characters play out a conflict between these two paradigms through their separation process, in 
The Girl the two protagonists’ initial trauma caused by the other’s apparatus of power 
(defamation for Mikael, rape for Lisbeth) is what brings them together in a matrixial encounter. 
The cottage on the Vangers’ snowbound island where the two of them, hired by the family’s 
dying patriarch, team up to re-investigate the Harriet Vanger’s decades old disappearance is a 
utopian enclave suspended in-between the two deadly regimes of capital they temporarily left 
behind. What’s stuck in this zone of indistinction is a life wounded and vulnerable, but whose 
tortured body can also serve as an interface of feminine borderlinking. On the one hand, the local 
cat being gutted by the Vagners who frown upon the investigation is an ominous sign, on the 
other, when one of them shoots Mikael with a hunting rifle, his torn up skin will establish a 
matrixial bond with Lisbeth who’s been torturing herself with tattoos and piercings all her life to 
ease her mental suffering. Although their sex scene doesn’t quite reproduce the CGI fascinance 
of Fight Club’s, Oedipal boundaries are loosened through reference to another Fincherian trope: 
incest. Lisbeth is the same age as Mikael’s teenage daughter, an avid catholic who has visited her 
father’s cottage earlier. Or perhaps it’s more appropriate to consider this feminine “incest” 
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between the two protagonists, initiated by Lisbeth, as the counterpoint to the masculine one 
Martin and Gottfried committed against the young Harriet in the form of rape. Mikael’s 
becoming-woman then reaches its apogee when he occupies the place of this sovereign power’s 
feminine Other, when he is trapped in the torture chamber of Martin, tied up like the girls he has 
killed until Lisbeth comes to his rescue.  
At this point, however, the narrative takes a more Oedipal direction with a shift to the 
action genre. We’ve already seen Lisbeth playing what Rikke Schubart calls the action hero 
archetype of the “rape-avenger” earlier when she tortured her state guardian for raping her. Now, 
however, she gradually slides from a feminist to a post-feminist position, towards another, more 
conservative archetype: that of the “daughter.” As Schubart notes, this figure usually appears in 
postmodern action films (Nikita, 1990; Kill Bill, 2003-2004) as a woman with mental problems, 
struggling to conform to a traditional gender identity, until a male master figure hires her, giving 
structure to her life by training her into a spy or an assassin who could put on the mask of 
classical femininity as a weapon.93 The former rape-avenger Lisbeth enters this new role when, 
before going after Martin, she asks Mikael politely: “May I kill him?” But her real 
transformation starts after she drives the villain off the road and lets him burn in his car—a 
cathartic repetition of lighting her own abusive father on fire as child. In order to restore Mikael 
reputation as a journalist, not only does she hack the accounts of Wennerström, but she makes 
herself over into the conservative image of a neoliberal femme fatale, taking her piercings out 
and putting on a business suit with a blonde wig, traveling to Switzerland to drain the banker’s 
accounts masquerading as his representative. Her self-given assignment works, so well in fact 
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that Mikael’s newly restored phallic image returns him to the arms of his former, more age and 
class appropriate lover, putting an end to his matrixial bond with Lisbeth.  
 Her failure to connect with him in the end is highlighted by the scene of her buying a 
leather biker outfit for him as a gift, imitating the one Mikael is wearing on an old photo with his 
(old-new) girlfriend from a time he was still riding motorcycles. The same way as she turned 
herself into living currency to manipulate global capital flows and restore Mikael’s symbolic 
power as a public intellectual, she now plans to commodify the skin that served as interface of 
their matrixial borderlinking, forming their bond into the image of the bourgeois couple. Before 
she could hand the gift to Mikael, however, she sees him together with his ex-girlfriend—a sight 
that leaves her broken and crying for a moment, only to throw away the clothes and drive away a 
few seconds later. This way, The Girl eventually deconstructs its own Seltzerian pathological 
public sphere, opposing the wounded skin as commodity fetish, a sovereign subject’s interface 
with capital, to the skin as a threshold of matrixial borderlinking. The ending also decreates the 
images of the two protagonists’ CGI merger in the opening credit sequence where their cyborg-
like bodies, formed out of a metallic liquid, are blending not only with each other but various 
machinic objects (wires, computers parts, motorcycle tyres, etc.). As mainstream versions of the 
shape shifting Grace Jones in her music video Corporate Cannibal (2008), Fincher’s figures, 
with their machinic fluidity and lack of static identity express the neoliberal ideal of flexible self-
modulation based on an underlying algorithm of control, what Steven Shaviro sees in the Jones 
video as the desire for an “absolute identification with capital.”94 The denouement, like Fincher’s 
other meditations on biocapitalist interfacing, reveals this synthesis to be impossible, throwing 
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back Lisbeth’s self-commodification as Daddy’s Young-Girl into the territory of unpaid 
cognitive and affective labour exploited by an old-new patriarchal apparatus of sovereignty.  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 Fincher’s films are not outside of the cynical paradigm of neo-noir. They merely bring 
out the tensions within its sovereign-image, decreating it into a dialectical contradiction. They do 
this by overpurifying classical Hollywood’s narrative economy to the point of machinic 
perfection, which in turn amplifies its necessary gaps and fissures—the arbitrariness and fragility 
of its sovereign suture—as a byproduct. As Kasman summarizes,  
These films, which seem so structured, seem elaborately, densely built, like scaffolding, 
over an emptiness inside, a void where the vitality, the engagement with one's 
surroundings and with life would normally be. These are stories of hyper-consciousness, 
a state of mind that roots these poor people in the zeitgeist facts of their times but 
ironically abstracts them from the ability to live in the present. Everything is a process 
forward, a movement onwards, an ever-increasingness, the ability to be of the now at the 
ultimate sacrifice of no longer living in the now.95  
On the one hand, these films demonstrate that the body’s sovereign merger with neoliberal 
capital’s ever productive algorithms is not possible, that such digital acceleration of life spews 
out the void of the subject as a remainder. On the other hand, this subject left behind by its own 
body’s connective mutation stands for inoperativity outside sovereign biopower, for a state of 
pure potentiality that that can be a basis of a new co-immunism.  
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This, then, is the Greimasian semiotic square “completed” with Fincher’s position 
revealing the neoliberal synthesis of bios and zoe as a contradiction (Figure 6):  
 
 
    BIOS + ZOE 
Danny Boyle 
    
  BIOS   ZOE 
   
 
  
NOT-ZOE       NOT-BIOS 
 
  
BIOS + NOT-ZOE 
Christopher Nolan 
ZOE + NOT-BIOS 
Nicolas Winding Refn 
    
    NOT-ZOE + NOT-BIOS  
David Fincher 
   
 
Figure 7. 
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8 Conclusion 
 
8.1 The Forced Choice of Film Noir 
The history of film noir’s sovereign-image is the history of what Lacan called the forced 
choice between “the Father—or worse,”1 the masculine symbolic order or a psychotic exit from 
it into a real state of exception: the domain of death driven surplus-enjoyment. In Seminar XI he 
compares this choice to a robber’s demand: “Your money or your life!”—the moral of the story 
being that even if the subject clings to his money (jouissance) and decides to give up his life (his 
social-symbolic place), he will lose his money anyway.2 While one has to give up something 
(objet a, full enjoyment) to enter the Oedipal order through symbolic castration, choosing objet a 
will not release the subject from the grip of the Father’s law. Retrieving the lost, pre-Oedipal 
enjoyment is structurally impossible as it’s nothing but a mirage constructed by symbolic 
castration itself.  
This forced choice, however, is not to be confused with what the later Lacan in Seminar 
XX calls the choice of sexuation.3 The theory of sexual difference displaces here the inescapable 
logic of the forced choice—the defining feature of the human condition for the early Lacan—by 
identifying the very form of its question as a masculine use of language, the purpose of which is 
to establish the symbolic and the real as separate topological layers of reality, pushing the lack at 
the core of the masculine subject beyond the horizon of meaning. This is not to say that the 
feminine subject is not “castrated,” that is, incomplete, lacking. It simply means that she doesn’t 
                                                 
1 Jacques Lacan, Television, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss and A. Michelson (New York: Norton, 1990), 46. 
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become castrated as a result of a forced choice but is always already “not whole,”4 which is why 
for her there is no objet a she had lost and seeks to recover from beyond language. One has to 
decide to be a sovereign (masculine) subject first in order for the forced choice to present itself. 
Being a man in the Lacanian sense means precisely that the choice of sexuation is overwritten by 
the forced choice.  
In a Hegelian manner, we could speak of noir’s sovereign protagonist’s and implied 
viewer’s history of coming to consciousness, his gradual awakening to the masculine situation of 
the forced choice—this unique synthesis between freedom and necessity that finally comes to the 
surface in the cynic’s enlightened false consciousness supporting the neoliberal cinematic 
apparatus. Yet, even as a cynic, the noir sovereign knows nothing of feminine jouissance 
because he still disavows the fundamental existential choice of sexual difference—this disavowal 
is his primordially repressed choice made in front of the abyss of absolute freedom. His cynical 
enlightenment is therefore limited to mapping the prison of the masculine apparatus from the 
inside.  
  In order for the forced choice between symbolic and real to have the appearance of an 
actual choice, it needs a minimum level of mediation by the imaginary. In Hollywood cinema, 
genres play this role of ideological mediation insofar as they present an imagined good life of 
shared transgressions they oppose to other, not properly immunized forms of life. Generic 
immunization is based on a chosen, playful suspension of the principle of equivalence that 
appears now at the boundaries of its bios as the pathology of autoimmity (enjoying too much) 
and following the letter of the law all too literally (not enjoyment enough)—two forms of life 
lacking the capacity of free choice. It is this imaginary antinomy (ideologeme in Jameson’s 
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terms)5 between a playfully lived (chosen) inequality and being enslaved to some abstract, rigid 
law of equality that serves as an ideological “illusion masking the real state of things,”6 namely 
the more fundamental antagonism (contradiction) of sexual difference, the choice between two 
incompatible forms of life. 
Noir fatalism, by contrast, is rather a meta-ideology that covers over the real when 
generic ideological binaries of choice fail. As Frank Ruda astutely suggests, fatalism can be 
defined as “choosing to be unable to choose”—7a diagnosis shared by fellow Hegelian Robert 
Pippin in his analysis of noir heroes who fatalistically deceive themselves into a state of 
diminished agency.8 Due to the crisis of the Oedipal order, film noir’s protagonists are 
unconvinced by generic expressions of “the Father—or worse” binary: men are reluctant to 
participate in the games of a homosocial community, and women refuse to play their role in the 
household. They “choose” (get caught in) the “worse” of their death drive instead. In the 
masculine order of language, their choice translates to choosing to be unable to choose, 
abandoning themselves to their bad fate. Their case illustrates how in the eyes of disciplinary 
society’s panoptic authority, one doesn’t choose anti-Oedipal deviance. One is (marked as) 
deviant.  
Yet, at least for the masculine hero, the “worse” of one’s deviant fate turns out to be not 
an anti-Oedipal line of flight but the law of the primordial father: that is, the father not as choice 
but as fate. The anti-Oedipal escape is looped back to the Oedipal regime through a Moebius-
strip, as its obscene underside. While ordinary ideological genre games provide the illusion that 
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anyone can be included in them who chooses to play along, classical noir’s meta-generic fatalism 
abandons ideologemes of a choice and with them the pretense of inclusivity, positing a rigid 
body politic of the hegemonic white male bios as the fascistic shadow cast by the multitude of 
generic discourses. At the level of social performativity, noir’s male and female protagonists are 
identical, equally death driven, deviant. But the femme fatale is punished not for what she does, 
but for what she is. The man’s biopolitical expulsion of the woman is not the result of an 
ideological binary in the generic sense, but of the arbitrary, that is, sovereign separation of 
political life (bios) from bare life (zoe), communal life as such from its sacred remainder. The 
scandal of the classical noir situation is that this absolute sovereign decision coincides with the 
absolute lack (disavowal) of freedom, putting the noir hero in close proximity with the Nazi 
bureaucrat Adolf Eichmann, the sovereign arbiter of millions’ life and death who insisted he had 
merely been following his Führer’s orders.9 This way, film noir tries to frame the cinematic 
apparatus as an “influencing machine”10 with no space for free will. Film noir is the truth of film 
genres in the same way as fascism is the truth of liberal democracy: they supplement the 
ideology of choice with a meta-ideology of absolute obedience to the law of the superego, 
together forming the sovereign-masculine apparatus of forced choice. The point here is that the 
generic and the noir (chosen and fated, liberal and fascist) approaches to belonging to a 
biopolitical community are interconnected; they are building blocks of one and the same 
sovereign apparatus of power. Yet, film noir is also a utopian formation precisely because of the 
lack of liberal inclusivity in its fatalism. It shows us that the forced choice between “the Father—
or worse” doesn’t cover the whole field and as a result, allows glimpses at the more primordial 
existential choice between “the Father and worse (the symbolic father and the superego)—or the 
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10 Joan Copjec, “The Anxiety of the Influencing Machine,” October 23 (Winter, 1982): 43-59. 
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feminine non-all.” If film noir is the symptom/truth of film genres, the feminine non-all is the 
symptom/truth of film noir, revealing the non-sovereign potential of the cinematic apparatus.  
 If classical noir’s masculine hero is the one who chooses to be unable to choose, the 
revisionist hero brings a properly existential decision (of sexual difference) into the noir 
situation. With regards to the forced choice, he inverts the fatalist’s position by choosing the 
Father—without what’s “worse” about him: symbolic universality without the mandatory, 
fascistic enjoyment; democracy without McCarthyism, racism, sexism, etc. This is what I have 
called the ethics of subtraction. The irony of the revisionist situation is that such naive 
universalist Oedipalization is not possible anymore and those who overidentify with the 
symbolic letter of the law become the enemies of the sovereign power apparatus: they are losers 
all the way (The Long Goodbye, Night Moves), who are marked for totalitarian surveillance (The 
Conversation) and execution (The Trial, Seconds) because all they want is to become a decent 
member of society and don’t have the stomach for the biopolitical violence undergirding it (Dirty 
Harry). It is as a byproduct of sticking to their outdated (inoperative) petty-bourgeois moral code 
that these men end up subtracted from the sovereign-masculine regime of power and are placed 
in a feminine subject position. Their moral code is obsolete because the regulative ideal of the 
new era is increasingly the neoliberal entrepreneur of the self instead of the Oedipalized family 
and nation that defined the post-war disciplinary society propped up by the obscene underside of 
noir fatalism. In the America of the 60s and 70s, enjoyment is less and less repressed and is 
instead directly solicited. If in the classical era the noir hero appeared as an exceptional pervert 
driven by surplus-enjoyment, in the emerging neoliberal society of enjoyment he stands out 
rather for the opposite reason: his unusual desire for Oedipal repression. This means that the 
sovereign decision of masculine sexuation that classical noir repressed is revealed now as an 
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existential choice in a historical moment when it’s not possible anymore in its traditional 
(disciplinary) form, recalling Heidegger’s famous claim that we fully understand what a tool (we 
might say: apparatus) is for only when it breaks, when its conventional use fails.11 The 
revisionist noir cycle therefore can be seen as the modernist attempt to misuse the classical noir 
apparatus, to make use of its failure, to use it not as a machine of sacred exceptions supporting 
Fordist patriarchy but as a profane means without an end.   
 Postmodern noir’s reactionary move then is to turn the revisionist reflection on the 
declining Oedipal-disciplinary order into nostalgia for its loss through the sovereign device of 
melancholy. Melancholy can be understood here as the choice to set up a forced choice between 
an idyllic past and a flawed present. Through a temporal displacement of what once was the only 
viable option in the masculine forced choice, the former hierarchy between symbolic and real is 
turned upside down. It is now the symbolic father’s universal authority that is shown as 
impossible (forever lost), and pursuing one’s private surplus-enjoyment in a neoliberal flight 
from Oedipal discipline is presented as the only alternative. As a rule, it is the femme fatale who 
(as a conscious calculation) performs this neo-noir choice of the “worse” over the Father as men 
tend to be caught in performing a simulacrum of traditional masculinity—a nostalgic image with 
no symbolic efficiency. In psychoanalytic terms, male noir heroes of the era (like Jake in 
Chinatown or Jeffrey in Blue Velvet) are trapped in the mirror stage of their psychosocial 
development: they are infantilized, unable to grow out of their narcissistic fantasies manipulated 
by the femme fatale (and as such, they allegorically embody the naive observer of postmodern 
cinema). But postmodern neo-noir’s women controlled sovereign apparatus is itself a 
compromise formation: stubbornly attached to the old, territorialized forms of American 
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capitalism anchored in Oedipal patriarchy while also exploring its new directions of neoliberal 
deterritorialization. The femme fatale can stand for the supra-national impetus of global 
capitalism and remain something of a patriot precisely through her melancholy, her enigmatic 
desire the masculine hero/viewer is invited to read as nostalgia for the golden age of the post-war 
gender consensus—a golden age she remains captivated by while also actively destroying it 
through her neoliberal entrepreneurship. By contrast, a utopian impulse in postmodern neo-noir 
becomes discernible when feminine desire is not directed at the past but appears fully immanent 
to the present, like the indifference of Manhunter’s blind heroine to the video footage of a 
murdered family screened in front of her, or Long Kiss Goodnight’s amnesiac assassin’s 
experiments with her muscle memory without remembering the purpose of her gestures. 
 What distinguishes cynicism from previous forms of noir sovereignty is an awareness of 
the Moebius-strip topology linking the two sides of the forced choice. For the noir cynic, the 
choice between “the Father—or worse” is not forced because one or the other option is 
impossible, missing, or lost. On the contrary, they are both present, but they now appear as two 
sides of the same coin, two aspects of a new monadistic apparatus of sovereignty. Where in 
disciplinary societies the forced choice of symbolic castration opposed individual jouissance to 
repression by the social, the cynic only sees two moments of his private life: himself as Father—
or himself as jouissance. The cynic is the symptom/truth of postmodern identity politics formed 
as resistance to a predominantly white heterosexual male disciplinary power. In the figure of the 
cynic, identity politics comes full circle: in its original form he is the western white heterosexual 
male subject performing his identity against his own authority. When in this new version of the 
forced choice the noir cynic chooses to give up jouissance by symbolically castrating himself, he 
ends up with a surplus-enjoyment of his drive (Memento, Inception). When he chooses to recover 
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his objet a instead, his path of self-purification leads him to renounce enjoyment in a self-
sacrifice (Valhalla Rising, The Neon Demon). In cynicism, the Father—or worse turn out to be 
Hegelien identities of opposites because the forced choice is now fully privatized. The cynic 
therefore cannot lose, but nor can he ever change: he can merely repeat the algorithm folding his 
life onto himself that won him the neoliberal competition until he destroys all generic forms of 
life (including the one he is coming from) like cancer cells destroys the body. 
This is why instead of propping up generic communities like classical noir did cynical 
noir is rather a post-generic (post-identitarian) phenomenon, an appropriate discourse for the 
monadistic subject of global capitalism, the entrepreneur of the self walking himself to the 
neoliberal market while imagining being independent from social-ideological mediation. It is 
only fitting that the first full blown neoliberal subject of film noir, exchanging resistance against 
panoptic discipline for a paradigm of self-surveillance would be a white heterosexual man—the 
exceptional identity position of the postmodern noir paradigm that was supposed to express the 
naive belief in disciplinary power, the privilege of not having to resist it. The emergence of the 
cynic retrospectively reveals not only that such assumption of early neo-noir was false, but that 
perhaps postmodern identity politics itself had been nothing but a transitory phenomenon in 
history, a vanishing mediator between two, Fordist and post-Fordist forms of commodity 
producing patriarchy. But to choose himself as master, the neoliberal cynic has to side with 
Empire, the deterritorialized form of capitalism mobilizing the productive capacity of individual 
affect and cognition. That is to say, Empire is not simply the bios of the old white supremacist 
patriarchy in the era of American globalization; its biopolitical body forms instead a hybrid 
hegemony valorizing different forms of life. The cynic therefore can be a universal subject only 
insofar as he brackets his own original bios of western white heterosexual masculinity that got 
443 
 
him to where he is and becomes a biopolitical species on his own. The trajectory of the global 
multitude’s cynical mutation passes through white male identity politics, but it points beyond 
gender, sexuality, and skin colour. The problem, of course, is that global capitalism’s post-
identitarian project can never be realized; insofar as capitalism relies on the social construction 
of value, it will always reproduce the sovereign separation between bios and zoe, productive life 
and life not worth living. This is also why the full transformation of the US into a 
deterritorialized Empire is impossible: such aspiration only leads to a terminal crisis of its 
national institutions and a desperate reassertion of the white male authority that could keep them 
under control as the sovereign exception to postmodern identity politics. 
The films of Danny Boyle, Christopher Nolan, Nicolas Winding Refn, and David 
Fincher, totalized into a Greimasian semiotic square, can be read as a series of failures of the 
sovereign power apparatus to perform the cynical collapse of bios and zoe and produce a truly 
self-made neoliberal subject beyond white male identity politics. The semiotic square pushes 
neo-noir’s cynical consciousness beyond itself, beyond the ideological fantasy of its self-closure 
to the point of its inherent contradiction. Insofar as neo-noir is not only a meta-generic but also a 
meta-cinematic form, such totalizing critique of its sovereign-image pushes the viewer to reflect 
on the contradictory, masculine and feminine, sacred and profane uses of the cinematic 
apparatus. For Hegel, human consciousness develops in a dialectical process, in thought’s 
movement beyond its self-posited limits by recognising its inability to close upon itself, thereby 
opening up repeatedly to the other not yet under its control.12 According to Timothy Bewes, 
postmodern cynicism can be described with Hegelian categories as a refusal of consciousness to 
                                                 
12 See G. W. F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, trans. G. Di Giovanni (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
347. 
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go beyond its own limits, as a retreat from truth, a “capitulation to ‘things as they are’.”13 He 
cites Hegel’s three archetypical examples when consciousness “retreat[s] from truth and strive[s] 
to hold on to what it is in danger of losing” from his Phenomenology of Spirit,14 the three of 
which, I claim, correspond to Boyle’s, Nolan’s, and Refn’s framing of cynicism. The first 
expresses a desire to “remain in a state of unthinking inertia,” which describes Boyle’s ironic 
synthesis between bios and zoe, a refusal to take their antagonism seriously, perhaps best 
captured in the director’s freeze frames of the cynic’s grin. The second is the “conceit which 
understands how to belittle every truth, in order to turn back into itself and gloat over its own 
understanding, which knows how to dissolve every thought and always find the same barren Ego 
instead of any content.”15 This is the territory of Nolan’s clever puzzle narratives fetishizing the 
sovereign ego setting up labyrinths for his own mind. And finally, it’s possible that 
consciousness “entrenches itself in sentimentality, which assures us that it finds everything to be 
good in its kind.”16 This is the attitude of Refn’s romantic aestheticization of the late capitalist 
world, the perspective of the beautiful soul floating above the apocalyptic madness of his 
creation. By contrast, the films of Fincher blow up the contradictions of cynicism, forcing 
consciousness to move beyond its sovereign limits. Through the lens of his oeuvre we can see 
the thinly veiled contradictions within the other filmmakers’ formulas, appearing now as nothing 
but futile attempts to avoid the traumatic real of sexual difference. Our totalizing critique of noir 
cynicism can reveal the fundamental indeterminacy at the core of the cinematic apparatus, and 
by undoing the forced choice of the sovereign-image bring the viewer back to the radically free 
                                                 
13 Timothy Bewes, Cynicism and Postmodernity (New York: Verso, 1997), 196. 
14 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Milner (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977), 51. [§80] 
15 Ibid., 51-52. 
16 Ibid., 51-52. 
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existential decision whether to use cinema as a tool of sovereign self-enfoldment or as a 
collective means without an end. 
 
8.2 The Sovereign-Image as Primitive Accumulation 
In the neoliberal society of the spectacle soliciting the commodification of its subjects’ 
singular form of life, cinema’s sovereign-image exemplifies what Marx called “primitive 
accumulation,” “the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production”17 
by privatizing hitherto common assets as in the 18th century enclosure of British farmland that 
created the conditions for the industrial revolution. In our case it is the sovereign decision that 
transforms the multitude’s common gestures qua means without an end screened and withheld 
from the viewer into his means of production by creating the image of a particular bios as the 
condition of possibility of capital accumulation. It is crucial to distinguish this Agamben-inspired 
definition of primitive accumulation from its vitalist reframing by Jonathan Beller for the post-
Fordist era: 
Primitive accumulation is now about mounting a belligerent campaign against the source 
of all value—human creativity itself, now located not just in the body of the worker, but 
in the mind of all: content producers, weak citizens, janitors and professors, natives, 
overseas contract workers, whores of all stripes—the general intellect. Wage labor, the 
exchange of money for subjective power, is not the only mode of exploitation—what falls 
outside of it and yet still enriches capital is primitive accumulation. Primitive 
accumulation is not simply the annexing of lands and resources, nor the environmental 
devastation wrought by corporations, nor the usual privatizations of public trusts 
                                                 
17 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, trans. B. Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 
875 
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demanded by the World Bank, the IMF, and now the WTO. All of the unpaid work of 
social cooperation, of attention, is also the active expropriation of the commons—part of 
the real costs of production, paid for with the living labor/life of disenfranchised 
masses.18 
Beller’s theory turns the cinema into a factory in the attention economy of unpaid cognitive and 
affective labour, a central apparatus of production in the society of the spectacle. Yet, what he 
misses is that at its zero level capitalist value doesn’t derive from the hidden accumulation 
(machinic enslavement) of human creative activity beyond the traditional (Fordist) system of 
wage labour (social subjection) but emerges thorugh a purely performative, sovereign imposition 
of this very division between Fordist and non-Fordist production, traditionally between the 
Oedipal-patriarchal bios of disciplinary power and the feminine zoe dissociated from it. Once we 
impose this sovereign separation on human life, the radical negativity at its core that Agamben 
calls impotentiality is disavowed, and life as such is reduced to the operativity of becoming (to 
the injunction of having to be), with bare life standing for an excess of life’s productive potential 
waiting to be actualized (like household labour excluded from the market or the film viewer’s 
unpaid attention). In other words, through the sovereign totalization of the social-symbolic order, 
capitalist value is imposed on human life as such before its actualization in a particular bios, 
despite the fact that it is only through a particular (traditionally: western white male) bios that 
life’s value comes to be actualized (represented and measured). This is why, once neoliberal 
capitalism subsumes all premodern forms of life under its productive apparatus, far from simply 
opposing zoe as unproductive life to productive communities of bios, soverein power constantly 
mobilizes the creative vitalism of bare life against established forms of productive life, revealing 
                                                 
18 Jonathan Beller, The Cinematic Mode of Production: Attention Economy and the Society of the Spectacle 
(Lebanon: University Press of New England, 2006), 294-295. 
447 
 
them as two sides of the same coin of capital accumulation linked through the abject-hegemonic 
body of the cynic. As such, the cynic’s sovereign-image stands for the smallest unit of capitalist 
value in the neoliberal society of the spectacle.  
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